¹ Blom-Cooper, L. and Drewry, G. (eds.), Law and Morality (London, Duckworth, 1976), 51.Google Scholar

² Koestler, A., Reflections on Hanging (London, Victor Gollancz, 1956), 58.Google Scholar

³ Beccaria, C., Crimes and Punishments, trans, by Farrer, J. A. (London, Chatto & Windus, 1880), 171–172.Google Scholar

⁴ Bentham, J., Principies of Penal Law, in Works, ed. by Bowring, J. (New York, Russell & Russell, 1962), vol. 1, p. 445.Google Scholar

⁵ Sellin, T., “Capital Punishment”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1965 edition, vol. 4, pp. 848–849.Google Scholar

⁶ See e.g. the debate between Haag, E. van den and Bedau, H. in Ethics, vol. 78 (1967/1968)Google Scholar, no. 4; vol. 80 (1969/70), no. 3; vol. 81 (1970/71), no. 1. The most recent attempt at showing that the death penalty does have the deterrent effects requisite for its utilitarian justification, the paper on “The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death” by I. Ehrlich (1975) 65 The American Economic Review, no. 3), also does not seem convincing; see the exchange between Ehrlich and his critics in (1975/6) 85 Yale L. J. no. 2 and no. 3.

⁷ Num. XXXV, 31 (the J.P.S.A. translation).

⁸ Greenberg, M., “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law”, in Goldin, J. (ed.), The Jewish Expression (New York, Bantam Books, 1970), 25–26.Google Scholar (Post-Biblical Jewish law evolved towards the virtual abolition of capital punishment, but that is of no concern here).

⁹ “… There is no parallel between death and even the most miserable life, so that there is no equality of crime and retribution [in the case of murder] unless the perpetrator is judicially put to death” (Kant's Political Writings, ed. by Reiss, H., trans, by Nisbet, H. B. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), 156Google Scholar). “… Since life is the full compass of a man's existence, the punishment [for murder] cannot simply consist in a ‘value’, for none is great enough, but can consist only in taking away a second life” (Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans, by Knox, T. M. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965) 247Google Scholar).

¹⁰ In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, let me emphasize the qualification which this statement obviously entails: retained, or reintroduced, only as the penalty for murder, and not for various political and even economic offenses, for which it is rather generously prescribed in some collectivist states today.

¹¹ “On Some Arguments against the Retributive Theory of Punishment”, (1979) 56 Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto, no. 1; “Punishment as the Criminal's Right”, (1980) 15 Hegel-Studien; “Is Retributivism Analytic?” (1981) 56 Philosophy, no. 216; “Utilitarianism and Self-Sacrifice of the Innocent” (1978) 38 Analysis, no. 4; “Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent”, (1980) 57 Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto, no. 4.

¹² In this section I draw heavily on two previous papers of mine on the subject of capital punishment: “Kant und Beccaria”, (1978) 69 Kant-Studien, no. 4, and “Life for Life” (1982) 29 Philosophical Studies (Dublin).

¹³ C. Beccaria, op. cit., supra n. 3 at 169–170.

¹⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, op. cit, supra n. 9 at 71.

¹⁵ For critical comments on my analysis and refutation of Beccaria's argument, developed in the paper on “Kant und Beccaria” and summarized here in the briefest way possible, see Cattaneo, M. A., Beccaria e Kant. Il valore dell'uomo nel diritto penale (Sassari, Università di Sassari, 1981) 20–30.Google Scholar

¹⁶ For an example of this view see Tolstoy, L. N., Smertnaya kazn i hristianstvo (Berlin, I. P. Ladizhnikov, s.a.) 40–41.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Vulović, S. V., Problem smrtne kazne (Beograd, Geca Kon, 1925) 23–24.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Cf. e.g. Blackstone, W., Commentaries on the Laws of England ed. by Andrews, J. DeWitt (Chicago, Callagan & Co., 4th ed., 1899) 1124.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Camus, A., “Reflections on the Guillotine”, in Resistance, Rebellion and Death, trans, by O'Brien, J. (New York, Vintage Books, 1974), 199.Google Scholar

²⁰ Quoted in Calvert, E. R., Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century (London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927), 132.Google Scholar

²¹ Leiser, B. M., Liberty, Justice and Morals: Contemporary Value Conflicts (New York, Macmillan, 1973), 225.Google Scholar

²² For a characteristic statement of this argument see A. Camus, op. cit, supra n. 19 at 206–210.

²³ See Hart, H. L. A., “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment”, in Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973), 14–17.Google Scholar

²⁴ Ibid., at 24.

²⁵ E. R. Calvert, op. cit., supra n. 20 at 172.

²⁶ For a good review of the relevant historical data see Kistyakovsky, A. F., Izsledovanie o smertnoy kazni (St. Peterburg, L. F. Panteleev, 2. izd., 1896), 260–267.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Sharp, F. C. and Otto, M. C., “A Study of the Popular Attitude towards Retributive Punishment”, (1909/1910), 20 International Journal of Ethics, no. 3Google Scholar; “Retribution and Deterrence in the Moral Judgments of Common Sense”, ibid., no. 4.

²⁸ Cf. I. Kant. op. cit., supra n. 9 at 157, and C. Beccaria, op. cit., supra n. 3 at 177.