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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 April 2010
Just before midnight on 10 November 1975 Portugal's high commissioner in Angola, along with the last remnants of the Portuguese army in Africa, embarked for Lisbon. Earlier in the day he had formally transferred sovereignty not to a successor government but to ‘the Angolan people’, a formulation which permitted Portugal to ‘decolonise’ without taking sides in the civil war which was at that time reaching its climax in Angola. Immediately the perfunctory ceremony in Luanda ended, the Portuguese officials left at speed for the harbour and the relative safety of their ships which departed immediately. Thus ended Portugal's 500-year empire in Africa. It is tempting to see Portugal's indecorous withdrawal from Angola as an emblematic climax to an increasingly destructive relationship with the former jewel in its African crown. In this view, the chaotic circumstances of Angola's road to independence had brought Portugal's own fragile and unstable post-revolutionary state to the point of destruction. Yet a quite different view can be proposed. The political and diplomatic challenges thrown down by the Angolan crisis might be seen, on the contrary, to have had a ‘disciplining’ effect on a revolutionary process in Portugal which was threatening to spin out of control as a result of its own internal pressures. Arguably, rather than exacerbating these pressures, the demands of events in Angola had a unifying effect on an otherwise fragmenting state.
1 Among the more general works in English dealing with Angola's late colonial and early post-independence experience are: Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique (Oxford 1992);Google ScholarGuimaraes, Fernando Andresen, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict (London 1998);Google ScholarHenderson, Lawrence, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict (Ithaca NY 1979);Google ScholarHeywood, Linda, Contested Power in Angola, 1840s to the Present (New York 2000);Google ScholarMacQueen, Norrie, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire (London 1997);Google ScholarMarcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Volume 1: The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950–62 (Cambridge MA 1969);Google Scholar Volume 2: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962–76 (Cambridge MA 1978); Somerville, Keith, Angola: Politics Economics and Society (London 1986);Google ScholarWright, George, The Destruction of a Nation: United States'Policy towards Angola since 1945 (London 1997)Google Scholar.
2 A detailed and careful exploration of the origins and bases of support of the three movements is provided by Heimer, Franz-Wilhelm, The Decolonization Conflict in Angola: An Essay in Political Sociology (Geneva 1979)Google Scholar.
3 On the war in Guinea and its impact on Portuguese politics seeGoogle ScholarMacQueen, Norrie, ‘Portugal's First Domino; “Pluricontinentalism” and Colonial War in Guine-Bissau, 1963–1974’, Contemporary European History 8/2 (1999) 209–230CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 See Munslow, Barry, Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins (London 1983) 114–130Google Scholar.
5 According to the CIA, by the time of formal independence China had drawn back from its support for the FNLA and UNITA, its rivalry with the Soviet Union being better served from the non-interventionist moral high ground. National Intelligence Bulletin, 11 December 1975, CIA Case Number F-1990-01945 (declassified and released, 13 November 1997).
6 For a contemporary account of the international dimensions to the Angolan civil war see Ebinger, Charles K., ‘External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War’, Orbis 20/3 (1976) 669–699Google Scholar.
7 This was the general thrust of the present author's own account of events published in 1997. MacQueen, , The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa - see especially 179–185Google Scholar.
8 Spinola, Antonio de, Portugal e oFuturo: Andlise da Conjuntura National (Lisbon 1974).Google Scholar
9 On the ‘Spinolist’ project see MacQueen, Norrie, ‘Antonio de Spinola and the Decolonization of Portuguese Africa’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 7/2 (1996) 436–465CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
10 Silvéio Marques had previously been governor-general of Angola under Salazar in the mid-1960s. His appointment by Spinola was provocative therefore - the more so as he had earlier tried and failed to have him appointed to the same post in Mozambique. António de Spínola, País sem Rumo: Contributo para a História de uma Revolucáo (Lisbon 1978) 290–291; 313.
11 Rosa Coutinho subsequently claimed he was appointed to Angola to ‘get rid’ of him from Lisbon: ‘Notas sobre a descolonizacao de Angola’, Seminário: 25 de Abril 10 Anos Depois (Lisbon 1984) 361. It is more likely, however, that he was appointed because of his standing with the MFA and his extensive experience of Angola. Spínola later remarked with characteristic vehemence that at the time he did not suspect he was ‘dealing with a pro-communist in’ thrall to the Soviet Union’, País sem Rumo, 317.
12 In the view of inter-territorial co-ordination minister, António de Almeida Santos, who was part of the Portuguese delegation, the agreement was concluded with relative ease because it had already been worked out substantially at the Mombassa meeting without Portuguese involvement. Author's interview with António de Almeida Santos.
13 Correia, Pedro Pezarat, A Descolonizacao de Angola: foia da Coroa do Imperio Portugues (Lisbon 1991) 130.Google Scholar
14 Guimāraes, , The Origins, 94Google Scholar.
15 An English translation of the Alvor agreement was published by the Portuguese government as Angola: The Independence Agreement (Lisbon 1975).
16 The resignation of the first post-coup prime minister, Adelino Palma Carlos, after his failure to engineer the enhancement of presidential powers had been an early indication of Spínola's declining authority. See the Sunday Times Insight Team, Portugal: The Year of the Captains (London 1975) 145–146Google Scholar.
17 The ‘Programme of the Armed Forces Movement’, despite being vague on significant detail and incomplete in its scope, became the political compass of the revolution pending the revision of the pre-coup constitution. It was first published in its final form in the Portuguese press on 27 April 1974, two days after the coup.
18 Prior to the MPLA-FNLA fighting there had been violence between the MPLA and a breakaway faction led by Daniel Chipenda its military leader in the east during the colonial war. The MPLA sought to justify its actions on the grounds that Chipenda's group had not been recognised by the Alvor agreement and therefore had no legal right to organise politically. Diário de Notícias (Lisbon) 14 April 1975Google Scholar.
19 Expresso (Lisbon) 28 March 1975Google Scholar.
20 Dídrio de Notícias, 31 March 1975.Google Scholar
21 Dídrio de Notícias, 9 May 1975; Expresso, 17 May 1975.Google Scholar
22 In fact, Silva Cardoso appeared more concerned with the build-up of MPLA armaments, although his attempts to confront this seemed to have been frustrated by more radical elements in the Luanda military. See Bridgland, Fred, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa (Edinburgh 1986) 119Google Scholar.
23 The Times (London) 16 May 1975Google Scholar.
24 A Descolonizaçāo Portuguesa: Aproximaçāo a um Esludo II [Grupo de pesquisa sobre a descolonizacao portuguesa] (Lisbon 1982) 242Google Scholar.
25 Interview in Expresso Revista (Lisbon) 17 February 1979Google Scholar.
26 Santos, António de Almeida, 15 Meses no Governo ao Servigo da Descolonizacdo (Lisbon 1975) 355Google Scholar.
27 A Descolonizacdo Portuguesa II, 215Google Scholar. Also Didrio de Noticias, 12 May 1975Google Scholar.
28 Quoted in Ernest Harsch and Thomas, Tony, Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War (New York 1976) 74Google Scholar.
29 Transcript of press conference (16 May 1975) reprinted in Manuela de S. Rama and Carlos Planier, Meh Antunes: Tempo de SerFirme (Lisbon 1976) 181–199.
30 Guimāraes, , The Origins, 95–96Google Scholar.
31 Expresso Revista, 17 February 1979Google Scholar.
32 Interviewed by Avillez, Maria Joāo, Do Fundo da Revoluçāo (Lisbon 1994) 28Google Scholar.
33 Fighting had also broken out between the MPLA and UNITA at by this time in die oil-rich Angolan enclave of Cabinda between Congo-Brazzaville and Zaire.
34 Article 27 of the Alvor agreement stated that ‘difficulties arising from the work of the [Transitional] Government’ should be solved by agreement between the presidential triumvirate and the high commissioner. Article 58 indicated that ‘questions arising as to the implementation and application’ of the agreement which cannot be resolved in this way ‘shall be settled by negotiation between the Portuguese Government and the liberation movements’.
35 Africa Contemporary Record XII, 1975-1976 (London 1976) B426Google Scholar.
36 Diário de Notícias, 5 June 1975Google Scholar.
37 Diário de Notícias, 16 May 1975Google Scholar. See also Guimarāes, The Origins, 95.
38 The Portuguese attack took place after the MPLA had refused to hand over those responsible for the original incident. Diário de Notícias, 28 June 1975Google Scholar.
39 Pompílio da Cruz, the leader of the Angolan Resistance Front (FRA) of right wing setders later claimed that it had been his men disguised as MPLA fighters who had been responsible for the original incident: Angola, Os Vivos e os Mortos (Lisbon 1976) 220–221. This ‘admission’ was taken up on the left to explain a violent breach between the supposedly revolutionary Portuguese troops and their ‘natural allies’ in the MPLA. Rosa Coutinho, for example, was ready to accept da Cruz's claim - ‘Notas sobre a descolonizaçāo de Angola’, 363. So too was the MFA luminary in Angola, Pezarat Correia, in his narrative of events - A Descolonizaçāo de Angola, 137. It is at least as likely, however, that da Cruz sought to ‘expropriate’ the incident to enhance the reputation of his not notably successful movement.
40 FNLA statement quoted in The Times, 14 July 1975. The rhetorical reference to ‘socio-imperialism’ is suggestive of Maoist attacks on Soviet communism at this time and a reminder of the FNLA's Chinese linksGoogle Scholar.
41 Correia, Pezarat, A Descolonizaçāo, 144.Google Scholar
42 Diário de Notícias, 14 July 1975.Google Scholar
43 Antunes, Melo interview in Palavras no Tempo (Lisbon 1990) 277Google Scholar.
44 The Times, 21 July 1975.Google Scholar
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46 During the transition phase in Mozambique the maintenance of order in urban areas had been facilitated by joint patrols by Portuguese forces and those of Frelimo - the single nationalist movement. Carlos Camilo, ‘Mozambique: os acontecimentos de 7 de Setembro e 21 de Outubro de 1974’, Semindrio: 25 de AMI 10 Anos Depots, 342–343. This was proposed for Luanda after the May fighting, but with three opposing movements and Portuguese forces to be accommodated it was not a practical option. Diário de Notícias, 16 May 1975.
47 Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 123Google Scholar.
48 Interview in Do Fundo da Revoluçāo, 28.
49 Author's interview with Vitor Crespo. Crespo's title was ‘minister for co-operation’ while Almeida Santos had been minister of ‘inter-territorial co-ordination’.
50 Diário de Notícias, 5 and 6 August 1975Google Scholar.
51 Despite suspicions on the part of the FNLA and UNITA Silva Cardoso may have been replaced at his own request. Diário de Notícias, 6 August 1975. Author's interview with Pedro Pezarat Correia. An acting high commissioner, General Ferreira de Macedo, filled the hiatus between Silva Cardoso's departure and Leonel Cardoso's arrival on 28 August.
52 The official announcement stated merely: ‘Considered temporarily suspended - the effect of the Alvor Agreement, concluded on 15 January 1975 between the Portuguese State, the FNLA, the MPLA and UNITA’ (Decree Law No. 458-A/75).
53 Diário de Notícias, 29 September 1975.Google Scholar
54 The Directory was formed, according to President Costa Gomes, by a Council of the revolution which had ‘lost its homogeneity’ to make its ‘solutions operational and effective more quickly’. Costa Gomes, Sobre Portugal: Diálogos com Alexandre Manuel (Lisbon 1979) 77.Google Scholar
55 ‘Documento dos Nove’, section 5, reprinted as appendix to Rama and Planier, Melo Antunes: Tempo de SerFirme, 228–229.
56 Ibid., secuon 3, 227–228.
57 As well as Melo Antunes the ‘nine’ included other key actors in the decolonisation process including Vasco Lourenco, Vitor Crespo and Brigadier Pedro Pezarat Correia, leader of the MFA in Angola in 1974 and then commander of the southern military region in Portugal.
58 The final conclusion to the ‘revolutionary process’ came at the end of November 1975, just a few weeks after the withdrawal from Angola, when a rebellion by leftist troops in Lisbon was put down by other army units.
59 Quoted in Didrio de Noticias, 6 September 1975Google Scholar.
60 By the beginning of June the national airline TAP was struggling to meet the demand for flights from Luanda to Lisbon. Expresso, 13 June 1975. In addition to those returning to Portugal, a considerable proportion of refugees went to South Africa.
61 Bergerol, Jane, ‘Portugal's Year in Africa’, Africa Contemporary Record 1975-1976, A116.The airlift was originally intended to transport 250,000 between August and October. The Times, 4 August 1975.Google Scholar
62 A Descolonizaāo Portuguesa II, 283–285Google Scholar.
63 Diário de Notícias, 12 September 1975.Google Scholar
64 The immediate reception of the retornados was, paradoxically, greatly helped by the virtual collapse of Portugal's tourist industry in the unstable atmosphere of summer 1975 leaving thousands of hotel rooms available for requisition by the government.
65 Expresso Revista, 17 October 1998. Author's interview with Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.Google Scholar
66 Author's interview with Vitor Crespo.
67 The Colombian novelist Gabriel García Márquez, wrote an eloquent - though heavily romanticised - account of the Cuban intervention in ‘The Cuban mission to Angola’, New Left Review 101–102 (February-April 1977) 123–137. A detailed but concise contemporary account of the various foreign involvement is given by Colin Legum, ‘Foreign intervention in Angola’ in: Legum, Colin and Hodges, Tony, The War over Southern Africa (London 1976) 9–44Google Scholar.
68 Correia, Pezarat, A Descolonizacdo, 148–149.Google Scholar
69 Diário de Notídas, 1 April, 16 April and 29 May 1975.Google Scholar
70 The Times, 15 May 1975.Google Scholar
71 Rama, and Planier, , Melo Antunes: Tempo de SerFirme, 47–48Google Scholar.
72 Melo Antunes interview in Do Fundo da Revoluçāo, 28; 30; Bergerol, ‘Portugal's Year in Africa’, All5.
73 See Tony Hodges, ‘How the MPLA won in Angola’, Legum and Hodges, The War over Southern Africa, 53. The final trigger came on 5 August when MPLA forces fired on Savimbi's plane at Silva Porto airport in the south of the country. James, W. Martin, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974–1990 (London 1992) 58Google Scholar.
74 United Nations Document A/PV.2382, 9 October 1975.
75 A Descolonizaçāo Portuguesa II, 237.Google Scholar
76 Interview in Expresso Revista, 25 October 1975.Google Scholar
77 Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 126.
78 A Descolonizaçāo Portuguesa II, 234–236.Google Scholar
79 ‘Documento dos Nove’, section 3, Rama and Planier, Melo Antunes: Tempo de SerFirme, 227.
80 United Nations Document A/PV.2382, 9 October 1975.
81 Crespo gained the impression during this tour that Presidents Machel of Mozambique and Nyrere of Tanzania were aware of the impending arrival of foreign support for the MPLA (which they both backed) and were therefore disinclined to participate in any fresh initiatives. Author's interview with Vitor Crespo.
82 Correia, Pezarat, A Descolonizaçāo, 170Google Scholar.
83 Both Costa Gomes and Vitor Crespo apparently favoured recognition but were heavily outvoted. Expresso, 12 November 1975.
84 Melo Antunes believed that the delay in recognition by Portugal merely deepened Angola's reliance on the Soviet Union after 1975. Interview in Do Fundo da Revoluçāo, 31.
85 Pezarat Correia notes that ‘[…] outside of Luanda the behaviour of some units was open to criticism, almost always because of shortcomings in leadership’ but that in the capital, where the situation was most complex, the army ‘showed much greater efficiency and determination’. A Descolonizaçāo, 164.
86 See MacQueen, , The Decolonization, 219–221.Google Scholar
87 In October 1974, soon after the fall of Spinola, Henry Kissinger had characterised Soares as ‘a Kerensky’ in the face of the Bolsheviks of the PCP - Isaacman, Walter, Kissinger: A Biography (London 1992) 673–674.Google Scholar Kissinger's assessment was, characteristically, historically informed but wholly mistaken.
88 Diário de Notícias, 28 May 1975.Google Scholar
