Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-9q27g Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T09:31:21.543Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Intellectual Change in Early Eighteenth-Century Tokugawa Confucianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Tetsuo Najita
Get access

Extract

When teaching Tokugawa intellectual history, I consistently encounter a question that is at once deceptively simple yet so difficult to respond to in a convincing and substantial way. Why do Japanese historians argue that Confucianism had an important impact on Tokugawa society, when geographical, political, and ethical realities in Japan were so vastly different from those in China? There is, of course, good reason to be perplexed, I reply, and offer a generalization or two. Tokugawa society clearly was not “Sinified” as is sometimes implied; but, on the other hand, the imprint of Confucianism on Tokugawa thought and culture was undeniably deep. Although the picture is sometimes overdrawn, Japanese historians constantly refer to Confucianism as the “rationalizing” force that transformed Japan from a religious and ascetic culture to a bureaucratic and secular one. The same historians continue to debate the intellectual merit of Tokugawa Confucianism in Japan's modern culture, for while the precise ramifications are still controversial, there is little doubt as to the depth of the Tokugawa intellectual engagement with Confucian thought and of the profound legacy of that engagement for the modern history of Japan. Unfortunately, these generalizations, although helpful, do not add up to convincing historical instruction, a realization that has invariably left me searching for more cogent lines of interpretation and more detailed characterizations of Tokugawa thought.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , August 1975 , pp. 931 - 944
Copyright
Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1975

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 This essay began as a reflection on the historiography of the late Professor Joseph R. Levenson. I have also benefitted greatly from the discussions of Professors Robert N. Bellah, Peter Duus, Harry D. Harootunian, Thomas Metzger, Shigeki Niiyama, Irwin Scheiner and Wei-ming Tu at a seminar on Tokugawa thought sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities.

2 Levenson, Joseph R., Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The Problems of Intellectual Continuity (Berkeley, 1958)Google Scholar. The themes set forth in this work is continued in two subsequent volumes: Confucian China and Its Confucian Past: The Problem of Monarchical Decay (Berkeley, 1964); and Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The Problem of Historical Significance (Berkeley, 1965). Other important essays by Levenson in the context of this paper are: “The Abortiveness of Empiricism in Early Ch'ing Thought,” Far Eastern Quarterly, XIII, 2 (Feb. 1954), pp. 155–165; “T'ien-hsia and Kuo and the 'Transvaluation of Values',” Far East-em Quarterly, XI, 4 (August, 1952), pp. 447–451; “The Attenuation of a Chinese Philosophical Concept: T'i-yung in the Nineteenth Century,” Asia-tische Studien (1955), pp. 95–102; “The Suggestiveness of Vestiges: Confucianism and Monarchy at the Last,” in Confucianism in Action, eds. David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (Stanford, 1959), pp. 244–267; and “The Place of Confucius in Communist China,” China Quarterly, 12 (Oct.-Dec, 1962), pp. 1–18.

3 This interpretive frame is also presented in Levenson's Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).

4 See Harootunian, Harry, Toward Restoration (Berkeley, 1970)Google Scholar, especially pp. 129–183; and also Albert Craig, “Science and Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan” in Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization, ed. Marius Jansen (Princeton, 1965). PP. 133–160.

5 Kaibara was also known as Sonken and more familiarly as Atsunobu. He referred to himself in his essays with his familiar name, such as Atsunobu hisoka ni omou….” He also used it to sign his essays. Good summaries of Kaibara's life and thought are: Inoue Tetsujirō, Nihon shushigaku no tetsugaku (Tokyo, 1927, first published 1905), pp. 264–362; Iwahashi Junsei, Dai Nihon rinrishisō hattatsu shi, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1915), I, 219–260; Kinsei shakai keizai gakusetsu taikei, 18 vols. (Tokyo, 1935), ed. Yokokawa Shirō, vol. 5, Kaibara Ekken shū; Inoue Tadashi, Kaibara (Tokyo, 1963); Matsuda Michio, “Kaibara Ekken no jugaku,” Nikon no meicho, Kaibara Ekken (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 7–54; Tsuji Tetsuo, “Kaibara Ekken no gakumon to hōhō,” Shisō, 11 (1974), PP. 57–70.

6 Taigiroku is included in most collections of Tokugawa thought. The version 1 relied on primarily is in Nihon shisō taiki, vol. 24, Kaibara Etyen to Muro Kyūsō (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 7–65 and 388–422. It is also in volume two of his collected works, Ekken zenshú, 8 vols. (Tokyo, 1910–1911); and in volume eight of Nihon rinri then, 10 vols., ed. Inoue Tetsujirō (Tokyo, 1901–1903); and volume six of Nihon jurin sōsho, 13 vols., ed. Seki Giichirō (Tokyo, 1927–1929).

7 These phrases are scattered throughout Kaibara's writings and can be easily found. See especially Shinshikjun, Ekken zenshū, vol. 3, pp. 641–685; Shōgakkun, ibid., pp. 2–43; Gojōkyn, Nihon shisō taikei, 34, 65–168; and Shinshiroku, Nihon rinri ihen, VIII, 7–205.

8 Kaibara's defense of ethics on practical grounds is a theme that runs through Gojōun and Taigiroku.

9 Shōgakkun, Zenshū, vol. 3, p. 2. Kaibara's ideas were echoed by Ninomiya Sontoku (1787–1856), the peasant sage of a century later. Common to both is a view of nature as the source of “blessings” and the belief that man's relationship with it should be dynamic and active. A useful discussion is Iwahashi Junsei, Dai Nihon rinrishisō, I, 242–260. See also Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion (Glencoe, 1957), p. 72 and passim.

10 Kaibara's language in his Gojōlytn goes as follows: Sei (life) to wa bambutsu o iu. Tenchi betsu ni kokoro nashi. (Nihon shisō taikei, 34, 71; see also Iwahashi, Dai Nihon rinrishisō, I, 228–232 and passim). Virtually identical language, although written in more formal style, is in Shinshiroku: Tenchi no taitoku sei to in. Kedashi tenchi betsn ni kokoro nashi. (Nihon rinri ihen, VIII, 72).

11 Kaibara's discussion of change in the material world is in Shinshiroku (Nihon rinri ihen, VIII, 41–72, 101–116, 186 and passim); and especially the introduction and the first volume of his Dai Yamato honzō, 16 vols. in Ekken zenshü, vol. 6, especially pp. 11–34. An example of Kaibara's language from the latter introduction: Shikaru ni tenka no jibutsu mikkai shite yamazu. Yne ni inishie no naki tokoro ni wa ima art; inishie no shirazaru tokoro ni wa ima shiru mono maiki (document) subekarazu. Kaibara described his general thesis as kiun zenkai setsu, meaning the steady and inevitable unfolding of things in nature. See Kaibara's Jigoshū, Ekken Zenshū, vol. 2, pp. 176–320, especially, 216–218, 244–24. Interestingly, he also tended to include human institutions in that general thesis: Gakujutsu seido no gotoki mina shikari, Kore kokon kiun no zenkai nari. Shizen no jisei masa ni kaku no gotoshi. (Shinshiroku, Nihon rinri, VIII, 155). The term for confusion is giwaku; for understanding kaitsū; and for doubt, utagai, the term he used throughout Taigiroku (Ibid., 155, 205). All these terms are still very much in use in modern Japan in the sense Kaibara understood them. A good discussion of these aspects of Kaibara is Macda Ichirō, “Keiken kagaku no tanjō,” Iwamuni kōza, Nihon rekfshi, vol. 11, Kinsei, no. 3 (Tokyo, 1963), pp. 171–215, especially 185–192.

12 Kaibara's discussion of dualism runs throughout Taigiroku. The piece is organized so that Kaibara states in volume one his general views on Neo-Confucian metaphysics; these views are then restated in volume two under specific subject headings. Most of the same points are scattered throughout his Shinshiroku.

13 Taigiroku, pp. 17–24.

14 lbid. References throughout the essay that refer to “Kensha to icdomo …” (that is, they are “Brilliant men, but…”) are followed by his critique of their petty polemics.

15 Ri wa ki no ri nari; ni aru ni arazaru nari. Taigiroku, p. 17.

16 Shinshiroku, p. 101.

17 Taigiroku, pp. 26–31; 55–79. Also Shinshiroku, pp. 35–43; Iwahashi, Dai Nihon rinri, I, 228–242; and Inoue Tetsujirō, Nihon shushigaku, pp. 320–323.

18 Kaibara did not believe in the possibility of comprehensive knowledge in all spheres (tenka zenzai nashi), which reinforced the distinctions that he made in fields of study. Shinshiroku, pp. 137–138 and passim. The following is an example of his thinking on the contrastive character of political history: Kara (China) no hō o Nihon ni okonau o seijin no michi to omou wa gu nari. Michi wa seijin no michi o okpnai hō wa kokudo ni shitagai jigi ni kpnaubeshi. Shinshikun, Zenshü, vol. 3, p. 644. A good discussion of these various aspects is Inukasa Yasuki, “Jugaku shisō to bakuhan taisei,” Kinsei Nihon shisōshi kenkyū, ed. Naramoto Tatsuya Tokyo, 1965), pp. 16–54, especially 35–54; and Morooka Yūko, “Kinseiteki gōriron no tenkai—Kaitokudō o megutte,” Ibid., pp. 87–133.

19 Taigirokfi, pp. 32–54.

20 Maeda, “Keiken kagaku,” Iwanami kōza, Kinsei, no. 3, pp. 190–191; and Inoue Tadashi, Kaibara, pp. 39–44.

21 On Hayashi Razan, see Tsuguo, Tahara, Tokugawd shisōshi kenkyū (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 7–22Google Scholar; and “Jugaku shisō to bakuhan taisei,” Kinsei Nihon shisōshi kenkyū, pp. 17–34; and for Nishikawa Joken, Sakata Ikuko's “Kinsei shizenkan no tenkai,” Ibid., pp. 179–232, especially 186–189.

22 Matsuura Rei, “Kinsei kohanki no shiso,” Kinsei Nihon shisōshi kenkyū, pp. 233–305, especially 268–280; and Sakata, “Kinsei shizenkan,” pp. 193–198.

23 These views are presented most clearly in Ogyuū's Tōmonsho (Nihon rinri then, VI, 147–203). Written in question and answer form, this piece presents the basic theories of Ogyū as he expounded them more formally in Bendō and Bemmei. It is penned in kanamajiribun, a style that is still relatively readable.

24 Dazai documented his views on Kaibara in “Sonken Sensei no Taigiroku o yomu,” which is included in Nihon shisōtaikei, vol. 34, pp. 59–62 and also in Nihon rinri then, VIII, 206–208. Dazai's main ideas are in his Bendōsho and Seigakfi mondō. Both are in Nihon rinri then, vol. 6. See my essay “Political Economism in the Thought of Dazai Shundai (1680–1747),” The Journal of Asian Studies, XXXI, 8 (Aug., 1972), pp. 821–839.

25 Key essays in some of the debates are in volume 4 of Nihon jurin sōsho.

26 This theme is scattered in Dazai's Seigaku mondō. Also it is especially clearly stated in the fifth book of a collection of his miscellaneous writings, Shishien mampitsu (eight books, publication date not certain). I have touched on some iconoclastic implications of Dazai's influence in a short essay “Restorationism in the Political Thought of Yamagat a Daini (1725–1767),” The Journal of Asian Studies, (November 1971), pp. 17–30.

27 Levenson concentrated on figures such as Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–1695), Wang Fu-chih (1619–1692), and Ku Yen-wu (1613–1682). See his “The Abortiveness of Empiricism in Early Ch'ing Thought,” Far Eastern Quarterly, XIII, 2 (Feb., 1954), pp. 155–165. Kaibara does not seem to have looked to these men for ideas. However, he documented in Taigiroku his debt to, and admiration for, Lo Cheng-an (1465–1547), especially for his critique on Wang Yang-ming idealism.