It may at first seem strange to speak of the politics of Iranology since until recently Iranology was so much confined within the limits of archaeology, linguistics, bibliography and other “micro” studies that any suggestion about its possible implications smacked of too conspiratorial an outlook of history. Yet if one sets aside the often unverifiable question of deliberate or non-deliberate political motives, there remains little doubt that Iranology has always been involved with politics. This statement is not difficult to prove in the case of the present phase of Iranology, when an increasing number of Iranian scholars are taking the initiative in the field, and a growing number of issues relating to the contemporary sociopolitical life of Iranians have become susceptible to political interpretation. The difficulty arises with regard to the formative period of Iranology when it was a preserve of European Orientalism and whose great pioneers were long thought to be inspired by nothing less than a pure love of knowledge. It is with this formative period of Iranology that the present paper purports to deal.

The world-wide expansion of multinational corporations and the concomitant rise in direct foreign investment have recently received considerable attention from economists. A continuing controversy has existed over the costs and benefits of foreign investment to both the capital-exporting and the host countries. The conflict between the interests of foreign capital and the "national" interest is particularly noticeable in the underdeveloped countries. While many of these countries have opted for the "free enterprise" path to economic growth, they lack the technical and administrative expertise, as well as political will, to explore alternatives to the foreign investment as an instrument for gaining access to the industrial countries' technological know-how and markets. At the same time there is a gradual realization that the alleged benefits of foreign investment are not automatic and that the costs may be substantial.

By the time the Fifth Development Plan was adopted in 1973, Iran had already experienced more than three decades of governmental efforts towards economic development. These efforts first started in the early 1920s and culminated, in the postwar period, in the country's First Development Plan. Before discussing the second and subsequent plans, it will be useful to review the main features of the initial efforts at planning in Iran.

The development policies of the government during the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941) did not constitute development planning as the term has come to be understood in the postwar economic literature. The prewar policies were restricted to partial investment programs for the public sector only, with little consideration concerning the activities of the private sector. Furthermore, even the public sector programs did not reflect any explicitly defined set of policy objectives.

Research in Iranian social and economic history is still relatively unknown. This situation is puzzling in view of the social and economic research in Arab and Turkish history, particularly from 1955 onwards. in the past ten years, social and economic research in these two areas of Middle East history have produced some excellent results. But similar research in Iranian history has not developed. This state of affairs is disappointing when we recall the words of Vladimir Minorsky in his "Foreword" to the Tadhkirat al-mulūk in 1943:

In 1946 a short autobiographical account of Ḥaydar Khān ᶜAmū Ughlū, the Caucasian revolutionary who participated in the Iranian Constitutional movement, 1905-1909, appeared in the Persian monthly journal, Yādigār. The article, which was accompanied by an introduction as well as by some concluding remarks, was unsigned. The editorial policies of the journal, however, indicate that unsigned articles were written by ᶜAbbās Iqbāl, the editor. Iqbāl does not attempt to establish the authenticity of this account, nor do other historians who have used it in their research. While in the absence of the document its authenticity cannot be established, it is possible to make some comments concerning the probability that this may be authentic and that the events mentioned in the autobiography took place, the role Ḥaydar Khān played in these events, and the significance of these events for the Iranian political structure.

Iranian villages generally contain two distinct social classes: (1) peasants who cultivate land they own and/or rent, and (2) landless non-farmers who engage in various commercial, service, and labor activities appropriate to an agricultural economy. Peasants generally employ one term to designate all landless villagers; the most widely used is “khwushnishin.” Although for peasants this term is useful, it poses some difficulty for the social scientist since khwushnishins do not comprise a homogeneous class, but rather are a collectivity of diverse occupational groups sharing in common only a landless status. Included among the khwushnishins are some of the wealthiest, as well as some of the poorest, of all villagers. In terms of economic and social stratification, one can identify at least three separate groups of khwushnishins. In this paper I propose to describe these three groups and analyze their unique roles in the villages.

Boir Aḥmad is the territory of the largest tribe (or confederation of tribes) of Kohkīlūyah in South Iran, located roughly south of the Bakhtīyārī and west of the Qashqā'ī. Its population (75,000 in 1966) subsists on a mixed economy of agriculture and animal husbandry, which in the highly segmented mountainous topography necessitates a variety of nomadic and transhumant adaptations.

The political position within the wider Iranian context of the area presently called Boir Aḥmad has had a variegated history. Under the rule of the Atābegs of Lur-i Buzurg (12th-14th cent.) it was fairly well integrated and administered, with a flourishing economy and a largely sedentery population. In the following centuries, less stable "anarchic" forms of political organization seem to have prevailed, until the Qājār rulers tied the area to the center by appointing the local khāns as tax collectors and through interfering in their power struggles.

The document translated below is a will written by cAbbās Mīrzā, the Heir Apparent, in July, 1830, three years before his death in Khurasan. This will is important because of its style and content. Written in a hasty manner, and originally in Persian, in some places it gives the impression of having been translated from Āzarī Turkish. The author has paid little attention to grammatical rules and literary embellishments. The force of the document derives from the author's deep feelings of hope (for future military success), sorrow (for past defeats), and uncertainty and worry (for the destiny of his children). References are made to the political events and personalities of the times, not directly, but in connection with the author's personal concerns. On the whole, cAbbās Mīrzā's major preoccupations in this document are to justify past errors, to be buried as a man of God, and to be remembered as a national hero.

The history of modern Iran, like that of most of the Middle East, is a very underdeveloped field when compared not only with the history of the West, but even with that of the Far East. When we speak of the United States' scholars, the reasons for this underdevelopment are not far to seek. Far more than scholars would like to admit, scholarship follows the geography of the national interests of the United States' rulers. As long as the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia were colonies or spheres of influence of other powers, American scholars ignored them almost totally. It is only since World War II that Near Eastern, African, and South Asian centers and institutes were set up, usually with the help of foundation, business and government money, and these centers gave the greatest impetus to the studies of the areas under question.