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Being Neighbors to Imam Reza: Pilgrimage Practices and Return Intentions of Hazara Afghans Living in Mashhad, Iran

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Diana Glazebrook  and
Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi
Diana Glazebrook
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University (Canberra, Australia)
Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi
Affiliation:
Department of Demography, University of Tehran (Iran), and Demography and Sociology Program, Australian National University
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Abstract

Many Shi'a Afghan refugees and migrants—most of whom are Hazara—have intentionally settled in Mashhad, Iran, the home of the Shrine of Imam Reza. Hazara also make pilgrimage to the Shrine of Imam Hossein located in Kerbala, Iraq. Hazara comprise nearly half of all documented Afghans in Iran, yet until mid-2005, their returns comprised only one quarter of the total UNHCR-assisted return figures to Afghanistan. Drawing on literature from anthropology and refugee studies on the affect of religious practice in a context of displacement, this article considers whether pilgrimage aspirations and practices of Hazara Afghans in Iran might constitute a factor in their decision making about repatriation to Afghanistan. The study proposes that the decision to return to Afghanistan for certain categories of Hazara is influenced by their pilgrimage practices and attachment to Shrine locations in Iran.

Type
Research Article
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , April 2007 , pp. 187 - 201
Copyright
Copyright © The International Society for Iranian Studies 2007

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Footnotes

This paper is based on the findings of a postdoctoral study undertaken by the first author during October and November 2003 while she was a visiting scholar in the Department of Demography at the University of Tehran, Iran, and a multi-sited study of Afghans in Iran undertaken by the two authors in 2005, in collaboration with Hossein Mahmoudian, Gholamreza Jamishidiha and Rasoul Sadeghi at the University of Tehran.

Thanks to the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Kabul, Afghanistan; the University of Tehran, Iran; and the Centre for Cross-Cultural Research at the Australian National University.

References

1 The vast majority of Hazara are Shi'a Moslem.

2 Three case studies of Afghans living in Zahedan, Tehran and Mashhad, and a briefing paper summarizing patterns for Iran generally were completed in 2005 and are available at http://www.areu.org.af/publications/.

3 In Mashhad, sixty structured interviews were conducted. Basic demographic details were elicited, and then open-ended questions were used to gather data on migration history, livelihood strategies, social networks and future intentions. The format allowed for analysis of correlations between respondents' intention to return to Afghanistan and other factors such as gender, ethnicity, children's educational level and duration of residence in Iran. The ‘sample’ was selected based on the relative Afghan population size in each of the four locations in Mashhad (Golshahr, Sakhteman also known as Shahid Rajai, Altaymoor also known as Sheikh Hassan, and Hosseinieh-e Heratiha). Features that were selected included widows as household heads, ethnicity, age, and phases of arrival to Iran (i.e., communist-led coup and subsequent Soviet occupation 1979-89; conflict between the Najibullah government and mujahedin 1989-92; and interfactional fighting, rise and overthrow of Taliban movement 1994-2001). Interviews were restricted to Afghan households that had been based in Iran longer than eight years, i.e., before 1996.

4 We are indebted to Gozdiak and Shandy's differentiation of affective and socio-political senses of religious practice; Gozdiak, E.M. and Shandy, D.J., “Editorial Introduction: Religion and Spirituality in Forced Migration” Journal of Refugee Studies 15, no. 2 (2002): 129–135CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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16 Article 122 of the Labor Law of Iran provides for the issuing, extension, or renewal of work permits of non-nationals with valid immigration or refugee documentation (U.S. Committee for Refugees 2004). In practice, the authorities have granted few work permits to refugees, but have generally tolerated the presence of Afghans working in areas where labor shortages have existed.

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24 Exceptions were made for those whose lives would be threatened, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was given responsibility for determining the presence or absence of a threat to life.

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26 UNHCR in Turton and Marsden, Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return to Afghanistan, 19.

27 Article 3 concerned the prevention of unauthorized employment of Afghan nationals by taking legal action against Iranian employers who employed Afghan nationals without work permits. Article 4 prohibited Afghan nationals, except for those who entered the country holding a valid passport and visa and were issued with a residence permit from all administrative services; activities in all parties and political, social and cultural groups of Afghan displaced persons; opening of new accounts in banks and interest-free loan associations and financial and credit institutions; and issuance and extension of any kind of insurance policy and provision of insurance services. Article 5 stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Organization (IRIB) would promote and encourage Afghan nationals to return to Afghanistan and would warn Iranian citizens about illegally employing or settling Afghan nationals. Article 8 stated that renting accommodations to Afghan nationals, except for those who have entered the country with a valid passport and visa and who have been issued with a residence permit was prohibited except with the permission of the provincial BAFIA offices.

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41 Al-Jawziyya in Macphee, “Medicine for the Heart: The Embodiment of Faith in Morocco,” 66.

42 Macphee, “Medicine for the Heart: The Embodiment of Faith in Morocco,” 55.

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44 Good, “The Heart of What's the Matter: The Semantics of Illness in Iran,” 36, 38.

45 Betteridge, A., “Specialists in Miraculous Action: Some Shrines in Shiraz,” Sacred Journeys: The Anthropology of Pilgrimage (Westport, Connecticut, 1992), 190Google Scholar.

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54 Canfield, R.L., “New Year's Day at Ali's Shrine,” in Everyday life in the Muslim Middle East (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1993), 235Google Scholar.

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56 Additionally, 95 percent of respondents in the AREU Case Study in Mashhad had made pilgrimage to Hazrat-e Massoumi in Qom and the Jamkaran mosque at Jamkaran with most making multiple visits; 93.3 percent had made pilgrimage to Shah Abdollah Azim in Tehran with most making multiple visits; 13.3 percent had made pilgrimage to Shah-e Cheragh in Shiraz; 18.3 percent had made pilgrimage to the Shrine of Ayatollah (Imam) Khomeini at Beheshte Zahra outside Tehran city; and 41.7 percent had made pilgrimage to the Shrine of Imam Hossein at Kerbala, Iraq.

57 Depending on the mode of travel, the cost of making pilgrimage to Kerbala was as high as 400,000 Tooman per person in 2005.

58 Canfield, R.L, “Symbol and Sentiment in Motivated Action,” in Language and Life: Essays in Memory of Kenneth Pike (Dallas, 2003)Google Scholar.

59 The thirty-five-member Constitutional Commission formed in April 2003 had broad ethnic representation including four Shi'a. The new Constitution stated that “followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law.” The Constitution allows Shi'a law to be applied to cases dealing with personal matters involving Shi'a. Additionally, Shi'a schools are permitted unrestricted operation (International Religious Freedom Report 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35513.htm).