¹ The terms Burma and Myanmar are used to simply denote the country. No connotative value is attached to either term, although the latter has acquired negative value among some scholars and analysts. As used in this instance, the name Burma refers to the country prior to 1988. In 1989, the ruling military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Committee (SLORC) renamed the country Myanmar. The latter name is subjected to dispute owing to the high level of political violence that accompanied leadership transition from 1988. It is also sometimes associated with tacit approval or support of the renamed State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government.

² See, for example, Womack, Brantly, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ The Imperial Chinese tributary system involved an elaborate web of subordinate relationships with China in the middle. Lesser states performed homage through gifts such as silk and gold. When such tributes were not forthcoming, China would launch a punitive expedition to correct the situation and restore equilibrium to the relationship. Similarly, the northern Malay states in peninsula Malaya paid homage to Siam at the turn of the twentieth century through gifts that were referred to as the bunga perak (silver flower) and bunga emas (gold flower). Such practices may well fall within a constructivist scheme of things where cultural norms and practices are given much greater importance than in realist and liberal renditions of international relations.

⁴ See Ganesan, N., ‘Myanmar's Foreign Policy Towards Its Near Neighbours’, International Studies Review, 11, 1 (June 2010): 1–24Google Scholar.

⁵ On the importance of historical conjunctures and their impact on politics and policy, see Collier, Ruth Berrins and Collier, David, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 27–39Google Scholar and Pierson, Paul, Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

⁶ British administration of Burma began with Arakan and Tennasserim via India in 1825. The First Anglo-Burmese War was fought from 1824 to 1826, the Second in 1852 and the Third from 1885 to 1886. There was little by way of an articulate British policy towards Burma and most of it was done piecemeal from India. See Callahan, Mary P., War and State Building in Burma (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), pp. 22–4Google Scholar.

⁷ Notwithstanding the different names that have been given to the military junta in power, the fact remains that it is a military regime. Although Ne Win officially stepped down from power in 1988, it is widely believed that he continued to exercise power until the time of his death in December 2002. The persons most closely associated with the current government are Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, Thura Shwe Mann, and Thein Sein. Until his detention and fall from grace in October 2004, General Khin Nyunt who was head of military intelligence and Prime Minister was also strongly identified with the government. An interesting and relatively unknown detail is that Khin Nyunt was perceived as being pro-China and in a seeming snub to him, on the very week when Khin Nyunt was detained, Than Shwe paid a formal visit to Delhi, India.

⁸ A recent treatment of Myanmar's foreign policy towards ASEAN and Thailand can be found in Ganesan, N., ‘Thai–Myanmar–ASEAN Relations: The Politics of Face and Grace’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 33, 3 (November 2006): 131–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Ganesan, ‘Myanmar's Foreign Policy Towards Its Near Neighbours’.

⁹ See Robert Taylor, H., The State in Burma (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 261 and 263Google Scholar. The Indonesian equivalent was encapsulated in the phrase ‘aktif dan bebas’ or active and independent.

¹⁰ The British distrusted Burman nationalists for their training and collaboration with Japanese forces, including the ‘Thirty Comrades’ that formed the core of the independence movement. As a result of such distrust and the British preference for ‘martial races’, both British regular troops and covert operatives relied heavily on the highland Kachin, Chin, and Karen for military recruitment. In fact, at the time of independence, the Burmese Army was disproportionately dominated by highland minorities, especially in command positions. See Callahan, War and State Building in Burma, pp. 104–6 and 129–35.

¹¹ Myanmar has always accused Thailand of providing sanctuary and logistical support and weapons to the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Shan State Army – South (SSA–S).

¹² See Haacke, Jurgen, Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and International Implications (London: International Institute of Stategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 381, 2006), p. 27Google Scholar.

¹³ Bray, John, Burma and the Politics of Constructive Engagement (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 56Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Hlaing, Kyaw Yin, ‘Myanmar in 2003: Frustration and Despair?’, Asian Survey, 44, 1 (January/February 2004): 90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ On 30 September 2009, the US Senate Sub-Committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs convened a meeting on Myanmar and invited the testimony of experts. During the meeting, even the Ethnic Nationalities Council of the Union of Burma had submitted a letter urging engagement with the military junta. Senator Jim Webb who chairs the Committee had earlier secured the release of John Yettaw who had been imprisoned in Myanmar for visiting Aung San Suu Kyi and violating the terms of her house arrest. More recently, the US sent a high-level team to Myanmar led by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell to engage the country. See ‘US warns of “slow, painful” talks with Myanmar’, Agence France Presse, 22 October 2009 and ‘US envoys in historic meeting with Myanmar PM’, ibid., 11 November 2009.

¹⁶ Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 262 and Callahan, War and State Building in Burma, pp. 154–6. At least to partly deflect this threat, the U Nu government was the first non-communist country to recognize China in 1949. Also see Bray, Burma and the Politics of Constructive Engagement, p. 45.

¹⁷ The Wa and the Kokang were the original sword arms of the BCP. The 17 groups that have officially negotiated peace settlements with the government include the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), New Democratic Army (Kachin), Palaung State Liberation Organization, Myanmar National Democracy Alliance (Kokang), Kachin Defense Army, Myanmar National Solidarity Party (Wa), National Democracy Alliance Army Military Local Administration Committee (Shan/Akhar), Shan State Army, Pa-O National Organization, Shan State Nationalities People's Organization, Mong Tai Army (MTA), Kayan National Guard, Kayinni National Progressive Party, Kayan New Land Party, Kayinni National People's Liberation Front, and New Mon State Party. The KNU that concluded a first round of peace talks has yet to ratify the agreement following the detention of Khin Nyunt in 2004 and the demise of its leader Saw Bo Mya in 2006. The Myanmar government reported that a 300-strong force led by Major General Htein Maung from the KNU/KNLA ‘returned to the legal fold’ in February 2007. Additionally, it was reported that another 71 members led by Saw Nay Soe Mya, son of Saw Bo Mya, along with 88 family members ‘had also followed suit’ in March 2009. The fighting along the Thai–Myanmar border between the tatmadaw and the KNU/KNLA in June 2009 led to more refugees crossing the border into Tak province in Thailand. See ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs releases Press Statement in Response to Declaration of EU Presidency’, New Light of Myanmar, 14 June 2009. And in the most recent communication issued by General Htay Maung, Chairman of the KNU/KNLA Peace Council to Chief of Military Intelligence General Ye Myit, there is a clear rejection of the attempt to integrate the KNU within the Burma Army Militia Group in April 2010.

¹⁸ See Tin Maung Maung Than, ‘Myanmar's Relations with China: From Dependence to Interdependence?’, paper presented at the conference ‘East Asia Facing a Rising China’, 11–12 August 2008, East Asian Institute, Singapore,

¹⁹ The most significant of such visits on the Myanmar side include those of Than Shwe, Khin Nyunt, Maung Aye, David Abel, Tin Oo, and Thein Win. On the Chinese side, Li Peng and Jiang Zemin visited Myanmar in 2000 and 2001 respectively, reaffirming cordial bilateral ties. See Maung, Mya, The Burma Road to Capitalism: Economic Growth versus Democracy (Westport, CO: Praeger, 1998), pp. 185–9Google Scholar and Muni, S. D., China's Strategic Engagement with the New ASEAN (Singapore, Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), pp. 40–1 and 77–8Google Scholar. In January 2003, Chinese Vice-Premier Li Lanqing, during a visit to Yangon, expressed the desire to push the bilateral relationship to a new and higher level. ‘China, Myanmar to Step up Cooperation: Vice-Premier’, People's Daily, 15 January 2003. In March 2009, Li Changchun, a member of the CCP's Political Bureau Standing Committee visited Yangon to sign joint agreements on constructing petroleum and natural gas pipelines as well as a framework agreement to jointly develop hydropower. Typically, Myanmar leaders such as Maung Aye and Thura Shwe Mann pay two visits to China each year, one to Beijing and the other to Yunnan province, which account for about half the value of all bilateral trade. The most recent visit by Maung Aye to Beijing in June 2009 also led to the signing of a number of bilateral agreements. And in June 2010 Chinese premier Wen Jiaobao visited Yangon and formally handed over the Chinese-built Myanmar International Convention Centre in Nay Pyi Taw's Zabuthiri township. Finally, Than Shwe has preferred to obtain medical treatment from China instead of Singapore since the former is able to provide greater privacy and secrecy.

²⁰ ‘China Opposes Interference in Myanmar’, China Daily, 21 August 2003.

²¹ Such facilities were rumoured to include those in Hainggyi in the Irrawady River estuary near Bassein, Ramree Island south of Sittwe in Arakan state, Zadetkyi Kyun (St Matthew's Island) off the Tenasserrim coast and Coco Island in the Andaman Sea. See Shad-liang, Chi, ‘Burma's Relations with the People's Republic of China: From Delicate Friendship to Genuine Cooperation’, in Carey, Peter (ed.), Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 85Google Scholar and Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Capitalism, p. 189. Also see Seekins, Donald M., ‘Burma–China Relations: Playing with Fire’, Asian Survey, 37, 6 (June 1997): 535Google Scholar. More recent reports however suggest that there is no truth to such speculations. See Andrew Selth, ‘Chinese Whispers: The Great Coco Island Mystery’, Irrawaddy (online edition) (January 2007).

²² This position is attributed to a statement made by General Zhao Nanqi, Director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, in 1993 in which he is reputed to have said that China cannot accept the Indian Ocean being India's Ocean. See Malik, J. Mohan, ‘Myanmar's Role in Regional Security: Pawn or Pivot?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 19, 1 (June 1997): 58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ Most writers refer to a large defence procurement exercise in August 1990 valued at some US$1.4 billion as the start of this weapons acquisition programme. Such acquisitions include fighter, ground attack, and trainer aircraft, frigates and fast patrol boats, main battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, and assorted small arms. Between 2001 and July 2003 alone, four shipments of weapons were reported. See Chi shad-liang, ‘Burma's Relations with the People's Republic of China’, pp. 84–86 and Military Balance (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998–99 and 2000–2001). In 1993 and 1999, Myanmar's defence expenditure was at its highest, at nearly 50% of the state budget. See Selth, Andrew, Burma's Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk, CO: Eastbridge, 2002), p. 332Google Scholar.

²⁴ In the case of the Gambari visit, the Chinese government reportedly leaned heavily on Myanmar by summoning the ambassador in Beijing repeatedly to enquire on the status of his visa application.

²⁵ See Ren Xiao, ‘The Fusion of Principle and Interest in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Case of the Myanmar Issue’, paper presented at a conference in Kunming, 21–2 July 2009.

²⁶ Maung, Mya, ‘On the Road to Mandalay: A Case Study of the Sinocization of Upper Burma’, Asian Survey, 34, 5 (May 1994): 186–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁷ Anthony Davis, ‘Burma casts wary eye on China’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 June 1999.

²⁸ During a routine road trip between the Myanmar–Thai border town of Tachilek to Chengtung in the Eastern Shan states in 2007, the author witnessed a large number of Chinese workers repairing the road.

²⁹ See Donald Seekins and Mya Maung, ‘On the Road to Mandalay’.

³⁰ Arnott, David, ‘China–Burma Relations’, Challenges to Democratisation in Burma (Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001), pp. 74–7Google Scholar. China is itself wary of the inflow of drugs from Myanmar and the international community has expressed reservations about the drug-related activities of certain ethnic groups, in particular the Shan, Wa, and the Kokang. In late August 2009, the Myanmar military engaged the Kokang 1,000 strong Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) that in turn led to some 30,000 Kokang and ethnic Chinese crossing the border into Yunnan province. The action drew a rare rebuke from the Chinese government. The Myanmar government claimed that it was raiding a drug factory, while detractors emphasized the action as a signal to other ceasefire groups and part of preparations for the 2010 national election. Eventually, however, a large quantity of methamphetamine tablets and precursors were seized, validating the junta's claims. See ‘Burmese junta issues a warning to China’, Nation, 4 September 2009 and ‘Myanmar police seize drugs’, Reuters, 4 September 2009.

³¹ The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) were clearly opposed to being inducted into a border security force. During a private interview conducted in Myitkyina with a Kachin leader in January 2010, it was disclosed that some 60% of KIO members are opposed to the idea. Among the major disagreements are force size and structure and whether the tatmadaw or Kachin officers will command units at battalion and brigade levels. In a subsequent briefing, it was revealed that the KIA is now able to field 35 operational battalions. Similar sentiments also appear to be shared by the Shan State Army – North (SSA–N). Both these groups, together with the Wa will have the greatest input into the negotiations in view of the size of their armies and the demonstration impact in turn on the smaller ceasefire groups. In April 2010, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) proudly inaugurated its Fourth Brigade in Pangsang to indicate that it has a current troop strength of 40,000 soldiers. Both the KIA and the SSA–N have taken note of the development and in seeming coordination with the Wa have opened offices in Pangsang. Interview with NGO worker, Yangon, 21 June 2010.

³² This was certainly the view of demobilized soldiers from the Mon State Party that the author interviewed in December 2006 at the headquarters of the Party.

³³ For a discussion of the Myanmar government's efforts at drug eradication, see Myoe, Maung Aung, Neither Friend Nor Foe:Myanmar's Relations with Thailand Since 1988 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002), pp. 130–42Google Scholar. For a more detailed discussion, see Chin, Ko-Lin, The Golden Triangle: Inside Southeast Asia's Drug Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009)Google Scholar.

³⁴ Ren Xiao, ‘The Fusion of Principle and Interest in Chinese Foreign Policy’.

³⁵ For example, in 1998, the Myanmar government announced a restricted list of items for import and export, leading to a fall in the total bilateral trade turnover from $749 million in 1997 to $400 million in 1998. Davis, ‘Burma casts wary eye on China’, p. 3. It has also been reported that the SPDC apparently turned down a Chinese proposal to build a container port at Bhamo and to improve the port facilities at Kyaukpyu in Rakhine state. See Steinberg, David, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001), p. 233Google Scholar.

³⁶ The constitution explicitly requires 255 of the seats in the House of Representatives or 110 out of 440 seats be reserved for the military. Additionally, the military chief will be able to nominate 56 candidates out of the 224-member House of Nationalities. This situation is not unlike that which obtained in Suharto's New Order Indonesia where 100 of the 500 seats in parliament were also reserved for military representation. The Myanmar Election Commission is expected to approve the registration of 40 political parties with a minimum of 1,000 members each. The registration process requires the payment of a US$500 fee per party member. Consequently, the registration of political parties is a tedious and expensive affair. The seven states and seven divisions in the country have been divided into a total of 330 electoral constituencies with 45 in Yangon and 36 in Mandalay, the second largest city. The new administrative capital of Naypyitaw will have a total of eight seats. Registration of candidates for elections will be from 16 to 30 August and withdrawal of candidates by 3 September 2010. See ‘Myanmar announces November 7 for general election’, Xinhua, 13 August 2010.

³⁷ The executive head of state is identified as someone with training in military or strategic affairs. Whereas some scholars regard the writing as subject to some interpretive latitude, the general feeling is that Than Shwe is likely to assume this executive appointment upon retirement.