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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
The basic rule of the common law is that damages in civil actions are awarded as compensation for injury and not as punishment for wrongdoing. The object is reparation; and the applicable principle is restitutio in integrum. Thus, the ultimate aim of the award is to restore the plaintiff, as far as money can do, to the position he would have been if the wrong had not been committed. In tort actions where the plaintiff's injury can be measured by some material loss, this principle will apply without much difficulty; however, in cases where the damages are “at large”—in that it involves a substantial subjective element, the viability of the principle of restitutio in integrum becomes doubtful. Moreover, the award of damages may sometimes look to the punishment of the defendant, instead of compensating the plaintiff; such damages are called “exemplary” damages.
1 Livingstone v. Raywards Coal Co. (1880) 5 A.C. 25, at 31, per Blackburn, Lord;Google ScholarMcCany v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [1965] 2 Q.B. 86, at 106, per Diplock, L. J.;Google ScholarOlabisi Ajala v. Shittu Are & Ors. (1985) H.C.N.L.R. 503, at 509; per Onalaja, J.;Google ScholarEliochin (Nig.) Ltd. v. Mbadiwe (1986) N.W.L.R. (Pt. 14) 47, per Obaseki, J. S. C.Google Scholar
2 Liesbosch Dredger v. Edison [1933] A.C. 449, at 463, per Wright, Lord;Google ScholarGeneral Tire & Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. Ltd. [1975] 2 All E.R. 173, at 177.Google Scholar
3 That sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation” per Lord Blackburn, Livingstone v. Rawyards Coat Co., above, n. 1, at 39.Google Scholar See also Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980] A.C. 174, at 187, per Scarman, Lord.Google Scholar
4 See the exposé of Lord Hailsham, L. C., in Broome v. Cassel & Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027, at 1072–75.Google Scholar
5 Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129; Broome v. Cassel & Co. Ltd., op. cit. See also Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th ed.) Vol. 12, p. 474, para. 1190.Google Scholar
6 See the discussion under “historical development”, below.
7 Above, n. 5.
8 These are: (1) Oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional action by government servants, (2) cases in which the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff, and (3) conduct for which exemplary damages are expressly authorized by statute. [1964] A.C. 1129, at 1220–23.Google Scholar
9 Section 45 of the Interpretation Act, Cap. 89, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958.
10 Above, n. 5.
11 The account given here is by no means exhaustive of the growth and development of the doctrine. For a fuller account, see Street, H., Principles of the Law of Damages (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1962), at 29–31;Google ScholarOgus, A. I., The Law of Damages (London, Butterworths, 1973), at 28–31;Google ScholarSchlueter, Linda L. and Redden, Kenneth R., Punitive Damages, (2nd ed.) (The Michie Company, 1989), at 3–15;Google ScholarRookes v. Barnard, above, at 1220–37.Google Scholar
12 It is necessary to mention however that multiple damages have been a feature of the common law since the 13th century. Note, “Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts”, (1957) 70 Harv.L.R. 517, 518.Google Scholar Indeed, multiple damages or punitive damages have been in existence since the Code of Hamurabi in 2000 B.C., Schlueter and Redden, op. cit., at 3.
13 H. Street, op. cit., at 29.
14 (1763) 2 Wils 205.Google Scholar
15 (1763) Loft. 1.
16 Ibid., at 4.
17 See for example, Benson v. Friedrick (1766) 3 Burh. 1845;Google ScholarTullidge v. Wade (1769) 3 Wills 18;Google ScholarBell v. Midland Rly (1861) 10 C.B.N.S. 287.Google Scholar
18 Mayne, and McGregor, on Damages, at 296, para. 207.Google Scholar
19 See generally, Schlueter and Redden, op. cit. (vol. 2), at 383–97, for the variety of terminologies used to describe the doctrine in the various common law jurisdictions.
20 See the old case of Fay v. Parker, 4 53 N.H. 342, (1872).Google Scholar
21 See for example, Holdsworth, A History of English Law (4th ed. 1936). “For indeed it cannot be said that English Law has committed itself finally and fully to exemplary damages, and many of the above cases point to the rationale not of punishment of the defendant but of extra compensation for the plaintiff for the injury to his feelings and dignity. This is, of course no exemplary damages at all. It is another head of non-pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.” At 43–45, 50–51.Google Scholar
22 Handbook on the Law of Damages, s. 78 (1935).Google Scholar
23 [1944] 1 All E.R. 236.Google Scholar
24 Ibid., at 330.
25 Above, n. 5.
26 [1964] A.C. at 1221–27.Google Scholar
27 Ibid., at 1220–33.
28 Ibid., at 1230.
29 Ibid., at 1227.
30 The doctrine was upheld in three consecutive cases by the English Court of Appeal: McCarey v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [1964] 3 All E.R. 947;Google ScholarBroadway Approvals Ltd. v. Odhams Press Ltd. [1965] 2 All E.R. 523;Google ScholarFielding v. Variety Incorporated [1967] 2 All E.R. 497.Google Scholar
31 [1971] 2 Q.B. 354.Google Scholar
32 Ibid., at 382.
33 Per Lord Hailsham L. C.: “I am driven to the conclusion that when the Court of Appeal described the decision in Rookes v. Barnard as decided per incuriam, … they really only meant that they did not agree with it. But, in my view, even if this were so, it is not open to the Court of Appeal to give gratuitous advice to judges of first instance to ignore decisions of the House of Lords in this way and, if it were open to the Court of Appeal to do so, it would be highly undesirable. …” Ibid., at 1085.
34 Denning, Lord, The Discipline of Law (London, Butterworths 1979), at 310Google Scholar, “I am sorry that I ever said it. It earned me a severe rebuke by the House of Lords.”
35 Fridman, , Punitive Damages in Tort, (1970) Can. Bar Rev. 373.Google Scholar
36 Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Property Ltd. (1969) 117 C.L.R. 118;Google Scholaraffirmed by the Privy Council, Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Uren [1969] 1 A.C. 590.Google Scholar The basic common law position is still maintained so that exemplary damages may be awarded for intentional torts or torts based upon “outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant in contumelious disregard of the plaintiffs rights”. Whitefield v. De Lauret & Co. Ltd. (1920) 29 C.L.R. 71, at 77.Google Scholar
37 See Deninson v. Fawcett (1958) O.R. 312, for a summary of the approach of Canadian judges to the doctrine before 1964.Google Scholar
38 Fridman, above, n. 35. For example Rookes v. Barnard was cited with approval in McDonald v. Hees (1974) D.L.R. (3d) 720 (N.D.D.C.T.D.);Google ScholarBanks v. Campbell (1973) 45 D.L.R. (3d) 603 (N.S.S.C.T.D.);Google ScholarWasson v. California Std. Co. (1964) 47 D.L.R. (2d) 71 (Alta. S.C.App.Div.).Google Scholar
39 See McElroy v. Cowper-Smith, [1967] S.C.R. 425, 62 D.L.R. (2d) 65 (“…in Canada the jurisdiction to award punitive damages in tort actions is not so limited as Lord Devlin outlined in Rookes v. Barnard”).Google Scholar
40 Nebraska, Miller v. Kingsley, 194, Neb. 123, 124, 230, N.W. 2d 472, 474 (9175);Google ScholarNew Hampshire, Panas v. Harakis, 129 N.H. 591, 608, 529, A.2d 976, 986 (1987);Google ScholarNew Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. (s.507:16) (specifically abolishing exemplary damages) and Washington, Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoeffer, 2 Wash. 45, 51–52 25 P. 1072, 1073–74 (1892).Google Scholar
41 Connecticut, Georgia and Texas, Ghiardi, J. and Kircher, J., Supplement (1991) at 19.Google Scholar
42 See generally Ghiardi and Kircher, above, at 21–25 for a tabular illustration of the present status of the doctrine in the United States.
43 Johnson v. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. (1959) W.N.L.R. 128.Google Scholar
44 (1964) 1 All N.L.R. 402.Google Scholar
45 Per Brett, J.S.C., at 406.Google Scholar
46 Wusamotu v. Lagos City Council (1966) L.L.R. 63.Google Scholar
47 (1982) N.C.L.R. 502.Google Scholar
48 Ibid., at 518.
49 Ibid., at 519.
50 Ibid., at 522.
51 (1971) 1 All N.L.R. 56.Google Scholar
52 (1980) 10 S.C. 1.
53 Ibid., at 15.
54 Above, n. 1.
55 Quotation from the Supreme Court's judgment, ibid., at 52.
56 Ibid., at 61.
57 Ibid., at 65–66.
58 Above, n. 44.
59 Above, n. 48.
60 See for example Association of Registered Engineering Contractors v. S. D. Y. Amaye, (1986) 3 N.W.L.R. 653Google Scholar and Ladejobi v. Shodipo, (1989) 1 N.W.L.R. 596, at 601.Google Scholar
61 Union Bank v. Nnoli (1991) 1 N.W.L.R. 268.Google Scholar
62 Ekpeyong v. Inyang, (1975) 2 S.C. 1 at 11, per Ibekwe, J. S. C.Google Scholar See also lge v. Olunloyo & Ors. (1983) 2 S.C. 258.Google Scholar
63 Kroger v. Demakes 566 S.W. 2d 653 (Texas Civil App. 1978).Google Scholar
64 Above, n. 60.
65 For example, Johnson v. Mobil Oil Ltd., above, n. 43;Google ScholarWusamotu v. Lagos City Council (1966) L.L.R. 63.Google Scholar In both cases the court awarded exemplary damages to “punish” the defendants for their reprehensible conduct, even though the plaintiffs did not expressly claim “exemplary” damages in their plaint.
66 See n. 64, and the corresponding text.
67 Above, n. 44.
68 Ibid., at 406. Emphasis added.
69 Order 18 Rule 8 (II).
70 Above, n. 60.
71 S. 12, High Court Law, Gap. 52, Laws of Lagos State, 1972.
72 It has been held that this provision enables Nigerian Courts to apply the applicable English Rules where the Local Rules of Civil Procedure are inadequate or silent on a particular subject-matter. Laibru Ltd. v. Building and Civil Engineering Contractors Ltd. (1969) 1 All N.L.R. 387.Google Scholar
73 Ibid., at 662.
74 For a consideration of the meaning of “special” and “general” damages, see Hakeem Ogunniran, “What Constitutes Strict Proof Of Special Damages”, Justice 108 Vol.2, No. 5, (1991) (Federal Ministry of Justice, Lagos, Nigeria).
75 See generally, Schlueter and Redden, above, n. 11 at 105–108. The United States' Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 8a) only require a short statement of the claim and a demand for relief. Therefore, it is not necessary to specifically state a claim for punitive damages. Nelson v. G. H. Murphy Co., 245 F. Supp. 846 (N.D. ala. 1965).Google ScholarThe same rule is applied in some states. Tucker v. Reynolds, 268 S.C. 330, 233 S.E.2d 402 (1977).Google ScholarCompare Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).Google Scholar
76 Riley, Tom, Proving Punitive Damages: The Complete Handbook (Prentice Hall Inc. 1981), at 33, para. 2.9.Google Scholar
77 “The type of misconduct needs to be specified, but punitive damages themselves do not.” See Schlueter and Redden, above, n. 11 at 106 and the numerous cases cited therein.
78 Ibid., at 107 and the cases cited in footnote 13.
79 Ibid.
80 It must be pointed out that this approach is not peculiar to Nigerian courts. For example, in Broadway Approvals Ltd. v. Odhams Press Ltd., op. cit., the court had awarded £10,000 for damages and Sellers, L. J., observed that: “If he had lost a leg, a great deprivation which nothing could restore, it is unlikely that he would have received more than about half of the sum awarded by the jury for the injury to his reputation.”
81 (1986) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 45) 828.Google Scholar
82 (1974) 1 Riv.St.L.Rep. (Pt. 1) 5.Google Scholar
83 Above.
84 (1985) High Ct. of Nig.L.Rep. 362.Google Scholar
85 Hakeem Ogunniran, “Limitation of Actions in Nigerian Law: A Critical Appraisal” (unpublished manuscript).
86 For example, Chief (Mrs) Ransome-Kuti & Ors v. Attorney General Suit No. LD/328/1977;Google ScholarSamuel Obere v. Board of Management, EKU Baptist Hospital Management (1978) 6/7 S.C. 15;Google ScholarRexford Aflo v. Thermostern (Nig.) Ltd. (unreported) Suit No. ID/192/84.Google Scholar
87 Unreported, Suit No. 1/93/87 of Monday, 20 03, 1989.Google ScholarThis judgment was serialized in the Nigerian Tribune from 16 May, 1989 to 19 05, 1989.Google ScholarBut the relevant part of the judgment—assessment of damages—is contained on pp. 1 and 9 on Friday, 19 05, 1989.Google Scholar
88 Ibid., at 10–11, per Ibidapo-Obe, J.
89 Ibid.
90 Suit No. ID/312/88 of Friday 2 06, 1989.Google Scholar
91 Wargen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W. 2d 437, 459 (1980).Google Scholar
92 Tetuan v. A. H. Robbins 241, Kans. 441, 738 P.2d 1210, 1238 (1987).Google Scholar
93 Two tests arc traditionally applied: whether the amount of the award “shocks the judicial conscience”; or whether the award reflects passion or prejudice on the part of the jury (or the judge as the case may be). Ace Truck & Equipment Rentals Inc. v. Kahn 746 P.2d 132 (Nevada 1987).Google Scholar
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., at 136–37, footnote omitted.
96 For example, U.S.A.: Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S.A. 29 (1971); Australia:Google ScholarUren v. John Fairfax & Sons Property Ltd., (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118; and England:Google ScholarRookes v. Barnard, op. cit.
97 See however the half-hearted observation of the Supreme Court in Eliochin (Nig.) Ltd. v. Mbadiwe: “The debate on whether the modern legal system should recognize exemplary damages has been on and all in all the case for dispensing with them has been made out. The central argument is that they are anomalous in the civil sphere, confusing the civil and criminal functions of law.” Op. cit., at 65.Google Scholar
98 It is conceived that the award of exemplary damages serves both primary and secondary objects. The former is compensatory whilst the latter is punitive. This latter object can be achieved by “awarding in addition to the normal compensatory damages, exemplary, punitive or retributory damages”. Eliochin (Nig.) Ltd. v. Mbadiwe, above, per Obaseki, J.S.C.
99 Measure of Damages, in Foundations of Legal Liability, 476, at 478.Google Scholar
100 See generally, Frefeild, “Rationale of Punitive Damages” (1935) Ohio State L.J. 5;Google ScholarWilliams, Glanville, “The Aims of the Law of Tort” (1951) Curr. Leg. Prob. 131;Google ScholarReisberg, “In Defence of Punitive Damages” (1980) 55 N.Y.U.L.R. 303.Google Scholar See also Schlueter arid Redden, op. cit., at 32–36 for a list of other useful references.
101 An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1823), 309.Google Scholar
102 See generally Hall, “Interrelations of Crime and Tort” (1943) Col.L.Rev. 753, at 757, (nn. 21–25), for the references to Bentham.Google Scholar
103 Jurisprudence, 5th ed., Vol. 1 at 504.Google Scholar See also Salmond, , Torts, 10th ed. at 124.Google Scholar “Pecuniary compensation is not in itself the ultimate object or a sufficient justification of legal liability. It is simply the instrument by which the law fulfils its purpose of penal coercion.”
104 Brandwen, , “Punitive-Exemplary Damages in Labour Relations Litigation”, (1962) 29 U.Ch.L.Rev. 460, at 464.Google Scholar
105 Superstition or Rationality in Action For Peace, 54;Google Scholar cited from Glanville Williams, “The Aims of the Law of Tort”, (1951) Curr. Lee. Prob. 131. at 144–46.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., at 145. Professor Morris was even more emphatic when he declared that “there can be an admonitory in the function of the law of torts and there should be such a function if it will work well”. “Punitive Damages in Tort Cases” (1931) 44 Harv.L.Rev. 117, at 1205.Google Scholar
108 To demonstrate statistically the efficacy of exemplary damages as deterrent may be as difficult as to demonstrate statistically the efficacy of prayer.” “Brandwen, Punitive-Exemplary Damages in Labour Relations Litigation,” at 465.
109 Sedgwick, T., Damages, cited from Street, above, n. 99, at 479.Google Scholar
110 E.g. Australia: Trindade, F. and Cane, P., The Law of Torts in Australia, 2 (1985), Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Property Ltd., above, at 158;Google ScholarCanada: Jackson v. Canadian Pac. Rly (1915); D.L.R. 380 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.);Google ScholarIndia: Singhall, J., Damages and Compensation, 16 (1970);Google ScholarNigeria: Eliochin Ltd. v. Mbadiwe, above, at 62.Google Scholar
111 See generally Ghiardi, J. and Kircher, J., Punitive Damages: Law and Practice, at 21–25 (Callaghan & Co., 1985).Google Scholar
112 As early as 1873, a court in the United States had described the doctrine as “a monstrous heresy … an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of law”. Fay v. Parker, above, n. 20, at 382.Google Scholar See also Brown v. Swineford 44, Wise. 282 at 286–88 (describing the doctrine as an “incongruity” and a “sin against sound judicial principle”).Google Scholar
113 See above, parts 1 & 2.
114 See below, nn. 115–18 and the accompanying text.
115 Zitzer, Kurt M., “Punitive Damages: A Cat's Clavicle in Modern Civil Law” (1989) 22 John Marshall L. Rev. 657;Google Scholar see also Hall, , “Interrelation of Criminal Law and Torts”, (1943) 43 Colum L.Rev. 753, 756–60 (1943);Google ScholarMcCormick, C., Handbook on the Law of Damages, section 137, at 560 (1935).Google Scholar
116 Greenleaf, Evidence (4th ed.) para. 253.Google Scholar
117 [1965] 2 Q.B. 86.Google Scholar
118 Ibid., at 106.
119 Note, “Exemplary Damages in Tort” (1957) 70 Harv.L.R. 517, at 518–19.Google Scholar
120 Exemplary damages are widely condemned as an “anomaly in the sphere of civil law. See Grass, “The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages” 12 Hastings Const. L.Q. 241, at 242; Note, “Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant” 34 U.Ch.L.Rev. 408; Carsey, “The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline” (1976) 11 Forum, 57 at 58.Google Scholar
121 Eliochin v. Mbadiwe, op cit., at 62.Google Scholar See also Johnson v. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. (1959) W.N.L.R. 128;Google ScholarWusamotu v. Lagos City Council (1966) L.L.R. 63.Google Scholar
122 Fridman, op. cit., at 403.
123 The action in tort is thus a “judicial parable” designed to control the future conduct of the community in general. Glanville Williams, op. cit., at 144.
124 Fridman, op. cit.
125 Ibid.
126 Harris, Angela P., “Re-reading Punitive Damages: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction”. (1989) 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1079.Google Scholar
127 Zitzer, Kurt, above, n. 115, at 674, citing Blackstone, Commentaries, Bk III, 2, Bk IV, 5 (1830);Google ScholarWalther, and Plein, , “Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kirk v. Combs”, (1965) 49, Marq. L. Rev. 369, 383.Google Scholar See generally, Schlueter and Redden, op cit., for several references on this issue.
128 See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y. 2d, 354, 359–60, 353 N.E. 2d 793, 796–97Google Scholar. “In imposing penal sanctions in private arrangements, a tradition of the rule of law in organized society is violated. One purpose of the rule of law is to require that the use of coercion be controlled by the State … For centuries the power to punish has been a monopoly of the State, and not that of any private individual. The day is long past since barbaric man achieved redress by private punitive measures;” and Horwitz, , “The History of the Public/Private Distinction”, (1982) 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1423, at 1424 (that combining public and private functions of law was an unhealthy and dangerous business).Google Scholar
129 Per Devlin, Lord, Rookes v. Barnard, op. cit., at 1228.Google Scholar
130 Harris, op. cit., at 1082. See also Cane, , “Public Law and Private Law: A Study of the Analysis and Use of A Legal Concept”, in Eekelaar, J. and Bell, J. (eds.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 57, at 61 (Oxford, 1987).Google Scholar “Since activities are not by their nature either public or private, the distinction is irrelevant to the regulation and control of human activity. Kennedy, , “The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction”, (1982) 130 U. Pa.L.Rev. 1349.Google Scholar
131 Harris, op. cit., at 1083.
132 Cole, “Can Damages Properly Be Punitive?” (1941) 6 Marshall, J. L.Q. 477, 478Google Scholar. See also, Blackstone, Commentaries, IV, 5 (that civil injuries are immaterial to the public).
133 Lambert, Thomas F. Jr, The Case For Punitive Damages: A New Audit (Atla Monograph Series, 1988), at 9Google Scholar.
134 Harris., op. cit., at 1084.
135 Ibid.
136 Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 474 N.Y.S. 2d 886, 892 (Sup. Ct. 1983)Google Scholar. See also Arab Termite & Pest Control, Inc. v. Jenkins, 409, So.2d 1039, 1042 (that punitive damages apply to wrongdoing not covered by the criminal law, where the private injuries inflicted partake of public wrongs)Google Scholar.
137 Harris, op. cit., nn. 114–16.
138 Ibid.
139 Of particular significance in this respect is the double jeopardy argument which has been the main argument in favour of the rejection of the doctrine in several jurisdictions in the United States of America. Willis, E., “Measure of Damages when Property is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual” (1909) 22 Harv. L. R. 419Google Scholar; Grass, “The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages”, (1985) 12 Hastings Const. L.Q. 241, 242Google Scholar. Note, “The Imposition of Punishment By Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages” (196) N.Y.U.L.R. 1158; The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 15, (Def. Research Inst., 1969) Long, “Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine. (1975–1976) 25, Drake L. R. 870, 889Google Scholar.
140 It is intended to write a follow-up paper, “The Constitutionality of Awarding Exemplary Damages In Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal and A Call For Statutory Reform”.
141 Per Taylor, J., at 137Google Scholar.
142 Street, op. cit., 11.
143 Zitzer, op. cit., at 676.
144 Section 35(7), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1989. “No person shall be held guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence heavier than the penalty in force at the time the offence was committed.”
145 Street, op. cit., at 37. But “… inadvisedly severe admonition in many cases may be too great a price for the prosecution of a few wrongdoers who might otherwise escape”. Morris, op. cit., at 1183.
146 Brandwen, op. cit., at 465.
147 After all, “The sanctions of the criminal law were imposed on the assumption that they would repress crime long before scientific methods of sociological investigation were invented.” Glanville Williams, op. cit., at 147.
148 See nn. 79–82 and the accompanying texts.
149 Col. Haliru Akilu v. Gani Fawehinmi, above, n. 85.
150 Olatunbosun v. Madaki, above, n. 8
151 McCarey v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., above, n. 2 at 960Google Scholar.
