What we mean precisely by judicial reasoning is the reasoning of the judge as disclosed in the grounds of his judgment. The writings of jurists, the arguments of counsel, the indictment filed by the prosecuting officer—all provide grounds which may effect the judge's decision ; but it is the reasoned judgment alone which provides all the elements required to unfold the characteristic features of judicial reasoning.

The operative part of the judgment, the very ruling, is preceded by the grounds which constitute the reasoning on which the ruling is based. Judicial reasoning thus constitutes a model of practical reasoning, aimed at justifying a decision, a choice or a claim, and establishing that they are neither arbitrary nor unjust: the judicial ruling is justified if the conclusion following its reasons conforms to the law.

Assimilating judicial reasoning to a syllogism whose conclusion is true because it can be formally proved as deriving from true premises, would deny the very nature of practical reasoning and make it impersonal and devoid of its essential element of adjudication. The specific juridical nature of the judge's reasoning is not the formally correct deduction drawn from premises—in this respect legal deduction bears no distinctive features—but lies in the reasoning which serves to lay down those premises within the frame of an existing legal system.