¹ The Mejelle is commonly referred to as a “Code”, although in fact, far from being a code, it is merely a digest or restatement of the law, as will become apparent also in this article, See: Omar, S. S., “The Majalla”, in: Law in the Middle East, edited by Khadduri, M. and Liebesny, H. J., Washington 1955Google Scholar, later referred to as L.M.E., pp. 292–308 at p. 296.

² Tedeschi, G., “Le Centenaire de la Mejelle”, in: Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 1969, pp. 125–133Google Scholar. On July 1, 1969 the Minister of Justice, MrShapira, Y. Sh., declared in the Kneset that “out of the 1851 articles of the Mejelle 947 have so far been repealed, 689 out of which in the Sixth Knesset”, that is during the years 1965–1969Google Scholar. See Divrei HaKnesset 1969, fascimile 32 p. 3321, A. These numbers may, however, be somewhat misleading since part of the articles described as “repealed” were in fact only partially repealed. Thus the Civil Wrongs Ordinance 1944 (The Palestine Gazette No. 1380, Supplement No. 1, December 28, 1944) in its 71st section repeals a large number of articles of the Mejelle, but only “in so far as they are repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the provisions of this Ordinance”. Moreover those articles which were repealed only since 1948, after the establishment of the State of Israel, are still valid in the Gaza Strip, and some of them also in Judea and Samaria. However, for reasons discussed in the present article the actual authority of the Mejelle is theoretical rather than real.

³ “…the Grand Vizier requested from the office of the Sheikh-u '1-Islâm the designation of a scholar particularly well versed in the principles of Sharia, yet able to understand the needs of modern times. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha was introduced to the Grand Vizier by the then Sheikh-u 'l-Islâm as the most suitable person for the purpose”. Mardin, E., “Development of the Sharia under the Ottoman Empire”, in: L.M.E., pp. 272–291, at p. 285.Google Scholar For more about Cevdet Pasha see in: Lewis, Bernard, “The Emergence of Modern Turkey”, London 1961, pp. 120–121Google Scholar. “When the Introduction and Book 1 were finished, we sent a copy to Sheikh-u 'l-Islâm. Copies were also sent to persons skilled and learned in Muhammadan Jurisprudence, and modifications were incorporated therein according to their recommendations.” Report of the Commission Appointed to Draft the Mejelle, in Hooper, C. H., The Civil Law of Palestine and Trans-Jordan, Vol. I, Jerusalem, 1933, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

⁴ Sheikh-u 'l-Islâm had asked that any cases which, for political reasons, should not be decided in accordance with religious law, should not be brought to his notice. See: Heyd, Uriel, “The Ottoman 'Ulemâ and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmûd II”, in Scripta Hierosolymitana, vol. IX: Studies in Islamic History and Civilization, Jerusalem, 1961, pp. 63–69, p. 89.Google Scholar

⁵ Arts. 1573, 1576.

⁶ Art. 1686.

⁷ Art. 1700.

⁸ Schacht, J., “Problems of Modern Islamic Legislation”, in: Studia Islamica 1960, XII, pp. 99–129, p. 108 n. 3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ See Kâsânî, , Badâ'i' 'l-Sanâ'i', Cairo, 1327, vol. VI p. 266Google Scholar, where it is clearly stated that there can be “absolutely no evidence of an infidel against a Moslem”.

¹⁰ In the Report of the Commission appointed to draft the Mejelle: “By means of them (i.e. “the rules of Muhammadan Jurisprudence” contained in the Introduction) a man can make his conduct conform to the Sharia law as far as possible…if a work were compiled devoid of divergencies and including only accepted opinion with regard to civil obligations in Muhammadan Law, and which is easy to refer to, all persons could easily study the same and apply the contents thereof to civil obligations.…In accordance with the orders of his Majesty the Sultan to produce a work of this nature…we met‥and collected together those matters of Muhammadan jurisprudence, according to the Hanafite school, which relate to civil obligations.” (Translated by Hooper, ibid. pp. 6, 4–5.)

¹¹ Yeshivat Hebron Knesset Israel v. Haj Abdel el Khatib (1933) 8 Rot. 543.

¹² Yehuda Blum v. Estate of Alfred M. Sursock et al. (1937) S.C.J. 164.

¹³ Palwoodma v. Majdalani (1937) 4 P.L.R. 271; (1937) S.C.J. 268; (1937) 2 Ct.L.R. 73, para. 18. (The emphasis is that of the author.)

¹⁴ 'Haydar, AlîDurar-u 'l-Hukkâm, Haifa, 1926.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Bâz, Selim, Ṣharḥ-u 'l-Majalla, Ṭab'a Ṭhâlitha, Beirut, 1923.Google Scholar

¹⁶ 'Alî Haydar, ibid. in his comment on art. 478, p. 466, and Selim Bâz, ibid. in his comment on art. 433, p. 250. This is so despite the rule according to which the rent proportionate to the period of non-enjoyment is normally deducted from the rent due. See 'Ali Haydar, ibid.,on art 455, para. (1).

¹⁷ Selim BâZ, art. 443, basing himself on Rad-u 'l-MuṬtâr.

¹⁸ The classical example is that of híring a physician. The hire is annulled if the patient recovers before he receives the treatment. One of these examples, that of hiring a dentist, is mentioned explicitly in art. 443 of the Mejelle. Similarly the hire of real estate is annulled, if the tenant falls ill so that he has no use of the property. This is particularly the rule in the case of animals hired for travelling. See Selim Bâz, art. 535, basing himself on the Hindiyya,and 'Alî Haydar art. 454, basing himself on al-Ṭûrî, and also art. 443, basing himself on Takmilat-u 'l-BaṬr.

¹⁹ “References have been made to English Law and there is little difference in principle between it and the Ottoman Law.” Para. 24 of Manning's judgment. The reference was made to the English law of contract rather than to the English law of lease, because of the latter's special nature in English law, and also because of the particular land laws of the country, which prevented the reception of the English law of landlord and tenant into the corresponding sphere of local law.

²⁰ Four years later the principle governing the frustration of contracts in English law has been widened; see Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corp. Ltd. [1941] 2 All E.R. 105.

²¹ L. J., Blackburn, in his well-known judgment in: Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 Band S 826Google Scholar; 122 E.R. 309, as cited in Swift v. Macbean [1942] 1 All E.R. 132. (The emphasis is that of the author.)

²² Attala and Kanawati v. The Corner House (1940) 7 P.L.R. 405; S.C.J. 243; 3 Ct.L.R. 210; Attorney General v. Qasem Bader (1940) P.L.R. 513; S.C.J. 552; 8 Ct.L.R. 226. When, however, the Police Order was accompanied by a demand from the landlord to vacate the premises, rent was no longer due because the Court considered such demand as terminating the contract. Cf. Attala v. Tuma et al. (1943) 10 P.L.R. 228; (1943) 1 A.L.R. 145.

²³ Para. 23 of the judgment of J., Halevy in: Albaranes v. Shmeterling (1949) 1 Psakim 72.Google Scholar

²⁴ Albaranes v. Shmeterling (1950) 4 P.D. 573; (1950–51) 3 P.E. 467. See particularly the enthusiastic support given to Justice Halevy's judgment by the President of the Supreme Court, para. 11.

²⁵ A momentary rise in the attention paid to the Mejelle can also be detected in another field. In a series of judgments given during the British Mandate, it had been held that the Mejelle does not apply to Miri lands, that is to the vast majority of the inhabited lands of the country. It started with the reference, made in El-Asmar v. Shami (1933) 1 P.L.R. 767; 1 Rot. 26, to a previous ruling supposedly made by the court, that art. 906 of the Mejelle applied in that case because the property in question was not miri but mulk. None the less, the court following El-Asmar v. Shami persisted in its view that the Mejelle does not apply to miri land; and Fitzgerald, C.J., even relied on art. 2 of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 and Tute's Commentary to that Code and various “specific” provisions of the Temporary Law Concerning the Transfer of Immovables of 1913. In fact, neither in art. 2 of the Ottoman Land Code nor in Tute's Commentary is there anything to preclude the application to miri lands of the laws regarding mulk lands; they merely show that mulk land is governed by the Sharia, i.e. Moslem Law. Similarly the Temporary Law Concerning the Transfer of Immovables of 1913 is no authority for the proposition that Moslem Law will never apply to miri lands. Admittedly, hire being the sale of benefit, “For the sale to be executory the vendor must be the owner of the thing sold, or the agent of the owner or his tutor or guardian” (art. 365 of the Mejelle). Since the nominal owner of miri lands is the State it would appear that a private holder of miri lands cannot legally transfer it. Nevertheless, art. 5 of the Law of 1913 allows private holders to transfer their rights; and this permission had already been granted in 1858 by art. 9 of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. It is clear therefore that the rights to miri lands are transferable by leave of the State, which is the nominal owner.

In 1948, soon after the establishment of the State of Israel, and without entering into all these arguments, a District Court ruled, in Galili v. Rot (1948) 1 P.M. 268, that “in the absence of an express indication to the contrary, one has to apply the principles of the Mejelle to miri lands”. This undoubtedly appears to be the correct view.

See, on this point, Dr.Weisman's, J. criticism in his review of Mrs. Lea DoukhanLandau's book Equitable Rights to Land and the Remedy of Specific Performance of Contracts for the Sale of Land, Jerusalem, 1968, in Mishpatim, vol. I, pp. 475–479Google Scholar, at p. 478 and note 24. Dr. Weisman, however, mentions a recent decision of the Tel Aviv District Court, Rashut ha-Pituah v. Othman Salim al-Saqiq (1969) 67 P.M. 23, at p. 26, which reiterates the erroneous opinion developed during the Mandate.

²⁶ In the minority opinion of Agranat, J.… it was not a case of hire, so that, instead of the Moslem Law of hire which did not apply, the question was to be decided under the English Law of Contract. To our mind, and with due respect, this opinion was the correct one, for the following reason (which is not explicitly mentioned by Agranat, J.): according to art. 365 cited above, the transferor must be either the owner or his agent, tutor or guardian, and in the case considered at issue this condition was not fulfilled.

²⁷ Per J., Dunkelblum, in Grodjinski v. Liber (1950) 4 P.D. 857, 864, F.Google Scholar

²⁸ Ibid. p. 861 G.

²⁹ Dunkelblum, J., refers on p. 868 B to an argument derived from Albaranes v. Shmeterling.

³⁰ Tedeschi, G., “On the Impossibility of Performance in Contract”, in Studies in Israel Private Law, Jerusalem, 1966, pp. 33–115, at p. 113.Google Scholar

³¹ Even an orientalist of the stature of Professor S. D. Goitein, who was fully conscious of the dependence of the Mejelle upon its sources, expressed himself too cautiously when he wrote that: “Sometimes the example accompanying the rule not only explains but also adds to the rule. This was pointed out by Hooper, vol. 2, pp. 19–20, and see: Malhi, A., Review of the History of the Law in Palestine, p. 40.Google Scholar” Goitein, S. D. and Ben Shemesh, A., Muslim Law in Israel, Jerusalem, 1957, p. 118.Google Scholar

³² This is Hooper's translation. In fact Mebânî means not just phrases but constructions of rhyme.

³³ Onar, S. S., “The Majalla”, in: L.M.E., ibid. p. 296.Google Scholar

³⁴ Pledges (art. 707), various types of partnerships (arts. 1405, 1432), agency (arts. 1451, 1500), besides the need for “words” (sözler, in sale (arts. 101, 102), hire (art. 434) and agency (arts. 1451, 1486).

³⁵ Pledges (art. 707), various types of partnerships (arts. 1361, 1405, 1482), agency (1451, 1486).

³⁶ With regard to guarantee (art. 623, in the example; art. 660); transfer of debt (art. 680); deposit (art. 773, first example); loan (art. 804, in the example); gift (art. 841); various types of partnerships (art. 1330 (first and second examples); arts. 1372, 1405, 1422, 1432, 1442); agency (arts. 1451, 1454 in the second and third examples, 1456 in the first, second and third examples; 1471–1474, 1478 first and second examples; 1480 in the example, 1481 in the example, 1485, 1486, 1495, 1497, 1498, 1501, 1506, 1508, 1509, 1510, 1511, 1513, 1515, 1516); release (arts. 1561, 1565, 1567, 1568). From Hooper's translation of the Mejelle, by far the best one in the English language, one cannot realize how frequently the Turkish verb demek is in use in the Mejelle because he diversifies its rendering in English. Thus, sometimes he translates it as “to tell” (arts. 623, 1480), on another occasion “to wish” (art. 1516), but more frequently “to instruct” (arts. 1471–4, 1479, 1480, 1481, 1495, 1497, 1498, 1501, 1506, 1508, 1509, 1510, 1511, 1513, 1515). The verb “to instruct” (emretmek)is to be found in the Mejelle (e.g. in art. 1513), but it is certainly not found in all the articles where Hooper puts it. Similarly the verb “to state” (beyan etmek, and the derivative: beyan olunmak) is found in the Mejelle (e.g. in arts. 1336, 1475, 1476, 1477, 1482), but not always where Hooper puts it (arts. 1485, 1486, 1561, 1565, 1567, 1568 in his translation). Also the verb “to inform” (haber vermek, e.g. in art. 1453, and bildirmek in art. 1524) is to be found in the Mejelle, but it does not exist at all in articles where Hooper puts it (arts. 660, 680, 1456).

³⁷ Hooper translates this term as “conduct”, but this is a simple inaccuracy. See: Redhouse, J. W., A Turkish and English Lexicon, Istanbul, 1921, p. 559.Google Scholar

³⁸ “En droit musulman, l'acte juridique consiste en une déclaration émise par une personne douée de raison, en vue de faire produire à la déclaration tous ses effets de droit.…L'effet de droit ne se réalise pas en vertu de cette volonté, mais bien comme le résultat nécessaire de la déclaration émise conformément à la loi. Tant les conditions que les effets de la déclaration appelée acte juridique sont determinés souverainement par le législateur.” Ch. Chehata, Le Concept de Contrat en Droit Musulman, Faculté de Droit de Paris, Cours de Doctorat 1955–6, pp. 137, 138

³⁹ “Offer and acceptance can be expressed orally or by conclusive acts of the parties.” Schacht, J., Idjab, in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ “They (articles 2–100 of the Mejelle) are said to have been culled from the work of Ibn Nujaym, a writer of the tenth century of the hejra (d. A.D. 1563).” Schacht, J., “Nature and Sources of the Sharia”, in L.M.E. pp. 83–112, at p. 103. See alsoGoogle Scholar; Aghnides, N. P., Mohammadan Theories of Finance, Reprint, Lahore, 1961, p. 182 para. 12.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Finding the source of article 2 of the Mejelle in a saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, Professor Schacht added: “This word “niyya” (intention) has a definite religious flavour, the practice of “directing the intention” before an act of prayer being common to Jewish, Christian and Islamic devotional writers. It differs somewhat, therefore, from intention in English Law.” Schacht, ibid. p. 106. The notion of “niyya”, claimed to have been developed under Jewish influence (see: niyya in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1st ed.) is found in the opening “tradition” reported in the authoritative collection of “traditions” from the Prophet Muhammad, compiled by Bukhârî. In fact the word used in arts. 2 and 3 of the Mejelle is not niyya but maqṣad. However, Schacht's observation is equally true, for, as can be seen from the following remarks of Professor Chehata, these terms are synonymous. “Ibn Nujaym s'est beaucoup intéressé à l'étude de l'élément volontaire, appelé niyya (intention), qui fait l'objet, dans son ouvrage, de longs développements. Il a même posé à son sujet des règles qui sont passées dans la codification ottomane du droit hanéfite connue sous la nom de Mejelle.

Pour définir la niyya (intention) il se refère à un ouvrage de Uṣûl (Méthodologie), à l'ouvrage intitulé al-Talwih dont l'auteur est Taftazani. D'après Taftazani la niyya serait l'intention (Qaṣd) en posant l'acte, d'obéir et de se rapprocher de Dieu Ibn Nujaym rapporte également une autre définition donnée par le juge al-Baydani: la niyya serait, selon ce dernier 'la volonté dirigée vers l'acte, en vue de plaire à Dieu et d'obéir à ses prescriptions.'

Dans ces deux définitions le point de vue religieuse est prédominant. Et il semble bien, comme le déclare Ibn Nujaym, que l'intention dans ce sens n'est requise que pour distinguer les actes rituels des autres actes ordinaires de la vie.…C'est dans ce sens qu'il emploie le terme dans la première règle posée par lui et qui est 'pas de mérite qu'en considération de l'intention.'

Mais en fait quand il s'agira d'applications, le terme va être employé dans un sens tout différent. La règle n'aura servi à rien. Il va d'ailleurs employer un autre terme dans le même sens, et c'est le Qaṣd ou le Maqṣad. Il pose comme second règle que les choses ne sont considérées qu'en fonction des buts recherchés: al-'Umûr bi-Mayṣidi-hâ (art. 3 de la Mejelle). Cette règle qui est parfois interprêtée par les modernes comme comportant une consécration de la théorie du motif ou de la cause dans le contrat est loin de valoir comme une règle de droit.…”

(Ch. Chehata, Le Concept de Contrat en Droit Musulman, Cours de Doctorat, Faculté de Droit de Paris, 1965–66, pp. 65/66).

“…Donc jusqu'ici le Qaṣd ou ta niyya ne nous apportent aucun élément de nature juridique. L'élément volontaire ou psychologique dans la formation de l'acte juridique n'est point en question” (ibid., p. 67).

“…L'acte constitutif d'un bien de main-mort (Waqf), même s'il est consenti en vue d'une oeuvre pie, ne requiert point la niyya. Si le constituant entend gagner un mérite au ciel, la niyya sera requise. De toute façon, l'acte sera valable et produira son plein et entier effet en droit

De même en est-il du testament. S'il est consenti en faveur d'une oeuvre pie, l'intention est exigée en vue d'acquérir le mérite. Sans intention, le mérite ne sera pas acquis, mais le testament est valide.

Dans ces deux cas Ibn Nujaym revient à l'acception rapportée dans sa définition. La niyya reprend ici son caractère purement religieux. Elle ne joue aucun rôle sur le plan juridique (ibid., p. 76).

“…Alors que le mariage, comme le constate Ibn Nujaym, peut être rapproché des actes de la pratique religieuse, il n'en constitue pas moins, en droit, un contrat qui ne requiert pas, en tant que tel, la niyya pour sa validité. Elle n'est requise, dans son sent religieux qu'en vue du mérite” (ibid., p. 77).

Nevertheless Professor Chehata proceeds to examine the use by Ibn Nujaym of the term niyya in other contexts. There he discovers that besides its religious meaning niyya has two other legal meanings of a highly technical nature. (See, ibid. pp. 68–85). These two legal meanings, however, are by no means implied in the term used in articles 2 and 3 of the Mejelle.

⁴² “…these rules alone are not sufficient to enable the Sharia judges to give a judgment in the absence of any more explicit authority.” (From The Report of the Commission Appointed to Draft the Mejelle, translated by Hooper, ibid., p. 6.)

⁴³ S.S. Onar, The Majalla, in I.M.E., ibid., pp. 292–308, at p. 296. See also Schacht, J., Nudjaym, Ibn, in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed.Google Scholar; Ibn Nudjaym was particularly interested in the systematic structure of Fiqh.

⁴⁴ “L'on ne peut s'empêcher… d'évoquer l'exemple du droit allemand. Comme l'écrit Rieg (Rôle de la Volonté, p. 91)…une fois 'matérialisée dans la déclaration, la volonté n'intervient plus sur le plan juridique.' Le droit musulman plus encore que ne le fait le droit allemand, matérialise la déclaration.” C. Ch. Chehata, ibid., p. 137.

⁴⁵ Chehata, Chafik, Essai d'une Théorie Générale de l'Obligation en Droit Musulman, Le Caire, 1936, Reprint, Paris, 1969.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Meron, Y., “The Development of Legal Thought in the Hanafi Texts”, in: Studia Islamica, XXX, February 1970, pp. 73–118.Google Scholar