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L'ORIZZONTE DELLA COOPERAZIONE. LA CONTROVERSIA SUI VANTAGGI RELATIVI NELLE RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 July 2018
Introduzione
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Gli studiosi di politica internazionale evocano spesso l'immagine dello «Stato di natura» per descrivere sinteticamente i rapporti tra gli Statio Per i pili pessimisti, descrivere i rapporti internazionali in questo modo equivale a postulare uno stato di guerra permanente, attuale o potenziale. Thomas Hobbes, che pose l'idea dello stato di natura tra le basi della sua dottrina dell' autorita politica, riconosceva che esso probabilmente non era altro che un'utile costruzione euristica se riferito ai rapporti tra singoli individui, rna ne difendeva il carattere di descrizione realistica se applicato ai rapporti tra i sovrani del suo tempo e non solo. Per Hobbes, anche se «non vi e mai stata un'epoca nella quale ogni uomo era in guerra contro un altro uomo», i re e gli altri sovrani, a causa della loro indipendenza, permanentemente «si trovano nella posizione di gladiatori, con Ie armi puntate, con i loro forti, Ie loro guarnigioni ed i loro fucili alle frontiere: la quale e una posizione guerresca» (Hobbes [1651] 1911, XIII, 103).
Summary
This article critically examines the dispute between realists and institutionalists on the conditions facilitating or hindering international cooperation and suggests a new solution. Realists base their scepticism about the possibility of cooperation in the international arena on the desire of the states to prevent a decrease of their relative power vis-à-vis other states, assuming that they are willing to forgo substantial absolute gains in order to avoid this outcome. In this article, the authors use two-person non-cooperative game theory to show that the «problem of relative gains» is ultimately an instance of the general problem of agreement instability. The problem can be solved if and when the conditions specified by institutionalist theory are present. A better understanding of «the logic of absolute gains» is also necessary because it helps to understand why cooperation can be difficult or absent even in those situations when, according to «the logic of relative gains», it is necessary, i.e. when two or more states face a common threat to their security.
- Type
- SAGGI
- Information
- Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , August 2001 , pp. 235 - 275
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2001 by Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna
References
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