¹ See Solove, Daniel, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 941 (1999)Google Scholar; Zurn, Christopher F., Deliberative Democracy and Constitutional Review, 21 Law & Phil. 467 (2002)Google Scholar; Tremblay, Luc B., General Legitimacy of Judicial Review and the Fundamental Basis of Constitutional Law, 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 525 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McDonald, Leighton, Rights, “Dialogue” and Democratic Objections to Judicial Review, 32 Fed. L. Rev. 1 (2004)Google Scholar; Waldron, Jeremy, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Alexander, Larry, Constitutions, Judicial Review, Moral Rights, and Democracy: Disentangling the Issues, in Expounding The Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory 119 (Huscroft, Grant ed., 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fallon, Richard H. Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (2008)Google Scholar; Law, David S., A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 Geo. L.J. 723 (2009)Google Scholar; Harel, Alon & Kahana, Tsvi, The Easy Core Case For Judicial Review, 2 J. Legal Analysis 227 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Such as article 93 of the German Constitution. See Grundgesetz für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [Gg] [Basic Law], 05 23, 1949 Google Scholar, BGB1. I, art. 93.

³ See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.).

⁴ In principle, one can recognize judicial review of the constitutionality of a constitutional amendment without recognizing judicial review of the constitutionality of a statute. in practice, all legal systems that recognize the former also recognize the latter.

⁵ See United Democratic Movement v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC) (S. Aft.).

⁶ I assume that the constitution itself is constitutional. When the argument is that the constitution itself is unconstitutional, additional problems arise that stray beyond the scope of this argument. A good question arose before the Constitutional Court of Peru, where it was argued that the country's Constitution was unconstitutional. The argument was rejected. The Constitutional Court discussed the question of its authority, granted to it by the Constitution, which according to the argument was unconstitutional. See judgment 14-2003 A1/TC of Dec. 17, 2003.1 examine the constitutionality of an amendment to a constitution according to the state's internal law and not in light of international conventions that bind it. See Schnably, Stephen J., Emerging International Law Constraints on Constitutional Structure and Revision: A Preliminary Appraisal, 62 U. Miami L. Rev. 417 (2007–2008)Google Scholar.

⁷ Turkish Const., 1982, art. 148.

⁸ Turkish Const., 1982, art. 4: “The provision of Article 1 of the Constitution establishing the form of the state as a Republic, the provisions in Article 2 on the characteristics of the Republic, and the provision of Article 3 shall not be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed.”

⁹ Turkish Const., 1982, art. 1 : “The Turkish state is a Republic.”

¹⁰ Turkish Const., 1982, art. 2: “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law….”

¹¹ See Gözler, Kemal, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments: A Comparative Study 23–24 (2008)Google Scholar.

¹² Decision of June 16, 1970, No. 1970/31, 8 AMKD 313 (1970), referred to by Gözler, supra note 11, at 40.

¹³ Decision of Apr. 3, 1971, No. 1971/37, 9 AMKD 416 (1971). Gözler, supra note 11, at 97 quotes the judgment (at 428–29), according to which the constitutional amendment must fulfill the “requirements of contemporary civilization” and must not violate “the coherence and system of the constitution.”

¹⁴ See Gözler, supra note 11, at 96.

¹⁵ Turkish Const., 1961, as amended in 1971, art. 147.

¹⁶ Decision of Apr. 15, 1975, No. 1975/87, 13 AMKD 403 (1975), referred to in Gözler, supra note 11, at 42.

¹⁷ Decision of Oct. 12, 1976, No. 1976/46, 14 AMKD 134-36 (1976), referred to in Gözler, supra note 11, at 43.

¹⁸ Decision of Jan. 28,1977, No. 1977/4,15 AMKD 106-31 (1977), referred to in Gözler, supra note 11, at 44.

¹⁹ Ozbudun, Ergun, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in Turkey, 15 Eur. Pub. L. 533 (2009)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Decision of June 8, 1987, No. 1987/15, 23 AMKD 282 (1987).

²¹ Decision of June 5, 2008, No. 2008/116.

²² This ruling was probably influenced by the German approach, and mainly by Conrad, Dietrich, Limitation of Amendment Procedures and Constituent Power, 15–16 Indian Y.B. Int'L Aff. 347, 394 (1966–1967)Google Scholar.

²³ The central book that guides the case law and literature in India on the subject of unconstitutional constitutional amendments is Krishnaswamy, Sudhir, Democracy and Constitutionalism in India: a Study of The Basic Structure Doctrine (2009)Google Scholar. See also Garg, R.D., Phantom of Basic Structure of the Constitution: A Critical Appraisal of the Kesavananda Case, 16 J. Indian L. Inst. 243 (1974)Google Scholar; Baxi, Upendra, The Constitutional Quicksands of Kesavananda Bharati and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 1 Sup. Ct. Cases. J. 45 (1974)Google Scholar; Palkhivala, N.A., Fundamental Rights Case: Comment, 4 Sup. Ct. Cases. J. 57 (1973)Google Scholar; Rao, P.P., Basic Features of the Constitution, 2 Sup. Ct. Cases. J. 1 (2002)Google Scholar; Sathe, P.A., Amendability of Fundamental Rights: Golaknath and the Proposed Constitutional Amendment, Sup. Ct. Cases. J. 33 (1969)Google Scholar; Tripathi, P.K., Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala: Who Wins? 1 Sup. Ct. Cases. J. 3 (1974)Google Scholar; Desai, A., Constitutional Amendments and the “Basic Structure “ Doctrine, in Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law 90 (Lyer, Venkat ed., 2000)Google Scholar.

²⁴ See Jacobsohn, Gary J., An Unconstitutional Constitution? A Comparative Perspective, 4 Int'L J. Const. L. 460 (2006)Google Scholar; Morgan, David G., The Indian “Essential Features “ Case, 30 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 307 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Abraham, Mathew, Judicial Role in Constitutional Amendments in India: The Basic Structure Doctrine, in The Creation and Amendment of Constitutional Norms 195 (Andenas, Mads ed., 2000)Google Scholar; O'Connell, Rory, Guardian of the Constitution: Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms, 4 J. Civ. Lib. 48 (1999)Google Scholar.

²⁵ Golaknath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643 (India).

²⁶ See Sankari Prasad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458 (India); Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 845 (India).

²⁷ Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225 (India).

²⁸ Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 229 (India).

²⁹ Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 (India).

³⁰ Sambamurthy v. Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1125 (India); Chandrakumae v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C 1125 (India).

³¹ Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl. No. 1/1930, as last amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBl I No. 2/2008, art. 140(1) (Austria).

³² Verfassungsgerichthof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court], Dec. 12, 1952, Erkenntnisse und Beschlüsse des Verfassungsgerichthofes [VFSLG] No. 2455/1952 (Austria).

³³ See Pfersmann, Otto, La révision constitutionnelle en Autriche et en Allemagne fédérale: théorie, pratique, limites, in La RèVision de la Constitution 7, 40 (1993)Google Scholar.

³⁴ See Comella, Victor Ferreres, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: a European Perspective 106 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ See Dyzenhaus, David, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Klein, Claude, The Eternal Constitution-Contrasting Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, in Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt: a Juxtaposition (Diner, Dan & Stolleis, Michael ed., 1999)Google Scholar.

³⁶ Schmitt, Carl, Constitutional Theory 150 (Seitzer, Jeffrey trans., Duke University Press, 2008) (1928)CrossRefGoogle Scholar:

The boundaries of the authority for constitutional amendments result from the properly understood concept of constitutional change. The authority to “amend the constitution,” granted by constitutional legislation, means that other constitutional provisions can substitute for individual or multiple ones. They may do so, however, only under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the constitution as an entirety is preserved. This means the authority for constitutional amendment contains only the grant of authority to undertake changes, additions, extensions, deletions, etc., in constitutional provisions that preserve the constitution itself. It is not the authority to establish a new constitution, nor is it the authority to change the particular basis of this jurisdiction for constitutional revisions.

³⁷ See Dietze, Gottfreid, Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms? Constitutional Development in Postwar Germany, 42 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1956)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ Judgment of April 4, 1950, published in 2 Verwaltungsrechtsprechung No. 65 (1950). in this case, a provision of the Constitution of Bavaria was examined (art. 184), according to which the provisions of the Constitution could not derogate from the effect of legislation from the Nazi period. The Constitutional Court of Bavaria annulled that provision, ruling that it was unconstitutional.

³⁹ Id. Justice Sussman translated the German into Hebrew, quoting this passage in EA 1/65 Yeredor v. The Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset 19(2) PD 365, 390 [1965] (Isr.).

⁴⁰ See Juristenzeitung 35 (1954)Google Scholar. For translations of parts of some of the judgments, see Dietze, supra note 37, at 18. See also Kommers, Donald P., The Constitutional Jurisprudence of The Federal Republic of Germany 48 (2d ed. 1997)Google Scholar; 30 Entscheidungen Des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Bverfge] [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court] 1 (1970)Google Scholar (Klass case).

⁴¹ The source of these provisions is in article 79(3) of the Constitution, which states: “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Lander, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.”

⁴² For analysis of this case, see Gözler, supra note 11, at 56.

⁴³ On certain occasions, dissenting opinions have denounced the constitutionality of the amendment. See O'Connell, supra note 24; Kommers, Donald P., German Constitutionalism—A Prolegomenon, 40 Emory L.J. 837 (1991)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

⁴⁵ U.S. Const., art. I, § 3.

⁴⁶ See U.S. Const., art. V: “… no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall be in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article….”

⁴⁷ See Gözler, supra note 11, at 28.

⁴⁸ See State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).

⁴⁹ See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). so Id. at 459.

⁵¹ See Skinner, George D., Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional Amendment, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 213 (1920)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Marbury, William L., The Limitations Upon the Amending Power, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 223 (1919–1920)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tribe, Laurence H., The Constitution We Are Amending: in Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 433 (1983–1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dellinger, Walter, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386 (1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rosen, Jeff, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 Yale L.J. 1073 (1990–1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ku, Raymond, Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 535 (1995–1996)Google Scholar; Mazzone, Jason, Unamendments, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1747 (2004–2005)Google Scholar.

⁵² See Ir. Const., 1997, art. 46.

⁵³ See O'Connell, supra note 24, at 61.

⁵⁴ Maia, Luciano, The Creation and Amendment Process in the Brazilian Constitution, in The Creation and Amendment of Constitutional Norms 54, 9 (Andenas, Mads ed., 2000)Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Id.

⁵⁶ See Gözler, supra note 11, at 47.

⁵⁷ See Constitución Política de la República de Chile [Constitution], 1980, art. 82(2) (Chile).

⁵⁸ See Gözler, supra note 11, at 5.

⁵⁹ S. Afr. Const., art. 167(4)(d). See also Sachs, Albie, South Africa's Unconstitutional Constitution: The Transition From Power to Lawful Power, 41 St. Louis U. L.J. 1249 (1996–1997)Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ See State v. Lennon, [1935] 1 Ir. 170, 198 (Ir.); Abortion Information, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 81 (Ir.); Riordan v. An Taoiseach, [1999] I.E.S.C. 1 (Ir.).

⁶¹ See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,459 (1939).

⁶² See supra section II.B.

⁶³ See supra section II.B.

⁶⁴ See Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 (India).

⁶⁵ On the “eternity clause,” see Sharon Wintel, “Eternal Clauses” in the Constitution: The Strict Normative Standard in Operating the “Constituent Power” (5766-2005) (unpublished LL.D. thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem). On constitutional amendments that violate Italy's eternity clause on the republican character of the government (in art. 139), see Corte Constituzionale, No. 1046/1988, Dec. 15-29, 1988. On a similar approach in Portugal, whose constitution includes a long list of eternity clauses (in art. 288), see Comella, supra note 34, at 107.

⁶⁶ See supra section II.D.

⁶⁷ See supra section II.A.

⁶⁸ See Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225 (India).

⁶⁹ See supra section II.B.

⁷⁰ Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 (India).

⁷¹ See Comella, supra note 34, at 107.

⁷² It is my opinion that this is also the case if the constitutional amendment (as opposed to the creation of a new constitution) is brought forth by means of a referendum.

⁷³ See Barak, Aharon, The Judge in a Democracy 20 (2006)Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ See supra section II.B.

⁷⁵ See Barak, Aharon, Purposive Interpretation in Law 373, 390 (2005)Google Scholar. See also Black, Charles L., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 39 (1969)Google Scholar; Tribe, Laurence H., The Invisible Constitution (2008)Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ See Barak, Aharon, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations 53 (2012)Google Scholar; see also Kirk, Jeremy, Constitutional Implications (I): Nature, Legitimacy, Classification, Examples, 24 Melb. U.L. Rev. 645 (2000)Google Scholar; Kirk, Jeremy, Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy, 25 Melb. U.L. Rev. 24 (2001)Google Scholar; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Two Ways to Derive Implied Constitutional Rights, in Legal Interpretation in Democratic States (Campbell, T.D. & Denys-Goldsworthy, J. eds., 2002);Google Scholar Barak, supra note 75, at 373.

⁷⁷ See HCJ 2257/04 Chadash-Ta'al Party v. Chairman of the Knesset Election Committee 58(6) PD 685 [2004] (Isr.); Krishnaswamy, supra note 23, at 131.

⁷⁸ See Verkuil, Paul R., The American Constitutional Tradition of Shared and Separated Powers: Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law, and the Idea of Independence, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 301 (1989)Google Scholar; Götz, Volkmar, Legislative and Executive Power Under the Constitutional Requirements Entailed in the Principle of the Rule of Law, in New Challenges to the German Basic Law 141 (Starcked., C., 1991)Google Scholar; Walters, Mark D., The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law, 51 U. Toronto L.J. 91 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Leclair, Jean, Canada's Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles, 27 Queen'S L.J. 389 (2002)Google Scholar; Mullan, David, The Role for Underlying Constitutional Principles in a Bill of Rights World, 2004 N.Z. L. Rev. 9 Google Scholar; Seedorf, Sebastian & Sibanda, Sanele, Separation of Powers, in Constitutional Law of South Africa 12–36 (Woolman, Stuart, Roux, Theunis & Bishop, Michael eds., 2008)Google Scholar; Walters, Mark D., Written Constitutions and Unwritten Constitutionalism, in Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory 245 (Huscroft, Grant ed., 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gerangelos, Peter A., The Separation of Powers and Legislative Interference, in Judicial Process: Constitutional Principles and Limitations (Gerangelos, Peter A. ed., 2009)Google Scholar; Goldsworthy, Jeffery, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates 61 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721,752 (Can.); Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 66 (India); Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 74 (CC) (S. Afr.); Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v. Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC)(S. Afr.); Doctors of Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) (S. Afr.).

⁷⁹ See HCJ 2257/04 Chadash-Ta'al Party v. Chairman of the Knesset Election Committee 58(6) PD 685 [2004] (Isr.); Krishnaswamy, supra note 23, at 131.

⁸⁰ See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.); Navot, Suzie, The Constitutional Law of Israel 115 (2007)Google Scholar.

⁸¹ See 1 Amnon Rubinstein & Barak Medina, Constitutional Law in the State of Israel 74 (6th ed. 2005) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar; Klein, Claude, The Constitutional Convention in the State of Israel, 2 Mishpatim 51 (1970) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar; Klein, Claude, After the Mizrahi Bank Case-The Constitutional Power in the Mirror of the Supreme Court, 28 Mishpatim 341 (1997) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar; Dotan, Yoav, A Constitution for Israel? The Constitutional Dialogue after “the Constitutional Revolution,” 27 Mishpatim (1996) 149 (in Hebrew)Google Scholar; Bendor, Ariel, The Legal Status of the Basic Laws, in Sefer Berenson 119 (Barak, Aharon & Berenson, Hayim eds., 2000) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.

⁸² See HCJ 4676/94 Meatrael Ltd. v. The Knesset 50(5) PD 15, 28 [1996] (Isr.). in the United Mizrahi Bank case, supra note 80, I left open for review the question regarding the Israeli Knesset's “abuse” of its constituent authority. Constitutional amendments are not subject to the limitations clause. See HCJ 1368/94 Porat v. The Government of Israel 57(5) PD 913, 914 [1994] (Isr.). The limitations clause is intended to restrict the “regular lawmaker.” It is not intended to limit the Knesset as a constitutional council.

⁸³ See HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset (May 11, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) para. 74 (Barak, P.) (Isr.).

⁸⁴ See HCJ 4676/94 Meatrael Ltd. v. The Knesset 50(5) PD 15, 28 [1996] (Isr.).

⁸⁵ Id.

⁸⁶ See The Movement for Quality Government in Israel case, supra note 83, but see also the dissenting opinion of Vice President Cheshin. Equality will remain part of Israel's common law.