¹ The procuration of women for the purposes of prostitution and the use of unlawful means, such as drugs, to obtain sexual intercourse: see sees. 2–4 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956. In the U.S., the rule is also found (in some states for certain offences) in the form of a statutory requirement: see Wigmore, , Evidence (3rd ed.) Vol. VII, secs. 2044 & 2061.Google Scholar

² Williams, G. L., “Corroboration—Sexual Cases” (1962) Criminal L.R. 662.Google Scholar

³ Cohn, J. in Ben Hamo v. A. G. (1963) 17 P.D. 2857, 2866.Google Scholar

⁴ Various modifications of these alternatives are also possible. A rule of types (i) and (ii) could be required only for certain offences; or a warning of type (ii) could be at the judge's discretion.

^4a The request came from the State Attorney Mr. Z. Bar-Niv.

⁵ Offences under sees. 152, 154 and 157 respectively, of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936; all these offences are felonies under Israel law, i.e. punishable by more than three years' imprisonment.

⁶ In 1961 Police Headquarters opened a central register of sex offenders, to which all sex offences are reported by the police in the locality in which they occur. The complaints in the sample were traced through this register.

⁷ Complaints of felonies must be dealt with by the district attorney; the police may recommend closure of a file but cannot close it themselves. All the complaints in the sample were classified by Police Headquarters as felonies; but some were classified by the local police as misdemeanours (e.g. where they considered the alleged indecent act to be without force) and were consequently not referred to the district attorney but dealt with by the police themselves.

⁸ By Police Headquarters—see n. 7 above.

⁹ Thus all cases brought before the magistrates' courts had been reduced to misdemeanour charges. This implies either a difference in evaluation of the case between police headquarters and the local police, or a reclassification by the local police to facilitate the securing of a conviction. Reclassification as a misdemeanour does not, however, of itself, eliminate the requirement of corroboraron, so long as the charge retains a sexual element. See also n. 12 below.

¹⁰ For this purpose it is the classification on the part of the police in the locality which is material; hence some of the “offences originally alleged” in Table II were misdemeanours. See n. 6 above.

¹¹ Three cases are omitted here: one was brought in a juvenile court; one was transferred to a Military Court; and in the third case the accused was confined to a mental institution.

¹² It does not follow that the new charge did not require corroboration; it may be that the accused was charged with a lesser (sexual) offence which he admitted. The question of which charges require corroboration has proved a controversial one in Israel and has arisen in a number of Supreme Court judgments, culminat ing in Ben H amo's case (op. cit.). If X is suspected of burglary and rape, and Y of an indecent assault, but in neither case is there corroborative evidence of the complainant's story, may X be charged—and convicted—of burglary with intent to commit a felony, and Y of assault with intent to commit a felony? Or may Y simply be convicted of common assault? The majority opinion in Ben Hamo's case was that a conviction for burglary with intent was possible (i.e. in X's case) since (a) the offence itself is non-sexual and (b) the facts constituting the burglary can be distinguished from the sexual element. It was not permissible, however, (e.g. in the case of the assault) to convict of a non-sexual offence based on the same set of facts which would constitute a sexual offence, i.e. merely by altering the name of the offence.

The minority held that corroboration is required for sexual offences and not for sexual acts, so that the court may—indeed it must—convict of a non-sexual offence in all these cases, if it believes the complainant and if the elements of a non-sexual offence are proved. The practical importance of this question is indicated by the following observation of Cohn J. in his minority opinion, at p. 2866: “There is hardly ever a sexual offence committed which does not involve also the commission of a non-sexual offence”. A ruthless application of this view could thus denude the corroboration rule of its effect.

¹³ One result was not available at the time of the study.

¹⁴ See n. 11, above.

¹⁵ i.e. even if the unknown result was conviction; moreover, in some of these cases the charge may already have been modified by the prosecuting authority.

¹⁶ These three elements are specified by Halevi J. in Ben Hamo's case, op. cit. 2870.

¹⁷ For the logical order in which corroboration is sought, the table must be read from left to right. Thus, where the absence of corroboration for the commission of the act is specified, this implies that there was corroboration of the identity of the suspect. Similarly, where the absence of corroboration for the lack of consent on the part of the victim is specified, this implies that there was corroboration of the identity of the suspect and the commission of the act.

¹⁸ El Musa v. A.G. (1947) A.L.R. 458 per Shaw J.

¹⁹ This was based on the French Code of 1808: see (1966) 1 Is. L.R. 381, note 1.

^19a See arts. 144 (contraventions), 173 (misdemeanours), 279, 280 and 290 (felonies).

^19b ‘…but in places where males cannot be possessed of the necessary information, the evidence of females alone will be accepted in respect of property”.

²⁰ By sec. 72 of the Trial upon Information Ordinance.

^20a See Drayton, Chap. 54; in the Official Gazette this section appeared as sec. 5. This ordinance was to apply “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Ottoman Civil Code or the Ottoman Codes of Procedure.”

^20b See memorandum of the Attorney General to the Chief Secretary in A.G. 19/56, in the Government Archives.

²¹ No. 68 of 1936. The historical background to this amendment has recently been analysed in an article by Ginossar, S. and Harnon, E., “The Need for Corroboration in Civil Matters” in (1964) 21HaPraklit.Google Scholar It is true, as they point out, that the Mandatory authorities were more concerned with criminal proceedings than civil proceedings; but this does not entirely explain their failure to amend the law as to corroboration in civil cases, for the political considerations which affected criminal proceedings would presumably not have applied with the same force to civil pro ceedings and would not necessarily outweigh the reluctance of the authorities to rely on the evidence of a single Palestinian. This last consideration, however, should hardly apply in the State of Israel. In the light of the criticisms of Prof. Ginossar, and DrHarnon, , a Bill (Hatsaot Hok 737Google Scholar) has now been published by the Ministry of Justice which would enable the court to determine a factual issue on the evidence of a single witness, on whom it relies, without corroboration. (In certain cases, however, the court must state the reasons which induce it to be satisfied with this evidence.)

^21a The abolition of the requirement of corroboration in criminal cases was intended to be temporary until the current disturbances should terminate; thus the amendment referred to the “suspension” of the original section and made provision for termination of the Amendment itself. However, provisions designed to facilitate convictions are perhaps more easily introduced than repealed and the original section was never revived.

^21b Jarad et al. v. A.G. (1938) 5 P.L.R. 111. It was pointed out by the respondents that the Mejelle never applied to criminal cases, but the Court did not deal with this point.

²² Jarad et al. v. A.G. (1938) 5 P.L.R. 111. In Jamal v. A.G. (1959) 13 P.D. 692 there is an interesting discussion by Deputy President Cheshin on the question as to whether the Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936 must be interpreted as deliber ately omitting any special requirements of corroboration for particular offences, in view of the fact that it was enacted three months after the amendment to the Evidence Ordinance was introduced. It was held that no such policy could be construed since (a) the Code did not deal with evidentiary matters and (b) the Code was first published in 1933, while the Amendment to the Evidence Ordinance was not brought into force until October 1937.

²³ See Cross, , Evidence 3rd ed. 162Google Scholar; Wigmóre, , Evidence vol. IX, sec. 2032.Google Scholar The divergence of English Law from Roman law systems in this matter seems partly to be accounted for by the role of the jury, who were themselves witnesses. That a single witness could suffice in English law was finally settled by the end of the 17th century. (Wigmore, ibid.) An exception was perjury, which had been tried almost exclusively by the Court of Star Chamber, whose rules were close to those of Roman and ecclesiastic law.

²⁴ See above n. 1. Besides the sexual offences referred to there, corroboration is also required by statute for a perjury charge and for the unsworn evidence of children. Moreover, there remain some provisions which require at least two witnesses (i.e. no other form of corroborative evidence will suffice). See Cross, op. cit. 163.

²⁵ The binding force of a “rule of practice” is explained historically by Simonds, Lord, L.C. in Davies v. D.P.P. [1954] 1 AU E.R. 507, 511Google Scholar, where he attributes it to the establishment of a permanent court of appeal for criminal cases: “After the enactment of the Criminal Appeal Act in 1907, what was no more than a ‘practice’ manifests an increasing tendency to assume the hard lineaments of a rule of law.”

²⁶ Other cases where corroboration is considered desirable are mentioned in Cross, op. cit. 175–76.

²⁷ Nokes, , in his Introduction to Evidence (3rd ed.) 500–05Google Scholar, distinguishes between the rule in relation to accomplices, where corroboration is “required by common law” and the rule in relation to sexual offences and children, where it is only “required by practice.” In the first case he states that the practice is to advise juries not to convict in the absence of corroboration and in the second case the judge will warn juries of the danger of so doing (my italics); if there is an in tentional distinction here it is hard to detect it in the judicial authorities. It seems, however, that the practice in relation to sexual offences is much more recent than for accomplices. In the latter case it dates back to the end of the 18th century (see the cases cited in Davies v. D.P.P.). It is discussed in the 9th edition of Best, The Principles of the Law of Evidence, 1902, sec. 171, and mentioned in sec. 621, which deals also with the statutory provisions in sexual cases but omits any reference to a general practice in these cases; and in Crocker's case (17 Cr. App. Rep. 46) Salter J. had to ask counsel: “Is corroboration necessary in sexual cases?” However, by 1925 the rule seems to have been firmly established. (See Jones' case, 19 Cr. App. Rep. 40.)

²⁸ It is not surprising that the requirement in regard to children seems to follow closely that for accomplices, since the leading authority on accomplices, R. v. Baskerville [1916] 2 K.B. 658, where the accomplices were boys, has been regarded as an authority on the evidence of children: see R. v. Cleal [1942] 1 All E.R. 203. However, in the case of Pitts (8 Cr. App. Rep. 126) in 1912, Ridley J. merely said that it was “always wise for the judge to address some caution to the possibility of such a young child having a mistaken recollection of what happened”, whereas he thought that “a jury may not act on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice”. He does not mention the relevance of the charge being a sexual offence. It may be that such “mixed” cases have contributed to the con fusion on this topic. See also Benjamin Brown's case (6 Cr. App. Rep. 24) where corroboration was required for the evidence of a girl victim of incest—apparently on the basis of her complicity.

²⁹ See the examples cited in Williams, op. cit., 670, note 23.

³⁰ See R. v. Trigg, 47 Cr. App. Rep. 94.

³¹ Apart from sexual offences and accomplices, corroboration is required in Israel on a perjury charge: see Piperling v. A.G. (1951) 5 P.D. 1209. Moreover, there are statutory requirements in the case of sedition (s. 59(5) of the Criminal Code Ord. 1936) and of the unsworn evidence of a child (sec. 6A of the Evidence Ordinance, as amended by sec. 221 of the Criminal Procedure Law, 1965). No corroboration, however, is required for the sworn evidence of a child: see Abu Jhaisheh v. A.G. (1946) A.L.R. 249, where it was held that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure (Trial upon Information) Ordinance were exhaustive and English statutory provisions were inapplicable.

³² III Ct. L.R. 284.

³³ In Aricha v. A.G. (1951) 5 P.D. 1200, Landau J. stated (at 1204) that “In England it is an established rule that it is unsafe to convict on the sole testimony of the complainant, and that additional evidence is required”. The authority cited, R. v. Barry, 18 Cr. App. Rep. 65, is in fact somewhat ambiguous, for Hewart L.C.J. stated (at 68): “The law was, of course, that in cases of this kind corroboration of the testimony of the person who suffered the outrage was not essential, but in practice it was required” (my italics). Later in the judgment, however, he said that the failure of corroboration might have prevented the jury from convicting, if it were known to them—thereby indicating that they still had the power to convict. However, similar misstatements have appeared in English textbooks: see Wills on Evidence (3rd ed.) 259, where he refers to rape and indecent assault as cases where “the Courts will not convict upon uncorroborated evidence.” The cases cited in support of this statement are cases in which the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the conviction for want of adequate warning on corroboration.

³⁴ See their comment on sec. 88 of their Draft Code on Evidence, 1952.

³⁵ Op. cit. note 18.

^35a Cf. Gordon Smith C.J. in A.G. v. Segal, 43 A.S.C. 754.

³⁶ Having referred to the judgment of Trusted C.J. in Halaby's case, Shaw J. commented (at 462) “It is, we think, not true to say that according to English law corroboration is essential in such cases…”.

³⁷ Yacobovitz v. A.G. (1952) 6 P.D. 514, 562.

³⁸ Aricha v. A.G., see n. 33 above, where the conviction was quashed for want of corroborative evidence. In addition to English precedent, Landau J. relied also on El Musa's case and on another Israel Supreme Court judgment, Shulman v. A.G. (1951) 5 P.D. 174, where Cheshin J. said (at 182): “The question is thus whether this evidence [i.e. of the complainant] was corroborated as required by law”. However, (a) there was no further discussion of the binding force of this require ment, and (b) it is arguable that this statement was obiter, since the court found ample corroborative evidence and upheld the conviction. Thus what Silberg J. regarded as an established rule laid down by the Supreme Court had in fact evolved without any discussion of its basis or its applicability.

³⁹ Op. cit. note 21; see Segal's case; n. 35a and 44 A.L.R. 158.

⁴⁰ At 115. The Court had, however, already hinted at its impending deviation from the English practice in the preceding passage: “When a Judge gives the necessary warning to the Jury, he has done all that the law requires him to do. He has no further control of the situation. The Jury may disregard his warning. But when there is no Jury the setting is entirely different.” (My italics.)

⁴¹ [1936] 2 All E.R. 813.

⁴² “Pursuant to Ordinance No. 6 of 1875, the trial was held before the Chief Justice of Fiji, who is the only judge in the Island, sitting with assessors, and by sec. 29 of the same Ordinance the decision was vested solely in the judge.” (Ibid. 814.)

⁴³ “Where there is a jury, the judge must warn them of the danger of acting on uncorroborated evidence, and where there is no jury, the tribunal must warn itself of this danger.” (Cross, op. cit. 169). The need for a tribunal to warn itself in England could arise in a court of summary jurisdiction not only in connection with the evidence of an accomplice, but also in a sexual case, for a summary court has jurisdiction to try, with the consent of the accused, an indecent assault: see Schedule 1 to the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, as amended by the 3rd Schedule to the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1962. In Israel a judge is expected to warn himself in any criminal case where the prosecution relies on the testimony of a single witness: see Al-Halak v. A.G. (1952) 6 P.D. 753. See also Akileh v. A.G. (1946) A.L.R. 16, where the appeal court found “clear indication that the Judge had warned himself in a proper manner”.

⁴⁴ [1916] 2 K.B. 658, 663.

⁴⁵ It is true that the judgment in Mahadeo's case is misleading on this point, since it states simply that “it is well settled that the evidence of an accessory…must be corroborated …” but R. v. Baskerville is cited as the authority for the proposition and its more restricted application is thus clear. It is interesting to observe also that Lord Reading's expression “virtually equivalent to a rule of law” became in Mahadeo's case “virtually a rule of law” and in Jarad's case “an absolute rule of law”.

⁴⁶ i.e. apart from the unfortunate wording referred to in n. 45.

⁴⁷ Thus the judge did not warn himself as required since he saw no need to do so. The Privy Council did not elaborate this point; perhaps this was because they had other reasons for having the conviction set aside.

⁴⁸ Op. cit. 2866. The attack was aimed at the rule requiring corroboration for the evidence of accomplices as well as that applying to sex offences, but it was directed primarily at the latter.

⁴⁹ According to this line of argument, the fact that the Israel practice is derived from the English serves merely to increase the irony.

⁵⁰ (1952) 6 P.D. 562.

⁵¹ The word “because” might, of course, relate to the historical explanation for the discrepancy between the two jurisdictions, rather than indicating any justification.

⁵² Op. cit. 2866.

⁵³ Wigmore's first objection to rules requiring corroboration in sexual offences (see vol. VII, sec. 2061) was that while there was some danger of false testimony in these cases, the consequences of letting these offences go unpunished were serious. (For the opposite view, that the harm caused by allowing guilty men to escape is outweighed by the danger of false testimony, see M. Ploscowe, in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 25 No. 2 at p. 223.) This two-limbed rule was used by Wigmore to justify a requirement of corroboration in treason cases and by Agranat J. in Yacobovitz v. A.G. cit., at 543, where he concluded that the corroboration rule should not apply to a murder charge with a sexual element, since (a) there was no likelihood of false charges in such cases, (b) the consequences would be serious if the offence went unpunished.

Wigmore's other objections were that (a) “a rule of law requiring corroboration has probably little actual influence upon the jurors' minds over and above that ordinary caution and suspicion which would naturally suggest itself for such charges” and (b) “the purpose of the rule is already completely attained by the judge's power to set aside a verdict upon insufficient evidence”. But surely the point is that where a statute requires corroboration absolutely (and this seems to be the form of the rule which Wigmore is considering), the judge is obliged to set aside a verdict if there is no corroboration. His power to do so, and the workings of the jurors' minds, are thus irrelevant.

⁵⁴ “The fact is that, in the light of modern psychology, this technical rule of corro boration seems but a crude and childish measure, if it be relied upon as an adequate means for determining the credibility of the complaining witness in such charges. The problem of estimating the veracity of feminine testimony in complaints against masculine offenders is baffling enough to the experienced psychologist. This statutory rule is unfortunate in that it tends to produce reliance upon a rule of thumb. Better to inculcate the resort to an expert scientific analysis o) the particular witness' mentality as the true measure of enlightenment.” (My italics.) Ibid. Wigmore is concerned almost exclusively with statutory rules laying down an absolute requirement of corroboration for sexual offences. He does not appear to recognize any common law requirement of a warning here (cf. his discussion on accomplices in sec. 2056; but he cites in a footnote the case of Benjamin Brown (see n. 28 above) ).

⁵⁵ The reference to Wigmore was particularly misleading in that the second and third of Wigmore's three objections to the corroboration rule related to the opera tion of the jury system (and thus are not relevant in Israel). Cohn J. also cited Me Cormick as a critic of corroboration rules, but the comments which appear in Mc Cormick on Evidence are confined to the problem of confessions.

⁵⁶ Op. cit. sec. 2057.

⁵⁷ In Ben Hamo's case; see above, n. 3. See also Silberg J. in Shvili v. A.G. (1953) 7 P.D. 438, 445, where he says that the same considerations apply in both cases, for “both are based on the same principle of special cautiousness.”

⁵⁸ Op. cit. 2871.

⁵⁹ Op. cit., sec. 2057, p. 322.

⁶⁰ “Corroboration—Accomplices” [1962] Crim. L.R. 588.

⁶¹ Professor Williams is concerned with the common law requirement to warn the jury; Wigmore seems to have had in mind statutory requirements.

⁶² [1962] Crim. L.R. 662. At 664 Dr. Williams states that “the rule requiring the corroboration warning to be given retains its importance as almost the only way by which the peculiar dangers of sexual charges are reflected in the legal process.” (My italics.) However, at 670 he refers to the mandatory requirement laid down in certain statutes and comments: “It is difficult to see why the requirement should not be extended to all charges of sexual offences; though such an exten sion would need to be accompanied by a more workable definition of the meaning of corroboration.” N.B.: This complex problem of definition is being ignored for the purposes of the present article which is concerned exclusively with the exis tence of such requirements as a matter of principle, and with an empirical study of their operation.

⁶³ Ibid. 669. The same reasoning would seem to apply where the judge sits without a jury. Thus Halevi J. concludes: “So long as we have no more effective guaran tee that the truth will be elicited in this delicate area of the law, we ought not to be in a hurry to abolish the cautionary measures which exist at present.”

⁶⁴ “The facts are that there exist occasionally female types of excessive or perverted sexuality, just as there are such male types; and that these are often accompanied by a testimonial plausibility which should not be taken at its face value.” (Ibid., sec. 924a, p. 460.) These remarks are illustrated by extracts from the writings of eminent psychiatrists.

⁶⁵ The Evidence Committee of the Israel Ministry of Justice also differentiated between these two types of case in their Draft Evidence Code, in which the requirement of corroboration was retained for the trial of sexual offences (and also for the evidence of minors), but not for accomplices: op. cit. secs. 87–89.

⁶⁶ Another commonly stated reason for a rule requiring corroboration in sexual offences that charges are easy to prefer but hard to disprove (see eg. Cheshin J. in Jamal, op. cit. 696), is an oversimplification of the problem. The onus of proof is on the prosecution and not on the defendant, so that the charges are hard to disprove only in so far as complainants may tend to be convincing—whether or not they are truthful.

Other reasons cited by the Israel Supreme Court: “There is an assumption that the Complainant will try and defend her honour” (Agranat J. in Yacobovitz, cit. 542). “If the judges have the power to convict on the strength of the complainant's evidence alone, it might prove to be a source of blackmail and vengeance.” (Silberg, J. in Sa'adia v. A.G. (1962) 16 P.D. 1860, 1862.Google Scholar)

⁶⁷ Wigmore, op. cit. Vol. III, sec. 924a. p. 459. N.B.: The corroboration rule has also been applied when the victim is male: See Burgess' case, 40 Cr. App. Rep. 144.

⁶⁸ This distinction is analysed in a comment on Toohey's case (see n. 69 below) by C. Tapper in (1965) 28 Mod. L.R. 360.

⁶⁹ Toohey v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] 1 All E.R. 506, overruling the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal in that case and Gunewardene's case [1951] 2 All E.R. 290. For a general perspective of the effect of this case on the law of evidence, see Andrews, J.A. [1965] Crim. L.R. 461.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ As regards admissibility Lord Pearce declared: “Medical evidence is admissible to show that a witness suffers from some disease or defect or abnormality of mind that affects the reliability of his evidence”; this, together with his Lordship's ex ample of shortsightedness as a physical defect evidence of which was admissible suggests that he might take a liberal view of mental abnormality. The second limitation, the availability of such evidence, is a more serious one: Toohey was fortunate in that (a) the complainant in that case (to whom the evidence of ab normality related) had been examined on the night of the alleged assault by a police surgeon who found him to be in a hysterical condition and (b) he had, since the trial, been certified as subnormal and an order had been made for his deten tion in a hospital.

⁷¹ Report of the Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence, 63 A.B.A. Rep. 570: cited in Wigmore, Vol. III, sec. 942a, p. 466.

⁷² “Only an inquiry into the social and mental history will reveal the degree of credibility. This inquiry the law of Evidence ought to permit to the fullest ex tent, rejecting the hindrance of rules that were framed without an understanding of these facts.” Wigmore, ibid. p. 460: the specific proposals for modification of the rules appear in sec. 924b. p. 466.) It is interesting to note that Wigmore adds (on p. 467): “The rule requiring corroboration of a female witness in such cases may of course remain.” It is hard to see the value of the other proposals if the corroboration rule remains.

⁷³ [1962] Crim. L.R. at p. 664. Wigmore also discusses the use of the polygraph in Vol. III, sec. 999. p. 644. If, however, the complainant's falsity was due to a degree of fantasy such that she could not distinguish the make-believe from the reality, would she react to the polygraph test?

⁷⁴ The indifference of the English legal profession and the lack of trained personnel to apply the tests.

⁷⁵ Silberg, J. in Shvili v. A.G. (1964) 18 P.D. 438, 445Google Scholar; cited by J., Berinson in Pick v. A.G. (1951) 5 P.D. 662, 667Google Scholar. In the latter case Berinson J. appears to attribute the origin of this remark to Lord Reading in R. v. Baskerville (see n. 44 above). In fact the reasoning belongs to Silberg J. What Lord Reading said was that the rule was “anomalous in its nature, inasmuch as it requires confirmation of the testimony of a competent witness.” There is no implication here that the rule is unnecessary; it is anomalous since it is an exception to the usual common law approach to the testimony of witnesses.

^75a The Bill recently published by the Israel Ministry of Justice (see above, n. 21) dealing with corroboration in civil cases does not propose any change in the rules applying in the field of criminal law. The explanatory comment states somewhat equivocally: “There is no purpose at this stage to alter the situation in the sphere of the criminal law.” (My italics.)

⁷⁶ If a psychological examination were conducted on a sample of complainants in a jurisdiction in which the “warning” rule applied, after the termination of legal proceedings, this would provide an indication of how successful the juries (or judges) had been in distinguishing the genuine from the false complaint. Alternatively, if this proposal proved objectionable, a purely descriptive study, on the lines of the present study, could be undertaken of a sample of cases which had been dealt with, distinguishing those which resulted in conviction from the remainder, and a second descriptive and psychological study of an independent sample of complainants: comparison of the descriptive data within and between the two samples might indicate whether the type of case which seemed genuine by the psychological test was the type of case which resulted in conviction.