In its judgment concerning the frontier dispute between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali (1986), the Chamber ot the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) summarized its opinion on the applicability of equity as follows:

The principles of the law of succession of the State of Israel are assembled in the Succession Law, 1965. This statute, consisting of eight chapters and 161 sections, constitutes a first attempt at codification of Israeli civil law. The statute was intended to end the recourse to the conglomeration of laws previously applied to a person's succession. We would emphasize in this context the provision of sec. 150 of the statute, which states: “In matters of succession, Article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922–47, shall not apply”.

The English common law is frequently referred to as a seamless web; continental lawyers tend rather to think of law in terms of internal coherence and consistency. This is not merely a linguistic fact, and the terms are not simply interchangeable. Each reflects the characteristic mode of thought and of development in its respective system: the common law constantly and gradually emerging as a cumulative historical process; continental law stemming from, and in every case ultimately resting on interpretation of, codes, the product of a moment in history. Thus, although they are both capable of denoting the same idea of wholeness, each term has a slightly different connotative emphasis, the one stressing historical coherence and the other emphasising conceptual coherence.

This is but one example of the proposition that institutions can not be imported wholesale, that foreign legal provisions, and terms of thought and reference, have to be evaluated beyond their immediate superficial appearance before they may be adopted or used as measures for local purposes. All such institutions have both a historical and a contextual significance which makes comparison on the level of one-dimensional questions such as, “Which is the better rule or the more attractive term?” meaningless.

Is there room for tax laws that would tax compensation differently than they would loss suffered by the person receiving compensation? This question must be posed at the outset of the discussion of taxation and tort compensation. The unanimous view would seem to be against taxing compensation resulting from loss that would not have been liable to tax. It follows that if the tax laws bring about such a result, for example, in Israel with regard to the interest component up to the date of judgment in compensation for loss not in the nature of income, or if such compensation is liable to capital profits tax, then the tax law concerned should be corrected. A more difficult question, however, is whether to exempt from tax compensation for loss of earnings brought about by personal injury – particularly physical injury.

The process of conversion to Judaism is paralleled to the acceptance of the Torah by the Jewish people at Sinai. In Jewish sources, the Sinaitic experience is viewed as a mass conversion of the Jewish people. The essence of this conversion was the acceptance of the commandments as binding upon the Jewish people. Similarly, the essence of a Gentile's conversion to Judaism in later generations, is his acceptance of the yoke of the commandments as binding upon him. In fact, the Talmudic sources go so far as to state that the Jewish people at Sinai underwent the same process as a proselyte: circumcision, immersion in a mikve and the bringing of a burnt-offering. In short, traditionally, the essence of conversion was the acceptance of the mitzvot.

The deontological justification of punishment is generally associated with the notion of “retributive justice”. This notion, however, underlies only one of two distinct approaches by which one may attempt to justify punishment within deontological morality. According to this, the classical approach, punishment is to be regarded as an end in itself, intrinsically valuable, from the moral point of view. According to other deontological views, however, punishment has only instrumental value – not, as in consequentialism, in the maximization of some general social good, but in the maintenance and equal distribution of basic individual rights. Borrowing Dworkin's terminology, this view can be called a “right-based” conception of punishment.

As our subject is the secularization of Greek Family Law, we may presume that this part of our legal system is not as yet secular or at least not exclusively so. Indeed, the strong influence of religious conceptions, particularly those of the Greek Orthodox Christian Church is an historical feature of Greek Family Law. This tradition is explained by the close relations in general between Church and State in Greece, relations which are rooted in the Byzantine era. The determinant importance of the Church in Greek society reached its peak during the period of the Ottoman occupation (1453-1821), when there was no Greek State and the Orthodox Church was its substitute. I think that we may find a parallel here between the Greek people and their religion and the Jewish people and their religion. After the national revolution of 1821, and with the regaining of their independence, the Greek people were organized in a secular state, retaining, however, important features of a religious character, in accordance with the nation's historical tradition.

Who ought to bring about the essential reform in criminal law? At first glance, the answer appears obvious and unequivocal. In all modern Western democracies, the norm is for the function of lawmaking to be in the hands of the legislative branch of government, to the exclusion of the judiciary or any other organ inside or outside government.

The question posed above, however, is meant to explore a different issue, namely, the interrelationship between parliament and the judiciary in the province of criminal law reform, and their respective functions in effecting new policies. Assuming the task of legislation to be reserved to parliament, is there no room for judges to read into parliamentary enactments trend-making reformative content which would allow the implementation of what judges conceive to be the policies of the legislature in the field of penal law reform? Or is it, rather, incumbent upon the legislature itself to shape the character of the necessary reform with the statutory tools available to it?

The following is a survey of major judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel published in (1986) 40 Piskei Din, vols. (i) and (ii), directly following upon our last digest, which appeared in (1987) 22 Is.L.R. 219.

One central decision published in the volumes presently reviewed, that of Zeitsov v. Katz (1986) 40(ii) P.D. 85, has not been included in this survey. The decision concerns the suit of a child born with a genetic disease, against a doctor whose allegedly negligent diagnosis led to the child's conception. This case has been discussed at length in an article which appeared previously in the Israel Law Review, and to which our readers are referred.

With the launching of Israel's first satellite, Offeq–1, on September 19, 1988, Israel's commitments in international space law came into practical effect. Specifically, Israel is bound through ratification to the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space; and the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. Two additional treaties, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space, and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have yet to be signed or ratified by Israel.