¹ Sec. 220 of the Income Tax Ordinance [New Version] defines a series of offences of tax evasion, each of which is a felony carrying a punishment of four years imprisonment or a fine of IL. 10,000 plus one and a half times the amount of income which has been concealed or attempted to be concealed.

² On this matter the court relied on American precedents and Rule 27(5) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953).

³ See para. 4 of the opinion of Sussmann J.

⁴ On the Hippocratic Oath and the Oath of Asaph the Physician, see Carmi, , Medicine and Law (1971, in Hebrew) 534–5.Google Scholar

⁵ Sec. 387 of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936.

⁶ Sec. 12(1) (b) of the Public Health Ordinance, 1940.

⁷ Defence Service Regulations, 1967, r. 4(c). See also sec. 33 of the Defence Service Law (Consolidated Version), 1959 (13 L.S.I. 338).

⁸ See, for example, sec. 28 of the Treatment of Mentally Sick Persons Law, 1955 (9 L.S.I. 137).

⁹ See the statement of Lord Mansfield in the Duchess of Kingston's Trial, quoted in Wigmore, , Evidence (McNaughton rev., 1961) vol. 8, §2380Google Scholar and the cases based thereon: R. v. Gibbons (1823) 171 E.R. 1117; Wheeler v. Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch.D. 675, 681.

¹⁰ See A.G. v. Mulholland [1963] 2 Q.B. 477, 489, 492.

¹¹ See R. v. Statutory Visitors to St. Lawrence's Hospital [1953] 2 All E.R. 766, 772.

¹² See the 16th Report of the Law Reform Committee on Privilege in Civil Proceedings, paras. 48–52, Cmnd. 3472 (1967). Indeed, the Civil Evidence Act of 1968 does not recognize any privilege for doctor-patient communications.

¹³ See the 11th Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee on Evidence (General), para. 276, Cmnd. 4991 (1972). The Committee did not completely reject the arguments for medical privilege, particularly in the case of consultations with psychiatrists, but it finally came to the conclusion not to recommend a new type of privilege. For a full analysis of this Report, see Cross, , “An Attempt to Update the Law of Evidence” (1974) 9 Is.L.R. 1.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Wigmore, ibid., §2380.

¹⁵ See the statement of Sussmann J. in the fifth paragraph of his opinion and the sources on which he relies. In Israel, there is a specific statutory provision concerning the testimony of a psychological expert: sec. 50 of the Evidence Ordinance [New Version] 1971.

¹⁶ Sec. 5D of the Evidence Ordinance, as enacted by amendment of the original Ordinance (22 L.S.I. 224).

¹⁷ Sec. 49 of the Evidence Ordinance provides:

“Testimony of Physician

49. (a) A physician is not bound to give evidence on any matter relating to a person who has availed himself of his services if such matter reached him in the course of his work as a physician and it is one of the matters which, by their nature, are generally communicated to a physician in reliance on his keeping them secret, unless that person has waived the privilege or the Court has found that the necessity to disclose the evidence for the purpose of doing justice outweighs the interest in its non-disclosure. The same applies to a person whom any matter communicated to a physician as aforesaid reached during his work in the service of the physician, or a medical institution or as a member of a professional team working with the physician in attending patients.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall apply also after the witness has ceased to be a physician or to work as specified in the latter part of that subsection.

(c) Where privilege is claimed under this section, the claim shall be dealt with in camera. If the Court decides to hear the testimony, it may hear it in camera”.

Sec. 52 of the Ordinance provides:

“Scope of Application

52. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to giving evidence both before a court or tribunal and before any authority, body or person competent under law to take evidence; and every reference in this chapter to a court shall be deemed to be a reference also to a tribunal and to any such authority, body or person as aforesaid”.

¹⁸ See McCormick, , Evidence (2nd ed., 1972) sec 99.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See McCormick, ibid., sec. 100 including n. 27.

²⁰ Ibid., sec. 99.

²¹ See Zilboorg v. Zilboorg (1971) 131 N.Y.S. 2d 122; Leeds v. Prudential Insurance Co. (1935) 96 A.L.R. 1414.

²² See sec. (f) infra. It should be noted that all of the judges agreed to reject the petition, but one of them (Kister J.) suggested that the respondent act with flexibility. If the petitioner convinces him “that in a particular case there is indeed an important interest of the patient in keeping secret even the name which appears in the physician's file (such as the name of a donor) the respondent should desist if he is satisfied that the matter will not prevent him from obtaining the in formation which he needs” (p. 270).

²³ See McCormick, ibid., sec. 102.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., sec. 103.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ See Ibid. concerning the differences of opinion in American precedents on this point.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ See supra p. 294.

³¹ See McCormick, ibid., sec. 101. Compare the privilege for communications between a lawyer and his client, Rubinstein v. Nazareth Textile Works B.M. (1961) 15 P.D. 1599, 1602.

³² See Wigmore, , Evidence (McNaughton, rev. 1961) vol. 8, § 2380aGoogle Scholar; McCormick, op. cit., sec. 101, 108; Chaffee, , “Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?” (1943) 52 Yale L. J. 607.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ See Cross, , Evidence (3rd ed., 1967) 246.Google Scholar

³⁴ Wigmore, op. cit., § 2285.

³⁵ See Wigmore, op. cit., p. 829, n. 1 and text.

³⁶ Thus Kister J. expressed readiness to accept such a solution with respect to the identity of a donor in the case of artificial insemination (p. 270).