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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2016
The following observations exclude from their scope two questions that are customarily brought into the discussion whenever the problem of self-determination is analyzed, namely:
1) Is self-determination to be equated necessarily with independence or are there any other conceivable models of self-determination?
2) What is a “people” for the purpose of exercising this right and where is the borderline to be drawn between peoples entitled to invoke this right and other entities not so entitled?
It is suggested that for the purposes of these brief observations it be assumed that self-determination is indeed to be equated with political independence and that there exists a way of establishing what group of persons qualifies for the term “people” and which entities do not.
1 Of the extremely voluminous literature of recent years on self-determination in general, see Raschhofer, , Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht, sein Ursprung und seine Bedutung (1960)Google Scholar; Higgins, , The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (1963) 90–106Google Scholar; Lachs, , “Quelques réflexions sur le problème du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes” (1957) 4 Revue de Droit Contemporain 63Google Scholar; Emerson, , “Self-Determination” (1971) 65 A.J.I.L. 459.Google Scholar
2 See on this Emerson, loc. cit. at pp. 465–6.
3 Ibid. at pp. 468–70.
4 Ibid. at pp. 460–2 and the authorities cited there. See also Feinberg, , The Arab-Israel Conflict in International Law (1970) 44–55.Google Scholar
5 See Decker, , Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen (1955) 17–27.Google Scholar
6 Emerson, loc. cit. at p. 468, n. 20.
7 Ibid.
8 Schücking, and Wehberg, , Die Satzung des Völkerbundes (1921) 275–6.Google Scholar
9 Emerson, loc. cit. at pp. 464–5.
10 Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960.
11 Resolution 2200 (XXI) of December 16, 1966 (Annex). As of January 1975 neither of these Covenants has entered into force (See (January 1975) UN Monthly Chronicle 107).
12 Resolution 2625 (XXV) of October 24, 1970.
13 Higgins, op. cit. at p. 106.
14 (February 1970) UN Monthly Chronicle 36.
15 The Declaration states that “self-determination should not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States”. In the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514 [XV]) the General Assembly had declared that “any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity or the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”.
16 On the developments that led to Bangladesh's accession to independence, see Choudhury, , “Dismemberment of Pakistan, 1971: Its International Implications” (1974) 18 no. 1 Orbis 179–200.Google Scholar
