¹ Piskei Din (P.D.) is a publication of law reports of the Supreme Court. In this survey cases will be cited according to their file number and year of filing. The following abbreviations are used: H.C.—High Court of Justice; C.A.—Civil Appeal; Cr.A.—Criminal Appeal; F.H.—Further Hearing; S.P.—Sundry Petitions.

² (1983) 18 Is.L.R. 268Google Scholar.

³ Abu Ita and others v. The Military Commander of Judea and Samaria and another, H.C. 69/81, and Kanzil and others v. The Customs Commissioner, Gaza Strip District and another, H.C. 493/81, 37 (ii) P.D. 197.

⁴ See: Dinstein, Y., “Value Added Tax in the Administered Territories”, (1984) 10 Iyunei Mishpat 159Google Scholar, and Sharon, P., “Notes” (1983) 18 Is.L.R. 475Google Scholar.

⁵ This arrangement was reached after a severe decline in value of the shares at the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange.

⁶ H.C. 205/82, 37(ii) P.D. 718.

⁷ S.H. (1981/82) 6. Ramat HaGolan i.e. the Golan Heights.

⁸ I.e.—to show it.

⁹ S.H. (1964/65) 270, and S.H. (1967/68) 28. An official translation was published in 19 L.S.I. 288 and 22 L.S.I. 28 which uses the term “Israeli national” instead of the term “Israeli citizen” used above.

¹⁰ Oleh is a Hebrew word and used to single out certain immigrants to Israel.

¹¹ H.C. 243/82, 37(i) P.D. 757.

¹² “The Palestine Liberation Organization”.

¹³ Also termed “the Administered Territories”.

¹⁴ See for instance: Levin J. at 767: “ … it is clear and evident that the P.L.O. in its character and by its way endangers the security and completeness of the State of Israel and denies the very right of its existence”, and Bach J. at 778: “There are no disputes among us in regard to the character and the aims of the organization called P.L.O. in its current form. There is no doubt that it is an organization which endangers the security and the well-being of Israel”.

¹⁵ 74 American Jurisprudence, 2nd 470, 471.

¹⁶ H.C. 322/81, 37(i) P.D. 789.

¹⁷ The Palestine Gazette No. 1442 of 27th Sept. 1945, Supp. No. 2, 1055 at p. 1079. These Regulations were made by the officer administering the Government of Palestine during the rule of the British Mandatory power, prior to the establishment of the State of Israel.

¹⁸ According to the exact wording of the judgment the word “for” should be added to the translation, but it appears clearly from the context that what was meant to say was, that the non-disclosure rested on Reg. 94(2) and not that there was a request for non-disclosure. It should perhaps be added, that only one Hebrew letter stands for the English word “for”, so that the possibility of a slip is great.

¹⁹ 13 L.S.I. 7 and 23 L.S.I. 160. Sec. 3 of that Law lists exemptions from the duty of stating reasons. Sub-sec. (1) states: “if the law which vests the power in him provides that he is authorised to exercise it at his discretion or without giving reasons”.

²⁰ 2 L.S.I. [N.V.] 198.

²¹ H.C. 477/81, 36(iv) P.D. 349.

²² ibid., at 352.

²³ 23 L.S.I. 283, 285.

²⁴ ibid., at 285.

²⁵ S.H. (1980/81) at 106.

²⁶ H.C. 688/81, 36(iv) P.D. 85.

²⁷ The judgment includes many details, but for brevity's sake only those needed to make possible a short view into the main problems of the case will be specified here. Further, I feel bound to mention separately that the particulars stated in the judgment in regard to an interim-order against the first three respondents, forbidding them to order the goods from the fourth respondent, the partial cancellation of that interim-order and the legal consequences of the cancellation, deserve a more comprehensive representation than is possible to make in this space-limited survey.

²⁸ The instant case of Migada Ltd., concerns the invitation for offers made by a public body. The reader's attention is called to the case of Raviv… Ltd., and another v. Beth Yules Ltd., and another, C.A. 207/79, 37(i) P.D. 533, which has been reviewed separately in (1982) 17 Is.L.R. 528Google Scholar. The case of Raviv concerns the rules applying to an invitation for offers (a “tender”) by a private company.

²⁹ H.C. 281/82, 37(i) P.D. 95.

³⁰ C.A. 433/80, 37(i) P.D. 337.

³¹ H.C. 25/82, 36(iv) P.D. 766.

³² He was also the Head of the Local Council at the relevant period.

³³ From the foregoing facts it appears clearly, that the Local Council concerned had indeed tried—although with no avail because the Minister of the Interior had not given his consent—to reduce the sums of the levy initially imposed on the petitioners' lands. Therefore it is not quite clear why the Municipality opposed the argument on behalf of the petitioners—which was accepted by the Supreme Court—that the list according to which the lands concerned were not agricultural lands, was deleted from the supplement of the bye-law before the levy became due. After all, by this argument the respondent local authority could have achieved what it apparently had tried to do, when it requested the consent of the Minister of the Interior for a change in the bye-law in order to make possible a reduction in the levy. By accepting the argument the respondent could also—so it seems—have escaped from the inconvenient remarks of the Supreme Court against the opposition to that contention. One possible explanation is, that as a result of accepting this argument, the local authority concerned would have had to reduce the levy by greater sums than it was prepared to do “voluntarily”.

³⁴ 1 L.S.I. [N.V.] 247.

³⁵ 1 L.S.I. [N.V.] 315.

³⁶ H.C. 175/82, 37(i) P.D. 496.

³⁷ 1 L.S.I. [N.V.] 247, 293.

³⁸ “The Minister”, according to sec. 1 of the Municipalities Ordinance [N.V.], means the Minister of the Interior.

³⁹ C.A. 453/81, 36(iv) P.D. 225.

⁴⁰ C.A. 32/81, 37(ii) P.D. 761.

^40a The usual panel of the Supreme Court in civil appeals in composed of three Justices.

⁴¹ It seems, that this ceremony was chosen in order to achieve a binding marriage according to Jewish religious law, even though it was not according to the regular legal procedure pertaining to the marriage of a Jewish couple in Israel.

⁴² Seemingly because it was not made under the auspices of the Rabbinate.

⁴³ The question, whether the private marriage ceremony was valid from the religious point of view, was left unanswered.

⁴⁴ Probably as distinct from religious law.

⁴⁵ 27 L.S.I. 117.

⁴⁶ The term “public policy” is that used in the authorized translation published in L.S.I. However, the term “public order” seems to be even closer to the term used in the original Hebrew text of the Law.

⁴⁷ It may be of interest to state, that sec. 61 (b) of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973 has been referred to in another case wherein family law was involved in order to apply another section of this Law to solve a property dispute between a man and his divorced wife. See Amrany v. The Great Rabbinical Court and others, H.C. 566/81, reported later in this survey. See infra at p. 545.

⁴⁸ The head note at p. 763, directly preceding the judgment that the appeal and the counter appeal were dismissed does not correspond with the real contents of the judgment.

⁴⁹ C.A. 443/81, 36(iv) P.D. 1.

⁵⁰ Property arrangements also included in the foreign judgment seem of no importance to the dispute in the Supreme Court of Israel and shall not be specified here.

⁵¹ The preceding note, n. 50 applies also to this judgment.

⁵² H.C. 71/80, 35(i) P.D. 100.

⁵³ 16 L.S.I. 106.

⁵⁴ Chapter Two concerns parents and their minor children.

⁵⁵ C.A. 137/81, 37(i) P.D. 505. The Hebrew world “Plonit” means “a female anonymous” and in this case stands in lieu of the name of the biological mother of the child concerned, so as not to disclose her identity and that of her child.

⁵⁶ 14 L.S.I. 93.

⁵⁷ 35 L.S.I. 360.

⁵⁸ C.A. 15/82, 37 (ii) P.D. 18. “Almoni” and “Plonit” are terms used in cases where the identity of the persons concerned is not disclosed. “Almoni” in this case is the husband, and “Plonit”—his wife.

⁵⁹ Apparently according to ancient Jewish Law.

⁶⁰ The maintenance payments adjudicated by the District Court for the children (which were not changed by the Supreme Court) did not include payments to their mother for the treatment of the children, because the District Court held the father liable for maintenance payments for his wife. Now that the Supreme Court cancelled this duty, the question of payments for the care of the children arose.

⁶¹ 7 L.S.I. 139.

⁶² H.C. 566/81, 37(ii) P.D. 1.

⁶³ Sec. 16 of the divorce agreement in this case included a provision authorizing the Rabbinical Regional Court of Haifa to decide on eventual future disputes between the parties on certain property matters.

⁶⁴ When there exists the possibility that the suit for divorce was made only to extend to the Rabbinical Court jurisdiction in regard to the matter incidentally involved.

⁶⁵ See also supra n. 47.

⁶⁶ C.A. 246/81, 36(iv) P.D. 673.

⁶⁷ Because the suit for divorce had been rejected by the Rabbinical Court.

⁶⁸ S. Levin J. and D. Levin J., as against the dissenting opinion of Shamgar D.P.

⁶⁹ It seems to me, after having read and re-read this judgment, that unfortunately several errors “crept” into it, possibly during the stages of preparing it for publication which made some parts of it difficult to understand. However, it is hoped that the above report represents the Court's decision correctly.

⁷⁰ C.A. 513/82, 37(ii) P.D. 813.

⁷¹ 19 L.S.I. 58.

⁷² 23 L.S.I. 283.

⁷³ The percentages were agreed upon by the parties. The widow was the owner of the other half of the flat.

⁷⁴ The meaning of this seemingly is, that it becomes independent of the party subdued to it, and related to the property concerned.

⁷⁵ 19 L.S.I. 58, 77.

⁷⁶ This survey does not include judgments of the National and Regional Labour Courts.

⁷⁷ H.C. 439/82, 37(ii) P.D. 109.

⁷⁸ 17 L.S.I. 161.

⁷⁹ Apparently the fund did not agree to a calculation based on the real wages.

⁸⁰ Cr.A. 288/81, 37(ii) P.D. 617.

⁸¹ L.S.I.—Special Volume, Penal Law, 5737–1977, at 79.

⁸² i.e., “lending” a worker of the company to the worker's committee.

⁸³ In the one, judgment was given in September 1982 and in the other, in the following month.

⁸⁴ C.A. 158/80, 36(iv) P.D. 793.

⁸⁵ 25 L.S.I. 11. Hereinafter: the Contracts-Remedies Law.

⁸⁶ C.A. 43/80, 36(iv) P.D. 387.

⁸⁷ See supra n. 84.

⁸⁸ According to sec. 5 a delay of more than the three days-of-grace allowed by the contract, in excess of the dates stipulated in it for the payments by the buyers of the flat, shall be regarded as a fundamental breach of it, which according to sec. 7 of the Contracts-Remedies Law entitles the injured party to rescind the contract.

⁸⁹ The relevant part of sec. 6 provides that “ … a sweeping stipulation in a contract making breaches fundamental without differentiating between them is invalid unless it was reasonable at the time the contract was made”.

⁹⁰ Hershko v. Wechter, C.A. 207/76, 31 (ii) P.D. 85.

⁹¹ See supra n. 86.

⁹² I.e. not linked and without revaluation.

⁹³ Attention should be paid that according to the facts of the case, as stated in the judgment, the dispute arose out of the delay in payment of the main, and of one additional smaller installment by the buyers, whereupon they were informed by the sellers' lawyer that the delay is a fundamental breach of the contract, and that therefore the contract is void.

⁹⁴ The judgment contains no reference to the case of Shalom v. Mota. See supra nn. 84 and 87.

⁹⁵ Seemingly at the time when agreement was reached.

⁹⁶ It seems of interest to note that the Supreme Court in this case went one step farther than in the case of N. Nowitz v. S. Leibowitz, 36(i) P.D. 537. See (1983) 18 Is.L.R. at 290Google Scholar. In that case the Court made an enforcement order regarding a contract for the sale of a flat, subject to the condition that the price stipulated in the contract be increased owing to inflation, despite the fact that the contract did not include a provision in this respect. In the present case the parties, as already mentioned, included an express stipulation that the price is final in their contract but not even this saved the buyers from revaluation by judgment of the Supreme Court. No reference was made to the case of N. Nowitz v. S. Leibowitz in the judgment in the appeal of E. Lai lush.

⁹⁷ C.A. 44/81, 37(i) P.D. 732.

⁹⁸ The “index” is usually published on the 15th day of every month in the afternoon and pertains to the previous month, starting from the first day of it.

⁹⁹ The commercial banks in Israel are closed on Saturdays.

¹⁰⁰ C.A. 495/80, 36(iv) P.D. 57.

¹⁰¹ 22 L.S.I. 113.

¹⁰² 27 L.S.I. 117.

¹⁰³ it is not clear from the judgment (sec. 11 and sec. 18), whether this result was based on the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973.

¹⁰⁴ The Court did not accept the suggestion made on behalf of the respondent, although it favoured it, that the revaluation of the gift should be made according to the rise of the value of the new flat. The Court rejected this suggestion, because its application needed the creation of a suitable factual basis, which had not been brought before the (lower) Court.

¹⁰⁵ C.A. 829/80, 37(i) P.D. 579.

¹⁰⁶ As stated in the judgment, apparently because they feared that in the meantime the flat which they wanted to buy might be sold to others and because of the non-existence of a written and signed contract.

¹⁰⁷ C.A. 323/80, 37(ii) P.D. 673.

¹⁰⁸ The holder of the account was a company which owed money to the appellant.

¹⁰⁹ I.e. that the company concerned had no moneys in the attached account.

¹¹⁰ C.A. 773/81, 36(iv) P.D. 816.

¹¹¹ Netanyahu J. agreed with the result reached by Barak J. but voiced reservation in regard to several other parts of the judgment.

¹¹² See sec. 29 of the judgment at 834.

¹¹³ C.A. 709/80, 36(iv) P.D. 273.

¹¹⁴ For loss of income and other damage.

¹¹⁵ Sec supra n. 98.

¹¹⁶ A very similar question as to the proper index applicable, arose in the case of the Estate of the late A. Knappo and others v. A. Tussia Cohen and another, see infra at p. 566 and was decided similarly to the decision in the case of Perlman and another v. Luson. See also the case of Ch.A. Vallero and others v. The Local Committee for Planning and Building, Jerusalem, supra at p. 555.

¹¹⁷ C.A. 295/81, 36(iv) P.D. 533.

¹¹⁸ The problem in this case concerned the pecuniary damage caused through loss of earnings during the “lost years”, and it should not be confused with the nonpecuniary damage for the curtailment of life expectancy, which was not the subject of this appeal.

¹¹⁹ See supra n. 40a.

¹²⁰ The judgment covers over forty pages of Piskei Din, most of them the minority view.

¹²¹ 29 L.S.I. 311.

¹²² 2 L.S.I. (N V.) 5.

¹²³ The dependants are not necessarily identical with the heirs of the deceased.

¹²⁴ Pickett v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., [1979] 1 All E.R. 774.

¹²⁵ Gammel v. Wilson and others, [1981] 1 All E.R 578.

¹²⁶ C.A. 116/81, 36(iv) P.D. 580.

¹²⁷ See supra at p. 563.

¹²⁸ K.T. 1976, No. 2706.

¹²⁹ See supra n. 116.

¹³⁰ C.A. 145/80, 37(i) P.D. 113.

¹³¹ In this connection the judgment deals at some length with the interpretation of sec. 63 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version], including the question, which repeatedly arises in the Court: what is meant by the words “ … being an enactment which … was intended to be for the benefit or protection of any other persons”, which are part of that section. Sec. 63 concerns breach of statutory duty. In the present case the Court concluded, that the reqxuirement according to a certain regulation, to put up signs on the premises of a swimming pool, with instructions to bathers in regard to diving into the pool's waters, is indeed a duty which “among others” is intended for the protection of every bather and for watching his interests for the completeness of his body. Thus, the regulation concerned is “intended for the benefit” of the injured claimant. See also B. Lachdar v. The State of Israel, C.A. 660/80, 36(ii) P.D. 836 included in the previous survey (1983) 18 Is.L.R. at 297Google Scholar, and M. Medina v. S. Cohen and M. Amram v. S. Cohen, C.A. 273/ and 292/ 80, 37(ii) P.D. 29, infra at p. 569.

¹³² I.e., the Local Council's ownership of the swimming pool concerned.

¹³³ Apparently “another person” is in this case the second respondent.

¹³⁴ C.A. 273/80 and counter appeal; C.A. 292/80, 37(ii) P.D. 29.

¹³⁵ Because it had been made without a lawful permit.

¹³⁶ Sec. 63 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version] was referred to also in the case of Vaaknin v. The Local Council of Bet-Shemesh and another. See supra at p. 567 and n. 131. According to the case of Vaaknin there is a difference between the liability for the breach of a statutory duty in Israel and the liability for such a breach in England (sec. 26 of the judgment in the case of Vaaknin.)

¹³⁷ See also other judgments mentioned in this survey, which are also connected to Land Law.

¹³⁸ C.A. 571/79, C.A. 49/81 (D. G'erbi v. Maxim etc.,), C.A. 57/81, 37(i) P.D. 589.

¹³⁹ 23 L.S.I 283.

¹⁴⁰ F.H. 40/80, 36(iii) P.D. 701. See the previous survey in (1983) 18 Is.L.R. 285Google Scholar.

¹⁴¹ At the time when the document was made.

¹⁴² See also the case of Abu Ita and others v. The Military Commander etc. 37(ii) P.D. 197 referred to in the introductory remarks, supra n. 3.

¹⁴³ C.A. 364/81, 37(ii) P.D. 744.

¹⁴⁴ 30 L.S.I. 46.

¹⁴⁵ C.A. 510/80, 36(iv) P.D. 589.

¹⁴⁶ From the context it appears that the Court meant the final day of every fiscal year.

¹⁴⁷ Particulars regarding this system are given in the judgment, but are omitted from here, mainly owing to a remark in the judgment that since the coming into force, in 1982, of an amendment to the Income Tax Ordinance [New Version], this seems to apply also in regard to reports based on the “cash system”.

¹⁴⁸ I.e. at the earlier date, and not only on the later date, when the increase is being materialized by the conversion of the Dollars into Shekels.

¹⁴⁹ C.A. 337/80, 37(ii) P.D. 538. This judgment has already been dealt with in an article by Prof. Hadari, Y. and Alter, A.: “Civil Legislation in Tax Law” (1984) 10 lyunei Mishpat 429Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁰ Matters of evidence are included also in several other judgments mentioned in this survey.

¹⁵¹ Cr.A. 501/81 and 610/81, 36(iv) P.D. 141.

¹⁵² S.H. 1979/80, p. 14. An English translation appears in: (1980) 15 Is.L.R. 575CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵³ It seems to be of interest to note that Ben-Porat J. adhered to her minority opinion in this case, when the subject turned up again in the case of Ch.M. All and others v. The State of Israel, Cr.A. 556/80, 614/80, 37(iii) P.D. 169.

¹⁵⁴ Cr.A. 16/32, 36(iv) P.D. 309.

¹⁵⁵ Manzour v. The Attorney General, Cr.A. 235/60, 16 P.D. 645.

¹⁵⁶ Cr.A. 889/79, 36(iv) P.D. 479.

¹⁵⁷ H.C. 249/82, 37(ii) P.D. 393.

¹⁵⁸ 3 L.S.I. [N.V.] 5.

¹⁵⁹ 35 L.S.I. 136. See infra n. 161a.

¹⁶⁰ The judgment covers almost forty pages of Piskei Din, and therefore—although regrettably—this report depicts only parts of it.

¹⁶¹ The Hebrew words translated above into “for reasons to be stated in writing”, have already been used in previous legislation, and the official translation of them in a previous instance was: “for reasons which shall be recorded”. See sec. 42C. of the Evidence Ordinance [New Version], enacted in 1973 (27 L.S.I. 265). The official translation of the Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981 has not yet been published.

^161a After this survey had already been set in print, the official translation of the Protection of Privacy Law, 5741–1981 was published. See supra n. 159.

¹⁶² Because it held that the manner in which the packages of drugs were achieved, was not in violation of privacy.

¹⁶³ Cr.A. 190/82, 37(i) P.D. 225–303.

¹⁶⁴ The cited sentence is a somewhat “free” translation from the Hebrew, representing the spirit but perhaps not all the exact words of it.

¹⁶⁵ See also the case of Sh. Kishales v. The State of Israel, Cr.A. 288/81, discussed supra at p. 551.

¹⁶⁶ Which are only few of many decided during the period to which this survey applies.

¹⁶⁷ Subject to the conditions set out in the lower Court's decision.

¹⁶⁸ S.P. 82/83, 37(ii) P.D. 738.

¹⁶⁹ Recordings made in Holland of a telephone conversation between a person in Holland and the respondent in Israel.

¹⁷⁰ S.P. 1027/82, 37(i) P.D. 110.

¹⁷¹ Because in regard to proceedings concerned with the charge of murder the Court is not competent to do so.

¹⁷² S.P. 361/83, 37(ii) P.D. 381.

¹⁷³ The release was also conditioned with a certain limitation of movement.

¹⁷⁴ See also E. Kraus v. The State of Israel, S.P. 22/83, 37(i), P.D. 365, where Elon J. dismissed the petitioner's objection to his arrest, despite the fact that another person accused together with the petitioner had been released. Elon J. explained, that the evidence against the other person was not so clear as that against the petitioner.

¹⁷⁵ I.e., that for instance the outcome of the petition depended on when it was filed.

¹⁷⁶ A similar trend, not to discriminate between persons accused together, can be traced in an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of J. Goren and another v. The State of Israel, Cr.A. 301/82, 37(i) P.D. 204, which dealt with the subject of equality in punishment. The court emphasized the prevailing rule in “our judicature” that a policy of uniformity in punishment has to be adhered to in cases and matters identical in their circumstances.

¹⁷⁷ S.P. 1004/82, 37 (i) P.D. 25.

¹⁷⁸ An objection is a sort of appeal.

¹⁷⁹ The situation is different in a case of a suspected person, before an information against him has been filed.

¹⁸⁰ The Judge, however, did not state on which source this assumption rests.

¹⁸¹ The Criminal Procedure Law, (Consolidated Version), 5742–1982 (S.H. 1981/82, p. 43) differentiates between an “objection” and a “reconsideration”. See also: A. Cohen v. The Stale of Israel, S.P. 821/82, 36(iv) P.D. 426, wherein Shamgar D.P. referred to the difference between “objection” and “reconsideration”.

¹⁸² S.P. 1044/82, 37(i) P.D. 78.

¹⁸³ Cr.A. 608/81, 37(i) P.D. 477.

¹⁸⁴ The decision concerned was made in response to a repeated request by the appellant to postpone his imprisonment according to a previous judgment.

¹⁸⁵ Cr.A. 696/81, 37(ii) P.D. 565.

¹⁸⁶ 11 L.S.I. 165.

¹⁸⁷ The official translation reads as follows: “a matter pending in any court if the publication is calculated to influence the course or outcome of the trial”.

¹⁸⁸ Cr.A. 163/82, 37(i) P.D. 622.

¹⁸⁹ 3 L.S.I. 61.

¹⁹⁰ These Regulations will henceforth be referred to as the Emergency Regulations. Reg. 2 (a) was replaced in 1975. See 29 L.S.I. 306.

¹⁹¹ 19 L.S.I. 288.

¹⁹² These places are called “region” in the Emergency Regulations.

¹⁹³ See L.S.I. Special Volume, Penal Law, 5733–1977 at 11. Sec. 3 provides: “The jurisdiction of the courts in Israel in the matter of offences extends to the area of the State and its territorial waters and, by Law, also beyond the said area. Where an offence is committed partly within the jurisdiction, the person who commits it may be tried and punished as if he had committed it wholly within the jurisdiction”.

¹⁹⁴ Unfortunately it is not possible to relate within the limited space of this survey, the detailed deliberations set out in this long judgment, and therefore, the above report concentrates mainly on its conclusions.

¹⁹⁵ Cr. A. 831/80, 36(ii) P.D. 169.

¹⁹⁶ Barak J. explained why he did not suggest refering the case back to the first instance in order to enable the prosecution to prove whether the person who received the firearm had or had not a licence as required.

¹⁹⁷ Cr.A. 185/82, 37(i) P.D. 85.

¹⁹⁸ L.S.I. 144, 152. This section has become sec. 176 of the Penal Law, 5733-1977, and it is not clear to me why the conviction for an offence committed in 1980 rested on the former Law and not on sec. 176 of the Penal Law.

¹⁹⁹ The judgment contains more particulars about the transaction.

²⁰⁰ The exact age had not been established.

²⁰¹ H.C. 60/83, 37(i) P.D. 754.

²⁰² This section was amended in 1980 (34 L.S.I. 62).

²⁰³ Cr.A. 705/81, 36(iv) P.D. 223. The judgment does not disclose by whom it was written, and it appears that all three Justices on the Bench—Ben-Porat J., Barak J., and Sheinbaum J.—cooperated.

²⁰⁴ The judgment does not specify into what place the appellant attempted to break, neither which sec. of the (Penal?) Law was thereby violated by him.

²⁰⁵ In result of the appeal.

²⁰⁶ And not expressed only in insincere words.