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‘Honestius quam ambitiosius’? An exploration of the Cynic's attitude to moral corruption in his fellow men*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2013

John Moles
John Moles
Affiliation:
University College of North Wales, Bangor
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Extract

Two important studies have recently appeared of the career and philosophy of the celebrated first-century Cynic Demetrius—an article by J. F. Kindstrand and a monograph by M. Billerbeck. Both scholars discuss Demetrius' defence of P. Egnatius Celer in AD 70. The purpose of the present paper is threefold: (i) to argue that Kindstrand's and Billerbeck's interpretations of this incident, different as they are, must, like all previous interpretations, be rejected; (ii) to offer a new perspective, in the hope of showing that Demetrius' action can be understood as thoroughly honourable; (iii) to demonstrate that Demetrius' action can be understood as not only thoroughly honourable, but also profoundly Cynic. It may be objected that investigation of motive in such a case is intrinsically misguided. The only evidence is a short notice in Tacitus, and it is of course true that we shall never be able to say for certain what Demetrius' motives were. Some modern historians, moreover, deprecate on principle analysis of motive, in the ancient world especially. It seems, nevertheless, both legitimate and worthwhile to attempt to understand the reasons why Demetrius, a Cynic philosopher of (on the normal view) high moral character, should have defended Celer, a Stoic philosopher who (again on the normal view) had revealed himself to be a complete scoundrel. The exercise may also serve to bring out some fundamental points about the Cynics' conception of man and their interpretation of human weakness. For reasons which will become clear below Cynicism was vulnerable to misunderstanding and misrepresentation. Demetrius' defence of Celer, I shall argue, provides an instructive paradigm for the correct interpretation of Cynicism.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 103 , November 1983 , pp. 103 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1983

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References

1 Kindstrand, , ‘Demetrius the Cynic’, Philol. cxxiv (1980) 83–98Google Scholar; Billerbeck, , Der Kyniker Demetrius: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühkaiserzeitlichen Populärphilosophie (Leiden 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Kindstrand 96 (F.; Billerbeck 46 f.

3 Doubtfully relevant is Schol. in Iuv. vet. ad sat. i 3: see n. 20 below.

4 Stoic influence is clear on (e.g.) D.Chr. iv (n. 110 below), the Geneva papyrus (n. 112), some of the Cynic letters (cf. Attridge, H. W., First Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus [Missoula 1976]Google Scholar; Malherbe, A. J., The Cynic Epistles [Missoula 1977])Google Scholar, and Oenomaus' attack on prophecy and the theory of predestination (Eus. PE vi 7.10–19), which exploits Stoic sense perception theory to support the argument (cf. A. A. Long, CR xxx [1980] 53 n. 1). But the Stoic influence is generally trivial—more a case of the use of convenient terminology or suitable ad hoc arguments than of change in philosophical orientation. (Diogenes himself seems have exploited other philosophers' theories when it suited him—cf. D.L. vi 70 with the good discussion of Dudley, D. R., A History of Cynicism [London 1937] 21 ff.Google Scholar) Such works, if not ‘pure’, art fundamentally Cynic. It is harder to classify works like Epictetus' περί κυνισμοῦ (see n. 92) or Julian's Orr. vi–vii, where sympathetic Stoics give their interpretations of the true meaning of Cynicism. Used critically, such works do seem to me to provide some useful evidence about Cynicism.

5 For Diogenes see von Fritz, K., Philol. Supp. xviii. 2 (1926) 55 ff.Google Scholar The objections of Tarn and others lack force: cf. Ferguson, J., Utopias of the Classical World (London 1975) 89 f.Google Scholar

6 Str. xv 1.64–5 = Onesicr. FGrH 134 F 17.

7 Bion: Kindstrand, , Bion of Borysthenes (Uppsala 1976)Google Scholar; Teles: Hense, O., Teletis Reliquiae2 (Tübingen 1909)Google Scholar, O'Neil, E. N., Teles: the Cynic Teacher (Missoula 1977)Google Scholar. Qualifications are necessary because although both writers are broadly Cynic their work is clearly a dilution of Diogenes', or even Crates', teaching, and also shows (I think) some Stoic influence.

8 The ancient tradition that Diogenes was Antisthenes' pupil was effectively refuted by Dudley (n. 4) 1 ff. (pace Höistad, R., Cynic Hero and Cynic King [Uppsala 1948) 10 ff.Google Scholar), but Antisthenic influence upon Diogenes has been widely accepted, and is patent (cf. esp. Xen. Smp. iv 34 ff.).

9 Cf. esp. Höistad (n. 8) 16 ff.

10 Cynic and Stoic attitudes to (e.g.) prophecy, political activity, and the meaning of the maxim κατά ϕύσιν ζῆν are characteristically different, even if individual Cynics and Stoics do not always adopt the characteristic positions of their respective philosophies.

11 The basic works on Cynicism are the books of Dudley (n. 4) and Höistad (n. 8). At the time of writing I have not seen Niehues-Proebsting, H., Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus (Munich 1979)Google Scholar.

12 Dudley (n. 4) 125 ff.; Kindstrand (n. 1) 89 ff.; Billerbeck (n. 1) passim.

13 Tac. Ann. xvi 32.3; Juv. iii 116f.; Cass. D. lxii 26.2.

14 Tac. Ann. xvi 21.1, 23.1, 30.1–33.2; Cass.D. lxii 26.1–3.

15 Tac. Hist. iv 6.

16 Tac. Hist. ii 91.

17 Tac. Hist. iv 6 ff.

18 Tac. Hist. iv 9.

19 I hope that this summary is suitably uncontroversial. For authoritative discussion see Brunt, P. A., PBSR xliii (1975) 7–35, esp. 28Google Scholar.

20 Roman advocates were not jurists or lawyers as such and could come from any social class in theory (cf. Schulz, F., History of Roman Legal Science [Oxford 1946] 43 ff., 108 fGoogle Scholar). The suggestion sometimes made that Schol. in Iuv. vet. ad sat. i 33 (‘Demetrium causidicum dicunt, qui multos Neroni detulit') refers to our Demetrius may or may not be right, but even if it is, the allegation can only rest on hostile interpretation of Demetrius' behaviour in 70.

21 Dudley (n. 4) 134.

22 J. M. C. Toynbee, C&R xiii (1944) 53.

23 Koestermann, E., Cornelius Tacitus: Annalen, Buch 14–16 (Heidelberg 1968) 407Google Scholar.

24 Griffin, M. T., Seneca: a Philosopher in Politics (Oxford 1976) 312 n. 2Google Scholar.

25 Hence the ancient dispute whether Cynicism was a αἵρεσις or merely an ἔνστασις βίου (D.L. vi 103).

26 The thesis has not won widespread acceptance (cf. Kindstrand [n. 1] 97), but is broadly endorsed by Momigliano, A.. JRS xli (1951) 148 f.Google Scholar = Quinto Contributo ii (Rome 1975) 946 f.Google Scholar, and Brunt (n. 19) 29 and n. 140. In my view it must be right in theory, but practice was more complex.

27 Kindstrand (n. 1) 97.

28 Tac. Hist. iv 7.

29 TAPA lxxxiii (1952) 292 ff.Google Scholar Rogers' main argument is Demetrius' probity, but he also contends that Tacitus' claim that the real ground for Soranus‘ prosecution was his failure to punish Pergamum for resisting Acratus' requisitions (Ann. xvi 23.1 f.) is refuted by chronology. But it is not necessary to convict Tacitus of ignorance or mendacity here (see Furneaux and Koestermann ad loc.). Even if it were, the behaviour Rogers attributes to Soranus would not have troubled a true Cynic—see below.

30 Kindstrand (n. 1) 90; Billerbeck (n. 1) 12 ff.

31 At least on any reasonable view (pace Rogers).

32 I exclude the hypothesis that Demetrius was an informer under Nero—cf n. 20.

33 Epict. i 25.22; Philostr. VA iv 42, v 19, vii 16; Kindstrand (n. 1) 94 f. Of course the Philostratean material is highly suspect in detail: cf. Bowie, E. L., ANRW ii 16.2 (1978) 1657 ff.Google Scholar But, given my working hypothesis that Demetrius was a sincere Cynic, it may be regarded as ben trovato. Bowie 1658 suggests, indeed, that ‘Demetrius might not have been uncomfortable under Neronian rule’, but the evidence he adduces is (1) Demetrius' defence of Celer, and (2) the anecdote of Lucian de Salt. 63, which, however, is surely fictitious (cf. Billerbeck [n. 1] 51 f.).

34 In fact Kindstrand seems to offer two possibilities: (1) Celer was completely innocent; (2) though not completely innocent, he should not have been singled out when the greater transgressors were left alone. But his argument is loose and he evidently favours the first possibility.

35 Cf. Rogers (n. 29) 292; Philostr. VA v 19 is, however, chronologically impossible (and, incidentally, untrue to Cynic thought): Kindstrand (n. 1) 88.

36 Cf. Dudley (n. 4) 134.

37 Cass. D. lxvi 13; Suet. Vesp. 13; Kindstrand (n. 1) 95 ff.; Billerbeck (n. 1) 47 ff.

38 For other Tacitean attacks on ‘ambitio’ cf. Agric. 4.3, 42.4, Hist. iv 6.1. A referee objects that in Hist. iv 40.3 Tacitus is implying that Demetrius was unfaithful to his philosophical principles (‘Cynicam sectam professus’, he nevertheless acted ‘ambitiosius quam honestius’). This is certainly Tacitus' view. My argument simply is that Tacitus is wrong, since to the Cynic ‘ambitio’ and ‘honestum’ are not opposed concepts: ‘ambitio’ is precisely the vehicle by which ‘honestum’ is advertised or performed. Tacitus, in short, does not understand Cynicism. The referee also points out that Tacitus is particularly outraged by Celer's betrayal of ‘friendship’ (Hist. iv 10) and argues that Cynicism, which set a high value on the concept of ‘friendship’ (see below), could not condone such a betrayal. But I do not argue that Cynicism could condone such behaviour, but rather that the Cynic concept of ϕιλία on a large scale (including, in the last resort, ϕιλανθρωπία or ‘friendship’ for all men) enabled Cynics to move from simple condemnation of those who committed morally wrong acts (including the betrayal of ϕιλία) to a more understanding attitude. There are always those (like Tacitus) who misunderstand, or refuse to accept, such an attitude. It remains significant that Tacitus does not use some harsher word than ‘ambitiosius’: he is uneasily aware that Demetrius' action was not simply ‘inhonestum’.

39 D.L. vi 27.

40 D.L. vi 69 etc.

41 D.Chr. vi 16 ff. I here assume that Dio Chrysostom is (sometimes) a good source for Cynicism, with two caveats: (1) some of his works are obviously more relevant than others (many are not Cynic at all); (2) formal exposition of Cynic doctrine need not entail sincere or practical adherence to Cynicism. For Dio as ‘Cynic’ see von Arnim, H., Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa (Berlin 1898) 245Google Scholar; Höistad (n. 8) 50–61, 86–94, 150–220; Moles, , JHS xcviii (1978) 94–6Google Scholar; cf. also n. 110 below. The objections of Desideri, P., Dione di Prusa: un intellettuale greco nell' impero romano (Messina/Firenze 1978) 537 ff.Google Scholar, and Jones, C. P., The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom (Cambridge Mass./London 1978) vi, 49 f.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, seem to me misconceived in principle.

42 D.L. vi 35.

43 Cynic self-humiliation: Höistad (n. 8) 60 f., 97, 101, 196 f.; ingratiation: Demetr. Eloc. 261.

44 Cynic ‘revaluation’ of concepts they vilified: cf. Kindstrand (n. 7) 65, 252.

45 Cf. Kindstrand (n. 1) 93 and n. 45.

46 Cynic portrayal of Alexander: see e.g. Höistad (n. 8) 204 ff,; Hamilton, J. R., Plutarch: Alexander (Oxford 1969) lvi, 34, 179Google Scholar; Fears, J. R., Philol. cxviii (1974) 130Google Scholar; see also Moles, ‘The Date and Purpose of the Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom’ Class. Ant. (forthcoming).

47 Str. xv i.64 = Onesicr. FCrH 134 F 17; uselessness of ὅπλα: cf. e.g. Philodemus περὶ τῶν Στωικῶν, col. 14 = Crönert, W., Kolotes und Menedemos (Munich 1906, repr. Amsterdam 1965) 61Google Scholar. Some scholars have failed to see the paradox in Onesicritus‘ ‘Cynic’ interpretation of Alexander.

48 Documentation in n. 73.

49 I stress this qualification, because the Cynic did in fact recognise obligations towards others besides his ὅμοιοι, and this is an important aspect of Cynicism—see below. For the ϕιλία the σοϕός with his ὅμοιος cf. e.g. D.L. vi 105.

50 I justify this statement, with a possible qualification, below (p. 114).

51 D.L. vi 105. The wording of this formulation may show Stoic influence (ἀναπόβλητος is a Stoic technical term, though ἀναμάρτητος is found earlier: LSJ s.v.), but the Cynics must have accepted the content on the old Socratic per definitionem argument.

52 Cf. Höistad (n. 8) 54 f., 61, 66 ff.

53 Crates fr. 1.5 Diehl; Solon fr. 13 West.

54 Lucian Demonax 10. In several respects Demonax' Cynicism was impure, but his basic orientation was clearly Cynic: cf. Dudley (n. 4) 158 ff. and Attridge in ANRW ii 16.1 (1978) 59 f.Google Scholar In the anecdote of Demonax 21 (p. 113 below) Demonax tacitly accepts the label ‘Cynic’.

55 Epict. iii 24.64. I cannot here discuss how far it is legitimate to extrapolate Cynic doctrine from Epictetus. There are contexts where it seems to me a truer emphasis to say that Epictetus has been influenced by Cynicism than that he is working with ideas which were indeed originally Cynic but have now been transmuted into Stoic.

56 D.L. vi 89 ἀδύνατον εἶμαι ἀδιάπτωτον εὑρεῖν, ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ ἐν ῥοιᾷ καὶ σαπρόν τινα κόκκον εἶναι. ‘ἀδιάπτωτος’ is a Stoic technical term, so this dictum may be contaminated by the Stoic tradition (though it is possible, here as elsewhere, that such terminology derives from Antisthenes, in which case it would have been available to early Cynics independently of Stoicism), but the sentiment is consistent with what is known of Crates' humane personality. It is true that the pomegranate analogy appears in Teles (55H = O'Neil [n. 7[ 63) and in Seneca (Ep. mor. 85.5): both reject it in favour of the more rigorous traditional Cynic—Stoic ideal of ἀπάθεια, and Seneca explicitly attributes the analogy to the Peripatetics. Moreover, Teles quotes Crates elsewhere for moderate Cynic views, but not here. But on the whole, I incline to regard the dictum as ben trovato.

57 Cf. e.g. D.L. vi 70.

58 Cf. D.L. vi 70 f.

59 So Höistad (n. 8) 128.

60 De Ben. vii 8.2; perhaps also Vit. beat. 18.3 with M. T. Griffin, CR xxxi (1981) 59, though Seneca's point is there obscure.

61 So, apparently, Kindstrand (cf. n. 34 above).

62 Documentation in Kindstrand (n. 7) 214 f.

63 μόνος: cf. e.g. Antisth. Od. 2, 8 = fr. 15.2, 8 Caizzi; D.L. vi 38; D.Chr. vi 60; αὐτάρκης: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 78, 104; ἀπάθης: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 2 = Antisth. fr. 128a Caizzi (for Antisthenes as ‘Cynic’ cf. n. 8 above). Here, as elsewhere, I follow Höistad (n. 8) 94 ff. (cf. also Caizzi, F. D., Antisthenis Fragmenta [Varese/Milan 1966] 90 ff.Google Scholar) in seeing serious philosophical content in Antisthenes' Ajax and Odysseus. A purely rhetorical approach, as e.g. Kennedy, G., The Art of Persuasion in Greece (London 1963) 170–2Google Scholar, yields little.

64 Cf. Rist, J. M., Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 61Google Scholar, correcting Baldry, H. C., The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge 1965) 111CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In what follows, however, I go further than Rist in giving a positive value to Cynic ϕιλανθρωπία.

65 Cynicism is basically non-sexist. Rist (n. 64) 61 ff. discusses Cynic views on the relationship between the sexes excellently.

66 Cf. e.g. Kindstrand (n. 7) 157, 220.

67 E.g. οἱ πλεῖστοι are ‘one finger removed from madness’ (D.L. vi 35 etc.); the Cynic's activities are regularly described in such terms as ἐλέγχω/ἐξελέγχω, ἐπιτιμάω, κολάζω, λοιδορέω, μέμφομαι, ὀνειδίζω, etc.; for representative documentation see Gerhard, G. A., Phoenix von Kolophon (Leipzig/Berlin 1909) 35–8Google Scholar.

68 This is Baldry's main argument (n. 64) 111.

69 Cf. e.g. D.L. vi 41, 60 (though note that ἄνθρωπος does not invariably have this connotation in Cynic texts: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 56); for the view that this implies that other men are sub-human see Baldry (n. 64) 111.

70 The view of De Witt, N. W., Epicurus and his Philosophy (Minneapolis 1954) 329Google Scholar, that Epicureanism was ‘the only missionary philosophy produced by the Greeks’ (my italics) is incorrect, unless of course Cynicism is not classed as a ‘philosophy’ (an arbitrary contention).

71 This argument holds even though Cynic insistence on the permanence of virtue was not always rigorously maintained (above). The argument is actually used, though in a different context, by Epict. iii 22.67.

72 Cf. Kindstrand (n. 1) 90, (n. 7) 138.

73 I give fairly full documentation of these concepts in order to show that they are integral to Cynicism and not an apologetic Stoic refinement. Of course the evidence does not permit precise dating of all these concepts and it may occasionally be possible to distinguish between Diogenic and Cratetean Cynicism (though this can easily be overdone—see below), but the general picture is clear. παιδαγωγός: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 75, 30 f.; [Diog.] Epp. 29.1,40.5; Epict. iii 22.17; Lucian Pisc. 45; Gerhard (n. 67) 35; Höistad (n. 8) 125 f., 131, 138, 176 ff., 210; Kindstrand (n. 7) 209; Billerbeck, , Epiktet: vom Kynismus (Leiden 1978) 71Google Scholar;: διδάσκαλος cf. e.g. Stob. iii 1.55; Gerhard 35 f; ἰατρός: cf. e.g. Antisth. Ai. 4 = fr. 14.4 Caizzi; D.L. vi 4, 6 = Antisth. frr. 185–6 Caizzi; D.L. vi 30, 36; Lucian, Vit. auct. 8Google Scholar; Höistad 101 f., 118 f.; Billerbeck 137; σωϕρονιστής: cf e.g. Str. xv i.64 = Onesicr. FGrH 134 F 17; [Socrat.] Ep. 12 (p. 618 Hercher—Simon to Aristippus on Antisthenes); Julian Or. vii 213a; Gerhard 36; νουθετητής: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 86; Gerhard 35; εὐεργέτης: cf. e.g. Epict. iii 22.77, iv 6.20; M. Aurelius vii 36 = Antisth. frr. 20a–b Caizzi; ἐπίσκοπος: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 102; D.Chr. ix 1; Epict. iii 22.72; Max. Tyr. xv 9c–d; Billerbeck 136 f.; κατάσκοπος: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 17, i8 = Antisth. fr. 1 Caizzi; D.L. vi 43; Plut. quom. adul. ab amico internosc. 70c, de exil. 606c; Epict. i 24.6–7, iii 22.24; Cynic ‘help’: cf. e.g. Crates fr. 1.5 Diels; Bion fr. 75 Kindstrand; [Diog.] Ep. 29.4; Lucian Peregr. 33; Julian Or. vi 201c; Cynic ‘salvation’: cf. e.g. Antisth. Od. 8, 10 = fr. 15.8, 10 Caizzi; Stob. iii 13.44, iii 8.20; D.Chr. i 84, xxxii 3 (with Höistad 160); Plut. quom. adul. ab amico internosc. 74c, de prof. in virt. 82a, de cap. ex inim. util. 89b = Antisth. fr. 77 Caizzi; Cynic as ἀγαθὸς δαίμων: D.L. vi 74; Apul. Flor. 22; Julian Or. vi 200b (arbitrarily deleted by edd. like Hertlein and Wright); Lucian, Demonax 63Google Scholar; this is perhaps a specifically Cratetean characteristic; Cynic as reconciler: cf. e.g. Xen. Mem. iv 64; Philod. Rhet. 223.12 ff. (Sudhaus) = Antisth. frr. 106–7 Caizzi; Str. xv 1.65 = Onesicr. FGrH 134 F 17; D.L. vi 86; Plut. Quaest. conv. 632e, cf. Brut. 34.5–8; Lucian, Demonax 9, 63Google Scholar; Apul. Flor. 22; Julian Or. vi 201b. Cf. also Plut. de fort. Alex. 329c (discussed below, p. 115). The continuity of Cynic ideas over the centuries is indeed striking.

74 Cf. n. 69 above.

75 Cf. e.g. Caizzi 91 (on Antisth. Od.).

76 As even Baldry (n. 64) 111 admits.

77 D.L. vi 87–8.

78 Cf. e.g. Julian Or. vi 201b–c.

79 Demonax 21.

80 For similar verbal jibes against Cynic/Stoic extremes cf. Plin. Ep. viii 16.3–4, Sen. Ep. mor. 99.5, and Cic. ad Quint. fratr. ii 10(9).3 (with my note in LCM vii.8 [May 1982] 63–5).

81 So Baldry (n. 64) 111.

82 So, e.g., de Romilly, J., La douceur dans la pensée grecaue (Paris 1979) 211 f.Google Scholar For explicit references to Cynic ϕιλανθρωπία see e.g. D.Chr. iv 24; Epict. iii 24.64; Lucian, Demonax 11Google Scholar; scholarly discussion and bibliography in Kindstrand (n. 7) 247.

83 For useful documentation see Malherbe, A. J., Novum Testamentum xii (1970) 210 ff.Google ScholarCf. e.g. Stob. iii 8.20 (? Demetrian—see Billerbeck [n. 1] 57 ff.).

84 For this important methodological point (in quite different contexts) cf. e.g. Lloyd-Jones, H., The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley/London 1971) 13Google Scholar; T. C. W. Stinton, CQ xxv (1975) 251.

85 Documentation in Malherbe (n. 83) 208 ff.; cf. also Dickie, M. W. in Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar Third Volume 1981, ed. Cairns, F. (Liverpool 1981) 199 ff.Google Scholar

86 Arguments analogous to those that follow here have of course been widely used in relation to Stoicism (and even Epicureanism), but are generally ignored in discussion of Cynicism (owing, I believe, to failure to take Cynicism seriously).

87 Meaninglessness of social distinctions: e.g. D.L. vi 104; rejection of conventional παιδεία: e.g. D.L. vi 103–4; non-Greek peoples as standards: e.g. D.L. vi 73; Weber, E., De Dione Chrysostomo Cynicorum Sectatore (Gotha 1887) 127–33Google Scholar; a slightly less dismissive attitude to παιδεία appears in Antisthenes' doctrine of the διττὴ παιδεία (Antisth. fr. 27 Caizzi; D.Chr. iv 29 if.; Höistad [n. 8] 56 ff.), which allowed human παιδεία a certain small value, but the concession was minimal, nor was this the usual Cynic view.

88 Cynic νοῦς: cf. e.g. Plut. de Stoic, repugn. 1039e = Antisth. fr. 67 Caizzi; [Diog.] Epp. 34.2, 40.5; D.Chr. x 28; Cynic λόγος: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 24, 73; indistinguishable from these is the γνώμη of Max. Tyr. xxxvi 1.

89 E.g. D.L. vi 105.

90 D.L. vi 70 (and many other refs).

91 Cf. n. 87 above.

92 Epict. iii 22; how far this work is properly Cynic is of course debatable: discussion in Dudley (n. 4) 190–8 (very balanced) and Billerbeck (n. 73) 1–9; the rejection of Cynic ἀναίδεια and the use of some Stoic terminology excepted, there is, I believe, little that is not Cynic, although it is of course Stoic as well. Cf. also p. 123 below.

93 iii 22.62 ff. (Billerbeck's comments ad loc. are misconceived).

94 Antisthenes: Xen. Smp. iv 37 = fr. 117.22 Caizzi; to Aristotle the arousal of pity depends on ὁμοιότης (Rhet. 1385b13, 1386a24), which is the normal Greek view: cf. in general Dover, K. J., Greek Popular Morality (Oxford 1974) 195 ff.Google Scholar

95 Zeno's Politeia: Baldry, , JHS lxxix (1959) 3 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and (n. 64) 153 ff.; Rist (n. 64) 64 ff.; its Cynic character: D.L. vii 4 with the discussions of Baldry and Rist.

Against the ‘universalist’ interpretation of πάντας ἀνθρώπους here adopted, it has been urged that: (1) there is no evidence that Zeno held such a view (Rist 65). But this is just petitio principii. (2) a universalist principle would conflict with the élitism attested in D.L. vii 32–4 (Baldry). This is a misunderstanding of the Cynic-Stoic ‘two-tier’ classification of mankind: see Fisch, M. H., AJP lviii (1937) 67 ff.Google Scholar Nor (pace Fisch) need it be supposed that πάντας ἀνθρώπους are actual members of the state, especially if Zeno's Politeia describes both the ideal state and the attitude of the wise to the present (O. Murray, CR xvi [1966] 369). D.L. viii 32–4 can be regarded as a statement of fact, Plut. de fort. Alex. 329a–b of the ideal or potential (as indeed Plutarch represents it). (3) a universalist principle is incompatible with the apparent form of the Politeia, which was jussive or prescriptive (Baldry [n. 64] 161 ff). This objection is met by the same argument as in (2) above.

The main suggested alternative interpretations to the ‘universalist’ interpretation are: (1) πάντας ἀνθρώπους only means ‘everybody’, ‘all people’ in a weak sense (Baldry, , JHS lxxix [1959] 13Google Scholar). This seems highly unlikely. Not only are there difficulties in devising a suitably weak application for the phrase, but this interpretation is incompatible with (a) the international character of Zeno's prescriptions and (b) the strong paradox of πάντας ἀνθπώπους . . . δημότας καὶ πολίτας. (2) πάντας ἀνθρώπους means ‘all wise men’ (Murray). On this hypothesis Plutarch is twisting Zeno's doctrine to suit his own argument. But this is very forced: Plutarch's wording is unequivocal: not only πάντας ἀνθρώπους (in paradoxical conjunction with δημότας καὶ πολίτας), but also εἷς δὲ βίος ᾖ καὶ κόσμος. Rist 65 suggests instead that Plutarch's account of Zeno's wording is correct, but that Zeno was using ἄνθρωπος in the strong Cynic sense. Again, this seems highly implausible. Elsewhere, the context makes clear when ἄνθρωπος has a strong sense. If Plutarch's rendering of Zeno's wording is remotely accurate, this did not apply to Zeno's use of ἄνθρωπος. Rist's interpretation also fails to give full value to the paradox in Zeno's words. In sum, I believe that Fisch and others are right to take πάντας ἀνθρώπους as ‘all human beings’.

96 Cf. Fisch (n. 95) 66 ff.

97 Cf. n. 73. The contention of Bosworth, A. B., JHS c (1980) 4Google Scholar, that Plutarch's interpretation of Alexander stems largely from interest in the ideas of reconciliation and fusion in the Roman Empire, seems to me to disregard the philosophical background, which is Cynic/Stoic.

98 Cf. Hamilton (n. 46) xxxi. Bosworth (n. 97) 4 argues instead that Plutarch has ‘totally transformed’ Onesicritus' view, which was ‘of an Alexander who still has sympathy for the search for wisdom even in the cares of empire’, whereas ‘for Plutarch Alexander not only sympathises with philosophical theories, he embodies and perfects them in his actions’. The centrality of the thesis ‘Alexander philosophus' to Onesicritus’ work is indeed debatable, but Fisch (n. 95) 129 ff. makes (on the whole) a good case for supposing that the thesis was not incidental but expounded at length and illustrated in several different contexts. (Even in Strabo Alexander is ϕιλόσοϕος ἐν ὄπλοις, i.e. ‘he embodies and perfects philosophical theories in his actions’.) Note too that in Str. xv 1.65 the Gymnosophists are seen as reconcilers.

99 Cf. especially Sen. Ep. mot. 116.5 = fr. 114; discussion in Rist (n. 64) 187 ff., 213 ff.; Griffin (n. 24) 179 ff.

100 Cf. n. 56.

101 Cf. especially the Christ-like sentiment of Antisthenes: D.L. vi 6 = fr. 186 Caizzi (similarly Stob. iii 13.43 [Diogenes]). Such a ‘fragment’ may of course not be authentic, but is at least consistent with Antisthenes' persona in Xenophon (cf. Xen. Smp. iv 37 = fr. 117.22 Caizzi, discussed above p. 115 and n. 94).

102 E.g. D.L. vi 71; appeals to animal behaviour: D.L. vi 22; D.Chr. vi 22, etc. Many scholars have failed to realise how far the Cynic identification of the ‘good’ life -with life ‘according to nature’ depended upon the primitivist ideal. It is not true that Diogenes ‘does not tell us what virtue is’ (Rist [n. 64] 59): the Cynic answer to the question is (no doubt) inadequate, but it is explicit.

103 Basic texts for this kind of reconstruction: D.L. vi 44; Str. xv 1.64 = Onesicr. FGrH 134 F 17; D.Chr. vi 22 f; [Diog.] Ep. 32.3; Lucian Fug. 17; Max. Tyr. Or. xxxvi; discussion in Vidal-Naquet, P., JHS xcviii (1978) 135Google Scholar. More generally relevant are the fragments of Diogenes' πολιτεία (conveniently, if carelessly, discussed by Ferguson [n. 5] 89 ff.) and Crates' Pera (best discussion in Höistad [n. 8] 129 ff).

104 Cynic emphasis on self-knowledge: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 83; D.Chr. iv 57, x 22, 27; Epict. iii 22.53; Julian Orr. vi 183b, 185a, 188a ff., vii 2iib–c.

105 Cynic ‘stripping off’: cf. e.g. Str. xv 1.64–5 = Onesicr. FGrH 134 F 17; [Diog.] Epp. 24, 29.2; D. Chr. iv 66; Lucian Vit. auct. 9.

106 Cf. e.g. D.L. vi 71.

107 Cynics might exploit physical theories on an ad hoc basis (cf. e.g. D.L. vi 73), but by and large they were unimportant to Cynic thought.

108 It may stem from Apollodorus of Seleucia (D.L. vii 121 = SVF iii, Apoll. Sel. 17), though the description is common in later Cynic texts (e.g. the Cynic letters) and ‘road imagery’ generally is also a Cynic τόπος.

109 Plut. an virt. doc. poss. 439e.

110 For recent discussions of this speech see Jones (n. 41) 120 f. and Desideri (n. 41) 287 ff. and my own forthcoming paper (n. 46). On the philosophical content (which is clearly Cynic) see Höistad (n. 8) 56–63, 154–8, 173 f., 180 f, 187, 202–22. For Cynic attitudes to Alexander cf. n. 46 and below.

111 D.Chr. iv 6, 38, 139; cf. Bosworth (n. 97) 4, n. 27.

112 Pap. Génev. inu. 271; published by Martin, V., MusHelv xvi (1959) 77–115Google Scholar; discussion by Photiadès, P., MusHelv xvi (1959) 116–39Google Scholar.

113 Col. ii, 45 ff.

114 Here specifically Greek civilisation: for the defectiveness of Greek civilisation in Cynic texts cf. e.g. D.Chr. viii 12, 15, ix 16, x 30; the theme seems also to be latent in Onesicritus' account of Alexander and the Gymnosophists—cf. Str. xv 1.65. Of course given that the Cynics condemned all civilisation, it is no surprise to find specific condemnation of Greek civilisation in Cynic texts.

115 Lucian, Demonax 7Google Scholar. Note, incidentally, that one of Demonax' teachers was our Demetrius (Demonax 3). We may note also, without overstressing, the fact that a lenient attitude to wrongdoers is quite frequently expressed in the Cynic Letters: cf. e.g. [Diog.] Ep. 28.3, 29.2–5; [Heraclit]. Ep. 5.3, 7.2.

116 Cf. Long, A. A., ‘The Stoic Concept of Evil’, PhilosQ xviii (1968) 329 ff.Google Scholar

117 Of later Cynic writings those of Dio Chrysostom, Oenomaus, and (in some ways) Lucian are most important. Demetrius probably wrote nothing (though cf. Kindstrand [n. 1] 93). What the evidential value of Lucian Vit. auct. 9 and Juv. xiii 121 (both attesting Cynic literature) is I am unsure.

118 Cf. 54.

119 The great representative of such ‘philanthropic’ Stoicism is of course Panaetius (n. 99). Similar views can be found in Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. Seneca: cf. Griffin (n. 24) 179 ff. Epictetus: cf. e.g. Epict. i 4, 13.3, 18, 28.10–11, 29.64–5, iii 22 passim, esp. 22.23, 22.72, 22.97 f., iii 24.66, 24.79, iv 4.27, 6.2, 12.19, fr. 71 Schweighäuser = 25 Oldfather. Marcus Aurelius: cf. e.g. ii 1, 13, iii 4, 11, iv 2, v 28, vi 27, 47, vii 22, 26, 31,63, 70, viii 8, 14, ix 11, 42, xi 18.3, 18.9, xii 12; discussion in Brunt, P. A., JRS lxiv (1974) 11 f.Google ScholarCf. also Thrasea Paetus' dictum: ‘qui vitia odit, homines odit’ (Plin. Ep. viii 22.3). Quint, i 1.9 = Diogenes of Babylon fr. 51 (SVF iii 220Google Scholar) is a clear example of a Stoic view that adverse environments are a mitigating (not, of course, a completely exonerating) factor. Note also that Celer's prosecutor Musonius could take a highly ‘philanthropic’ view of vice (fr. 39 Hense), but evidently chose not to in the case of Celer.

120 Hist. iv 8.

121 Cf. Syme, R., Tacitus (Oxford 1958) 187 f.Google Scholar

122 Syme 187.

123 As Syme emphasises, Marcellus' views substantially accord with Tacitus' own, in the Agricola and elsewhere.

124 Bernays, J., Lucian und die Kyniker (Berlin 1879) 27 f.Google Scholar; Zeller, E., Die Philosophie der Griechen (Leipzig 1923) iii.1 287 f.Google Scholar, 791 f.

125 Followers of Bernays–Zeller: e.g. Marcks, J. F., Symbola critica ad epistolographos Graecos (diss. Bonn 1883) 13 f.Google Scholar; Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa2 (Göttingen 1959) i 170 f.Google Scholar; A. A. Long (private letter to me and review of Billerbeck's, Der Kyniker Demetrius, JHS cii [1982] 260)Google Scholar; followers of Dudley: e.g. (apart from Kindstrand and Billerbeck) R. Helm, RE xii (1924) 5 (anticipating Dudley); Höistad (n. 8) passim; Brunt, , PCPS xix (1973) 9, (n. 19) 29Google Scholar; Griffin (n. 24) 306; Moles, , JHS xcviii (1978) 94Google Scholar; Jones (n. 41) 49; Attridge (n. 54) 56 ff.; Malherbe, in Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, Supp. (New York 1976) 201 ff.Google Scholar and (n. 4) 7.

126 Cf. e.g. K. von Fritz in OCD 2 (Oxford 1970) 305.

127 Dudley (n. 4) 117 ff.; more could obviously be made of the impact of Stoicism, which borrowed so extensively from Cynic ethics.

128 Though it is hard to attach much meaning to (3).

129 Favonius is so described in Tac. xvi 22.4. Geiger, J. argues in RSA iv (1974) 167 ff.Google Scholar that Favonius' philosophical allegiance is an open question, given the tendentiousness of the speech Tacitus attributes to Cossutianus Capito in Ann. xvi 22. But on a priori grounds (strict Cynicism being incompatible with senatorship or public office) Favonius is best classed as a Cynicising Stoic (like, indeed, his friend and inspiration, Cato the Younger).

130 D.L. vi 104; the traditional identification of Diocles the doxographer with Meleager's friend is doubted by Gow, A. S. F. and Page, D. L., The Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams (Cambridge 1965) xviGoogle Scholar, but unreasonably.

131 The implications of the term αἵρεσις are exhaustively analysed by Glucker, J., Antiochus and the Late Academy (Göttingen 1978) 166 ff.Google Scholar He shows that it does not mean ‘school’ in an institutional sense, but rather ‘school of thought’, ‘persuasion’. Since the term can refer both to ‘schools of thought’ within different systems of philosophy and to separate systems of philosophy conceived as ‘schools of thought’ (one can talk e.g. both of αἱρέσεις within Stoicism and of Stoicism as a αἵρεσις), the description of Cynicism as αἵρεσις tells us nothing about its status in relation to Stoicism.

132 Laberius Compitalia fr. 3 Ribbeck; Antipater: AP xi i58 = Gow, –Page, , The Garland of Philip (Cambridge 1968)Google Scholar, Antipater no. 97.

133 Meleager as ‘Cynic’: cf. Athen. 157b, 502c; D.L. vi 99; his previous σκηπτροϕόρος σοϕία: AP xii 101 = Gow–Page no. 103. The phrase alludes (pace Gow and Page ad loc.) to the σκῆπτρον of Diogenes and his followers (a half-ironic, half-serious description of the Cynic's staff—the emblem of the Cynic ‘king’): cf. e.g. [Diog.] Ep. 19; Epict. iii 22.34, 22.57, 22.63, i v 8.30, 8.34; Julian Or. vi 181b; Apul., Apol. 22Google Scholar. Consistent also with the Cynic persona are (1) the imitation of Menippus; (2) the cosmopolitan epitaph (AP vii 417 = Gow–Page no. 2); (3) the spoof Λεκίθου καὶ ϕακῆς σύγκρισις (Athen. 157b).

134 For the most important testimonia see Billerbeck (n. 1) 4; also relevant are the Cynicising aspects of Zeno's and Chrysippus' teachings (particularly in their Πολιτεῖαι).

135 Cf. Billerbeck (n. 1) 3 f.

136 Cass. D. lxvi 13.1 ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ἐκ τῶν Στωικῶν καλουμένων λόγων . . . μεθ᾿ ὧν καὶ ⊿ημήτριος ὁ κυνικός … (but could this be a case of ‘Telemachus and the other suitors’?).

137 As (e.g.) Prof. Long argues. We might also recall that Epictetus, like Dio Chrysostom (sometimes) and Julian, simultaneously upholds a Cynic ideal and attacks so-called ‘degenerate’ Cynics. In reality of course the behaviour of these ‘degenerate’ Cynics was truer to the original Cynic spirit than was the ideal Κυνικός of bowdlerising Stoics, and the attacks upon these Cynics might be taken to imply the existence of a type of Cynicism outside Stoicism.

138 Cf. n. 4.

139 D.L. vi 103–4 (αἱρέσεις meaning ‘school of thought’, but here referring to separate systems of philosophy: cf. n. 131).

140 Vit. auct. 7 fF., 20 ff.

141 Juv. xiii 121 f.

142 E.g. Oenomaus (cf. n. 4).

143 Note also that the Cynic Epistles consistently project Cynicism as a distinct ‘philosophy’ (cf. e.g. [Crates] Ep. 16.1, 29.1).