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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
1 See the Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (the Pearson Report), Cmnd 7058 (1978) which, after an extensive investigation covering several countries, concluded that road accidents account for one in eight of all injuries but are responsible for one in three of all accidental deaths.
2 See Vol. I, para. 996 of the Pearson Report.
3 See the Pearson Report, Vol. I, paras. 246–263; Fleming, , “Is there a future for tort?” (1984) 59 A.L.J. 131Google Scholar; Ison, , The Forensic Lottery, London, 1967; and the Woodhouse Report on Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand, 1967.Google Scholar
4 Early common law elements of strict liability can be found in the rule in Ryland v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 (H.L.), but it has mostly resulted from modern statutes such as liability under the Nuclear Installations Act, 1965, and some statutory duties arising under industrial safety legislation.
5 See generally, Atiyah, P. S., Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 2nd ed., London (1975);Google ScholarFranklin, , “Replacing the negligence lottery. Compensation and selective reimbursement” (1967) 53 Virginia Law Report 724.Google ScholarFranklin, , “Personal injury accidents in New Zealand and the United States: some striking similarities” (1975) 27 Stanford Law Report 653.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
6 See Fleming, J. G., The Law of Torts, 7th ed., Sydney, 1987, at 375 ff.Google Scholar
7 This is however subject to certain exceptions such as where the accident is caused by the “inexcusable” fault of the victim.
8 See generally, Fombad, C. M., “The scope for uniform national laws in Cameroon”, (1991) 29 Journal of Modem African Studies.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
9 Ibid, at 450–52.
10 See Fleming, , op. cit., at 337.Google Scholar
11 See, Atiyah, , op. cit., at 3Google Scholar, and Saunders, J. B. (ed.), Mozley & Whiteley's Law Dictionary, 1977, at 5Google Scholar
12 See s. 3(2).
13 This is repeated several times, e.g. see ss. 1(1), 2(1), 5(1) and 5(2).
14 See s. 1(2).
15 See s. 2(2), (3) and (4).
16 See s. 2(2).
17 See Anoukaha, François, “L'ordonance no. 89/005 du décembre 1989 et le décret no. 90/1197 du 3 Août 1990: le ‘petit noel’ des victimes d'accidents de la circulation”, (1990) 3 Juridis Info at 55.Google Scholar
18 Ibid.
19 See Fitter v. Veal (1701) 12 Mod. 542.
20 See decree no. 90/1197 of 3 August, 1990, fixing the modalities for determining the rate of incapacity and evaluating compensation in accident cases (the 1990 decree).
21 See Ibid., ss. 1–4.
22 See Ibid., s. 3(2).
23 This non-accumulation of benefits is excluded by s. 8(1).
24 In spite of the steady movement towards excluding the deduction of collateral benefits from fatal accident awards in English law today, the problem of distinguishing the deductible from the non-deductible remains. Lord Bridge pointed out in Hodgson v. Trapp [1988] 3 W.L.R. 1281 at 1286 that it is difficult to “articulate a single jurisprudential principle by which to distinguish the deductible from the non-deductible receipt.”
25 See Dulieu v. White [1901] 2 K.B. 669 at 679.
26 The “shabby millionaire” principle was formulated by Scrutton, L.J., in The Arpad [1934] P. 189 at 202. It is distinguishable from the “egg-shell skull” principle in that it is concerned with responsibility not for unexpected consequences but with the unexpected cost of expected consequences.Google Scholar
27 See s. 2(8)(a).
28 See s. 9(2).
29 See s. 5 of the 1990 decree.
30 See s. 9(1).
31 The English version of the Ordinance in s. 2(8)(a) inexplicably talks of both “losses” and “damages” resulting from “temporary incapacity” and “permanent disablement” as if “incapacity” and “disablement” were different notions. Later s. 10 talks of “temporary disability” and s. 11 “permanent disability”. This is merely a result of sloppy translation. There is no reason why the French term “incapacite” should variously be translated as “incapacity”, “disablement” and “disability”. We shall use the term “incapacity” throughout.
32 See s. 10.
33 See s. 10(2).
34 As pointed out in n. 31, the expression “permanent incapacity” is used in preference to “permanent disablement” and “permanent disability” used in the official English text which means the same thing.
35 See s. 11(2).
36 See Munkman, J., Damages for Personal Injuries and Death, 6th ed., London, 1980, at 165.Google Scholar
37 See s. 2(8)(a).
38 See s. 12(1).
39 See s. 12(2).
40 This can be contrasted with the English case of Donnelly v. Joyce [1974] Q.B. 454 where the plaintiff's mother gave up employment to nurse him. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover in respect of her lost wages.
41 [1964] A.C. 326 at 368–69.
42 See Munkman, , op. cit., 107–108.Google Scholar
43 See s. 14(2) and s. 9 of the 1990 decree.
44 See s. 15.
45 See s. 16(2) and s. 10 of the 1990 decree.
46 Sees. 6 of the 1990 decree.
47 See Dias, and Markesinis, , Tort Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1989, 547–551Google Scholar and Rogers, W., Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 13th ed., London, 1989, 617–621.Google Scholar
48 See Munkman, op. cit., 110 ff.
49 (1808) I Camp. 493.
50 See Munkman, , op. cit., at 112.Google Scholar
51 S. 2(6)(b)82ff.
52 See Ngwafor, E. N., Motor Accident Compensation in Cameroon after the 1969 Ordinance, Canada, 1993, 82 ff.Google Scholar
53 See s. 2(8)(b).
54 See s. 11 of the 1990 decree.
55 See s. 18(1).
56 See s. 18(4).
57 See s. 18(5).
58 See s. 19(1).
59 See s. 13 of the 1990 decree and also s. 19(2) and (3) of the Ordinance.
60 See Fleming, , op. cit., at 627Google Scholar and Munkman, , op. cit., at 111.Google Scholar
61 This was introduced in England by s. 1(a) of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1976.
62 See s. 3(2).
63 (1816) I Stark 493.
64 See s. 3(2).
65 See Horabin v. British Overseas Airways Corp. [1952] 2 A.E.R. 1016.Google Scholar
66 Ibid, per Barry, J., at 1022.
67 See s. 5(4).
68 See s. 6.
69 See s. 41(2).
70 See s. 25.
71 See s. 26(3).
72 See s. 26(1) and (2).
73 See s. 28(1). There is no exact common law equivalent to the notion of a “nullité relative”, translated literally as “relatively void”. It may in this context be taken to mean voidable.
74 See ss. 29–30.
75 See ss. 30–31.
76 See s. 32.
77 See s. 33(1).
78 See s. 33(2).
79 BEAC is the Central Bank for Central African States.
80 See ss. 38 and 39.
81 See s. 40.
82 This simply means that the victim becomes a civil party in criminal proceedings.
83 See Francois, Anoukaho, op. cit., at 62.Google Scholar
84 Ibid, at 58, although it must be pointed out here that the notion of “manifestly insufficient” is vague and may create its own problems.
85 See Rogers, , op. cit., at 32.Google Scholar
