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Administrative Detention by Non-State Armed Groups: Legal Basis and Procedural Safeguards

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2020

Maria Gavrilova
Maria Gavrilova*
Affiliation:
Legal Adviser to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Regional Delegation for the Russian Federation, Belarus and Moldova; maria.s.gavrilova@gmail.com.
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Abstract

The realities of contemporary armed conflicts with a complex interweaving net of actors are rarely reminiscent of classic combat scenarios envisaged by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions. The scarcity of conventional regulation of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), coupled with the non-state character of the majority of detaining powers, lead to lack of clarity regarding the legal regime of detention of persons captured by non-state armed groups (NSAGs). In the absence of an explicit authorisation for internment under the international humanitarian law applicable to NIACs, recent developments in case law have induced a scholarly debate on what is the legal basis for administrative detention carried out by these actors. The article analyses key arguments presented by both sides of the debate, concluding that neither side can demonstrate either the existence or the absence of the authorisation in question, while the discussion itself has limited practical value in regulating the conduct of NSAGs. At the same time, the practice of states, although still ambivalent, points to the gradual transformation of mere legality, or the so-called ‘inherent power’ to intern, into a customary provision providing a legal basis for administrative detention by NSAGs.

Keywords

international humanitarian lawdetentioninternmentnon-state armed groups
Type
Articles
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 53 , Issue 1 , March 2020 , pp. 35 - 70
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2020

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Footnotes

The article reflects only the views of the author and not necessarily those of the ICRC.

References

1 Unless applied to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) by analogy or building up the basis for customary international humanitarian law (IHL).

2 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (GC III), art 3; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (GC IV), art 3.

3 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (AP II), arts 5–6.

4 ICRC, ‘The Roots of Restraint in War’, 18 June 2018, 13.

5 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, [110], [119].

6 See Clapham, Andrew, ‘Detention by Armed Groups under International Law’ (2017) 93 International Law Studies 1Google Scholar; Mačák, Kubo, ‘A Needle in a Haystack? Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2015) 45 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 87Google Scholar; Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande, ‘Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?’, EJIL: Talk!, 7 May 2014, https://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts; Sean Aughey and Aurel Sari, ‘IHL Does Authorise Detention in NIAC: What the Sceptics Get Wrong’, EJIL: Talk!, 11 February 2015, https://www.ejiltalk.org/ihl-does-authorise-detention-in-niac-what-the-sceptics-get-wrong; Murray, Daragh, ‘Non-State Armed Groups, Detention Authority in Non-International Armed Conflict, and the Coherence of International Law: Searching for a Way Forward’ (2017) 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 435CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sivakumaran, Sandesh, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 2014) 301–05Google Scholar; Debuf, Els, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed Conflict (Hart 2013) 451–98Google Scholar; Hill-Cawthorne, Lawrence, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 2016) 66–107Google Scholar.

7 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) (UK), [232]–[268].

8 See, eg, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222 (ECHR), arts 5 and 15; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), arts 4 and 9.

9 ICRC, Annual Report 2016, May 2017, 82, 512.

10 See, eg, Zegveld, Liesbeth, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2002) 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 101–05; Eric David, ‘IHL and Non-State Actors: Synopsis of the Issue’ (2003) 27 Collegium, Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium: Relevance of International Humanitarian Law to Non-State Actors, 25–26 October 2002, 27, 35; Haye, Eve La, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2008) 119–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Milanović, Marko, ‘Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (And Why We Should Care)’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 25, 38–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moir, Lindsay, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2002) 52–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 96–99.

11 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Cambridge University Press 2016) (Commentary on GC I) paras 505–08; Sandoz, Yves, Swinarski, Christophe and Zimmermann, Bruno (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols (ICRC and Martinus Nijhoff 1987)Google Scholar (Commentary on the Additional Protocols) paras 4442–44.

12 Kleffner, Jann K, ‘The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Organized Armed Groups’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 443CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 444. See also the authors cited at n 10.

13 AP II (n 3) art 1.

14 Jean S Pictet (ed), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (ICRC 1960) 35.

15 ibid 35–36.

16 ibid 36.

17 Tadić (n 5) [70]; ICTR, Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4, Trial Chamber I, 2 September 1998,  [620]; ICC, Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, Trial Chamber III, 21 March 2016, [128].

18 See, eg, Sivakumaran (n 6) 170–80; Dinstein, Yoram, Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moir (n 10) 36–38; ICRC, ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?’, Opinion Paper, March 2008, 3–5.

19 ICTY, Prosecutor v Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu, Judgment, IT-03-66-T, Trial Chamber II, 30 November 2005 (Limaj and Others), [89]; ICTY, Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski & Johan Tarčulovski, Judgment, IT-04-82, Trial Chamber II, 10 July 2008 (Boškoski & Tarčulovski), [197];

20 ICTY, Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, Judgment, IT-04-84-T, Trial Chamber I, 3 April 2008 (Haradinaj and Others), [60]; Boškoski & Tarčulovski (n 19) [199]–[203].

21 ICTR, Prosecutor v Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Judgment, ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Chamber I, 6 December 1999, [93]; Limaj and Others (n 19) [90]; ICTY, Prosecutor v Mile Mrkšić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šljivančanin, Judgment, IT-95-13/1-T, Trial Chamber II, 27 September 2007, [407].

22 ICRC (n 4) 21–24.

23 Haradinaj and Others (n 20) [60]; ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007, [234];

24 Boškoski & Tarčulovski (n 19) [196]–[197[; Sivakumaran (n 6) 174–80; Dinstein (n 18) 32.

25 Commentary on GC I (n 11) para 429.

26 AP II (n 3) art 1; See also Akayesu (n 17) [626]; ICTY, Prosecutor v Enver Hadžihasanović, Mehmed Alagić, Amir Kubura, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, IT-01-47-PT, Trial Chamber, 12 November 2002, [87]; Boškoski & Tarčulovski (n 19) [197].

27 Commentary on GC I (n 11) paras 447–51.

28 Dinstein (n 18) 17–18; Sivakumaran (n 6) 182.

29 Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 11) paras 4453, 4464–67.

30 ibid paras 4454, 4457.

31 Commentary on GC I (n 11) para 385.

32 Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 11) para 4466.

33 Boškoski & Tarčulovski (n 19) [197].

34 ICRC, ‘Detention’, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/detention.

35 ECtHR, Storck v Germany, App no 61603/00, 16 June 2005, para 74.

36 ibid; see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person) (7–31  October 2014), UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/35 (General Comment No 35), para 6.

37 Pejic, Jelena, ‘Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence’ (2005) 87 International Review of the Red Cross 375, 375–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38 GC III (n 2) art 21; GC IV (n 2) art 41.

39 AP II (n 3) art 5.

40 ICRC, ‘Strengthening International Humanitarian Law Protecting Persons Deprived of Their Liberty: Concluding Report’, 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 32IC/15/19.1, October 2015, 9.

41 Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 11) para 3063; ICRC, ‘Strengthening Legal Protection for Persons Deprived of Their Liberty in relation to Non-International Armed Conflict: Regional Consultations 2012–13’, Background Paper, 10.

42 Commentary on GC I (n 11) para 718; Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 1.

43 See, eg, Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 1; Clapham (n 6) 5–7; Mačák (n 6) 95.

44 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (entered in force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (AP I), preamble; GC III (n 2) art 3.

45 See Commentary on GC I (n 11) para 504; Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 11) para 4442.

46 Sivakumaran (n 6) 242–46; Somer, Jonathan, ‘Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of Belligerents in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 655, 656–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mačák, Kubo, Internationalized Armed Conflicts in International Law (Oxford University Press 2018) 146–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 See, eg, Dinstein (n 18) 65–68; Somer (n 46) 663–64; Moir (n 10) 65–67.

48 Zegveld (n 10) 151–52; Kleffner (n 12) 454–56.

49 Sivakumaran (n 6) 562–64.

50 International Law Commission, ‘Identification of Customary International Law: Text of the Draft Conclusions as Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading’ (17 May 2018), UN Doc A/CN.4/L.908, Conclusion 4: Requirement of Practice, para 3; see also Wood, Michael, ‘The Evolution and Identification of the Customary International Law of Armed Conflict’ (2018) 51 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 727, 731–33Google Scholar.

51 Statute of the International Court of Justice (entered in force 24 October 1945) 33 UNTS 993, art 38.

52 The drafting history of AP II can serve as a clear illustration of this attitude: see Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 11) paras 4412–15.

53 Even in the case of the prolonged armed conflict in Syria, state authorities refer to hostilities as ‘crisis’: see, eg, ‘Al-Jaafari: Terrorism of ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and Negative Intervention in Syrian Affairs are Real Obstacles in Front of Humanitarian Work in Syria’, Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, 27 July 2017, https://www.un.int/syria/statements_speeches/al-jaafari-terrorism-isis-jabhat-al-nusra-and-negative-intervention-syrian. For more examples of states’ unwillingness to admit the state of a NIAC see Watkin, Kenneth, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries: Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary Conflict (Oxford University Press 2016) 176–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54 Fleck, Dieter, ‘The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict’ in Fleck, Dieter (ed), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 590Google Scholar.

55 See, eg, ICTY, Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgment, IT-95-14/1-T, Trial Chamber, 25 June 1999, [211]–[230].

56 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (entered in force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art 31(3)(b).

57 It does not mean, however, that by virtue of this conclusion NSAGs would acquire any special standing under domestic law or avoid prosecution for unlawful deprivation of liberty in accordance with the criminal code of a particular state.

58 Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (n 6); Kevin Jon Heller, ‘IHL Does Not Authorise Detention in NIAC: A Response to Murray’, OpinioJuris, 22 March 2017, http://opiniojuris.org/2017/03/22/33037.

59 See, eg, Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 70; Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (n 6).

60 See, eg, Aleksovski (n 55) [222]–[228]; ICTY, Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvočka, Milojica Kos, Mlađo Radić, Zoran Žigić, Dragoljub Prcać, Judgment, IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber I, 2 November 2001, [124], [159]–[174].

61 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (Rome Statute), arts 8(2)(c)(i)–(ii).

62 Provided those attacked were not hors de combat and provisions regulating the use of means and methods of warfare were complied with: see Dinstein (n 18) 226.

63 Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 73–74; Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (n 6).

64 Doswald-Beck, Louise, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (Oxford University Press 2011) 262–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

65 The conduct outlawed by IHL would equally be rendered illegal during peacetime by virtue of the application of IHRL in the absence of a valid ground for derogation. The law enforcement paradigm either encompasses the same prohibition (eg criminalising rape and the use of torture) or imposes stricter requirements when it comes to the use of lethal force and guarantees against arbitrary deprivation of liberty: see, eg, Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, UNGA Res 34/169 (17 December 1979), UN Doc A/RES/34/169, art 3; Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 27 August to 7 September 1990, paras 4–5.

66 For a comprehensive comparison of the IHL and IHRL frameworks in respect of the right to life and the right to liberty see Doswald-Beck (n 64) 161–92, 253–76.

67 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (entered into force 29 April 1997) 1974 UNTS 45, art 1(5).

68 For further detail see Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law – Vol I: Rules (ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2005) (ICRC Study), rr 75, 263–65.

69 Bongard, Pascal, ‘Engaging Armed Non-State Actors on Humanitarian Norms: Reflections on Geneva Call's Experience’ (2013) 58 Humanitarian Exchange 9, 10–11Google Scholar.

70 Bangerter, Olivier, ‘Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect International Humanitarian Law or Not’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 353, 358–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 377–78.

71 Rome Statute (n 61) art 8(2)(c)(iii).

72 Kubo Mačák, ‘No Legal Basis under IHL for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts? A Comment on Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence’, EJIL: Talk!, 5 May 2014, https://www.ejiltalk.org/no-legal-basis-under-ihl-for-detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts-a-comment-on-serdar-mohammed-v-ministry-of-defence.

73 Debuf (n 6) 466.

74 AP II (n 3) preamble, para 4; Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 11) para 4440.

75 Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 11) paras 4412–16.

76 Melzer, Nils, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC 2009) 46–64Google Scholar.

77 Aughey, Sean and Sari, Aurel, ‘Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: Serdar Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence’ (2015) 91 International Law Studies 60Google Scholar, 95.

78 For an overview of the debate see Murray (n 6) 442–44.

79 ibid 443.

80 Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 69.

81 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser 3) 461 (entered into force 26 January 1910) (Hague IV), preamble.

82 AP I (n 44) preamble.

83 Commentary to the Additional Protocols (n 11) paras 4414–15.

84 ibid para 4441.

85 ICCPR (n 8) art 9; American Convention on Human Rights (entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123, art 7; ECHR (n 8) art 5; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217, art 6.

86 ECtHR, Al-Jedda v UK, App no 27021/08, 7 July 2011, para 99; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), ‘Report on Terrorism and Human Rights’, 22 October 2002, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, para 127; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AComHPR), ‘Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa’, 28 July 2016, 31.

87 See, eg, Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 24 December 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/22/44.

88 The existence of a legal basis is not the only requirement found in the jurisprudence of the human rights bodies; however, it is the one that is universally accepted because of the similarity in formulations used in human rights instruments: see, eg, ECtHR, Witold Litwa v Poland, App no 26629/95, 4 April 2000, para 72; General Comment No 35 (n 36) para 11; Case of Gangaram -Panday v Suriname (1994) Inter-Am Ct HR, Judgment of 21 January 1994, (Ser C) No 16, [47].

89 See, eg, Heller (n 58).

90 See ICRC Study (n 68) rule 99, 347–52.

91 In reality, the proportion will be significantly higher given the number of NSAGs taking part in armed conflicts and the existence of NIAC without the involvement of any state.

92 Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 91–95; Ryan Goodman, ‘Authorization versus Regulation of Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2015) 91 International Law Studies 155, 163–65.

93 Murray (n 6) 448.

94 See Pictet (n 14) 30–34.

95 ibid 27–28.

96 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (entered into force 19 June 1931) 118 LNTS 343, art 1; Hague IV (n 81) arts 3, 5.

97 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863 (Lieber Code), art 134.

98 Institute of International Law, ‘The Laws of War on Land’, 9 September 1880 (Oxford Manual), part II(III)(B).

99 GC IV (n 2) art 27.

100 ibid art 132.

101 GC III (n 2) art 118.

102 GC IV (n 2) arts 42, 78.

103 Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 77–83.

104 Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, ‘The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines’, 19 October 2012 (Copenhagen Principles), Chairman's Commentary to the Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, para 4.4.

105 ECtHR, Hassan v UK, App no 29750/09, 16 September 2014, para 104; Case of Coard and Others v US (1999) IACHR, Report No 109/99, 29 September 1999, [45]–[59].

106 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (13 April 2006), UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, paras 5–20.

107 ICRC, ‘Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges’, Opinion Paper, November 2014, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/internment-armed-conflict-basic-rules-and-challenges; see also ICRC, ‘Strengthening International Humanitarian Law Protecting Persons Deprived of Their Liberty: Resolution’, 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 8–10 December 2015, 32IC/15/R1, preamble.

108 See, eg, Mačák (n 6) 105–106.

109 Commentary on GC I (n 11) para 728.

110 See, eg, Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 70–73; Debuf (n 6) 469–73.

111 Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (n 6).

112 Debuf (n 6) 460–61.

113 ibid 472–73.

114 See Section 2.3.

115 Charter of the United Nations (entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 103.

116 For an overview of the debate on the interrelation between IHL and IHRL and divergences in the practice of human rights institutions, see Sassòli, Marco and Olson, Laura M, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 599CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Heintze, Hans-Joachim, ‘On the Relationship between Human Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law’ (2004) 86 International Review of the Red Cross 789Google Scholar; Tomuschat, Christian, ‘Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scobbie, Iain, ‘Principle or Pragmatics? The Relationship between Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2009) 14 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 449CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Droege, Cordula, ‘The Interplay between International Humanitarian law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict’ (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 310CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

117 Debuf (n 6) 472–73; Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (n 6); Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 71.

118 See, eg, Al-Jedda (n 86) para 60; ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, App no 61498/08, 2 March 2010, para 111.

119 Hassan (n 105) para 77.

120 ECtHR, Isayeva v Russia, App no 57950/00, 24 February 2005, paras 12–28, 172–201; ECtHR, Abuyeva and Others v Russia, App no 27065/05, 2 December 2010, paras 7–9, 196–203.

121 ECHR (n 8) art 5.

122 Hassan (n 105) paras 104–05.

123 Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 US 507 (2004), 521; also the position of the UK in Serdar Mohammed (n 7).

124 Debuf, Els, ‘Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict, Chatham House and International Committee of the Red Cross, London, 22–23 September 2008’ (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 859, 863–64Google Scholar.

125 Copenhagen Principles (n 104) Principle 4.

126 ibid, Chairman's Commentary to the Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, paras 4.1–4.4.

127 Al-Jedda (n 86) paras 102–109.

128 Hassan (n 105) paras 104–105.

129 See, eg, Al-Jedda (n 86) para 100; ECtHR, A and Others v UK, App no 3455/05, 19 February 2009, para 172.

130 See, eg, Heller (n 58); Murray (n 6) 450–51.

131 GC III (n 2) art 3; AP II (n 3) arts 5–6.

132 For the most elaborated list of war crimes see Rome Statute (n 61) art 8.

133 Meaning the amnesties under AP II (n 3) art 6(5).

134 See Section 2.3.

135 Rome Statute (n 61) arts 8(2)(c), 8(2)(e).

136 ibid art 7.

137 ibid art 7.

138 Sassòli and Olson (n 116) 603–05.

139 See, eg, Al-Jedda (n 86) para 100; A and Others (n 129) para 172; ECtHR, Ireland v United Kingdom, App no 5310/71, 18 January 1978, para 196.

140 Hassan (n 105) paras 98–105.

141 For an overview of the key findings of the ECtHR see, eg, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, ‘The Grand Chamber Judgment in Hassan v UK’, EJIL: Talk!, 16 September 2014, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-grand-chamber-judgment-in-hassan-v-uk; De Koker, Cedric, ‘Hassan v United Kingdom: The Interaction of Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law with regard to the Deprivation of Liberty in Armed Conflicts’ (2015) 31 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

142 Case of Arturo Ribón Avilán and 10 Others v Colombia, Case 11.142 (1997) IACHR, Report No 26/97, 30 September 1997, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc 6 rev, [132]; Case of Juan Carlos Abella v Argentina, Case 11.137 (1997) IACHR, Report No 55/97, 18 November 1997, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc 6 rev (Juan Carlos Abella) [157]–[171].

143 Case of Las Palmeras v Colombia (2000) Inter-Am Ct HR, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 4 February 2000, (Ser C) No 67, [34].

144 AP II (n 3) art 6; AP I (n 44) art 75.

145 Murray, Daragh, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups (Hart 2016) 223Google Scholar.

146 GC IV (n 2) arts 42–43.

147 GC III (n 2) art 110.

148 GC IV (n 2) art 27; See Commentary on GC I (n 11) para 721; Debuf (n 124) 862–66.

149 GC IV (n 2) art 42 (emphasis added).

150 ibid art 78 (emphasis added).

151 See Section 3.4.

152 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 29: States of Emergency (Article 4) (31 August 2001), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para 11.

153 Commentary on GC I (n 11) paras 717–32.

154 AP II (n 3) art 4.

155 For a detailed discussion on the justifiability of status-based detention see Aughey and Sari (n 77) 89–94.

156 Melzer (n 76) 27–36.

157 See Schmitt, Michael N, ‘The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis’ (2010) 1 Harvard National Security Journal 5, 21–24Google Scholar; Akande, Dapo, ‘Clearing the Fog of War? The ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 180, 186–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

158 Murray (n 145) 241–46.

159 See nn 94–95.

160 The applicability of the first two requirements elaborated in this article for civilian internees in times of armed conflict was confirmed by the practice of the UN Human Rights Council: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court (6 July 2015), UN Doc A/HRC/30/37, para 9, Annex, paras 9–10.

161 ICCPR (n 8) art 9(2); American Convention on Human Rights (n 85) art 7(4); ECHR (n 8) art 5(2). The rare exception to this rule is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (n 85), provisions of which do not explicitly provide for this guarantee. This omission has been compensated by resolutions and the jurisprudence of the AComHPR: see Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial, March 1992, AComHPR Doc Res.4(XI)92 (AComHPR Resolution).

162 Greenwood, Christopher, ‘International Law and the “War against Terrorism”’ (2002) 78 International Affairs 301CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 316.

163 ICCPR (n 8) art 9(3); American Convention on Human Rights (n 85) art 7(5); ECHR (n 8) art 5(3). Although the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (n 85) does not explicitly provide for this guarantee, the validity of the guarantee has been confirmed in the practice of the AComHPR: see AComHPR Resolution (n 161) para 2(b).

164 AP II (n 3) art 6(2); Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32: Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to Fair Trial (23 August 2007), UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32, para 19.

165 Hassan (n 105) para 106; Human Rights Council, Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: Detailed Findings (23 February 2016), UN Doc A/HRC/31/CRP.3, para 128.

166 Customary international law did not outlaw the performance of such a review by quasi-judicial and/or military bodies as long as necessary requirements are met: ICRC Study (n 68) rr 100, 355–57.

167 ECtHR, Findlay v UK, App no 22107/93, 25 February 1997, paras 74–80.

168 Case of Durand and Ugarte v Peru (2000) Inter-Am Ct HR, Judgment of 16 August 2000, (Ser C) No 68, [126].

169 Clapham (n 6) 16; Coard and Others (n 105) para 58.

170 See, eg, Copenhagen Principles (n 104) Principle 12; General Comment No 35 (n 36) para 12.

171 Pejic (n 37) 388.

172 Sassòli, Marco and Shany, Yuval, ‘Should the Obligations of States and Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law Really Be Equal?’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 425CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

173 Bangerter (n 70) 368–83.

174 Hyeran Jo, Compliant Rebels (Cambridge University Press 2017) 53–79.

175 For an overview see Sivakumaran, Sandesh, ‘Courts of Armed Opposition Groups: Fair Trials or Summary Justice?’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 489CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

176 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ Rep 136; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment [2006] ICJ Rep 6; Isayeva (n 120); Abuyeva (n 120); Juan Carlos Abella (n 142) [158].

177 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Wiesner, Cornelius, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State: A Possible Contribution from Customary International Law?’ in Kolb, Robert and Gaggioli, Gloria (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 146, 149–52Google Scholar.

178 It was one of the key arguments considered in the doctrine in support of the direct applicability of IHL to NSAGs.

179 See the synopsis of the performance of armed groups in Katharine Fortin, ‘The Application of Human Rights Law to Everyday Civilian Life under Rebel Control’ (2016) 63 Netherlands International Law Review 161.

180 Henckaerts and Wiesner (n 177).

181 Clapham, Andrew, ‘Human Rights Obligations for Non-State Actors: Where Are We Now?’ in Lafontaine, Fannie and Larocque, François (eds), Doing Peace the Rights Way: Essays in International Law and Relations in Honour of Louise Arbour (Intersentia 2019) 11Google Scholar.

182 Hill-Cawthorne (n 6) 217–21.

183 Constantinides, Aristotelis, ‘Human Rights Obligations and Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups: The Practice of the UN Security Council’ (2010) 4 Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 89Google Scholar.

184 Rodley, Nigel S, ‘Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?’ in Clapham, Andrew (ed), Human Rights and Non-State Actors (Edward Elgar 2013) 836Google Scholar.

185 Daragh Murray, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups?’, EJIL: Talk!, 2 November 2016, http://www.ejiltalk.org/book-discussion-introducing-daragh-murrays-human-rights-obligations-of-non-state-armed-groups-2.

186 Henckaerts and Wiesner (n 177) 161–62.

187 See, eg, Murray (n 145) 177–202.

188 Institute of International Law, ‘The Application of International Humanitarian Law and Fundamental Human Rights, in Armed Conflicts in which Non-State Entities are Parties’, Session of Berlin – 1999, 25 August 1999, paras II–IV, http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1999_ber_03_en.pdf.

189 Rodley (n 184) 854.

190 Henckaerts and Wiesner (n 177) 159–60.

191 See, eg, Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (5 February 2013), UN Doc A/HRC/22/59, paras 10, 64.

192 See UNSC Res 2332 (21 December 2016), UN Doc S/RES/2332, para 1; UNSC Res 2399 (30 January 2018), UN Doc S/RES/2399, 3 para 2; UNSC Res 2429 (13 July 2018), UN Doc S/RES/2429, 5 para 3; UNSC Res 2434 (13 September 2018), UN Doc S/RES/2434, 3 para 4.