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Terminal Flight: The Air Traffic Controllers' Strike of 1981

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

David Morgan
Affiliation:
David Morgan is Senior Lecturer in Political Theory and Institutions at the UniversityofLiverpool, P.O. Box 147, Liverpool L69 3BX. He wishes readers to note that the latter part of this article is based on interviews conducted over a period from Spring 1982 throughSeptember 1983. With one exception, the condition of securing these interviews was hisagreement to preserve the anonymity of the respondents.

Extract

A conservative Republican presidential candidate committed to the “free market,” a “landslide” victory, the election of many “conservative” Democrats who had strong reservations about organized labour and a willingness to increase defence at the expense of all other federal spending: all suggested that confrontation with unions in both public and private sectors was a real possibility in 1981. A strike in the public sector there certainly was, and it was full of ironies. The union concerned was the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization [PATCO] which, under the abrasive leadership of Robert Poli, had endorsed the Reagan candidacy, offended the AFL–CIO leadership, waged its strike with little union help, and was crushed, to judge by the opinion polls, amidst considerable popular acclaim. Ronald Reagan capped a very successful seven months, spent pushing Congress into rewriting U.S. taxing and spending priorities, by sacking thousands of federal employees all over the U.S.A.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

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References

1 See letter from Richard J. Leighton, General Counsel for PATCO, to Michael Balzano of the Reagan–Bush headquarters, 20 October 1980. The letter indicates that, in return for support PATCO would be given veto power over any new FAA head, and its members would have the right to strike “in certain circumstances” and negotiating rights “equal to or in excess of those enjoyed by postal workers.” See also Reagan's reply of the same day which embodies his recognition of much, though not the strike clause in the PATCO position.

2 On this see Cohen, Sanford, Labor in the United States (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1979Google Scholar) and Wellington, Harry H., Labor and the Legal Process (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968)Google Scholar. AFL–CIO-affiliated unions comprised at 22% a declining share of the total work force, and the largest single affiliate by 1978 was the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees with 1·7 million members. The 1960s and 1970s, at all levels of government, saw a greater willingness to allow employees to organize but, equally, a refusal to grant them the right to strike. PATCO was clearly so forbidden, as will be seen.

3 Good surveys of a large literature are found in Shaw, D., McCombs, M., eds., The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda Setting Function of the Press (St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1977)Google Scholar. Also in McKuen, M. B. and Coombs, S. L., More Than News: Media Power in Public Affairs (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981)Google Scholar and Lemert, J. B., Does Mass Communication Change Public Opinion After All? (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981)Google Scholar. Most recently see also Lang, Gladys E. and Lang, Kurt, The Battle for Public Opinion (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1983Google Scholar) and Robinson, Michael J., Over the wire and on T.V.–CBS and UPI in Campaign '80 (New York: Basic Books, 1983)Google Scholar.

4 See for example PATCO memo sent to members on 23 May 1981, p. 7 for the FAA position on a Dress Code which made clear that, while “neckties are not mandatory”, casual clothing (jeans, gym clothes, sneakers) was declared to be “not appropriate attire.”

5 Controllers began work as civil service G.S. 7s after seventeen weeks' training, and could rise to top grade controllers (G.S. 10 – pay $22–29,000 in 1981) in small Air Traffic Centers in two years, and large Centers (G.S. 14: $41–54,000) in five years. In 1981 there were more than 16,000 controllers earning on average nearly $40,000 at age thirty-five – good salaries for a work force which was 90% non-graduate, even among new entrants.

6 In September 1981 the Department of Transportation set up an enquiry into the episode, and this reported in March 1982. The report found a “generation gap” in management style at the FAA with “poor” morale at all levels. Both factors contributed to “acute episodic stress” which was real though difficult to measure, the report asserted. The phenomenon was widespread among older controllers who were, as PATCO asserted, the most fearful of “freezing” in crisis situations. See United States Government, Department of Transportation, “Management and Employee Relationships Within the Federal Aviation Administration,” Vol. 1, pp. 41–69.

7 PATCO was founded in 1968 under President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988, but was, at first, denied sole bargaining rights by the FAA. In March 1970, 3,000 air controllers struck, 1,000 were suspended, and 52 were sacked. As of September 1970, PATCO was under permanent injunction not to strike. Though President Nixon replaced Executive Order 10988 with Executive Order 11491 in October 1969, and signed the Airport and Airway Development and Revenue Acts in May 1970, PATCO was refused exclusive bargaining recognition until October 1972. In July 1976, May–June 1978, and August 1980, PATCO members engaged in “go slows” which delayed takeoffs and cost airlines millions of dollars.

8 Poli letter to members 17 June 1981, p. 2.

9 $39 million against the FAA estimate of $770 million for full PATCO position.

10 Luce Press Clipping Service Transcript 31 July 1981. All transcripts cited hereafter are from this source.

11 Ibid., 5 August 1981, WTTG TV, Washington, D.C.

12 Ibid., 5 August 1981, WRC TV, Washington, D.C.

13 Ibid., 5 August 1981, WJLA, Channel 7, Washington, D.C.

14 Ibid., 6 August 1981, ABC Evening News.

15 Ibid., 7 August 1981, WDVM TV, Washington, D.C.

16 Ibid., 7 August 1981, ABC TV, Good Morning America.

17 Ibid., 11 August 1981, WRC TV, Washington, D.C.

18 Ibid., 12 August 1981, WTTG TV, Metro Media News.

19 Ibid., 13 August 1981, NBC/AP Poll given in NBC News.

21 Ibid., 16 August 1981, CBS Evening News.

22 Ibid., 25 August 1981, WTTG TV, Metro Media News.

23 Ibid., 31 August 1981, CBS Evening News.

24 Interview at AFL–CIO headquarters Spring 1982.

25 New York Times, 1 08 1982. Pp. 1, 16Google Scholar.

26 United States Government, Department of Transportation, “Management and Employee Relationships etc.”

27 Washington Post, 12 June 1982.

28 Interview – PATCO staff member.

29 Interview – two AFL staff members.

31 31 July 1981. WJLA, Channel 7, Washington, D.C.

32 Air Transport Association of America, Annual Reports 1977, 19811983Google Scholar.

33 Interview — DOT official.

35 Interview — Linda Gosden, aide to Drew Lewis.

36 Interview — FAA official.

37 Interview — AFL official.

39 Interview — DOT official.

40 Interview — AFL official.

41 Transcript, 12 August 1981, CBS TV, Evening News.

42 Interview — PATCO official.

43 Interview — AFL staff member.

44 Interview — FAA official.

45 Interview — Linda Gosden.

46 Interview — AFL staff member.

47 Interview — Linda Gosden.

48 Interview — AFL official.

49 Transcript. 5 August 1981.

50 Interview — Linda Gosden.