¹ See Walkin, J., “The Attitude of the Tsarist Government Toward the Labor Problem,” American Slavic and East European Review, XIII (April 1954), 163–184CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Several thousand pages of documentary material, chiefly reports by local administrative and police officials and by factory inspectors, are contained in Pankratova, A. M. (ed.), Rabochee Dvizhenie v Rossii v XIX Veke (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1950–1952), 6 volsGoogle Scholar The present study is based in part on a survey of these documents.

³ Significant industrial undertakings existed in Russia before then, of course, although there is disagreement among historians regarding their scale. Cf. Koulischer, J., “La grande industrie aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles: France, Allemagne, Russie,” Annales d'histoire économique et sociale, III (Jan. 1931), 39–46Google Scholar, and Liashchenko, P. I., History of the National Economy of Russia, (trans, by Herman, L. M.; New York: MacMillan, 1949), pp. 288Google Scholarff. The period from the 1860's to 1890 may be considered the “preparatory stage” of industrialization; after 1890, in W. W. Rostow's terms, the country entered the stage of self-sustained industrial growth. See Rostow, W. W., “The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth,” Economic Journal, LXVI (March 1956), 25–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ For a broader analysis of the emergence and of the economic and social implications of this tradition, see Blum, J., “The Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe,” American Historical Review, LXII (July 1957), 807–836CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brutzkus, B., “Die historischen Eigentümlichkeiten der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung Russlands,” Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven, (1934), pp. 62–99Google Scholar, and Bendix, R., Work, and Authority in Industry, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956), pp. 174–90Google Scholar

⁵ This was one of its chief arguments against the emancipation of the peasants; see Tourgueneff, N., La Russie et les Russes (Parsis: Comptoir des Imprimeurs Unis, 1847), II, 239Google Scholar

⁶ See J. Mavor, Economic History of Russia (New York: E. P. Dutton, n.d.), I, 446ft; Tugan-Baranovskii, M., Russkaia Fabrika v Proshlom i Nastoiashchem (St. Petersburg, 1898), pp. 122Google Scholarff. The texts of numerous worker petitions may be fund in Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie … (2d edition; Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1955), Vol. I:Google Scholari.

⁷ The consequences of petitions in a Kazan factory between 1796 and 1849 are presented schematically in Bendix, Work, and Authority in Industry, pp. 172–73.

⁸ See Portal, R., L'Oural au XVIII^e siècle (Paris: Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 1950), pp. 283Google Scholarft.

⁹ Possessional factories were specially privileged private enterprises which had peasants bound to the establishment as such, rather than to the owner, who was usually a merchant. The owner himself was almost in a civil servant position; see Liashchenko, History of the National Economy of Russia, pp. 293–94, and Schulze-Gärvernitz, G. von, Volkswirtschaftliche Studien aus Russland (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1899), pp. 32–33Google Scholar

¹⁰ Workers could be given a passport to seek a job elsewhere. For details on the liquidation of the possessional rights and duties see Shelymagin, I. I., Fabrichno-Trudovoe Zakonodatel' stvo v Rossii (Moscow: Iuridicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1947), pp. 22–32Google Scholar.

¹¹ Ibid. pp. 28–29. Some of the older studies attach more significance to the 1835 labor regulations. See for instance Litvinov-Falinskii, F. P., Fabrichnoe Zakonodatel' stvo i Fabrichnaia Inspektsia v Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1900), pp. 3–4Google Scholar

¹² A central feature of this disciplinary paternalism, according to a German observer, was that “The orders which the master himself gives must be unalterable, not an iota of them can be relinquished.” Haxthausen, Baron von, The Russian Empire, its People, Institutions, and Resources (trans., by Farie, R.; London: Chapman and Hall, 1856), I, 334Google Scholar

¹³ On early Russian entrepreneurs see Kulischer, J., “Die kapitalistischen Unternehmer in Russland (insbesondere die Bauern als Unternehmer) in den Anfangsstadien des Kapitalismus,” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LXV (1931) 309–55Google Scholar

¹⁴ This legal distinction was not invented in feudal Russia but borrowed from “liberal” post-revolutionary France. French labor legislation in the early 19th century recognized the employer as a superior in wage disputes and made strikes and picketing a criminal offense.

¹⁵ Shelymagin, Fabrichno-Trudovoe Zakonodatel' stvo v Rossii, pp. 30–31. Article 1791 was intended to apply only to unfree labor and consequently was dropped in the 1866 edition of the Penal Code. See Prokopovich, S. N., K Rabochemu Voprosu v Rossii (St. Petersburg: E. D. Kustova, 1905), pp. 46–47Google Scholar

¹⁶ Between 1864 and 1885 the number of “factories and works” in 34 industries of European Russia increased from 5,782 to 6,232 and the number of workers from 272,385 to 436,775. The total number of industrial workers reported in official statistics for European Russia in 1885 was 615,598. Lenin, V. I., The Development of Capitalism in Russia (Moscow:Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), p. 661Google Scholar

¹⁷ Perhaps the tradition of the bound factory worker also had an influence in these matters.

¹⁸ This spirit manifested itself especially in times of crisis, as exemplified in peasant uprisings.“What they did possess was a stubborn character which enabled them to endure defeat, flogging, imprisonment, and death before the eyes of their comrades, without the subjugation of their indomitable spirit.” Mavor, Economic History of Russia, I, 446.

¹⁹ Prokopovich, S. N., “Krest'ianstvo i Poreformennaia Fabrika” in Dzhiveleg, A. K., et al. (eds.), Velikaia Reforma (Moscow: Istoricheskaia Komissiia Reforma, 1911), VI, 276Google Scholar

²⁰ See for instance Pashitnow, K., Die Lage der arbeitende Klasse in Russland (trans, by Nachimsor, M.; Stuttgart: J. H. W. Dietz, 1907Google Scholar).

²¹ Quoted in Turin, S. P., From Peter the Great to Lenin (London: P. S. King & Sons, 1935), p. 34Google Scholar

²² For some interesting illustrations see Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. II:i, No. 17, pp. 543–45, and Vol. II:ii, Nos. 3, 11, 12, pp. 589–90, 596–99.

²³ Ibid., II :i, 35, 45, 56. This kind of evidence can obviously be considered only as an order of magnitude, rather than precise information. As anyone who has dealt with strike data knows, even the figures published officially in economically advanced countries are subject to a high degree of error.

²⁴ See Tugan-Baranowsky, M., Geschichte der russischen Fabrik. (trans, by Minzes, B.; Berlin, E.Felber, 1900), pp. 211Google Scholar, 358–65.

²⁵ In a letter by an official of the Ministry of Justice to Alexander II in 1866, quoted by Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …,, II:i, 13.

²⁶ Ibid., No. 86, pp. 242–43.

²⁷ Prokopovich, K Rabochemu Voprosu v Rossii, p. 41.

²⁸ Circular No. 1906 of the Ministry of the Interior, July 6, 1870. Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. II:i, No. 86, p. 243. The gubernii (provinces) listed were: Arkhangel'sk, Astrakhan', Vologda, Viatka, Kostroma, Novgorod, Olonets, and Samara. The regulations applied only to European Russia, exclusive of Poland, Finland, and the Caucasus.

²⁹ Later experience revealed that legal investigations of strikes could be embarrassing indeed. It must be remembered that the judicial branch of the Russian government had received farreaching independence in 1864. See Kucherov, S., “The Jury as Part of the Russian Judicial Reform of 1864,” American Slavic and East European Review, IX (April 1950), 77–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ Russian courts in the second half of the nineteenth century demanded that three major conditions be fulfilled before imposing the criminal strike penalty: first, proof had to be presented that the workers had stopped working; second, the stoppage had to be the result of a conspiracy among the workers; third, the stoppage had to aim at a change in agreed upon wages or working conditions. From the decision by the Moscow Sudebnaia Palata in the case of the Kuznetsov porcelain works; Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. Ill :i, No. 140, p. 426.

³¹ For a listing of early legal developments sec Ibid., II:i, 619.

³² Ibid., p. 44.

³³ Cf. Ibid., Vol. II:i, No. 91, p. 248; No. 98, p. 266; No. 100, p. 273; No. 102, p. 276; No. 103, p. 277; No. 188, p. 504.

³⁴ Ibid., Vol. II:i, No. 14, pp. 533–35.

³⁵ Ibid., No. 105, pp. 279–307.

³⁶ A committee established in 1859 for the study of child labor in St. Petersburg had recommended various restrictions on hours and on child labor and a system of factory inspections which found support among St. Petersburg manufacturers but was stubbornly opposed by those in Moscow. For a brief history of Tsarist factory legislation and a good bibliography see “Arbeiterschutzgesetzgebung (Russland)” in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, (4th ed., Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1923), I, 520–34Google Scholar The reason for the difference in attitude between the two cities is usually attributed to the fact that the St. Petersburg textile mills were more efficient than those of Moscow and less dependent on long hours and exploitation of child labor.

³⁷ Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, II :i, 48.

³⁸ Prokopovich, K. Rabochemu Voprosu v Rossii, p. 49. Later, newspapers were forbidden to report and comment on strikes.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 51.

⁴⁰ Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. II:i, No. 18, p. 545.

⁴¹ Ibid., No. 19, pp. 547–49.

⁴² Cf. Ibid., Vol. II:ii, No. 39, pp. 82–84; No. 22, pp. 612–13; No. 280, pp. 533–37; No. 33, pp. 640–41.

⁴³ The 1870's, of course, saw the beginning of revolutionary propaganda among the workers. See Nikitin, I., Die ersten Arbeiterverbände und sozialdemokratischen Organisationen in Russland, (trans, by Berlin, S.E.D., Berlin: Tribüne Verlag, 1954Google Scholar).

⁴⁴ Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. II:i, No. 168, p. 478. The “Third Department” normally reported directly to the Tsar.

⁴⁵ Ibid., No. 70, pp. 166–67. One report mentions that workers talk about strikes in America and do not even know where America is; Ibid., No. 94, pp. 197–98.

⁴⁶ Ibid., No. 239, pp. 452–55.

⁴⁷ Cf. Ibid., No. 183, pp. 359–60; No. 10, pp. 595–96; No. 14, pp. 601–2; Nos. 30–32, pp. 636–38.

⁴⁸ Ibid., No. 34, p. 641.

⁴⁹ Ibid., No. 29, p. 636. For similar observations on other areas, see Ibid., No. 33, pp. 640–41.

⁵⁰ Wagenführ, R., “Die Industriewirtschaft—Entwicklungstendenzen der deutschen und internationalen Industrieproduktion 1860 bis 1932,” Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung, Sonderheft 31 (Berlin, 1933), p. 18Google Scholar Russia of course was still an overwhelmingly agricultural country; according to the first general census of the Russian Empire, in 1897, only 9.8 per cent of the total population were engaged in, or dependents of persons engaged in, Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction. Computed from pervaia Vseobshchaia Perepis Naselenia Rossiskoi Imperii 1897 (St. Petersburg: Ministry of die Interior, 1905Google Scholar), General Summary, Vol. II, Table XXI, p. 296.

⁵¹ Khromov, P. A., Ekonomicheskoe Razvitie Rossii v XIX–XX Vekakh (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1950Google Scholar), Appendix Table 4, pp. 452–55.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ The extent to which public lectures and periodical articles in favor of regulation influenced this reversal is hard to evaluate. The speeches and articles on this topic by Professor Ianzhul, I. I., a leading proponent of regulation (see his Ocherki i Issledovania [Moscow, 1889Google Scholar], 2 vols.) were studied by officials of the Ministry of Finance. From official debates of the legislative proposals we can infer also that the army was interested in factory reform because the alleged poor health of workers in the factory provinces made many unfit for military service. See Ianzhul, I. I., “Vospominania o Perezhitom i Vidennom,” Russkaia Starina, CXLII (April-June 1910), 92Google Scholar

⁵⁴ On this historically significant strike there are 72 documents in Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. III:i, Nos. 1–71, pp. 123–302. This factory was an integrated spinning, weaving, dying and finishing works employing reportedly 17,783 workers in 1884; Ibid., p. 824. Another estimate for 1887 gives the employment as 12,000 workers; Ibid., p. 571.

⁵⁵ Ibid., No. 1, pp. 703–4.

⁵⁶ For a summary of the rules concerning employer-worker relations see Turin, From Peter the Great to Lenin, pp. 185–86.

⁵⁷ Stated in an explanatory note to the project of law of 1886, quoted in Prokopovich, K Rabochemu voprosu v Rossii, p. 87.

⁵⁸ See “Russkii Zakon’ i Rabochii,” Osvobozhdenie, Vol. I (August 2, 1902), No. 4, pp. 51–52.

⁵⁹ There was another invidious legal distinction: if an employer did not live up to the contract, a worker had to go to court to be released from his contractual obligations, but an employer in the reverse situation could, in a number of specified situations, legally ignore his contractual obligations.

⁶⁰ In his Memoires, Professor Ianzhul notes that when he reported for his appointment as inspector, Bunge told him: “We cannot immediately do much for the workers, we must act carefully in order not to cause resentment in prejudiced circles, but I am convinced that step by step it will be possible to settle this question properly …” See “Vospominania o Perezhitom i Vidennom,” Russkaia Starina, CXLII, 84. The director of the Department of Trade and Manufacture told Ianzhul that his new job dealth with “the destiny of the workers,” Ibid.

⁶¹ Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, III:i, 72, 79.

⁶² Turin, From Peter the Great to Lenin, p. 187. For a discussion of the validity of these figures see the review of the original official publication in Die Neue Zeit, XXV:i (1906–1907), 615–16Google Scholar

⁶³ The figures refer to 1895–1904. “Factories employing from 20 to 100 workers showed a percentage of disputes ranging from 2.7 to 9.4, whereas in those which employed from 100 to 1,000 workers the percentage varied from 21.5 to 49.9 per year.” Turin, From Peter the Great to Lenin, p. 187.

⁶⁴ A Moscow province police report notes that most strikes are settled directly between master and workers, with the employer often agreeing to higher wages which he takes back through higher fines and higher prices at the factory store; Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. III:i, No. 193, pp. 559–60. A report from St. Petersburg complained that often the police are not informed of “unlawful” worker conduct; Ibid., pp. 447ft.

⁶⁵ Mikulin, A. A., Ocherki iz Istorii Primeneniia Zakona 3-go liunia 1886 Goda O Naime Rabochikh (Vladimir: V. A. Larkov, 1893), pp. 6–7Google Scholar Mikulin was a factory inspector.

⁶⁶ One factory fined a worker 3 rubles if it was discovered that he was overpaid and had not reported it.

⁶⁷ “The government continuously vacillated between closing its eyes to the labor problem … and making efforts to show the workers its impartiality, its readiness to defend them against cruel exploitation.” Berlin, P. A., Russkaia Burzhuasiia v Staroe i Novoe Vremia, (Moscow: “Kniga,” 1922), p. 190Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. III:i, No. 17, p. 737.

⁶⁹ Mikulin, Ocherki iz Istorii Primeneniia Zakona …, Appendix No. 1, p. 9. This does not mean that all employers mistreated their workers. A German investigator found a good deal of genuine paternalism in St. Petersburg factories, but it was usually coupled with complete intolerance of any sort of indiscipline. See Göbel, O., Entwicklungsgang der russischen Industriearbeiter bis zur ersten Revolution, (Leipzig: Teubner, 1920), pp. 73–75Google Scholar

⁷⁰ In 1894 the workers of Karl Til & Co. in Moscow complained that they received 20 blows with the birch rod as punishment. The factory inspector obtained a written promise from the factory manager that he would no longer beat the workers and reported him to the local magistrate. Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. III:ii, No. 19, p. 602.

⁷¹ Berlin, Russkaia Burzhuasiia v staroe i Novoe Vremia, pp. 191ff.

⁷² Mikulin, Ocherki iz Istorii Primeneniia Zakona …, pp. 55–56.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 53.

⁷⁴ Ianzhul, “Vospominania o Perezhitom i Vidennom,” Russkaia Starina, CXLII, p. 85. The problem of lack of knowledge worked both ways. Official lists of factories were quite incomplete and sometimes listed factories which did not exist. Ibid., p. 88. See also Litvinov- Falinskii, Fabrichnoe Zakonodatel' stvo …, pp. 313ft.

⁷⁵ Mikulin, Ocherki iz Istorii Primeneniia Zakona …, p. 68.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 78. See also Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenic …, Vol. Ill :ii, No. 80, pp. 181–82.

⁷⁷ Mikulin, Ocherki iz Istorii Primeneniia Zakona …, pp. 69–70.

⁷⁸ Ianzhul recalled that some of the large factory directors told him that they were too busy to see him; “Vospominania o Perezhitom i Vidennom,” Russkaia Starina, CXLII, 86.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 86, 94.

⁸⁰ The police and the inspectors often got in a position where they were bargaining on behalf of the workers while at the same time they were threatening the workers with reprisals.

⁸¹ In 1885 there were 1,295 industrial establishments for each inspector; by 1899, however, the ratio was 80:1; I. Kh. Ozerov, Politika po Rabochemu Voprosu v Rossii za Poslednye Gody (Moscow, 1906), p. 8Google Scholar

⁸² There were, however, certain general labor contract provisions in the Law of 1886 which were immediately applicable to the whole empire.

⁸³ Prominent among the latter were the Society for the Cooperation between Russian Industry and Trade, the Moscow Manufacturers’ Council, and the All-Russian Merchants Trading at the Nizhnii Novgorod Fair.

⁸⁴ According to Berlin, Vyshnegradskii was given the post in order to mend strained relations between die government and business interests; Russkfaia Burzhuasiia v Staroe i Novoe Vremia, p. 198.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ For some interesting cases involving English managers and foremen see Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. III:ii, Nos. 135–47, PP. 301–51; and No. 27, pp. 610–14.

⁸⁷ Ibid., No. 240, pp. 517–18.

⁸⁸ This problem was most vexing in the textile industry where fines for poor workmanship were most prevalent. It was often a problem of determining to what extent and which worker was at fault, or whether the equipment or the raw material was faulty. See for instance, Ibid., No., 153, p. 364.

⁸⁹ Ozerov, Politika po Rabochemu Voprosu v Rossii za Poslednye Gody, p. 13. By then this was already a well established practice.

⁹⁰ A. M. Pankratova (ed.), Rabochee Dvizheni e …, Vol. III:ii, No. 28, pp. 615–16

⁹¹ Quoted in Ozerov, Politika po Rabochemu Voprosu v Rossii za Poslednye Gody, p. 24.

⁹² Apparently the method was used that was most promising in restoring calm in the opinion of the official in charge. For instance, in a series of strikes in 1889 the governor of the Vladimir province ordered very severe measures against the workers, employing Cossacks with knouts, even though in earlier strikes he had mostly put pressure on the employers. He explained to the Ministry of the Interior that on account of unfavorable business conditions “I did not see any possibility of obtaining concessions from the manufacturers for the workers as in earlier instances, so I decided to resort immediately to stern measures …” Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie …, Vol. III:i, No. 247, p. 666.

⁹³ Ozerov, Politika po Rabochemu Voprosu v Rossii za Poslednye Gody, pp. 118–23.

⁹⁴ Pankratova, Rabochee Dvizhenie. …, III:ii, 614.

⁹⁵ Prokopovich, K Rabochemu Voprosu v Rossii, pp. 72–73

⁹⁶ Trade unions were legalized in 1906.

⁹⁷ Turin, From Peter the Great to Lenin, p. 53.

⁹⁸ An interesting example was the Putilov factory, see Mitelman, M., Istoria Putilovskogo Zavoda (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1941Google Scholar).

⁹⁹ This was not true, however, in the case of the Jewish labor organizations; see Paretzki, E., Die Entstehung der jüdischen Arbeiterbewegung in Russland (Published Doctoral Dissertation, University of Basel, 1932Google Scholar).

¹⁰⁰ Kolossow, N., “Die Organisationen der russischen Arbeiter,” Die Neue Zeit, XVI :ii (1897–1898), 579Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Ozerov, Politika po Rabochemu Voprosu v Rossii za Poslednye Gody, pp. 163–64.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 164.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 163.

¹⁰⁴ Berlin, Russkaia Burzhuasiia v Staroe i Novoe Vremia, p. 205.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in Gordon, M., Workers Before and After Lenin (New York: Dutton & Co., 1941), p. 29Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Within the government there was a conflict of attitude between the Ministry of Finance, which was responsible for promoting industry and reflected some of the manufacturers’ ideas, and the Ministry of the Interior, whose members were drawn mainly from the landed aristocracy and favored the maintenance of “patriarchal” relations in industry. Walkin, J., “The Attitude of the Tsarist Government Toward the Labor Problem,” American Slavic and East European Review, XIII (April 1954), 178–79Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Gordon, Workers Before and After Lenin, p. 29.

¹⁰⁸ For a comparative analysis of this problem within the context of British and German industrialization see G. V. Rimlinger, “The Legitimation of Protest: A Comparative Study in Labor History,” to appear in Comparative Studies in Society and History.

¹⁰⁹ Walkin, “The Attitude of the Tsarist Government Toward the Labor Problem,” American Slavic and East European Review, XIII, 165.

¹¹⁰ “Tout en recommandant … aux inspecteurs des fabriques de ne point perdre de vue le caractĕre éminement patriarchal des rapports qui en Russie ont existé de tout temps entre patrons et ouvriers, M. Vitte a l'air de ne point attacher lui même une grande importance a ce régime prétendu paternel et ne recule point devant la nécessité de sermoner vertement ceux des chefs d'industrie qui n'ont pas su éviter les dangers d'une grĕve par des concessions faites ă temps.” Kovalevsky, M., Le régime économique de la Russie (Paris: Giard and Briĕre, 1898), p. 237Google Scholar