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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
Six hundred miles west of Hang-chou the Yangtze River emerges from a mountain corridor onto the lowland plain of south-central China. Here the river bed widens sharply and loses depth; the Yangtze winds a snake-like path across a thousand miles of rich, flat, water-laced country, northeastward to Han-yang, then south toward the Po-yang Lake, north again to Chiang-ning (modern Nanking), and finally into the East China Sea at modern Shanghai. Medieval Chinese called it simply “River”—a River among rivers, the designation of an entire S-shaped area whose character depended more on water than on land, the dominant feature of the southern landscape. In the twelfth century this river region developed a strategic importance as it became first the refuge for a besieged court, then an area of contention with barbarian invaders, and finally the principal artery of Chinese control. This transformation reflected a major reorientation of the Chinese mind.
The following abbreviations will be used in the notes: CHHC, Chung-hsing hsiao-chi; CTHP, Chin (a hsii-picn; CTTP, Chin t'a ts'tii pien; FJC, Fei-jan chi; HNYL, Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu; LCSC, Liang-ch'ao sheng cheng; PMHP, San-ch'ao pei-meng hui-pien; SHY, Sung hui-yao k.ao: SS, Sung-shih.
The most convenient access to material on the Lake Rebellion is Sung-tai san-ts'e nung-min ch'i-i shih-liao hui-pien edited by Su Chin-yuan and Li Ch'un-p'u (Peking, Chung-hua shu-chu, 1963). Pages 173 to 304 assemble relevant passages from 18 sources in a careful and comprehensive way, which seems to meet the highest standards of mainland Chinese editing and collation, and which inspires confidence in its reliability. In no case have I found any significant discrepancy between the collection and the original texts, and the selection of texts reflects no particular ideological bias. Indeed, properly weighted, the documents would make a very scant case for Marxist interpretation.
That case has been made, however, both in Chinese and in Russian. In Chinese, see the essay by Cheng Kuang-ming, “T'an Chung Hsiang, Yang Yao ch'i-i” in Li Kuang-pi (ed.), Chung-kuo nung-min ch'i-i lun-chi (Peking 1958), pp. 205–215. In Russian, see G. Y. Smolin, "Kristianskoe vosstanie god rukovodstvom Chung Hsiang i Yang Yao" [Peasant Uprising in China under the leadership of Chung Hsiang and Yang Yao] in Problemy vostokpvednia (Moscow, 1960:1) pp. 57—70.
There is a real and basic problem witii all sources for unsuccessful rebellions. All are written from the government side, which means not only that they are prejudiced against the rebels, but also that they cannot know any situation "from the outside in" as the rebels see it. This is the universal failing of all sources at our disposal, because Chung Hsiang and Yang Yao kept no records of their own. Beyond this, the sources we have are by no means equally reliable. I have indicated below my particular reservations about CTTP and CTHP (see note 64). Besides these, I have confined myself primarily to the HNYL and PMHP, which are both sound. The HNYL is especially guaranteed by Li Hsin-ch'uan's reputation as one of the very finest historians of the Sung period. Because of this, and for its detail, I have preferred HNYL in citing basic information about the period, although other sources generally corroborate it.
1 The region was underdeveloped. While new strains of early and medium ripening rice were introduced in Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsi during the eleventh century, permitting both double cropping and extended cultivation on the hillsides, good land remained fallow in the lake district, and a single crop of late ripening rice was the rule. This was harvested in the ninth or tenth lunar month. See Ping-ti, Ho, “Early Ripening Rice. …” Economic History Review IX, 200–18Google Scholar.
2 Tsʻai Ching and Tʻung Kuan, notorious under Hui-tsung, were exiled here in the 1120ʻs. Sung respected the persons of officials, and exile was the most serious standard punishment.
3 The chien of Kuei-yang (center of the copper mines) was raised to chün status in 1133. See Wright, Hope, Geographical Names in Sung China (La Haye, 1956), p. 30Google Scholar.
4 PMHP 136.5a-b (p. 224).
5 CHHC 14 (entry for 4th/SH 3) (p. 219).
6 HNYL 42 (kuei-ssu/2nd/SH 1) (p. 181).
7 “Remnant armies” is perhaps the best translation for i-ping. The romanized form should not be confused with i-ping (patriotic troops), which does not figure in this paper.
8 HNYL 42 (i-yu/2nd/SH 1) (p. 180).
9 CHHC 8 (entry for 2nd/CY 4) (p. 213).
10 CTHP 25.1a. Text also speaks of yao-tʻu (followers in sorcery) and yao-tang (the clique of sorcerers).
11 HNYL 31 (shen-wu/2nd/CY 4) (p. 173).
12 PMHP 137.4b (p. 224).
13 HNYL 31 (shen-wu/2nd/CY 4) (p. 173) Probably a contraction of pʻang-men tso tao.
14 CTHP 25.1b (p. 271).
15 PMHP 137.9a-b (p. 225) Kʻung's story is wild, wooly, and a trifle uncertain. It begins in Tung-pʻing, a prefecture northeast of Kʻai-feng near the Yellow River. Kʻung held a minor office here but was chronically at odds with the local cognizant. When he became embroiled in scandal, he was forced to flee, but later returned to Tung-pʻing under a different name. Political turmoil then permitted him to gain a following, with which he moved south, arriving in the lake district close on the heels of the Chin. Whatever Kʻung may have been when he started, and however loyal his regard for the Sung, his band became simple marauders by the time they reached Ching-hu.
16 PMHP 136.5a (p. 224).
17 PMHP 137.4b and 9b (p. 225).
18 HNYL 31 (shen-wu/2nd/CY 4) (p. 174).
19 PMHP 137.4b-5a (p. 225).
20 HNYL 31 (shen-wu/2nd/CY 4) (p. 173). Proposals for the equalization of property and wealth were not confined to the rebels, but were also made at the highest levels of government. For example, the reformist ideas of Liu Hsün (C. S. 1115, SS biog. ch. 422.1a-2b), expressed on the eve of the rebellion, dealt with the growing concentration of land ownership and with farmers who lost their livelihood as a result. For discussion of these matters, see Chang Yin-lin, “Nan Sung chʻu-nien ti chün-fu ssu-hsiang” in Ta-kung pao, shih-ti chou-kʻan no. 87, 29 May 1936.
21 HNYL 31 (shen-wu/2nd/CY 4) (p. 174).
22 FJC (p. 300).
23 HNYL 31 (shen-wu/2nd/CY 4) (p. 174).
24 CTHP 25.2b-3a (p. 272).
25 PMHP 137.9b (p. 225).
26 HNYL 32 (wu-chʻen/3rd/CY 4) (p. 175).
27 PMHP 137.11b (p. 226).
28 Yang's proper name was Yang Tʻai, but he was called Yang Yu because of his youth, which the Hunan dialect renders as Yao. See HNYL 34 (keng-chʻen/6th/CY 4) (p. 177).
29 CTHP 5.11a-b (p. 292).
30 CTHP 22.8b-9a (p. 268). The transfer of leadership was a complicated matter. The mantle passed first to Yang Hua and Yang Kuang, but Hua surrendered to Chʻeng Chʻang-yü in 11th/1130 and Kuang was murdered by his followers in 2nd/1132. Yao was subordinate to the others at first (because of his age) but became the major rebel leader after their demise. The number of rebels as cited here is probably exaggerated.
31 HNYL 34 (keng-chʻen/6th/CY 4) (p. 177).
32 CTHP 25.5a (p. 273). The term also refers to naval stations (not bases) on the seacoast. This use too reflects the temporary, almost portable nature of the installation.
33 CTHP 27.3b (p. 285).
34 See below, p. 485.
35 HNYL 32 (kuei-mao/3rd/CY 4) (p. 175)
36 HNYL 32 (wu-chʻen/3rd/CY 4) (p. 176).
37 HNYL 36 (wu-hsü/8th/CY 4) (p. 178).
38 Li Chung-ting-kung wen-chi [Collected Works of Li Kang], ch. 15 (p. 295).
39 ibid.
40 HNYL 41 (i-mao/1st/SH 1) (p. 179).
41 Ibid. These terms refer to revenue from silk production. See Li Chien-nung, Sung Yüan Ming ching-chi shih kao (Peking 1957), pp. 218 ff.
42 HNYL 46 (i-wei/9th/SH 1) (p. 182).
43 HNYL 60 (shen-hsü/11th/SH 2) (p. 184).
44 Ibid.
45 LCSC (p. 204).
46 HNYL 63 (keng-yen/2nd/SH 3) (p. 185).
47 HNYL 64 (Keng-hsü/4th/SH 3) (p. 186).
48 Ibid.
49 CHHC 14 (entry for 4th/SH 3) (p. 172)
50 HNYL 66 (chia-wu/6th/SH 3) (p. 186).
51 HNYL 68 (i-hai/9th/SH 3) (p. 187).
52 The terminology for pacification describes three increasing levels of severity: (1) chao, to call or summon the bandits; (2) fu or pʻing, to pacify or settle a rebellion; and (3) tʻien, to exterminate the rebels.
53 HNYL 66 (chia-wu/6th/SH 3) (p. 188).
54 From the 15th to the 30th days of the ninth lunar month, or about 23 October to 6 November.
55 HNYL 69 (jen-chʻen/10th/SH 3) (p. 189).
56 CTHP 25.5a-b (p. 273).
57 HNYL 72 (wu-wu/1st/SH 4) (p. 190)
58 HNYL 74 (ping-chʻen/3rd/SH 4) (p. 191).
59 HNYL 78 (keng-hsü/7th/SH 4) (p. 192).
60 HNYL 79 (hsin-ssu/8th/SH 4) (p. 193). Actually Yüeh was appointed commissioner for Ching, Hsiang, and Tʻan, while Wang had been commissioner for Ting, Li, Yüeh, E, and Tʻan. It is not clear that Wang was actually removed, but his responsibilities definitely shifted to Yüeh Fei.
61 HNYL 89 (chia-shen/5th/SH 5) (p. 198).
62 HNYL 89 (wu-hsü/5th/SH 5) (p. 198).
63 HNYL 90 (chia-chʻen/6th/SH 5) (p. 199).
64 The evaluation of Yüeh Fei's military ingenuity is problematical. Then as now, he symbolized the fight against appeasement, described in Chinese as chin-chung pao kuo (utterly faithful in the service of country). In consequence a tremendous mythology has grown up around the man, making fact almost inseparable from fiction. See Wilhelm, Hellmut, “From Myth to Myth …” in Wright, A. F. (ed.). Confucian Personalities (Stanford 1962), pp. 146–161Google Scholar. We cannot take the whole story which follows at face value, especially as much of it is derived from the CTTP and CTHP, compiled by Yüeh Fei's grandson and surely biased in his favor. These works are indeed major elements in the making of the great myth.
65 SS 380.15a.
66 SS 365.10a.
67 CTHP 28.2b (p. 287).
68 CTHP 19.3a (p. 267).
69 CTHP 18 (p. 265).
70 HNYL 90 (kuei-chʻou/6th/SH 5) (p. 199) Also CTHP 19.4b.
71 CTTP 19.8a-b.
72 CTHP 19.4a (p. 268).
73 FJC (p. 299).
74 SS (p. 231).
75 CTHP 19.4a (p. 268).
76 CTHP 26.10a (p. 283).
77 HNYL 42 (i-yu/2nd/SH 1) (p. 180).
78 Ibid.
79 PMHP 147.6a (p. 227).
80 See below, p. 486.
81 HNYL 85 (jen-chʻen/2nd/SH 5) (p. 194).
82 CHHC 16 (entry for 2nd/SH 4) (p. 221).
83 SHY, ping section, 10.37.
84 SS 365.7b. Also CTTP 10.13a (p. 260).
85 CTTP 1.4a-b (p. 259).
86 CTHP 5.12a-b (p. 293).
87 CTTP 5.18b (p. 253).
88 CTHP 5.9a (p. 291).
89 HNYL 85 (wu-tzu/2nd/SH 5) (p. 194).
90 Kao-tsung has been much maligned by Chinese historians because of the national disgrace over which he presided, and it has been customary to assume that he was negligent and ineffectual. My reading indicates precisely the opposite—that he was a sensitive, perceptive, consummate politician—and I have set forth these ideas in an unpublished paper, “The Sung Restoration: Politics and Economics in China 1142–1162.” The propositions I advance here about Kao-tsung's motives are speculative, but they are wholly consistent with everything I know about the man and his reign.
91 Chinese see an opposition between i (what is done without thought of personal gain) and li (socially conditioned activity). Li can thus be associated with a compromise of personal ethics in the face of social norms and political authority, while i is associated with instances where individuals exert themselves against authority. But there remained a prejudice (as in the West) against associating “rightness” or “righteousness” with unsuccessful rebellions, and it is not clear how early the expression chʻi-i was used to describe mere peasant uprisings.
92 The words pʻan and fan are phonetically and graphically related to fan (to reverse, overturn, etc.).
