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In Search of Humanity: The Moral and Legal Discrepancy in the Redress of Violations in International Humanitarian Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 March 2023
Abstract
Both international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) make extensive references to humanity. Yet the role attributed to humanity differs between the two. Humanity is seen in IHRL as the source of the rights, whereas in IHL it is interpreted as a moral obligation to avoid harm. This article challenges this perspective. Relying upon contemporary interpretations of IHL, it will be argued that, in a moral sense, IHL matches up closely with IHRL. Crucial here is that humanity, rather than reflect a utilitarian perspective to avoid harm, is worded in stronger terms. To reflect this accurately, it is argued that IHL is best seen as a reflection of TM Scanlon's contractualism as opposed to utilitarian reasoning. Relying upon the similarities in moral reasoning visible in both bodies of law, the article argues that this should also be reflected when it comes to redress for violations. In a concrete sense, the argument here is that this also presents a moral requirement to recognise individual claims within IHL. To give legal effect to this moral demand, it is suggested that IHRL might play a role in bridging the gap between the moral and legal considerations in IHL.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press in association with the Faculty of Law, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
References
1 Some quotes within this article make reference to the law of armed conflict (LOAC) or the law of war. For the purpose of this article, these are considered synonyms. In a similar way, reference will be made to notions of redress and reparations, mainly for stylistic reasons. For content, these can also be considered synonyms.
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57 This seemingly indicates a belief that doctors who do contribute to ‘malicious aggression’ would suffer reduced immunity: FM Kamm, ‘Failures of Just War Theory: Terror, Harm and Justice’ (2004) 114 Ethics 650, 690.
58 ICRC Study (n 15) rule 25: Medical Personnel.
59 Jeff McMahan, ‘Necessity and Proportionality in Morality and Law’ in Claus Kreß and Robert Lawless (eds), Necessity and Proportionality in International Peace and Security Law (Oxford University Press 2020) 3, 22.
60 Raphaël van Steenberghe, ‘Proportionality under Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clarifying their Relationship’ (2012) 45 Israel Law Review 107, 123–24.
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63 ICRC Study (n 15) Rule 1: The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants.
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69 International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (2001), UN Doc A/56/10, Commentary to art 25 para 21.
70 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222 (ECHR), art 15.
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85 Practice has indeed demonstrated that courts have considered situations in which IHL applies to be unique and limits the applicability of IHRL; see ECtHR, Hassan v United Kingdom, App No 29750/09, 16 September 2014, paras 96–106.
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89 Lieblich (n 73) 330.
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92 Lieber Code (n 39) art 29.
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100 Scanlon (n 12) 110.
101 Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume One (Oxford University Press 2011) 411.
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131 Shelton (n 125) 19.
132 David B Michaels, International Privileges and Immunities: A Case for a Universal Statute (Martinus Nijhoff 1971) 50.
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137 ICRC Study (n 15) rule 50: Destruction and Seizure of Property of an Adversary.
138 Hayashi (n 42) 105.
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140 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) Merits, Judgment [1986] ICJ Rep 14, [218].
141 Dinstein (n 8).
142 Jeroen van den Boogaard, ‘Reimagining IHL Principles Part I: The Wrong Principles’, Articles of War, 8 December 2020, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/reimagining-ihl-principles-part-i-wrong-principles.
143 Elliot Winter, ‘Pillars not Principles: The Status of Humanity and Military Necessity in the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2020) 25 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 1, 3.
144 ibid 16–17.
145 Joseph Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ (1972) 81 Yale Law Journal 823, 837.
146 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (n 78) para 525.
147 For more on principles, specifically within IHL, see Jeroen C van den Boogaard, ‘Fighting by the Principles: Principles as a Source of International Humanitarian Law’ in Mariëlle Matthee, Brigit Toebes and Marcel Brus (eds), Armed Conflict and International Law: In Search of the Human Face (TMC Asser 2013) 6–10.
148 Larsen, Kjetil Mujezinović, ‘A “Principle of Humanity” or a “Principle of Human-Rightism”?’ in Larsen, Kjetil Mujezinović, Cooper, Camilla Guldahl and Nystuen, Gro (eds), Searching for a ‘Principle of Humanity’ in International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 124, 143Google Scholar.
149 ICTY, Prosecutor v Furundžija, Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, para 183.
150 For regional obligations, see ECHR (n 70) art 13; American Convention on Human Rights (entered into force 22 November 1969) 1144 UNTS 123, arts 10, 63 and 68. Whereas the African Charter does not contain an explicit reference to a remedy, the court has interpreted it to hold an obligation to offer an effective remedy: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jawara v The Gambia, Comm. No. 147/95-149/96, 11 May 2000, para 31.
151 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217A(III) (10 December 1948), UN Doc A/810, art 8.
152 Some conventions require states to adopt an additional optional protocol (eg International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13).
153 Shelton (n 125) 241–49.
154 Gabriela Echeverria, ‘The UN Principles and Guidelines on Reparation: Is there an Enforceable Right to Reparation for Victims of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Violations?’, PhD thesis, University of Essex (United Kingdom), 2017, 211; CIL here refers to ‘customary international law’.
155 cf ICJ, Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) Judgment [2012] ICJ Rep 2012, [57] with PCIJ, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Objection to Jurisdiction of the Court (1924) PCIJ Rep (Ser A No 10) 12.
156 This is at the discretion of the Prosecutor, though, and is not available directly through individuals, as is the case with bodies such as the human rights court; see Moffett, Luke and Sandoval, Clara, ‘Tilting at Windmills: Reparations and the International Criminal Court’ (2021) 34 Leiden Journal of International Law 749, 758CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
157 This statement, however, did point to a general difficulty in finding a forum through which this right could be enforced: United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 2 November 2000 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (3 November 2000), UN Doc S/2000/1063, para 21.
158 See also, eg, the argument by Gaeta that customary law should be interpreted as to what it constitutes now rather than the historic definition: Gaeta (n 14) 310.
159 Köchler, Hans, ‘Normative Inconsistencies in the State System with Special Emphasis on International Law’ in Capaldo, Giuliana Ziccardi (ed), The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2016 (Oxford University Press 2017) 175, 175–76Google Scholar.
160 Naz Modirzadeh, ‘Keynote Lecture’, speech delivered at the 16th Minerva Conference, 8 November 2021, https://en.minervacenter.huji.ac.il/2021-events.
161 Dinstein argued passionately against this, stating that it would lead to ‘a legal regime change that will revolutionize the field by making hostilities impossible to engage in effectively’: Dinstein, Yoram, ‘Concluding Remarks: LOAC and Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It’ (2011) 87 International Law Studies 483, 492Google Scholar.