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TECNICHE DECISIONALI E SISTEMA DEI COMITATI

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 June 2016

Giovanni Sartori
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Introduzione

Il problema delle tecniche decisionali — nel significato piú lato della dizione — si pone per le decisioni collettivizzate, e cioè sottratte alla competenza di ciascun individuo in quanto tale. Se per decisione individuale si intende che ogni individuo ≪ decide per sé ≫, allora le decisioni collettivizzate sono decisioni non-individuali. Nulla vieta beninteso, che una decisione collettivizzata venga presa da una persona sola. Ma se quella persona ≪ decide per tutti ≫, e la sua decisione è vincolante nei confronti di tutta la collettività alla quale è indirizzata, allora abbiamo una decisione collettivizzata. Dunque — sia chiaro — la nozione di collettivizzazione non postula che il soggetto decidente sia un ≪ collettivo ≫, o meglio un ≪ gruppo ≫; postula che le decisioni prese valgano per tutta la collettività alla quale sono destinate.

Summary

Summary

The starting point of the analysis is the Calculus of Consent by Buchanan and Tullock. A major modification is introduced, however, in their concept of external costs, which is redefined in term of ≪ risks ≫ that are truly external, i.e. affecting the collectivity at large. As a consequence, the frame of reference no longer is direct, but representative democracy. Decision making techniques are assessed in relation to i) their zero sum or positive sum outcomes, ii) their conditions of applicability (the structure of alternatives), and iii) their over time distributive effects. In this perspective the committee system is appraised and placed within the overall context of a democratic system, with special emphasis on participatory demands on the one hand, and on ≪ democracy in output ≫ (equi-distribution) on the other hand. In spite of mounting dissatisfaction, representational techniques of controlled transmission of power remain essential for reducing the external risks without intolerable decision costs. But the attempt pursued in the essay at bringing together the manifold strands of the literature brings out how much has yet to be explored.

Type
Saggi
Information
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , April 1974 , pp. 5 - 42
Copyright
Copyright © Società Italiana di Scienza Politica 

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