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Partisan gerrymandering with geographically compact districts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2019

Boris Alexeev*
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University
Dustin G. Mixon*
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University
*
* Postal address: Department of Mathematics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA.
* Postal address: Department of Mathematics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA.

Abstract

Bizarrely shaped voting districts are frequently lambasted as likely instances of gerrymandering. In order to systematically identify such instances, researchers have devised several tests for so-called geographic compactness (i.e. shape niceness). We demonstrate that under certain conditions, a party can gerrymander a competitive state into geographically compact districts to win an average of over 70% of the districts. Our results suggest that geometric features alone may fail to adequately combat partisan gerrymandering.

Type
Research Papers
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 2018 

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