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Factionalism and Iranian Politics: The Post-Khomeini Experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Sussan Siavoshi
Sussan Siavoshi*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Trinity University
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Extract

The elections to the fourth session of the Iranian parliament (Majlis) were generally considered as the beginning of the end of factional politics in Iran. The typical journalistic analysis of Iranian politics, emphasizing the existence of two “moderate” and “radical” factions on the Iranian political scene, concluded that the “moderate” forces, led by President Hashemi Rafsanjani, had inflicted a decisive blow on the “radical” faction and neutralized the Majlis (which had been controlled by the radicals in its third session) as an impediment to the president's plan for reconstruction of the economy. Soon after the convening of the Fourth Majlis, however, the legislature challenged the authority of the Rafsanjani government either by initiating legislative bills to limit the authority of the president or by shelving the bills introduced by the government.

Type
Research Article
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 25 , Issue 3-4 , 1992 , pp. 27 - 49
Copyright
Copyright © Association For Iranian Studies, Inc 1992

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References

1. For a sampling of such analyses see The Economist, 18 April 1992; New York Times, 10 May 1992; and Facts on File, 23 April 1992, and 14 May 1992.

2. Three examples of such challenges occurred in the first four months of the life of the Fourth Majlis. The first was the introduction and passage of a bill that took away the authority of the ministry of interior in controlling several municipal functions. See Mashrūḥ-i muẕākirāt-i majlis-i shūrā-yi Islāmī (Comprehensive Proceedings of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, henceforth MMMSI) 21 (26 August 1992): 28-34, and MMMSI 22 (30 August 1992): 22-9.

The second was to pass a law, despite government opposition, that bans mandatory retirement of the employees of the ministry of education. See MMMSI 35 (6 October 1992): 22-36. The third example was to suspend a government bill regarding a cultural agreement between the Islamic Republic and the the Federal Republic of Germany. See MMMSI 25 (6 September 1992): 20-21.

3. For a sample of previous works on elite factionalism in post-revolutionary Iran see Hooglund, Eric, “Social Origins of the Revolutionary Clergy,” in The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic, Middle East Institute, 29-37Google Scholar; Gregory Rose, “Factional Alignments in the Central Council of the Islamic Republican Party of Iran: A Preliminary Taxonomy,” in ibid., 45-53; and Akhavi, Shahrough, “Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” The Middle East Journal 41, no. 2 (1987): 181-201Google Scholar.

4. For the complete list of these twenty-three founders of the AMU see the daily Kayhān, 4 April 1988.

5. See Khu'iniha's interview in Kayhān, 30 March 1988.

6. Kayhān, 31 March 1988.

7. Each of these two organizations endorsed thirty individuals as its candidates for the Tehran race. Out of these sixty candidates twelve individuals, including Rafsanjani, enjoyed the support of both the AMU and the SMC.

8. For a brief reference to this terminology see the monthly Bayān, nos. 5-6 (October-November 1990): 29.

9. At one point the supporters of the radical approach were in control of most key positions in the government. Since the assumption of the office of the presidency by Rafsanjani in 1989, many of these positions have been taken away from them. Still, the latter are represented at all levels of the state institutions, including the middle and upper-middle echelons.

10. For a sample of this faction's emphasis on social justice see the speeches of radical deputies, particularly Ha'irizadih, Abul-Hasan, MMMSI 175 (4 December 1989): 28Google Scholar; Malikasa, Karim, MMMSI 398 (15 September 1991): 18Google Scholar; Bayat, Asadullah, MMMSI 400 (18 September 1991): 18-19Google Scholar; Qazizadih, Husayn, MMMSI 419 (10 November 1991)Google Scholar; and Dilbari, Muhammad Isma'il, MMMSI 420 (12 November 1991): 19Google Scholar.

11. See Kavusi, Nadir, MMMSI 408 (8 October 1991): 18Google Scholar; Hijazi, Fakhr al-Din, MMMSI 412 (16 October 1991): 18Google Scholar; and Shahidi, Muhammad ‘Ali, MMMSI 416 (3 November 1991): 18Google Scholar.

12. See irizadih, Ha', MMMSI 390 (27 August 1991): 20-21, and 403 (25 October 1991): 21Google Scholar; Qazizadih, MMMSI 419 (10 November 1991): 18Google Scholar; Shafi'i, Muhsin, MMMSI 386 (18 August 1991): 18Google Scholar; and Katira'i, Murtiza, MMMSI 389 (25 August 1991): 18Google Scholar.

13. For a sample of these kinds of criticisms see editorials in Salām, particularly 21 November 1992, 26 December 1992, 27 December 1992, 28 December 1992, and 30 December 1992.

14. See Ha'irizadih, MMMSI 185 (20 December 1989): 18-19Google Scholar, and Islami, Yadullah, MMMSI 393 (2 September 1991): 19Google Scholar.

15. See the daftar-i taḥkīm-i waḥdat's resolution presented during a demonstration commemorating the seizure of the American embassy on 4 October, published in Saldm, 18 October 1992.

16. Salām, 23 April 1992.

17. See Shafi'i, Karim, MMMSI 393 (2 September 1991): 20-21Google Scholar; Niazi, Mahmud, MMMSI 394 (3 September 1991): 20Google Scholar; and Ahmadnizhad, ‘Abd al-Karim, MMMSI 396 (11 September 1991): 19Google Scholar.

18. See Damadi, ‘Izzatullah, MMMSI 184 (19 December 1989): 18Google Scholar.

19. Risālat, 26 July 1992.

20. Risālat, 28 July 1992.

21. Excerpts from the SMC proclamation printed in Risalat, 3 May 1992.

22. Salām, 23 December 1992. It is interesting to note that ‘Adili's statement is in fact a reflection of ideology—an ideology held by technocrats.

23. See Rafsanjani's speech to the Majlis, MMMSI (27 August 1989): 21-3.

24. See Rafsanjani's speech to the Majlis, MMMSI 431 (17 November 1991): 21- 2.

25. Salām, 25 August 1992.

26. The argument that cooperatives are a communist idea was put forth by Azari- Qumi in a seminar on Islamic economics. See the monthly Bayān (October- November 1991): 43.

27. Salām, 23 August 1992.

28. For examples of such statements see those of Ni'matzadih, the minister of industry, in Risālat, 27 June 1992; Murtazavi, the general director of foreign investment of the ministry of economics and finance, in Risalat, 30 May 1992; and the Iranian ambassador to Italy, in Salām, 10 June 1992.

29. See Risālat, 3 May 1992, and the main editorial piece in the same newspaper, 2 June 1992.

30. Khomeini, Ruhullah, Saḥifīh-yi nūr (Tehran: The Organization of Cultural Documents of the Islamic Revolution, 1990), vol. 9, 226Google Scholar.

31. Ibid., vol. 21, 202.

32. Ibid., vol. 6, 168, and vol. 11, 226.

33. See Islami, Yadullah, MMMSI 393 (2 September 1991): 19Google Scholar; and Alhusayni, Hasan, MMMSI 394, 17-18Google Scholar.

34. See ‘Ali Muhtashimi's article in Kayhān (Special Edition for the First Anniversary of the Passing Away of Imam Khomeini), 3 June 1990, 10 and 23.

35. See Muntakhabnia, Rasul, MMMSI 172 (28 November 1989): 18; Zabihullah Safa'i, ibid., 20-21Google Scholar; and Ilias Hazrati, MMMSI All (27 November 1991): 20.

36. See a critical essay on the perils of reopening the Iranian embassy in Saudi Arabi, and Iran's rapprochement with Egypt in Bayan 9 (May 1991): 24, 25 and 82.

37. An editorial in Salām (7 June 1992) criticized the statement by the Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia in which the ambassador equated Saudi Arabia with Iran, calling the two countries the two powerful wings of the Islamic world. Salām's position was that revolutionary Islam should never be considered the same as the “American Islam” of the Saudi rulers.

38. For example see the speech given by Amar Musa, Egypt's foreign minister at the Brookings Institution, published in Salām, 3 October 1992.

39. See editorial in Salām, 1 October 1992.

40. Ibid.

41. See Ahmad Khomeini's speech on the third anniversary of his father's death, published in Salām, 7 June 1992.

42. See the editorial in the conservative newspaper Risālat, 30 May 1990.

43. Salām, 9 June 1992.

44. For a sample of the conservative faction's views on cultural matters see different issues of MMMSI. Of particular importance are positions taken by Hijazifar, Hashim, MMMSI 397 (12 September 1991): 18Google Scholar; Yusifpur, ‘Ali, MMMSI 400 (18 September 1991): 19-20Google Scholar; Musavi, Muhammad Kazim, MMMSI 407 (6 October 1991): 19Google Scholar; Natiq-Nuri, ‘Ali Akbar, MMMSI 411 (15 October 1991): 18Google Scholar; and Ahmad Natiq-Nuri, MMMSI All (27 November 1991): 18.

45. See Rafsanjani's speech during the Friday prayer addressing the necessity of abandoning anti-West slogans as a means to counter the Western campaign of portraying Iran as a terrorist nation, in Iṭṭilā'āt, December 1991.

46. Salām, 26 August 1992.

47. Salām, 24 April 1992.

48. See Bayat, Asadullah, MMMSI 400 (18 September 1991): 18Google Scholar; Islami, Yadullah, MMMSI 402 (24 September 1991): 20-21Google Scholar; and Hijazi, ‘Izz al-Din, MMMSI 412 (16 October 1991): 18Google Scholar.

49. An example of the radical stand on films is its defense of the progressive but controversial Muslim film-maker, Makhmalbaf. See Abrār, 7 July 1990.

50. For an elaboration of this approach see the extensive interview with Muhammad Khatami, the minister of culture and Islamic guidance, in Iṭṭilā'āt, 10 January 1991.

51. For example, there was a motion by seventy conservative members of the Majlis to pass a tough law on veiling. The motion was tabled for six months as a result of the efforts of non-conservative members of the Majlis. See MMMSI All (27 November 1991): 25-31.

52. See the extensive interview with Rafsanjani in the monthly Adabislān (April- May 1991): 6-9. In that interview Rafsanjani expressed his views on different cultural issues such as music, film, and literature.

53. See Rafsanjani's speech to the Iranian representatives abroad, Iṭṭilā'āt, 17 July 1991.

54. See Rafsanjani's speech at the annual meeting of the heads of Islamic countries in Senegal (weekly Kayhān-i havā'ī, 18 December 1991). See also his speech to a group of women teachers and religious students, Iran Times, 3 August 1990.

55. See Risālat, 23 August 1990 and 22 May 1992.

56. Personal interview with ‘AH Riza Shuja'-Nuri, the director in charge of the international section of the Farabi Cinematic Foundation, July 1992.

57. For relevant data on book publication see Kitābnāmih (Tehran: The Printing and Publication Organization, Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, various years).

58. See various editorials in Kayhān, particularly 18 July 1992; 21 July 1992; 23 July 1992.

59. See the extended interview with Sina Vahid, a film critic in Risālat, 10 May 1992 and 12 May 1992.

60. For a careful description of the social and professional background of the three sessions of the Islamic revolution see Ahmad Ashraf, “Theocracy and Charisma: New Men of Power in Iran,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 4, no. 1 (1990): 127-30.

61. Baydn, June/July 1990.

62. Ibid.

63. The Voice of the Islamic Republic, 28 May 1992.

64. Ibid.

65. One indication of the conservative nature of the new Majlis is that all the 30 Tehran candidates presented in the SMC list were elected to the parliament. Of the 30 candidates presented by the AMU only two, joint candidates of both AMU and SMC, were able to enter the Fourth Majlis.

66. MMMSI (27 August 1989): 21.

67. Ibid.: 23, and MMMSI (29 August 1989): 45.

68. For a sample of these efforts see speeches by Muhammad Husayn Mahluji, the minister of mining and metals (daily Iṭṭilā'āt, 27 August 1991); Mas'ud Ruhani Zanjani, the head of the Plan and Budget Organization, to foreign political and economic representatives, Iran Times, 7 September 1990; and ‘Abd al-Husayn Vahaji, the minister of commerce, to the heads of guild unions, Iran Times, 27 July 1990. See also views expressed by Hadi Nizhad Husaynian, the minister of heavy industries, Risālat, 19 June 1990.

69. See Rafsanjani's, speech to the Majlis outlining the 1992-93 budget in MMMSI 431 (7 December 1991): 22Google Scholar.

70. See statements by Muhsin Nurbakhsh, the minister of economics and finance, Iṭṭilā'āt, 5 May 1991, and ‘Ali Naqi Khamushi, the head of the chamber of commerce, industries, and mining, in weekly Kayhān-i havā'i, 1 January 1991.

71. See Vilayati's speech to the 20th session of the foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Istanbul, Iṭṭilā'āt, 6 August 1991.

72. Kayhān, 10 July 1990, 15 July 1990, and “\1 July 1990.

73. Risālat, 29 May 1990.

74. Kayhān, 25 July 1990.

75. See Yazdi's sermon on 10 August 1990, Friday prayer published in Iran Times, 17 August 1990.

76. See Khamene'i's important and extended message in commemoration of the first anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's death published in Kayhān, 2 June 1990.

77. Ibid.

78. Daily Iṭṭilā'āt, 12 June 1990.

79. Kayhārt, 2 May 1990.

80. Iran Times, 21 September 1990.

81. See excerpts from speeches by two radical members of the Majlis (Asadullah Bayat and Muzaffarinizhad) in the monthly Rāh-i mujāhid (The Holy Warrior's Path) 57 (June-July 1990): 28.

82. See Muhammad Husayn Jahangiri's speech in the Majlis, ibid.: 30.

83. Abrār, 24 and 25 July 1990.

84. Risālat, 24 July 1990.