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The Law as a Weapon in Marital Disputes: Evidence from the Late Medieval Court of Chancery, 1424–1529

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2012

Abstract

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 2004

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References

1 Public Record Office, London (hereafter abbreviated as PRO) C1/82/87, Isabelle, late the wife of Richard Vergeons v. Thomas Hyll, wiremonger of London, brother-in-law of complainant (ca. 1487–1503). Unfortunately, it is difficult to date many of the Chancery documents because the bills themselves do not provide any indication of the year. For the purposes of this article, I have attempted to date each bill according to chancellor. This was not an easy undertaking. Often, the only clues to the identity of the chancellor in the bill may be an address of the following sort: “to the Ryght reverent fader in god the Bisshop of Excester and channceler of Englond.” This address, in combination with the bundle number, was used to approximate the dates for the bills; the dates were then checked against Timothy S. Haskett's brief guide of sample periods used for the ECCE Project and published in his The Medieval English Court of Chancery,” Law and History Review 14 (1996): 283Google Scholar.

2 Helmholz, R. H., Marriage Litigation in Medieval England (Cambridge, 1974)Google Scholar; Hanawalt, Barbara A., “Females as Felons and Prey in Fourteenth-Century England,” in Women and the Law, 2 vols., ed. Weisberg, D. K. (Cambridge, 1982), 1:180Google Scholar; Palmer, Robert C., “Contexts of Marriage in Medieval England: Evidence from the King's Court circa 1300,” Speculum 59 (1986): 4267CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Given the disparity in names between the two men, it seems likely that the blood relationship was between Thomas's wife and the couple, rather than between Thomas and Richard.

4 Hawkes, Emma, “‘[S]he will … protect and defend her rights boldly by law and reason…’: Women's Knowledge of Common Law and Equity Courts in Late-Medieval England,” in Medieval Women and the Law, ed. Menuge, Noël James (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 151, 155Google Scholar.

5 Haskett, “Medieval English Court of Chancery,” pp. 288–89.

6 It was simply not possible to peruse sixty-one thousand bills of Chancery. Instead, I chose to examine all three volumes of the List of Early Chancery Proceedings. Although the case summaries included in these volumes are exceedingly brief and sometimes misleading, they were sufficiently detailed to allow me to discern those cases related to marital disharmony, and any cases in which husband and wife appeared as petitioner and respondent. See Public Record Office, List of Early Chancery Proceedings, vols. 1–3, Public Record Office Lists and Indexes nos. . 12, 16, 20 (London, 1901, 1903, 1906; reprint, New York: Kraus, 1963)Google Scholar. The Public Record Office's computerized catalog (PROCAT) was used to supplement this primary search.

7 In cases of domestic violence, litigants may have been accustomed to embellishing their stories. See Butler, Sara M., “Lies, Damned Lies, and the Life of Saint Lucy: Three Cases of Judicial Separation from the Late Medieval Court of York,” in Trompe-l’œil: Imitation & Falsification, ed. Romanski, P. and Sy-Wonyu, A. (Rouen, 2002), pp. 116Google Scholar.

8 Unfortunately, no coroners’ rolls for this period have survived from the city of London in order to provide the opportunity to check the facts.

9 P. Tucker has suggested that Chancery bills “were sometimes composed and perhaps even written by the plaintiff himself.” See Tucker, P., “The Early History of the Court of Chancery: A Comparative Study,” English Historical Review 115 (2000): 791811CrossRefGoogle Scholar, quote on 791.

10 Early bills were usually drafted in French (although some were certainly in Latin). All but one of the cases relevant to this study is in English.

11 The phrase “non audet cohabitare cum eius virum” was regularly used in libels or depositions for cases of judicial separation on the grounds of cruelty (saevitia) in the church courts of medieval England in order to meet the court's requirements that the extent of cruelty endangered the life of the spouse. For example, see York Borthwick Institute (YBI) CP. F 235/2, Agnes Benson v. Peter Benson (1448), or YBI, CP. G 35/1, Joanna Ireby v. Robert Lonesdale (1509).

12 PRO, C1/6/318, Lady Margery of Longford v. her husband Richard of Clyderhowe (ca. 1424–25); PRO, C1/162/46, Alice, wife of George Softley of Latton, previously wife of Thomas Westwode of Latton, and Richard, son of the said Thomas and Alice v. George Softley of Latton (ca. 1504–9).

13 Harding, Alan, The Law Courts of Medieval England (London, 1973), p. 102Google Scholar.

14 Tim Stretton has examined the difficulties associated with coverture and its impact on wives. See Stretton, Tim, Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 2223CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 A writ designed specifically for the prosecution of husbands for violent trespass against their wives did exist, and thus cases of this nature should have rightfully belonged to the king's courts. Nonetheless, it is clear that wives, whether out of fear or ignorance, did not use the royal courts for this purpose; the records of Chancery, then, at the very least demonstrate that wives were not using this court to resolve straightforward issues of domestic violence. For a discussion of domestic violence in the king's courts, see Butler, Sara M., The Language of Abuse: Marital Violence in Later Medieval England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, in press)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Walker, Sue Sheridan, “Punishing Convicted Ravishers: Statutory Strictures and Actual Practice in Thirteenth and Fourteenth-Century England,” Journal of Medieval History 13 (1987): 237–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 Ibid., p. 239.

18 Ibid., p. 238.

19 Ibid., p. 246; Kelly, Henry Ansgar, “Statutes of Rapes and Alleged Ravishers of Wives: A Context for the Charges against Thomas Malory, Knight,” Viator 28 (1997): 398–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 PRO, C1/71/139, John Haket v. Nicholas Moungumrey, alias Shyrley of Salisbury (ca. 1487–1503).

21 PRO, C1/83/38, Philip Cabull of Bristol v. William and John, sons of complainant's wife for abduction of complainant's wife (ca. 1487–1504).

22 PRO, C1/343/57, Richard Ores v. William Harryson (1504–9).

23 PRO, C1/492/ 35, Richard Chirden v. William Morton of Bilburgh, father-in-law of complainant (ca. 1515–29).

24 As Maria Cioni has observed, it was not until the case of Elisabeth Walgrave v. Arthur Goldinge in 1581 that the court of Chancery chose to recognize this difficult situation and provide a remedy for separated wives. See Cioni, Maria L., Women and Law in Elizabethan England with Particular Reference to the Court of Chancery (New York, 1985), p. 172Google Scholar.

25 An ex officio act book from Canterbury demonstrates that there might be quite a disparity. For example, while John Cok de Holyngham was required to pay his wife 12 d. per week, the wife of William Bergh was to receive only 6 d. per week from her husband. See Canterbury Cathedral Archives, Y.1.3, fols. 112 and 116. Comparatively, a York consistory court act book notes the case of Richard Wilkynson and his wife Margaret. In 1420, when the couple approached the court to request a separation to which both parties unanimously consented, their property was divided equally between them, and the division itself was carried out by four arbitrators, two chosen by each party. See York Consistory Court AB/1, fols. 177r–177v.

26 PRO, C1/45/46, John Matheu de Tamall, yeoman v. Walter Hankocke and others of St. Cue (ca. 1467–70).

27 PRO, C1/61/382, Richard Wymound, grocer v. Nicolas Dobson (ca. 1473–74).

28 Hanawalt, Barbara A., “‘Good Governance’ in the Medieval and Early Modern Context,” Journal of British Studies 37 (1998): 248CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 See McSheffrey, Shannon, “Men and Masculinity in Late Medieval London Civic Culture: Governance, Patriarchy and Reputation,” in Conflicted Identities and Multiple Masculinities: Men in the Medieval West, ed. Murray, Jacqueline (New York, 1999), pp. 243–78Google Scholar.

30 Walker, “Punishing Convicted Ravishers,” pp. 245–46.

31 S. F. C. Milsom notes that “many petitions of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries complain of matters which in principle were remedied by the common law. Special treatment is sought because the petitioner is too poor to sue, or his adversary so powerful that sheriffs will not do their duty or jurors tell the truth.” See Milsom, S. F. C., The Historical Foundations of the Common Law (London, 1981), p. 83Google Scholar.

32 PRO, C1/75/39, Thomas Gwyn v. Thomas Colle, parson (ca. 1487–1504).

33 See Powell, Edward, “Jury Trial at Gaol Delivery in the Late Middle Ages: The Midland Circuit, 1400–1429,” in Twelve Good Men and True: The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 1200–1800, ed. Cockburn, J. S. and Green, Thomas A. (Princeton, N.J., 1988), pp. 102–3Google Scholar.

34 Sequestration to prevent the plaintiff from experiencing undue force was a common procedure in the canonical courts. For example, in the period from 1463 to 1505, Canterbury act books record at least nine cases of sequestration. See Canterbury Y.1.6, fol. 21; Y.1.15, fols 160 and 201; Y.1.16, fol. 253; Y.1.17, fol. 13; Y.1.19 in which the folios are unnumbered but the cases are those of Ralph Huddingfeld of Smorden and his wife Amica Humfrey, and Lodan of Betrysden and his wife Elisabeth Barker; and finally, Y.2.2, fols. 37 and 110.

35 Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, pp. 283–313.

36 PRO, C1/295/4, John Carvare, clerk chancellor to Thomas late archbishop of York (ca. 1504–9). Certiorari.

37 Judicial separations were very infrequent. For example, for the ecclesiastical province of York from the fourteenth to the early sixteenth century, there are only six identifiable cases of applications for separation on the grounds of cruelty.

38 Swanson, R. N., “Angels Incarnate: Clergy and Masculinity from Gregorian Reform to Reformation,” in Masculinity in Medieval Europe, ed. Hadley, D. M. (New York, 1999), p. 170Google Scholar.

39 Given the predominance of women at Chancery in cases related to inheritance, Chancery may well have seemed the logical forum for the resolution of property disputes. Moreover, enfeoffment to use was defensible only at Chancery, owing to the failure of the common-law courts to recognize its existence.

40 PRO, C1/266/23, Agnes wife of Thomas Leylond v. her husband Thomas Leylond (ca. 1500–1509).

41 R. H. Helmholz notes that the growth of trusts for women by the fifteenth century is substantial enough to explain, in part, why married women no longer felt inclined to make wills of their own. See his “Married Women's Wills in Later Medieval England,” in Wife and Widow in Medieval England, ed. Walker, Sue Sheridan (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1993), pp. 165–82Google Scholar. Timothy Haskett notes that uses, which often seem to have been established for women, were the most common subject of disputes in Chancery at 27.4 percent. See Haskett, “Medieval English Court of Chancery,” p. 300.

42 PRO, C1/289/33, William Broune, executor of Thomas Broune v. Elizabeth wife of Thomas Broune (ca. 1504–9).

43 J. H. Baker notes that by 1300, a wife could bind her husband “to a sale of goods which came to his use or profit.” Cited in Loengard, Janet S., “Common Law for Margery: Separate but Not Equal,” in Women in Medieval Western European Culture, ed. Mitchell, Linda E. (New York, 1999), p. 123Google Scholar (for a discussion of women's market rights, see pp. 123–25 of Loengard). For a much lengthier discussion of this subject, see Jordan, William C., Women and Credit in Pre-industrial and Developing Societies (Philadelphia, 1992)Google Scholar.

44 The literary evidence from the time suggests that creditors permitted wives a good deal of flexibility in this respect. For example, in Chaucer's “The Shipman's Tale,” the wife of a merchant tells Daun John that she needs 100 franks to pay off her dress bill, owing the following week. The implication is that she must pay it off before her husband finds out the bill even exists.

45 Loengard, “Common Law for Margery,” p. 124. While it is clear that creditors were quite happy to conduct business with medieval English wives in this manner, it is difficult to say whether a separation between husband and wife necessarily quashed this marital privilege. Buying on credit may well have been a practical method of supporting one's wife during a separation; merchants and workmen, however, may have been less assured of payment in these situations and refused to trade on these grounds alone. In Elizabeth's situation, certainly, before her separation was widely known, a fruitful trip to market might have allowed her to stock up on necessities, thereby sustaining herself for some time before needing to dip into Thomas's allowance.

46 Please see n. 35 above concerning the use of the term “force and arms.”

47 PRO, C1/365/37, Thomas Thornton chaplain v. James Mawncy of London carpenter (ca. 1504–9).

48 PRO, C1/6/318, Lady Margery of Longford v. her husband Richard of Clyderhowe (ca. 1424–25) (the records do not offer surnames for either individual). This case also appears in an archiepiscopal register from the period. While Margery was in the process of obtaining a fair separation agreement, the church courts were attempting to enforce an action for restoration of conjugal rights. In fact, the archbishop's court even turned to the secular arm of the law in this matter after repeated injunctions failed to convince Margery to return to her husband. Whether the secular courts actually got involved in the case is hidden from the historian, but Margery's case certainly demonstrates that marital disputes could well find their way into a variety of courts in an attempt to find a just resolution. See The Register of Henry Chichele Archbishop of Canterbury 1414–1443, 2 vols., ed. Jacob, E. F. (Oxford, 1938), 1:185Google Scholar.

49 In an examination of applications of separation for both ecclesiastical provinces in the medieval period, I was incapable of finding a case of separation on the grounds of adultery alone. Typically, allegations of adultery were combined with those of physical abuse. For example, see YBI, CP. E 257, Margery de Devoine v. Richard Scot (1349), or YBI, CP. F 56, Cecilia Wyvell v. Henry Venables (1410).

50 PRO, C 1/162/46, Alice wife of George Softley of Latton previously wife of Thomas Westwode of Latton, and Richard son of the said Thomas and Alice v. George Softley of Latton (ca. 1504–9).

51 Most likely, the property to which Alice and Richard refer constituted part of Alice's dower lands, upon which she was a life tenant. In this situation, Richard would stand to inherit the estate after his mother's death.

52 See Galloway, Andrew, “Marriage Sermons, Polemical Sermons, and The Wife of Bath's Prologue: A Generic Excursus,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 14 (1992): 330CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schnell, Rüdiger, “The Discourse on Marriage in the Middle Ages,” Speculum 73 (1998): 771–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

53 Both Barbara Hanawalt and Jeremy Goldberg have theorized that families most likely continued to play an important role as advisors and mediators in domestic disputes. See Hanawalt, Barbara A., The Ties That Bound: Peasant Families in Medieval England (Oxford, 1986), pp. 208–10Google Scholar; Goldberg, P. J. P., Women, Work, and Life Cycle in a Medieval Economy: Women in York and Yorkshire c. 1300–1520 (Oxford, 1992), p. 267CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54 PRO, C1/287/47, John Baker, clerk (ca. 1504–9).

55 It is possible that Thomas's wife had already begun a suit in ecclesiastical court for a judicial separation on the grounds of cruelty, although I was incapable of finding evidence of such a suit. However, John Baker's initial actions strongly suggest that he did not feel the beating required ecclesiastical intervention; his opinion may have changed with subsequent dealings with his brother-in-law. The bill certainly does not indicate that a suit had been initiated in the church courts, and it seems likely that an appeal to the regular process might well have been mentioned in this case only because it would have strengthened Baker's negative depiction of his brother-in-law.