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MODELLI TEORICI DI FEDERALISMO
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 July 2018
Introduzione
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Tutti gli studiosi concordano nel considerare l'unione degli stati americani creata con la Costituzione del 1787 il primo esempio di federalismo in senso moderno. Qual è la novità storica del federalismo americano? In sintesi, si può affermare che essa consiste in un rafforzamento del potere centrale che si accompagna a un insieme di garanzie costituzionali circa le sfere di autorità o la ripartizione di funzioni tra differenti livelli di governo. La Costituzione di Filadelfia viene inoltre generalmente considerata un esempio di deliberata progettazione istituzionale e i vari saggi che compongono il Federalist – scritti da Hamilton, Jay e Madison allo scopo di illustrare i vantaggi che sarebbero derivati da un'organizzazione federale degli stati indipendenti allora uniti nella confederazione nordamericana –sono considerati la prima articolazione compiuta della teoria federalista. Dall'«invenzione» del sistema americano, che introduce un'innovazione sostanziale nella storia delle istituzioni occidentali, poi ampiamente imitata in numerosi paesi, il federalismo è diventato una delle realtà politiche più importanti e uno dei temi più dibattuti nella letteratura.
Summary
This essay reviews three main strands of research in the analysis of federalism, which have in common the methodological premises of rational choice theory: a) the economic approach and the analysis developed within public choice; b) political theory, as represented by the work of W.H. Riker; c) new institutionalism, or analyses of institutions using tools derived from microeconomics, game theory, and social choice theory.
The economic discussion of federalism mainly concentrates on federalism as a substantial degree of decentralization. This approach stresses the consequences of decentralization in terms of efficiency induced by competition, but fails to provide satisfactory means of distinguishing federalism from other forms of government.
In defining federalism as a «constitutionally determined tier structure» of government, the political theory of W.H. Riker focuses on the origins of federations as «constitutional bargains». Riker's theory also gives a contribution to an understanding of the fundamental problem of what prevents the central government from overturning the constitutional restrictions.
Institutional stability is a central issue of new institutionalism. Such approach offers new insights about the meaning of an effective constitution, interpreting it as a coordinating device rather than as a social contract. As applied to the analysis of federalism, new institutionalism usefully contributes to explaining the survival of federal systems and devising some general rules of constitutional design.
- Type
- RASSEGNE
- Information
- Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , August 1995 , pp. 307 - 341
- Copyright
- Copyright © Società Italiana di Scienza Politica
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