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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
The belief that entrepreneurship, i.e., the predisposition towards risk-taking and innovative behavior in commercial situations, is the key factor in economic development is still widely held by social scientists and developmental planning experts. Based upon the theoretical positions of economists, such as Schumpeter, entrepreneurial historians and many sociologists, the occurrence of economic development is explained by the presence of individuals whose actions promote capital accumulation, rational allocation of resources, and the like for their own benefit and, as a consequence, for the benefit of society. Often intertwined is the belief that the shaping force behind the structure of society and its processes of change are values exemplified by Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the classic statement of this position.
1. Schumpeter, J., Theory of Economic Development (Galaxy Books; New York: Oxford University Press, 1961).Google Scholar
2. See for example the journal Explorations in Entrepreneurial History.
3. Weber, M., The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).Google Scholar
4. McClelland, D. C. and Winter, D. G., Motivating Economic Achievement (Free Press Paperback; New York: The Free Press, 1969).Google Scholar
5. See, for example, the arguments of Bendix, R., Nation Building and Citizenship (Anchor Books; Doubleday and Company, 1969)Google Scholar; Rudolph, L. and Rudolph, S., The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967)Google Scholar; and the articles in “Post-Traditional Societies,” Daedalus, (Winter, 1973).
6. M. Weber, op. cit., p. 17.
7. Nash, M., “Some Social and Cultural Aspects of Economic Development,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 7 (1959), pp. 137-1-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar; M. Nash, “The Social Context of Choice in a Small-Scale Society,” Man, 61 (1961), pp. 186-191; and Geertz, C., Peddlers and Princes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963).Google Scholar
8. Jacobs, N., The Sociology of Development: Iran as a Case Study (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966)Google Scholar; and McClelland, D. C., “National Character and Economic Growth in Turkey and Iran,” Communications and National Development, ed. Pye, L. W. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).Google Scholar
9. “Problems of the ‘Bazaar,’” Echo of Iran, Echo's Economic Reports No. 119, 1965.
10. Rotblat, H. J., “Stability and Change in an Iranian Provincial Bazaar” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1972).Google Scholar
11. H. J. Rotblat, “Social Organization and Development in an Iranian Provincial Bazaar,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, forthcoming.
12. For an explanation, see H. J. Rotblat, “Stability and Change in an Iranian Provincial Bazaar,” pp. 6-18.
13. The occupation derives its name from the Arabic word ˓allāf meaning grass, fodder or forage. A common translation of ˓allāfi is corn chandler. Haim, S., New Persian-English Dictionary. 2 vols. (Tehran: Librairie Beroukhim, 1962)Google Scholar; and Lambton, A. K. S., The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966 (London: Clarendon Press, 1969)Google Scholar. The dictionary definition does not, however, convey the notion that a wide variety of goods are normally sold in the ˓allāfī. Therefore “commission agent” will be used here as the English equivalent. It should be noted that the use of ˓allāf to mean a wholesale commission agent is characteristic of the Qazvin Bazaar and may carry different connotations in other cities.
14. Payment to the farmer is made prior to and independent of any payment made by the buyer. Failure to collect on credit extended to the buyers is an operating loss which the agent must absorb. He cannot pass this to his clients or customers.
15. Lambton, A. K. S., Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953)Google Scholar; Lambton, A. K. S., The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966 (London: Clarendon, Press, 1969)Google Scholar; and Gharatchehdaghi, C., Distribution of Land in Varamin (Publication of German Orient Institute) (Opladen: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1967)Google Scholar.
16. Because prices are determined under conditions approximating a “free market,” the prevailing market price is also the “best” price which the agent can reasonably expect to obtain in any given transaction.
17. One of the most important effects of Land Reform has been to increase the freedom of movement given the peasants. Not only can they come to the city more frequently, but they can also interact more with other villagers. This increased contact with the marketplace and the people in it enables the peasants to acquire information about the state of the market and market prices. Thus, the possibility of a villager's being cheated by his agent is greatly minimized--something of importance for the welfare of the poor peasants.
18. Baer, G., “The Administrative, Economic and Social Functions of Turkish Guilds,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1 (1970), pp. 28–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Baer, G., “Guilds in Middle Eastern History,” Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. Cook, M. A. (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 11–30Google Scholar; and Ashraf, A., “Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Boureoisie in Iran,” Iranian Studies, II (1969), pp. 54–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
19. Belshaw, C. S., Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).Google Scholar
20. This may be indirectly beneficial to the agent because of the prestige accorded to bearers of the title ḥājī and the implications it has for personal reputation. See H. J. Rotblat, “Social Organization and Development in an Iranian Provincial Bazaar.” But the positive results of piety may not be as important to the commission agent as it is to the retailer or craftsman, for whom reputation is a key element in the maintenance of a stable clientele.
