Gli strumenti referendari rappresentano un tentativo di conciliare i limiti posti dalle grandi dimensioni del corpo elettorale – che rendono impossibili vere e proprie assemblee popolari del tipo Landsgemeinde – e l'esigenza di una partecipazione diretta dei cittadini ai processi decisionali. Di questi strumenti analizzerò in questa sede i più «democratici», quelli cioè che sono il prodotto di spinte «dal basso», frutto di richieste promosse da un certo numero di elettori al di fuori di qualsiasi controllo da parte del potere politico. Non terrò conto, pertanto, né dei referendum obbligatori, imposti dalla costituzione (in generale nei casi in cui si tratta di modificarla o di consentire un parziale abbandono di sovranità), né di quelli organizzati a scopi tattici o di legittimazione, né, a fortiori, dei plebisciti a carattere personale.

This article is devoted to the analysis of functions and disfunctions which can be recognized in two different forms of direct consultations: referendum, to be considered a veto on some acts of the legislative or the government, and initiative, which tries to transfer the production of laws from elected representatives to the voters. Generally speaking, referendum instruments are considered functional for the demos, since they grant the power to decide directly the issues and increase occasions for participation and socialisation, and disfunctional for the political élites, who usally consider direct consultations an interference in decision making.

The author tries to offer a more articulate discussion of the subject. For instance, empirical analysis shows that referendums may work as instruments of integration of oppositions and as ways to strengthen the legitimacy of the élites, thus becoming functional for them. But disfunctions and risks showed by direct consultations (which are zero-sum mechanisms) often appear to be neglected. First of all, they need a higher level of knowledge and competence than in normal elections, since voters are issue deciders and not simply electors; moreover, the overload on governments may be a consequence either of a proliferation of inputs (intiative) or of an excessive contestation of the governments’ outputs (referendum); the fact that referendum and initiative may become an instrument of pressure and a «blackmail potential» in the hands of minority groups opposing and obstructing innovations suggests that popular consultations may also produce conservative effects.