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The Development of Nazi Monetary Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Martin Wolfe
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania

Extract

The Nazis dealt rather cautiously with the German monetary system during die first two years of dieir regime. Hitler was particularly sensitive to questions of “confidence,” and was glad to saddle Schacht with the responsibility of keeping die monetary system from blowing up in die face of die new government. But by the end of 1934, diere were signs that the Nazis were beginning to take Germany out of die stream of what Goering contemptuously called “the so-called free play of economic forces.”

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1955

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References

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