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Modernization and Reactionary Rebellions in Northern Siam

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

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Abstract

Ted Robert Gurr's hypotheses on political violence and James C. Scott's on patron-client relations are used to explain why modernizing policies of the Siamese government provoked rebellions in Chiang Mai in 1889 and in Phrae in 1902. The article suggests that the rebellions resulted from Siamese government attempts to increase its revenues and control in the North. In Chiang Mai and Phrae these attempts simultaneously threatened the livelihood and security of ordinary peasants, who formed the base of the rebellions, and groups outside the ranks of ordinary peasants, who provided leadership. Modifications of Gurr's and Scott's work are suggested which can be tested and further refined, or rejected, in the study of other rebellions.

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Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1979

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References

1 Scott, James C. has discussed these topics in detail in “The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia,” JAS, 32 (1972), 537CrossRefGoogle Scholar. There is considerable evidence that economic growth in less developed countries leads to economic hardship for the poorer segments of the population. See Adelman, Irma and Morris, Cynthia Taft, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1973).Google Scholar

2 Scott, James and Kerkvliet, Ben, “The Politics of Survival: Peasant Response to ‘Progress’ in Southeast AsiaJournal of Southeast Asian Studies, 4 (1973), 252–62 cover these forms of response in considerable detail.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 This usage is suggested by Tilly, Charles, “Collective Violence in European Perspective,” in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, eds. Graham, Hugh Davis and Gurr, Ted Robert (New York: Signet 1969), pp. 1523Google Scholar. See also Berger, Peter L., Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change (Garden City: Anchor, 1976), p. 24Google Scholar; and Hagopian, Mark N., The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974), pp. 1019.Google Scholar

4 Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), p. 6.Google Scholar See also Bunnag, Tej, “Khabot phu mi bun phak isan, r.s. 121” [The Holy Man's Rebellion in Northeast Thailand, 1902]Google Scholar, Sang-khomsat Parithat [Social Science Review] (June 1967), pp. 7686Google Scholar; Keyes, Charles F., “Millenialism, Theravada Buddhism, and Thai Society,” JAS, 36 (1977), 283302Google Scholar; and Murdoch, John B., “The 1901–1902 ‘Holy Man's Rebellion,’Journal of the Siam Society, 62 (January 1976), 4767Google Scholar; Johnston, Dav B., “Rural Society and the Rice Economy in Thailand, 1880–1930.” Diss. Yale Univ. 1971Google Scholar, which has an interesting chapter on bandits, local elites, and local administration in central Thailand.

5 Scott and Kerkvliet, p. 242.

6 Rustow, Dankwart, “Modernization and Comparative Politics: Prospects in Research and Theory,” Comparative Politics, 1 (October 1968), 3751.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 13.

8 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, pp. 177–92.

9 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 341.

10 Scott, James C., “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” The American Political Science Review, 61 (March 1972), 92.Google Scholar

11 Scott, “The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds,” pp. 13–19.

12 Scott and Kerkvliet, p. 246.

13 Scott and Kerkvliet, p. 262.

14 Three of the states’ history from 1774–1874 is covered in Phraya Maha-arnattayaihibodi (Run Siphen), Phongsawadan Muang Nakhon Chiang Mai, Muang Nakhon Lampang, Muang Lamphunchai [Chronicles of Chiang Mai, Lampang, and Lamphun] (Bangkok, 1963)Google Scholar. A brief history of the states is LeMay, Reginald, An Asian Arcady: The Land and Peoples of Northern Siam (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer and Sons, 1926).Google Scholar More detailed histories in English can be found in Brailey, Nigel J., “The Origins of the Siamese Forward Movement in Western Laos, 1850–1892,” Diss. Univ. of London 1968Google Scholar, and Ramsay, James Ansil, “The Development of a Bureaucratic Polity: The Case Of Northern Siam,” Diss. Cornell Univ. 1971Google Scholar.

15 I shall use the Thai form, chao, rather than the anglicized chaos for this word.

16 Rabibhadana, Akin, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782–1873 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 74, 1969), p. 77.Google Scholar

17 Relations between the chao and peasants are described in Curtis, Lillian Johnson, The Laos of North Siam (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1903), pp. 120–30;Google ScholarHallett, S. Holt, A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1890), pp. 131–32Google Scholar; Brailey, pp. 27–29; Ramsay, pp. 40–48. I have been unable to find specific examples of prerogatives, only assertions by European travellers in the North in the late nineteenth century that peasants could change patrons or move to a different area if they desired.

18 Brailey, pp. 68–71.

19 Concern on this score can be found in a letter from King Chulalongkon to Phra Ratchasampharakon, 168/45, 12 July 1883, Thailand National Archives, Nangsu Chut (Phiset), vol. 10.

20 For greater detail see Ramsay, James Ansil, “Modernization and Centralization in Northern Thailand, 1875–1910,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (March 1976), pp. 2229Google Scholar; Bunnag, Tej, The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892–1915 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 6566.Google Scholar

21 Ramsay, “The Development of a Bureaucratic Polity,” p. 88. The chao muang had lost lawsuits to British citizens over the rights to teak forests inching Mai. He was deeply in debt to King Chulalogon as a result of having to borrow money from him to settle the lawsuits. The traditional methods of collecting revenue in Chiang Mai did not bring in enough income to pay off the debt, and the chao muang settled upon farming out taxes to Chinese tax collectors as a way of collecting enough money to pay his creditors.

22 Brailey, pp. 214–17.

23 Archer to Gould, 10 October 1889, Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, Series 69, No. 133.

24 Archer to Gould, 10 October 1889.

25 Scott, “The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds,” p. 7.

26 Brailey, p. 280; Ramsay, “Modernization and Centralization in Northern Thailand,” p. 24; and Bunnag, pp. 65–66.

27 The northern Thai title of phaya, which is used here for a village headman, should not be confused with the much higher central Thai title of phraya. The latter is used “for persons of the second highest rank of conferred nobility.” Haas, Mary R., Thai-English Students Dictionary (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1964), p. 359.Google Scholar

28 The British vice-consul in Chiang Mai wrote that the chao muang of Chiang Mai was “a steady and zealous partisan of the Siamese.” Archer to Gould, 10 October 1889.

29 Archer to Gould, 10 October 1889. This figure seems suspiciously large, but as far as I am aware, there is no way of checking Archer's estimate.

30 Brailey, pp. 352–53.

31 Gould to Satow, 15 January 1885, Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, Series 628, No. 157.

32 Stringer, C. E. W., “Report on the Trade of the Chiengmai Vice-Consul District for the Year 1890,” Great Britain, Foreign Office, Accounts and Papers, Commercial Reports, Vol. lxxxiv (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1892), p. 6.Google Scholar

33 Ramsay, “The Development of a Bureaucratic Polity,” pp. 113–14.

34 There seems to be no accurate census of the number of Shans in northern Siam until 1903, when a list of British subjects in Chiang Mai and Nan was published. In that year, 3,490 British subjects registered at the Chiang Mai consulate and 998 more registered at Nan. In Chiang Mai there were 2,567 Shans and Karens. In Nan there were 138 Shans. See “Report for the Year 1903 on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular District of Chiangmai, No. 3291,” Great Britain, Foreign Office, Accounts and Papers, Commercial Reports, Vol. xcii (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1905), p. 10.Google Scholar

35 Ramsay, ‘The Development of a Bureaucratic Polity,” pp. 123–77.

36 Beckett to Greville, 28 August 1897, Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, Series 628, No. 247. King Chulalongkon to Prachao Nakhon Chiang Mai (Eng. trans.), 9 April 1897, Thailand, National Archives, Ministry of Interior Records, Series 16.3, No. 5.

37 Prince Damrong to Krom Mun Sommot, 584/8225, 26 March 1900, Thailand, National Archives, Ministry of Interior Records, Series 58, No. 33.

38 Prince Damrong to King Chulalongkon, 477/3520, 17 June 1902, Thailand, National Archives, Ministry of Finance Records, Series 22.2, No. 42.

39 The Siamese government accused the chao muang of planning the rebellion in accord with the Shans and other members of his family. Tej Bunnag, whose article provides the best account of the rebellion, accepts the government's conclusions. See Bunnag, Tej, “Khabot ngiao muang phrae” [The Shan Rebellion in Phrae], Sangkhomsat Parithat [Social Science Review] (September 1968), pp. 6780Google Scholar. The government case, however, rests to a large extent upon the testimony of witnesses of question-able integrity. The British vice-consul considered the government's key informant to be unreliable and unscrupulous. Lyle to Beckett, 18 November 1902, Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, Series 628, No. 280. By one account the chao muang fled as soon as he learned of the Shans’ attack, but was soon discovered and forced along with other senior chao to drink the water of allegiance to the Shans. This behavior suggests that the chao muang did not plan the attack ahead of time. Thomas to Chao Phraya Surasak Montti, 27 August 1902, Thailand, National Archives, Ministry of Interior Records, Series 63, No. 3. These points are discussed further in Ramsay, “The Development of a Bureaucratic Polity,” pp. 219–34. For documents in Thai relating to the rebellion see Prachum Phongsawadan [Collected Annals], vol. 75: Prap ngiao: thon thi 1 [Suppressing the Shans: Pt. 1], and vol. 78: Prap ngiao: thon thi 2 [Suppressing the Shans: Pt. 2] (Bangkok: Dept. of Fine Arts).

40 King Chulalongkon to Prince Damrong, 55/539, 25 August 1899, Thailand, National Archives, Ministry of Interior Records, Series 58, No. 41.

41 Phraya Si Sahathep to Prince Damrong, 10/1352, 2 April 1900, Thailand, National Archives, Ministry of Interior Records, Series 58, No. 33.

42 Phraya Si Sahathep to Prince Damrong, 2April 1900.

43 Fenger to Gulburg, 25 October 1904, Thai-land, National Archives, Ministry of Interior Records, Series 58, No. 172.

44 “Report for the Year 1900 on the Trade of the Consular District of Chiengmai, No. 2717,” Great Britain, Foreign Office, Accounts and Papers, Commercial Reports, Vol. cx (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1902), pp. 45.Google Scholar

45 Curtis, p. 337; see also F. S. Thomas to Chao Phraya Surasak Montri, 27 August 1902, Thailand, National Archives, Ministry of Interior Records, Series 63, No. 3.

46 Although the leadership of the rebellion was provided by a group of Shans, indigenous parts of the Phrae population also participated. It is there-fore somewhat misleading to refer to the rebellion as a “Shan rebellion.”

47 In making this assertion I am assuming, as I did earlier in the paper, that the rebellion was not planned beforehand between the chao muang of Phrae and the Shans.

48 Bunnag, “Khabot ngiao muang phrae”; and Ondam, Bantorn, “The Phrae Rebellion: A Structural Analysis,” The Cornell Journal of Social Relations, 6 (Spring 1971), 8497.Google Scholar

49 The measures taken by the Thai government to restore stability are discussed in Ramsay, “The Development of a Bureaucratic Polity,” pp. 234–47.

50 Skocpol, Theda, “France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 18 (April 1976), 177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

51 Report to King Chulalongkon, 1 July 1902, Thailand, National Archives, Ministry of Interior Records, Series 58/21; see also Bangkok Times, 14 August 1902, p. 14. The events at Mae Ngat have been classified as a demonstration rather than a rebellion because the peasants were less organized than in the other two cases, the duration was much shorter, and most importantly, the goals were different. The peasants at Mae Ngat were protesting the orders of one official at his headquarters. The rebellions aimed at overthrowing Bangkok's control in the North and were directed at major administrative centers.

52 Beckett, “Report on the Shan Uprising,” n.d., Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, Series 628, No. 279.

53 Wolf, Eric R., Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper Colophon, 1973), p. 290Google Scholar; Moore, Barrington Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon, 1967), pp. 221–22Google Scholar. On the role of petty officials and bandits as rebel leaders in the Chinese context see Wakeman, Frederic Jr, “Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History, ” JAS, 36 (1977), 204.Google Scholar

54 Beckett to Archer, 6 September 1900, Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, Series 628, No. 267.

55 I have been unable to obtain exact numbers. In 1906 they numbered a “few hundred.” General Report on Siam 1906, 27 May 1907, Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, Series 371, No. 333.

56 Several British consular officials remarked on the decline in the use of corvée. For example, see “Report for the Year 1913 on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular District of Chiengmai, No. 5446,” Great Britain, Foreign Office, Accounts and Papers, Commercial Reports, Vol. lxxv (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 19141916), p. 9.Google Scholar

57 W. A. R. Wood, “Note on the Provincial Administration in the Chiengmai Consular District,” 10 December 1924, Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, Series 628, Box No. 40 (no file no.).

58 Chao Muang Intaworot of Chiang Mai owed the Siamese government 320,000 baht and the Bombay Burmah Corporation 80,000 baht when he died, in 1910. In Lampang Chao Muang Bunyawat owed the Bombay Burmah Corporation 300,000 baht at his death in 1922. W. F. Lloyd, “Memorandum on the Present Position of the Me Chem Forest Working Scheme and the Principle Events Leading Up to It,” n.d., Thailand, Ministry of Finance Library, Series 25, No. 6.

59 A table showing the percentage of northerners in various ranks of government in the North can be found in Mom Chao Boworadet, “Comments on a Report by Fitzmaurice,” 12 November 1919, Thailand, National Archives, Sixth Reign Documents, Series 53, No. 9. I have assumed that many of the northerners in these ranks are lesser cbao and former officials under the cbao, although the evidence on this point is limited. Prince Damrong repotted to King Chulalongkon on 1 July 1903 that a civil service school had been opened in Chiang Mai with an enrollment of over 30 students and that the cbao in the northern states were sending their descendants there to study. Prince Damrong to King Chulalongkon, 570/3776, 1 July 1903, Thailand, National Archives, Ministry of Interior Records, Series 58, No. 51.