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Politics does not stop at the ‘nuclear edge’: neoclassical realism and the making of China’s military doctrine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 May 2017

Paolo Rosa  and
Paolo Foradori
Paolo Rosa*
Affiliation:
School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
Paolo Foradori
Affiliation:
School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
*
*E-mail: paolo.rosa@unitn.it
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Abstract

The article tries to explain why China, after having launched a crash programme in the mid-1950s to develop a nuclear deterrent, did not formulate a clear operational doctrine with respect to the targeting and employment of atomic weapons until the mid-1980s. Propositions derived from neoclassical realism are used to shed some light on this puzzling aspect of China’s nuclear doctrine. The general hypothesis of the study is that, international predicaments notwithstanding, China’s domestic politics prevented the possibility of articulating a clear and detailed nuclear doctrine during the period following the first nuclear test, when such a doctrine was more necessary.

Keywords

neoclassical realismnuclear doctrineChinafactional politics
Type
Research Article
Information
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , November 2017 , pp. 359 - 384
Copyright
© Società Italiana di Scienza Politica 2017 

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