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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2018
The concept of late development is ubiquitous in political science. Scholars generally use the term to explain the state's role in the economy based upon the timing of a country's industrialization. Many consider Japan a quintessential example of state-driven late development. This article surveys the late development theories of Alexander Gerschenkron and Alice Amsden. It then appraises these theories based upon Japan's experience, demonstrating that neither accurately describes the state's role in Japan's industrialization.
To be clear, the argument is not that the state played no part in Japan's economic development. The question is whether late development offers an effective conceptual tool for explaining the causes, content, and timing of state action. There are many possible explanations of Japan's industrialization. Late development is only one of them, and not a very good one.
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54 Hanai, ‘Kei Kōgyō no Shihon Chikuseki’, pp. 124, 134; Tsūshō Sangyō Shō (ed.), Shōkō Seisaku Shi 1–2, pp. 42–3. The direct tax on domestic, non-agricultural production over 1898–1902 was only 2.8%: Miyajima, Sangyō Seisaku to Kigyō Tōji no Keizaishi, p. 32.
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57 Miyajima, Sangyō Seisaku to Kigyō Tōji no Keizaishi, p. 42; Tsūshō Sangyō Shō (ed.), Shōkō Seisaku Shi 1–2, p. 136.
58 Cf. Gerschenkron, Continuity in History, pp. 93–4; Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, pp. 133, 355.
59 Tsūshō Sangyō Shō (ed.), Shōkō Seisaku Shi 1–2, pp. 52, 101.
60 See Samuels, ‘Rich Nation, Strong Army’.
61 In Gerschenkron's words, industrialization would have to proceed ‘along a broad front, starting simultaneously along many lines of economic activities’: Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, p. 10.
62 Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan, p. 71; Kanji Ishii, ‘Bakumatsu Kaikō to Gaiatsu e no Taiō’, in Ishii, Hara, and Takeda (eds.), Nihon Keizaishi 1, pp. 24–6.
63 See Table 2 in Tsūshō Sangyō Shō (ed.), Shōkō Seisaku Shi 1–2, p. 29.
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73 Miyajima, Sangyō Seisaku to Kigyō Tōji no Keizaishi, p. 17.
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75 Miyajima, Sangyō Seisaku to Kigyō Tōji no Keizaishi, pp. 48, 54–6.
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77 Ibid., pp. 117, 139.
78 Ibid., pp. 141–2.
79 Ibid., pp. 158–62.
80 Miyajima, Sangyō Seisaku to Kigyō Tōji no Keizaishi, pp. 3, 269–70.
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