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The Rise and Fall of a Partnership: The British Council and the Islamic Republic of Iran (2001–09)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Maryam Borjian
Maryam Borjian*
Affiliation:
Language Program in the Department of African, Middle Eastern and South Asian Languages and Literatures at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
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Abstract

This paper examines a partnership between the British Council and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) that emerged in March 2001 as a result of their shared aspiration for collaboration in scientific, academic and cultural arena. The alliance came as a surprise because after twenty-three years of antagonism on the part of the government of the IRI, the hostile attitudes were put aside virtually overnight to reunite with an old adversary for a mutual collaboration. The present qualitative study examines the reasons behind the start of the partnership, the domains within which the British Council was permitted to operate in Iran, and the reasons behind the end of the partnership. The data were gathered from various sources, including field-notes, policy documents analysis, personal interviews, and various online sources. The findings reveal that the duration of the partnership was closely intertwined with the rise and fall of the reformist administration, under President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). The partnership began mainly due to efforts made by the reformist administration to take the IRI out of its international isolation and thus became inactive not long after the reformist administration, and eventually came to an end in January 2009, under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Type
Articles
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 44 , Issue 4 , July 2011 , pp. 541 - 562
Copyright
Copyright © Association For Iranian Studies, Inc 2011

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References

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6 In 1925, an Iran–America Cultural Society (Anjoman-e Farhangi-ye Irān of Āmrikā), was established under the leadership of Mohammad-Ali Foroughi, Reza Shah's distinguished prime minister, but did not last long, due to limited financial resources. The Society was revived in 1942, when Iran was occupied by the Allied troops. The chief statesman supporting the idea was the education minister, Isa Sadiq, who served as the Society's vice president and the president in 1942–44 and 1944–53, respectively. According to Sadiq's memoirs, he was able to persuade the Fulbright Commission to financially support the Society in 1949, and so the Society was able to expand its operations throughout the country in 1950s (Sadiq, I., Khāterāt-e ‘Omr [Memories of Life] (Tehran, 1974) 3: 289–303Google Scholar). According to the US Department of State, the Iran–America Society was “formally established in Tehran in the mid-1950s as a nonprofit organization. It served as the venue for US cultural programs in Iran through the work of the United States Information Service (USIS) and was mandated to foster among Americans and Iranians a greater knowledge of the arts, literature, science, folkways, social customs, economic and political patterns of the United States and Iran, and to develop a deeper understanding of the similarities and diversities of the Iranian and American ways of life.” http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/July/20090716172735xjsnommis0.8587109.html#ixzz0x8xxuUL8 (accessed 21 August 2010). It is not clear to the present author whether the two societies merged in the 1950s to operate as one entity under one name, the Iran–America Society, as Isa Sadiq does not distinguish between the two societies. From the 1950s up to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Iran–America Society was the most active center for cultural-educational relations between Iran and the US. Under the IRI regime, the Society was first shut down and over time became nationalized with a new name, Kanun-e Zaban-e Iran (the Iran Language Center).

7 Founded in 1958 under the German Cultural Institute in Iran, the Goethe Institute was the largest German language learning center in Iran prior to the foundation of IRI. For more on educational operations of Germans in Iran, see C. Catanzaro, “German Cultural Influence in Persian,” Encyclopedia Iranica (2001), http://www.iranica.com/articles/germany-vii.

8 On French educational operation in Iran, see J. Hadidi, “French Schools in Persia,” Encyclopedia Iranica, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/france-xv.

9 Excluding the Iran–America Society, the British Council was the most unfortunate of the European cultural institutions, as their French and German counterparts were permitted to resume their operations, although on a limited scale, in Iran in 1991 and 1995, respectively. On French cultural, scientific and technical collaboration with IRI, see the official website of French embassy in Iran, http://www.ambafrance-ir.org/article.php3?id_article=442. On German's operation in IRI, see C. Catanzaro, “German Cultural Influence in Persian,” Encyclopedia Iranica (2001), http://www.iranica.com/articles/germany-vii.

10 As far as funding is concerned, for the majority of its activities the Council is dependent on grants from the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Overseas Development Administration (ODA). For more, see Phillipson, R., Linguistic Imperialism (Oxford, 2003), 141Google Scholar.

11 The British Council's Annual Report 1940–41:10 quoted in Phillipson, Linguistic Imperialism, 138–9. Also see R. Phillipson for a comprehensible account of the history of the British Council.

12 Quoted in Phillipson, Linguistic Imperialism, 140.

13 Quoted in Phillipson, Linguistic Imperialism, 138.

14 On the operation of the British Council in pre-revolutionary Iran (1942–78), see “British Council,” Encyclopedia Iranica, 7: 455–56.

15 With the rise of Reza Shah to power, Iran began to build a growing relationship with the Third Reich, mainly because of the negative roles Britain and Russia had played in Iran during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the years between the two world wars, Germany played a major role in the economic development of Iran. As World War II loomed, Reza Shah declared Iran's neutrality in the war and refused to expel the large German community living in Iran. When the war began, Allied forces occupied Iran and forced the Shah to abdicate in September 1941 in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941–79). For Iran–German relations, see Hambly, G., “The Pahlavi Autocracy: Reza Shah, 1921–1941,” The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge, 1991)Google Scholar.

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17 On internal circumstance of Iran and its foreign policy between and after the two world wars, see Hambly, G., “The Pahlavi Autocracy: Reza Shah, 1921–1941,” The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge, 1991), 7: 213–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ferrier, R. W., “Anglo-Iranian Relations, iii. Pahlavi Period,” Encyclopedia Iranica, 2: 51–9Google Scholar; Saikal, A., “Iranian Foreign Policy, 1921–1979,” The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge, 1991), 7: 426–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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19 For a comprehensive account of Khatami's domestic and foreign policy consult, Amir Arjomand, S., After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (Oxford, 2009)Google Scholar.

20 Plan and Budget Organization, “Law of the Third Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of the IRI” (Tehran, 1999).

21 Plan and Budget Organization, “Law of the Fourth Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of the IRI” (Tehran, 2004). To obtain an electronic copy of the English versions of the Third and Fourth Five Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plans of IRI see the official publications section of the IRI's Management and Planning Organization, formerly known as Plan and Budget Organization, www.ifla.org.

22 On the cooperation of each of these organizations with IRI, see the official website of each institution, in which various reports are available free of charge, including: UNDP at http://www.undp.org.ir/; UNICEF at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/iran.html; UNFPA at http://iran.unfpa.org/; UNOCD at http://www.unodc.org/iran/index.html?ref=menutop; UNESCO at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/worldwide/unesco-regions/asia-and-the-pacific/iran-islamic-republic-of/ and the World Bank at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRANEXTN/0,,menuPK:312962~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:312943,00.html.

23 For more information on the major shortcomings of the education system in IRI, see Human Development Report of the Islamic Republic of Iran, published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Plan and Budget Organization of IRI (Tehran, 1999). An electronic copy of the report can be obtained from the UNDP website, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/iran/iran_1999_en.pdf.

24 On Khatami's educational reform, see Mehran, G., “Khatami, Political Reform and Education in Iran,” Comparative Education, 39, no. 3 (2003): 311–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 It should be noted that the Third Development Plan had to be revised several times to be accepted by all forces within the ruling elite, including the Supreme Leader, the Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council, and the Islamic Parliament.

26 As cited in M. Majdzadeh-Tabatabai, “National Identity and Civic Values in the Pre-Revolution and Post-Revolution English as a Foreign Language Textbooks in Iran” (PhD diss., Loyola University, Chicago, 2006), 2.

27 In the introductory years of the IRI, English was considered a suspicious subject matter, as it was closely associated with the United States, or “the Great Satan” (sheytān-e bozorg) as the IRI authorities called it. The attitude towards individuals who were fluent in foreign languages was equally negative, as they were perceived as a groups of Westoxicated, upper-class, secular individuals, alienated from their own Islamic heritage, and with an admiration and love for foreign cultures and languages. The best illustration could perhaps be the imprisonment of Dr. Mohsen Shokuh—the founding director of Shokuh Language Institute, the first English language institute established by an Iranian in Iran, in 1950, which was one of the most popular language institutes in pre-revolutionary Iran. Charged with promotion and dissemination of cultural and linguistic imperialism, which meant offering English courses via his language institute, Dr. Shokuh was arrested, imprisoned and received a death sentence right after the 1979 revolution. However, he was soon freed and even several years later, at the request of the government, he was invited back to re-open Shokuh Institute (author's personal interview with the director of Shokuh Institute[0], Tehran, winter 2008). After a heated debate as what to do with English,, a consensus was eventually reached; English continued to remain in school curricula for scientific and political purposes and was offered from the first year of junior high school (sixth grade) onward. Yet, in 1990, more unfavorable attitudes towards English were displayed. One such attitude was the reduction of English at secondary and post-secondary education. Whereas teaching English was delayed one grade from sixth to seventh grade at second level, the number of courses of English for General Purposes (EGP) and Pre-University English were reduced from two courses (each of two credits) to one course (three credits) and from two courses (each of three credits) to one course, respectively, at post-secondary level. On this topic see, M. Borjian, “English Education in Post-Revolutionary Iran (1979–2009): The Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending” (PhD diss., Teachers College, Columbia University, 2009); see M. Borjian, “Policy Privatization and Empowerment of the Sub-national Forces: The Case of Private English Language Institutes in Iran,” Viewpoints Special Edition: Middle East Institute (MEI) Series on Higher Education and the Middle East (vol. 1): Serving the Knowledge-Based Economy, 1 (2010): 58–61, http://www.mei.edu.

28 Based on a personal interview with the director of the British Council Iran, i.e. staff member # 1, which was conducted in the Council's representation in Tehran, Qolhak, on 20 April 2008.

29 A blog named TEFL in Iran, http://tefliran.blogspot.com

30 Personal interview with the staff member # 2 of the British Council Iran. The interview was conducted in the Council's representation in Tehran on 25 April 2008.

31 According to a 1999 report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), among 61 developing and less-developed countries, IRI has the highest rate of brain drain, with an annual estimate of 150,000 emigrants (200,000 according to IRI's official statistics); on this, see W.J. Carrington and E. Detragiache, “How Extensive is the Brian Drain?,” Finance and Development (IMF's quarterly magazine), 36, no. 2 (July 1999), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/06/carringt.htm. On migration as the main reason behind taking the IELTS exam in IRI, see F. Harrison, “Huge Cost of Brain Drain,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6240287.stm.

32 The data retrieved from the website of the British Council of Iran prior to being blocked, http://www.britishcouncil.org/iran.htm

33 The Archives of TELLSI. Established in 2003 through the efforts of Ali-Akbar Mirhassani, an American-educated Iranian professor of English at Tehran's Instructor Training University (Dāneshgāh-e Tarbiat-e Modarres), the Teaching English Language and Literature Society of Iran, known by its acronym, TELLSI, is the first and only professional associated established for English scholars and practitioners in Iran since the inception of the Islamic Republic in the country in 1979. Having around 700 members, TELLSI brings Iranian English scholars and practitioners together via organizing an annual national conference and publishing a journal entitled the Journal of English Language and Literature Society of Iran. Between 2004 and early 2006, TELLSI closely collaborated with the British Council in Tehran and organized various joint workshops on English-teaching related topics (author's fieldnotes). It should be noted that TELLSI's pre-revolutionary counterpart was named the Association of Professors of English of Iran (APEI), which collapsed in 1984, mainly due to excessive conflicts between the older generation and the newly arrived ones, majority of the latter group affiliated with the IRI. On this, see Borjian, “English Education in Post-Revolutionary Iran”; Ziahosseiny, M., “Key Figures in ELT: Professor Seyyed Mohammad Ziahosseiny,” Iran Language Institute Language Teaching Journal, 1, no. 1 (2005): 99–106Google Scholar.

34 For more on the operation of private English language institutes in Iran, see Borjian, “Policy Privatization and Empowerment of the Sub-national Forces.”

35 ELT Banbury, a UK-based English language institute, located in Oxford and licensed by the UK Border Agency, offers English courses for international students. The center works closely with the British Council and it often hosts international students sent to the UK on a British Council scholarship. For more information of ELT Banbury, see http://elt-banbury.com/language-school-Oxford.php.

36 Fieldwork notes, Private Language Institute # 4, 5 October 2008.

37 Website of the British Council Iran, http://www.britishcouncil.org/iran.htm.

38 Personal interview with the director of the British Council Iran, i.e. staff member # 1, which was conducted in the Council's representation in Tehran, Qolhak, on 20 April 2008.

39 Website of the British Council, http://www.britishcouncil.org/iran.htm.

40 from BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/arts/3414291.stm (accessed 8 March 2008).

41 Personal interview with the director of the British Council Iran, i.e. staff member # 1. The interview was conducted in the Council's representation in Tehran, Qolhak, on 20 April 2008.

42 On Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his championship in defending the Islamic Revolution against the cultural attack of the West, see the next section of the present article; also see Amir Arjomand, S., After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (Oxford, 2009), 158–61Google Scholar.

43 Personal interview with the staff member # 3 of British Council Iran. The interview was conducted in the Council's representation in Tehran, Qolhak, Tehran, 5 May 2008.

44 Iran Daily, Wednesday, 23 May 2007, quoted in China's People's Daily, http://english.people.com.cn/200705/23/eng20070523_377237.html.

45 Personal interview with the director of the British Council Iran, i.e. staff member # 1. The interview was conducted in the Council's representation in Tehran, Qolhak, on 20 April 2008.

46 Bulletin board of the British Council Representation, Tehran, April 2008 (emphases original).

47 For the British side of the story of the closure of the British Council and the intimidation of local staff by the local government to force them resign, see BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7870503.stm; also see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7872525.stm; as well as Channel 4 News, http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/tehran+british+council+closed++iran+says+they+had+no+right+/2924957.

48 Website of the British council Iran at: http://www.britishcouncil.org/iran.htm (accessed 20 May 2010).

49 From an interview with Mostafa Mo'in posted on his weblog at http://drmoeen.ir/biography.php.

50 For more on this subject, see Azizi, N., The Development of Higher Education in Iran (Tehran, 2006)Google Scholar.

51 On the limited impact of President Khatami's policies on the country's education system, see Mehran, G., “Khatam Comprehensive Plan for the Memorization of Koran and Understanding of Koranic Knowledge, executed by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance i, Political Reform and Education in Iran,” Comparative Education, 39, no. 3 (2003): 311–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 For more on this topic, see Arjomand,, After Khomeini, 159; BBC News, “Farewell to a Change, Subtle Iran,” 7 July 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/6277172.stm.

53 On this, see the regulations issued by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution since 2006, including Regulation No. 603, in effect from 1 May 2007 and No. 608, in effect from 9 July 2007, http://www.iranculture.org.

54 For a critical analysis of the role of British Council worldwide and its leading role in the ELT business, see Phillipson, R., Linguistic Imperialism (Oxford, 2003)Google Scholar.

55 Ouyang, H., “Resistance to the Communicative Method of Language Instruction within a Progressive Chinese University,” Local Meaning, Global Schooling: Anthropology and World Culture Theory (New York, 2003), 121–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.