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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Persian territorial designs in Baluchistan clashed with British interest to construct an Indo-European telegraph line through the Makran Coast, where Britain had close local allies in dispute with Persia. The British prime interest being the speedy construction of the line, they decided on bypassing these disputed territories by connecting Bushehr, through submarine cable, with Gwadar—which they believed, contrary to the Persians, to be non-Persian. The Persian government protested against the British infringement of her sovereign rights, adopting both diplomatic and military approaches. This forced the British government to check the legality of the Persian claims. But the arbitrary was neither neutral nor fair, with Britain opposing the suzerainty of Persia over the chiefs of western Makran, while acknowledging the right of conquest by others elsewhere on the coast. This was in line with British policy of favoring governments bordering British India over Persia. Although unable to change the arbitrary, the Persian government still managed, in spite of her military weakness, to drag the British government into a hard bargain and tough negotiations.
1 During the first half of the nineteenth century, Qajar designs in Western Afghanistan were checked twice by British intervention in the Perso-Afghan conflict: in the First Herat Crisis (1837–1838), through fortification advice and financial assistance provided to the sieged Heratis by the British, as well as the conquest of Kharg Island and Palmerston's threat to declare war on Persia if the latter failed to withdraw its forces from Herat and stop the siege; and in the second Herat Crisis (1855–1856)—by sending a large force from India, which managed in conquering Kharg Island and part of southern Persia (Bushehr and its environs), this forcing Persia not only to withdraw its forces from Herat, but even to give up on any territorial claim in Afghanistan in the Treaty of Paris (1857). See S. Shahvar, “The Iranian Army in the Wars and Internal Struggles in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century and Its Place in the Process of Westernization of Iran,” (M.A. Thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1991) [immediately after (in Hebrew)]: (vol.) 1: 122–142; Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Small Players of the Great Game: The Settlement of Iran's Eastern Borderlands and the Creation of Afghanistan (London and New York, 2004), 128–149; Mohammead Taqi Khan Lesan al-Molk, Nasekh al-Tavarikh, ed. Baqer Behboudi (Tehran, 1965), 2, 302–330; Seyyed ‘Ali Mirina, Vaqaye’-e Khavar-e Iran dar Dowreh-ye Qajar: Shouresh-ha, Qiyam-ha, Toghyan-ha, va Jang-ha-ye Tawayef (Mashhad: Nashr-e Parsa, Spring 1367/1988), 57–62.
2 See introduction to Part I and notes 12–15 therein.
3 Captain Herbert Disbrowe (Acting Political Agent, Muscat) to Samuel Mansfield (Commissioner in Sind), Muscat, 9 March 1863, India Office Records (IOR), Letters/Political and Secret (L/P&S) /6/230, vol. 2, no. 47, Political Department (PD). This information reached Disbrowe by way of a Baluch, who fled Chahbahar on the third and arrived at Matrah, near Muscat, on 5 March 1863.
4 Mir′Abdullah to Seyyed Thoweini ibn Sultan Sa'id (abstract of trans.), Chahbahar, 11 Ramazan 1279 h./2 Mar. 1863, encl. 1 in Disbrowe to Mansfield (immediate), Muscat, 30 March 1863, L/P&S/6/230, vol. 2, no. 56, Secret Department (SD). Mir ′Abdullah was a powerful Baluch chief and an efficient ruler, who became tributary to Persia about 1848.
5 Ebrahim Khan to Seyyed Thoweini, Pishin, n.d. (probably beginning of Mar. 1863), encl. 2 in Disbrowe to Mansfield, 30 March 1863.
6 Disbrowe to Mansfield, 30 March 1863.
7 Disbrowe to Seyyed Thoweini, Muscat, n.d. (probably Mar. 1863), encl.3 in Disbrowe to Mansfield, 30 March 1863.
8 Disbrowe to Seyyed Thoweini, Muscat, n.d. (probably Mar. 1863), encl.3 in Disbrowe to Mansfield, 30 March 1863.
9 I. Walton to Mansfield, n.p. (Gwadar), 18 April 1863, no. 109 in Precis of Makran Affairs (secret), by J. A. Saldanha (Calcutta, 1905), 17.
10 Byram Khan (Chief of Pasni?) to Mansfield (abstract trans.), Pasni, 27 Ramazan 1279 h./18 March 1863, enclosure in Mansfield to Sir Bartle Frere (Governor of Bombay Presidency), Karachi, 10 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, no. 45 (PD). It might be that the Persian force sent to Gwadar under Shah Doust consisted of most of the force, which Ebrahim Khan led to Makran from Kerman while Ebrahim Khan himself stayed with a small force at Pishin.
11 Walton to Hewett, Gwadar Harbour, 12 March 1863, no. 72, encl.2 in Commodore James Trushard [Commander, Indian Navy (hereafter: I.N.)] to Frere, Bombay, 8 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, no. 247 Maritime Department (MD).
12 Hewett to Trushard, n.p. (Gwadar), n.d. (mid. March 1863), no. 5, enclosure 1 in Trushard to Frere, 8 April 1863.
13 Ebrahim Khan to Seyyed Saif ibn Salem (abstract trans.), n.p. (Pishin), 19 March 1863, enclosure in Disbrowe to Mansfield, Muscat, 3 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, no. 61 SD.
14 Seyyed Thoweini to Seyyed Saif ibn Salem (trans.), Muscat, 13 Shawal 1279 h./2 April 1863, enclosure in Disbrowe to Walton, Muscat, 3 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, no. 60 (SD).
15 Ebrahim Khan threatened to capture Chahbahar unless the Sultan of Muscat and Oman agreed to prevent the British from erecting the telegraph line. But Disbrowe did not support Persian sovereignty claims over Chahbahar: “Chabbar [Chahbahar]… has continued in the undisputed possessions of the Rulers of Muscat for the last hundred years;” see Disbrowe to R.F. Thomson (British Charge d'Affaires, Tehran), Muscat, April 1862, enclosure in Thomson to Lord John Russell (British Foreign Secretary), Tehran, UK National Archives, Foreign Office (FO) 60/279, no. 36.
16 Disbrowe to Walton, Muscat, 3 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, no. 62 (SD).
17 Disbrowe to Thomson, Muscat, 4 April 1863, FO 248/214, no. 65 (SD).
18 The event Walton was referring to concerned the conspiracy of the leading chiefs of Kalat against Mir Khodadad Khan, proclaiming his cousin, Shirdel Khan, as their ruler (17 March 1863). The town and the fort of Kalat were surrendered to the rebels without resistance, and Khodadad Khan retired to Naserabad in Kech. Shirdel Khan was murdered by his own guards in May 1864, and Khodadad Khan was re-elected as chief of Kalat; see Government of India, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, compiled by A.U. Aitchison (Calcutta, 1933), xi:188.
19 Walton to Mansfield, at sea on HMS “Hugh Rose,” 8 April 1863, no. 90, enclosure 1 in Mansfield to Frere, Karachi, 9 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, no. 43 (SD).
20 Mansfield to Frere, 9 April 1863.
21 Mansfield to Disbrowe and Frere, Karachi, 8 & 9 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, nos. 208 & 41(in vol. 2) (SD) respectively.
22 Mansfield to Frere, 9 April 1863, no. 41.; Ibrahim Khan to Khodadad Khan (trans.), n.p. (Pishin), n.d. (beginning of April 1863), attached to H. Green (Political Superintendent and Commandant, Frontier Upper Sind) to Mansfield, Jacobabad, 6 April 1863, no. 209 (PD), enclosure 1 in Mansfield to Frere, Karachi, 9 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, no. 42 (SD).
23 Mansfield to Frere, 9 April 1863, no. 41.
24 The first time was in 1838,when the British show of force in the Persian Gulf caused the Persian army to retire from the siege of Herat (1836–38).The second time was in 1856, when the conquest of Herat by the Persian army resulted in the Anglo-Persian war of 1856–57.
25 For Persian designs in Sistan, see Mojtahed-Zadeh, P., The Amirs of the Borderlands and Eastern Iranian Borders (London, 1995), 364–76Google Scholar. This book was updated and republished under the title Small Players of the Great Game.
26 Mansfield to Frere, 9 April 1863, nos. 41 & 43.
27 Mansfield to Frere, 9 April 1863, no. 41.
28 Mansfield to Frere, 9 April 1863, no. 43.
29 Mansfield to Frere, Karachi, 10 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, no. 45 (PD).
30 Anderson to Mansfield, Bombay Castle, 13 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, no. 93 (SD). The force finally sent was composed of 100 policemen with no troops, apparently due to the belief that a police force would incite less opposition by the local people than a military force.
31 Anderson to Disbrowe, Bombay Castle, 13 April 1863, L/P&S/6/230, no. 94 (SD).
32 Anderson to R. F. Thomson (British Charge d'Affaires, Tehran), Bombay Castle, 13 April 1863, L/P&S/6/ 230, no. 95 (SD).
33 Thomson to Russell, Tehran, 12 April 1863, FO 60/279 & 248/212, no. 25.
34 Thomson to Disbrowe, Tehran, 6 May 1863, enclosure in Thomson to Russell, Tehran, 6 May 1863, FO 60/279 & 248/212 and L/P&S/9/165, no. 36.
35 Thomson to Russell, Tehran, 12 April 1863, FO 60/279, no. 25. Already in the first round of the Anglo-Persian negotiations for the passage of the Indo-European telegraph line through Persia, the Persian government was quite apprehensive about the effects of the telegraph construction on its sovereignty rights in territories east of Bandar ‘Abbas; see memo by the Persian government (articles 8–10), enclosures 1 (Persian text) and 2 (English translation) in C. Alison (British Minister, Tehran) to Russell, Tehran 6 November 1861, FO 60/279.
36 Indeed, writing in the mid 1870s, Sir H. C. Rawlinson analyzed those events as follows: “When the attention of Persia was drawn to so anomalous a condition of affairs in territory which she claimed as her own, and especially when she became alive to the uncertainty of the border line between her territories and those of the Khan of Kelat, she seems to have required her frontier officers [such as Ebrahim Khan] at once to assert and extend their authority;” See Rawlinson, H. C., England and Russia in the East (London, 1875), 112Google Scholar.
37 Thomson to Disbrowe, 6 May 1863.
38 Thomson to Disbrowe, 6 May 1863.
39 Advantages such as strengthening the central authority in the periphery, breaking Persia's geographical isolation vis-à-vis Europe and bringing her into the family of nations and providing Qajar treasury with a source of steady income, to name a few.
40 Thomson to Disbrowe, 6 May 1863.
41 Mirza Sa'id Khan (Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs) to Thomson (trans.), Tehran, 6 May 1863, enclosures 1 & 2 in Thomson to Russell, 6 May 1863, FO 60/279 & 248/ 212 and L/P&S/9/165, no. 39.
42 Mirza Sa'id Khan to Thomson, 6 May 1863, enclosures 1 & 2 in Thomson to Russell, 6 May 1863.
43 Thomson to Mirza Sa'id Khan, Tehran, 6 May 1863, enclosure 3 in Thomson to Russell, 6 May 1863, no. 39.
44 Indo-European Telegraph Department, Persian Gulf Section, Official History of the Mekran Telegraph Line from Karachi to Jask (Karachi, 1895), 47.
45 Indo-European Telegraph Department, Persian Gulf Section, Official History, 47–48.
46 The scarcity of water had often obliged Izaak Walton “to place guards, with drawn swords, over dirty puddles…”; see Walton to F.J. Goldsmid (on special missions and political employment under Bombay government) (extract of a letter), Gwadar, 5 April 1863, in Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society 7, no. 3 (1862–3), 117.
47 The route of the telegraph line was slightly changed (from the proposed route of Goldsmid) by I. Walton, due to the difficult terrain; see Walton to Goldsmid, 5 April 1863.
48 Charles Metcalf MacGregor, Quartermaster General of the Indian Army, who visited Baluchistan during 1875–76, accounted it a miserable place, unfit for human residence; see MacGregor, C.M., Wanderings in Balochistan (London, 1882)Google Scholar, 5, 26 & throughout.
49 Mansfield to Frere, 9 April 1863, no. 43 (SD). Those boundaries were finally defined during 1870–72 by a boundary commission, headed by Goldsmid. On this subject, see Goldsmid, F.J., Eastern Persia: An Account of the Journeys of the Persian Boundary Commission, 1870–71–72, 2 vols. (London, 1876)Google Scholar; Mojtahed-Zadeh, P., “The Eastern Boundaries of Iran,” in McLachlan, K. (ed.), The Boundaries of Modern Iran (London, 1994), 130–133Google Scholar; Gholamreza Tabataba'i, “Ketabcheh-ye Tahdid-e Hodoud-e Sistan va Baluchestan 15 Rajab 1288/1 September1871,” Farhang-e Iran Zamin, 28 (winter 1368 s./1989), 294–318.
50 On the laying of these submarine cables in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, see Shahvar, “The Formation…,” 447–510; C. Phelps-Harris, “The Persian Gulf Submarine Telegraph of 1864,” Geographical Journal 135, pt. 2 (June 1969): 169–190.
51 Survey of the Makran Coast west of Gwadar up to the neighborhood of Bandar ‘Abbas (between 56 & 63 degrees East) for the continuation of the landline along the Persian coast was made by Goldsmid between Dec. 1863 and Feb. 1864; See: Goldsmid, F.J., “Notes on Eastern Persia and Western Beluchistan,” Journal of the Royal Geographical Society 37 (1867): 269–297CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
52 P. Stewart to the Under Secretary of State for India (USSI), 14 August 1862, IOR, Letters/Public Works Department (L/PWD)/2/203, no. 57 Telegraphs (T).
53 P. Stewart, “Extension to the Westward of Mekran Coast Telegraph,” (memo.), 19 September 1862, L/PWD/2/203, no. 66a (T).
54 This was one of the major conclusions from the failure of former submarine lines, such as those laid in the Atlantic Ocean and Red Sea.
55 India Office memorandum, 14 November 1863, L/PWD/2/204, no. 420.
56 H. Merivale (USSI) to E. Hammond (Permanent Under Secretary, FO), London, 22 August 1863 (Confidential), FO 60/279, no. 241.
57 Mirza Sa'id Khan to C. Alison (translation), Tehran, 10 October 1863, enclosure in Alison to Russell, 15 October 1863, no. 15, FO 60/279.
58 Mirza Sa'id Khan to Alison, 10 October 1863, enclosure in Alison to Russell, 15 October 1863.
59 The Lease agreement read that “Bender-’Abbas, with all its Dependencies, as well as the appendages of that frontier, is [shall be] placed [accounted] as a portion of the territories of Persia (or, Fars), and the Ruler of the whole of that frontier [i.e., the ruler of Muscat] is subject to the exalted Government of Iran (Persia).” See article I of the lease agreement from 17 Nov. 1856, in Aitchison, A Collection of…, 12: cxlii-iv.
60 Mirza Sa'id Khan to Alison, 10 October 1863.
61 Mirza Sa'id Khan to Alison, 10 October 1863.
62 Alison to Russell, Tehran, 15 October 1863, FO 60/279, no. 15.
63 Merivale to Hammond, London, 17 December 1863 (confidential), FO 60/279, no. 335.
64 Mansfield to Frere, Karachi, 4 June 1863, FO 60/279, no. 70. Mansfield enquired with the Muscat authorities to either buy or lease Gwadar. The ruler of Muscat declined to sell the place but was ready to lease it.
65 “Memorandum by the Rev. George Percy Badger on the Pretensions of Persia in Beloochistan and Mekran, drawn up with especial reference to her Claim to Gwadur and Charbar,” London, 23 December 1863, FO 60/287.
66 “Memorandum by the Rev. George Percy Badger on the Pretensions of Persia in Beloochistan and Mekran, drawn up with especial reference to her Claim to Gwadur and Charbar,” London, 23 December 1863, FO 60/287. This means that Badger was thinking of minimizing British involvement as much as possible, and was considering British non-intervention even in matters of the protection of the telegraph line.
67 Colonel H. M. Durand (Secretary, India Government, Foreign Dept.) to Anderson, Culcatta, 8 August 1863, FO 60/279, no. 484.
68 Mansfield to Frere, 4 June 1863. The Sultan of Muscat refused to sell Gwadar, but was ready to lease the town for $MT 12,000 annually, which the British believed was too expensive and therefore decided on leasing a piece of land enough for their telegraphic needs.
69 Advantages such as the introduction of modern technology and technical studies; strengthening the authority of the central government over periphery; becoming part of the international commerce; etc. Curzon talked of “enormous benefits that have resulted from the introduction of that system [Indo-European telegraph] into the country [Persia]” and noted that “it was her [Persia's] geographical position that made Persia the fortunate recipient of this not wholly disinterested boon;” see Curzon, G.N., Persia and the Persian Question, 2 vols. (London, 1966; 1st edition, 1892), 2: 607Google Scholar.
70 Indeed, from reports of the British telegraph staff working in Gwadar, one can learn that Persia was not so much concerned as to what happened with the telegraph works in Gwadar, but rather beyond it (to its west). In mid 1863 they had reported that “the alarm caused by the threats of the Persian Governor of Bunpoor appeared to have subsided, and no apprehension was entertained of any hostile action on his part so long as we did not carry the aerial line beyond Guadur;” see Mansfield to Frere, 4 June 1863.
71 “Report by Colonel Goldsmid on the Claims of Persia, Khelat, and Muscat to Sovereign Rights on the Mekran Coast,” Bombay, 22 December 1863, FO 60/287; Goldsmid to W. H. Havelock (Officiating Secretary, Bombay), 10 December 1863, L/P&S/18/C68.
72 “Report by Colonel Goldsmid on the Claims of Persia, Khelat, and Muscat to Sovereign Rights on the Mekran Coast,” 22 December 1863; Goldsmid to Havelock, 10 December 1863.
73 “Report by Colonel Goldsmid on the Claims of Persia, Khelat, and Muscat to Sovereign Rights on the Mekran Coast,” 22 December 1863; Goldsmid to. Havelock, 10 December 1863.
74 Goldsmid, F. J., “Notes on Eastern Persia and Western Baluchistan,” Journal of the Royal Geographical Society 37 (1867): 270–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
75 Memorandum by Goldsmid, 24 December 1863, L/P&S/18/C68; Goldsmid to Havelock, 10 December 1863.
76 Goldsmid to Havelock, 10 December 1863. Goldsmid even gave an example, according to which while he was on his tour in Gwadar, a local chief presented him a petition, “praying generally for British interference against the tyranny of the ‘Gujjurs’ [Qajars] collecting the revenue.”
77 Goldsmid to Havelock, 10 December 1863. Apart from Persian activities on the Makran Coast, Goldsmid found that they were pressing also in the interior of Baluchistan, north of Gwadar and directly against the frontier of Ketch, the westernmost district of Kalat. He feared that Persia would use growing internal conflicts in Kalat “for intrigue, if not for the actual advance of troops.”
78 Mirza Sa'id Khan had previously told Alison that the basic object of the Persian government in Baluchistan was to secure the Persian frontier in the region, and Goldsmid believed that this statement suggested a good opportunity to begin the border's delimitation work; see Goldsmid to Havelock, 10 December 1863.
79 Goldsmid to Havelock, 10 December 1863; and “Report by Colonel Goldsmid on the Claims of Persia…,” 22 December 1863.
80 According to Sir Denis Wright, “from mid-1860s [i.e., the completion of the Indo-European telegraph line] until the end of the Qajar period 1925 the Indo-European telegraph was Britain's most precious interest in Persia, outranking in importance both the Imperial Bank and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company;” see Wright, D., The English Amongst the Persians During the Qajar Period, 1787–1921 (London, 1977), 128Google Scholar.
81 Sistan Province was part of the Achamenid (559–330 B. C.) and Sassanid (AD 224–651) pre-Islamic Persian empires. In the Islamic period, and since the re-unification of Persia in 1501, Sistan (together with Khorasan) formed the eastern borders of Persia under the Safavid (1501–1722) and Afsharid (1736–1747) dynasties. After the assassination of Nader Shah in 1747, Sistan was torn between Persia and Afghanistan, returning gradually (together with parts of Baluchistan and Eastern Khorasan) into Persian hands between 1810 and 1840. In the Treaty of Paris (March 1857), which ended Persian claims to Eastern Khorasan/Western Afghanistan (namely, Herat Province), both Afghani dynastic families of Sadozai (ruling over Herat) and Barakzai (ruling over Qandahar and Kabul) laid claims on sections of Sistan. The British strategic apprehension, that Qajar irredentism in Afghanistan combined with Russian support might pose a serious threat to the security of British India, brought the British to think of containing Persia in Sistan as they did in Herat. At first, they silently supported the advances made on Sistan by the Afghani ruler, Dust Mohammad Khan (d. 1863), and later his son, Shir Ali Khan, disregarding Persian requests for British intervention in stopping these Afghan moves according to the Paris Peace Treaty. Persia could not sit idle and see her territories being torn away. For a detailed account of these developments, see Mojtahed-Zadeh, The Amirs of…, 364–76.
82 For a detailed account of Persia's Eastern borders, see Goldsmid, Eastern Persia…; Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz, Small Players of the Great Game: The Settlement of Iran's Eastern Borderlands and the Creation of Afghanistan (London & New York, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mokhber, M. A., Marzha-ye Iran [The Boundaries of Iran] (Tehran, 1945)Google Scholar. For a short and concise account of the Persian territorial aspirations on its eastern borders, see P. Mojtahed-Zadeh, “The Eastern Boundaries of Iran,” in McLachlan, K. (ed.), The Boundaries of Modern Iran (London, 1994), 128–139Google Scholar.
83 Alison to the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs (memo.), Gulhak, 1 September 1871, FO 60/391, no. 37. The Persian government accepted the new boundary, known as “the Goldsmid's line,” with two reservations: that Kouhak and part of the Mashkil Valley should go to Persia. British refusal forced Ebrahim Khan to capture those areas, which were finally recognized as Persian territory in the demarcation agreement signed on 24 Mar. 1896. See Col. T.H. Holdich (British Commissioner for the demarcation of the Perso-Baluch frontier) to the Secretary of the Indian government, FD, Camp Panjgur, 5 April 1896, FO 60/627, no. 34.
84 See Part I, note 90.
85 On this point, see also Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh, Frontier Fictions: Shaping Iranian Nation, 1804–1946 (Princeton, N.J., 1999), 33 ffGoogle Scholar.
