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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
The Shatt al-Arab question has been the subject of several studies, most of which concentrate on the internationalization of the subject. However, few, if any, works have analyzed how this territorial dispute was perceived within Ottoman bureaucratic circles. When the Ottoman Empire reinstated a constitutional monarchy in 1908, the Ottoman–Iranian border dispute regarding the Shatt al-Arab had to be readdressed, with international players involved in the process. Considering the role of foreign factors, this study focuses on the contesting interests of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War on the Shatt al-Arab question (1912–13) and considers how these interests shaped foreign policy in the process of negotiating a resolution.
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8 For the complete version of the Erzurum Treaty (1823) see Hurewitz, J.C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton, NJ, 1956), I: 90–92Google Scholar.
9 Richad Schofield, “Narrowing the Frontier,” 149; Schofield, Richard, “Laying it Down in Stone: Delimiting and Demarcating Iraq's Boundaries by Mixed International Commission,” Journal of Historical Geography 34 (2008): 413CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
10 Schofield, “Interpreting a Vague River Boundary Delimitation,” 76.
11 Russia wanted stability in the Caucasus, while Britain sought stability in Mesopotamia to secure its economic intrests. Schofield, “Narrowing the Frontier,” 152.
12 Schofield, “Narrowing the Frontier,” 170.
13 Paşa, Hurşid, Tahdid-i Hudud-ı İraniye memuriyetiyle fi 28 Sefer sene 65 ve fi 11 Kanun-ı Sani sene 64 tarihinde taraf-ı Devlet-i Aliyye'den i‘zam buyurulmuş olan müteveffa Derviş Paşa ile birlikte bulunan Ankara Valisi esbak Müteveffa Hurşid Paşa tarafından kaleme alınmış olan layihadır (Dersaadet, 1300 (1882/83)), 2Google Scholar.
14 Hunseler, “The Historical Antecedents of the Shatt al-Arab Dispute,” 11; Melamid, Alexander, “The Shatt Al-Arab Boundary Dispute,” The Middle East Journal 22–3 (1968): 352Google Scholar; Al-Jamil, Sayyar, “Iraqi–Iranian Boundary and Territorial Disputes,” Arab–Iranian Relations (Beirut, 1998), 260Google Scholar; Schofield, “Interpreting a Vague River Boundary Delimitation,” 77; Kaikobad, The Shatt-al-Arab Boundary Question, 17. For the complete version of the Erzurum Treaty signed in 1847 see al-Izzi, Khalid, The Shatt al-Arab River Dispute in Terms of Law (Baghdad, 1972), 123–125Google Scholar; Translation of the New Treaty of Erzeroum (1847), in The Iran–Iraq Border (1840–1958) (see note 5), 5: 110–11.Google Scholar
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16 Schofield, “Narrowing the Frontier,” 154; Schofield, “Laying it Down in Stone,” 411; Ateş, Empires at the Margin, 180–88.
17 Hunseler, “The Historical Antecedents of the Shatt al-Arab Dispute,” 11; Izzi, The Shatt al-Arab River Dispute in Terms of Law, 10; Schofield, “Interpreting a Vague River Boundary Delimitation,” 79; Paşa, Tahdid-i Hudud-ı İraniye, 4; Kurşun, Zekeriya, “19. Yüzyıl Ortalarında Bayezid Sancağı,” Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi 2 (2000): 104;Google Scholar Ateş, Empires at the Margin, 212–26.
18 Schofield, “Narrowing the Frontier,” 161–62; Schofield, “Laying it Down in Stone,” 413; Ateş, Empires at the Margin, 249.
19 Ateş, Empires at the Margin, 274–5.
20 Lieutenant Wilson to Major Cox, in The Iran–Iraq Border (1840–1958) (see note 5), 4: 373.
21 Schofield, “Narrowing the Frontier,” 161–3; Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Tanzimat'tan Birinci Dünya Savaşı’na Osmanlı-İran İlişkileri,” KÖK Araştırmalar, Osmanlı Özel Sayısı (2000), 12; Wilson, Arnold T., The Persian Gulf (London, 1959), 257;Google Scholar Kaikobad, The Shatt-al-Arab Boundary Question, 23.
22 Ateş, Empires at the Margin, 276.
23 Schofield, “Narrowing the Frontier,” 165–70; Ateş, Empires at the Margin, 293–7.
24 For a further debate on impact of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution on the frontier question see Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946 (Princeton, NJ, 1999), 101–144.Google Scholar
25 Ateş, Empires at the Margin, 442; Schofield, “Laying it Down in Stone,” 415. For the complete version of the convention see Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, I: 265–7.
26 Hunseler, “The Historical Antecedents of the Shatt al-Arab Dispute,” 12.
27 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Hariciye Siyasi (HR.SYS) 700/2, 8.
28 The article in the agreement stating that the matter could be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration was favored by the Ottoman Empire and it was included in the protocol to prevent the colonial powers from interfering in the solution process. For the complete version of the protocol see BOA, HR.SYS 700/2, 134.
29 For an example of this see Sir Barclay, G. to Sir Grey, Edward, Sir Grey, Edward to Sir Buchaman, in The Iran-Iraq Border (1840–1958) (see note 5), 4: 475–476.Google Scholar Britain and Russia were afraid of the possibility of the Ottoman and Persian empires referring the whole dispute to the Hague Tribunal. In this case both Great Britain and Russia would have beenexcluded from the concessions. Memorandum on the Proposed Submission of the Turco-Persian Frontier Dispute to the Tribunal, Hague, in the Iran–Iraq Border (1840–1958) (see note 5), 5: 9–15.Google Scholar
30 For detailed analysis of the disagreement between Persian and Ottoman delegations during negotiations by the commission see Kurt, Burcu, “Ortadoğu'daBir İstikrarsızlık Unsuru: Şattü'l-Arap Sorunu” (Master's diss., Marmara University, 2006), 42–78.Google Scholar
31 For the complete version of the diplomatic note by Britain see Schofield, “Interpreting a Vague River Boundary Delimitation,” 285; BOA, HR.SYS 704/1, 1–4.Google Scholar For the complete version of the Russian diplomatic note see BOA, HR.SYS 705/1, 12–14.
32 After this date up until the Bâbıâli coup d’état, the minister of war was Hüseyin Nazım Pasha, the minister of foreign affairs was Gabriel Noradonkyan Efendi, the grand vizier was first Ahmet Muhtar Pasha and then after October 1912 Mehmet Kamil Pasha. Kuneralp, Sinan, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali 1839–1922 (Istanbul, 2003), 1–10.Google Scholar Before Hüseyin Nazım Pasha was appointed as the minister of war, he had been the governer of Baghdad and the commander of the Sixth Army for more than a year, he had been removed from these duties for various reasons. BOA, İrade Meclis-i Mahsus (İ.MMS) 1329.Ra.12/137.
33 BOA, HR.SYS 701/1, 37.
34 BOA, HR.SYS 701/1, 36.
35 BOA, Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları (MV) 169/73.
36 BOA, HR.SYS 704/4, 36.
37 BOA, HR.SYS 701/1, 45.
38 The newspaper is not identified in the clipping. BOA, HR.SYS 702/1, 11.
39 BOA, MV 172/13.
40 BOA, HR.SYS 701/1, 58.
41 BOA, HR.SYS 702/1, 15. The members appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War officially started work after being approved by the government. BOA, MV 173/15.
42 The commission negotiations were interrupted after the twentieth sitting held on 5 September 1912 and were taken up after four months passed. For the twentieth and twenty-first process verbals see BOA, HR.SYS 704/3, 22; BOA, HR.SYS 704/4, 42.
43 BOA, HR.SYS 704/4, 18.
44 BOA, MV 173/16; BOA, HR.SYS 702/1, 22.
45 BOA, HR.SYS 704/5, 1.
46 BOA, HR.SYS 704/5, 2.
47 BOA, HR.SYS 704/5, 3; BOA, HR.SYS 702/1, 25.
48 BOA, MV 173/25.
49 BOA, HR.SYS 702/1, 31.
50 BOA, HR.SYS 704/6, 1–2.
51 For a copy of the report sent by the Ottoman delegation see BOA, HR.SYS 702/1, 32–3.
52 BOA, HR.SYS 702/1, 27; BOA, HR.SYS 704/6, 3.
53 BOA, HR.SYS 702/1, 29.
54 BOA, HR.SYS 704/7, 1.
55 BOA, HR.SYS 704/7, 2.
56 BOA, HR.SYS 704/7, 3.
57 BOA, HR.SYS 704/7, 5.
58 BOA, Sadaret Evrakı (A.VRK) 770/13, 1.
59 BOA, A.VRK 770/13, 1.
60 BOA, A.VRK 770/13, 1.
61 Included in the Baghdad Railway concession were guarantees of a certain revenue per kilometer of track laid, the so-called kilometer guarantees. For further details regarding the Baghdad Railway Agreement see Özyüksel, Murat, Osmanlı-Alman İlişkilerinin Gelişim Sürecinde Anadolu ve Bağdat Demiryolları (Istanbul 1988), 143–215Google Scholar.
62 BOA, A.VRK 770/13, 1.
63 BOA, A.VRK 770/13, 2.
64 After the Babıali Coup, Mahmud Şevket Pasha was appointed the minister of war and the grand vizier; Said Halim Pasha was appointed the minister of foreign affairs. Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali, 1–10.
65 Kurşun, Zekeriya, Basra Körfezi'nde Osmanlı-İngiliz Çekişmesi: Katar'da Osmanlılar 1871–1916 (Ankara, 2004), 137.Google Scholar
66 Throughout this process Persia remained mostly passive, believing that it would secure a better deal by supporting the mediating powers than negotiating vis-à-vis Istanbul. Schofield, Schofield, “Laying it Down in Stone,” 413, 416; Kaikobad, The Shatt-al-Arab Boundary Question, 49.
67 For the complete version of the Constantinople Protocol dated 1913 see BOA, HR.SYS 720/11, 46.
68 For the minutes of the technical commission see The Iran–Iraq Border (1840–1958) (see note 5), 6: 57–250.
69 Al-Izzi, The Shatt al-Arab River Dispute in Terms of Law, 17. However Schofield numbers these boundary pillars as 223. Schofield, “Laying it Down in Stone,” 419–20.
70 For detailed information regarding the activities of the technical commission see Kurt, “Ortadoğu'da Bir İstikrarsızlık Unsuru: Şattü'l-Arap Sorunu,” 105–36.
