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The Independence of Morocco's Competition Council
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 October 2022
Abstract
Morocco's Competition Council has undergone major reform since 2011. New legislation has elevated the Council from its former role as a consultative authority to an independent, financially autonomous, decision-making authority. Despite these changes, however, many questions have been raised with regard to the Council's independence, and its duty to monitor and enforce free and fair competition, as well as the sufficiency of the guarantees concerning the statutory impartiality and powers that enable the Council to fulfil its mandate independently. The Council's independence merits discussion in the debate on the optimal implementation of a competition authority, as it is relevant to good governance and the rule of law. To regulate competition effectively, it is essential that the competition regulator remains independent. However, within a democratic framework, the Council's independence must be balanced by parliamentary accountability and budgetary control.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London
Footnotes
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Professor of public law, Faculty of Juridical, Economic and Social Sciences, Ibn Zohr University, Morocco.
References
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