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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 February 2016
The approach of my good friend Shachar illustrates the saying that uncompromising aspiration to perfection is a hindrance to progress. To me, his approach, whereby “we will only have our personal intuitions to tell us who was judged correctly, but our personal intuitions may be wrong”, is unacceptable, both in itself, and from the point of view of the conclusions to be drawn therefrom under Shachar's central thesis.
A. Ambiguity in Shachar's Thesis
But first, the thesis is not entirely clear. On page 648, he writes as follows: “… I believe that intuitive answers to complex moral questions are not necessarily arbitrary. One choice is probably better or worse than the others, yet it often cannot be rationally and conclusively demonstrated to be so”.
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10 M. Kriele, supra n. 2, at 104.
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