Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-s2hrs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-19T15:39:37.610Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Polybius' other view of Aetolia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2013

Kenneth S. Sacks
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley

Extract

The discovery and publication two decades ago of the Roman-Aetolian treaty of 212/11 has helped to place Polybius' reliability as a source under close scrutiny. As a result, his account of the confrontation between the Aetolians and Flamininus at Tempe, in 197, may not stand the test of a comparison. Yet in order to use the preserved inscription as a control for this specific event, Polybius' general feelings concerning Aetolian responsibility for the consequent Syrian War must also be considered. Historians have hitherto assumed that if Polybius is demonstrably antagonistic towards his northern neighbours when recording affairs of the third century, he must be equally so for those of the second century. A close examination of Polybius, however, will reveal substantial reasons for doubting such an assumption.

For events of the third century, where he is most completely preserved, Polybius is indeed prejudiced against the Aetolians. He unleashes his venom both when following Aratus' Ὑπομνήματα to 220 and afterwards when employing various sources. To Polybius, the Aetolians are violent and aggressive in spirit (iv 3.5), cruel (iv 18.7–9), impious (iv 62.2), haughty (iv 64.8), inhuman (iv 67.3–4), and cowardly (iv 79.1). They are also natural revolutionaries (xiii 1.2), spendthrifts (xiii 1.1), and liars (iv 29.4–5). Though at times Polybius considers their behaviour scandalous (iv 27.1–8), he admits that the Greeks have become quite inured to it (iv 16.1–2). The most grievous faults of the Aetolians, however, are their desire for aggrandizement and lust for booty.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1975

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 E.g., Klaffenbach, Günther, Der Römisch-Ätolische Bundnisvertrag vom Jahre 212 v. Chr. in Sitzungsberichte der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (1954) 19Google Scholar; Badian, E., Review of Lehmann's, G. A.Untersuchungen zur historischen Glaubwürdigkeit des Polybios (Münster, 1967) (hereafter, Lehmann)Google Scholar, in Historische Zeitschrift, ccviii (1969) 642; Muylle, J., ‘Le Traité d'amitié entre Rome et la ligue étolienne’, in L'Antiquité Classique, xxxviii (1969) 428Google Scholar; and Deininger, Jürgen, Review of Lehmann, Gnomon xlii (1970) 67Google Scholar.

2 Polybius discusses his sources: iv 2.1–2. Where he uses Aratus he may still be supplying his own invective against the Aetolians: Larsen, J. A. O., ‘The Aetolians and the Cleomenic War’, in The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan (1966) 4357Google Scholar. Moreover, for some Greek affairs prior to 220, Polybius may not be following Aratus; his criticisms of the Aetolians in these sections would certainly then be his own: Gruen, Erich S., ‘Aratus and the Achaean Alliance with Macedon’, in Historia xxi (1972) 609625Google Scholar, especially 617–20. For a more complete discussion of Polybius' sources, cf. F. Walbank, W., Commentary on Polybius I 2634Google Scholar (hereafter, Walbank I or II), and Polybius (Berkeley, 1972) 74–84.

3 Klotz, Alfred, Livius und seine Vörganger II 115Google Scholar.

4 All translations by Shuckburgh unless otherwise noted; those from Livy are from Sage's Loeb edition. On the Aetolian ὀργή, cf. P. iii 3.3.

5 The outbreak of the Second Punic War is in some respects similar (iii 15.9–13). Polybius declares Hannibal's πρόφασις to be false, and like the Aetolians he acted in extreme anger. But Polybius goes even further here and actually exculpates Hannibal within the context of the αἰτία ἀληθινή.

6 Though the Aetolians were unquestionably angered by the denial of three towns which they thought were theirs, the anger encompasses far more than just unsatisfied territorial desires: Polybius specifically says they felt belittled κατὰ πολλά. This will be confirmed later.

7 E.g., P. i 1.5–6; cf. Walbank, , Polybius 130Google Scholar, n. 1 for a complete list of passages.

8 Cf. Walbank, F. W., ‘Polybius and Rome's Eastern Policy’, in JRS liii (1963) 113Google Scholar, and Polybius 160–6.

9 Cf. Walbank, I 361 and JRS liii (1963) 6Google Scholar.

10 Cf. P. iii 15.9–10 on Polybius' criticism of a false πρόφασις where there is a true and justified αἰτια (supra, n. 5).

11 The Glabrio incident is central to understanding the concept of deditio in fidem and hence much discussed; most recently by Flurl, Wolfgang, Deditio in Fidem: Untersuchungen zu Livius und Polybios (München, 1969) 2678Google Scholar.

12 Nissen, Heinrich, Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius 202Google Scholar. Hereafter, Nissen.

13 Nissen 167.

14 Polybius' treatment is sufficiently sympathetic to make modern scholars speculate that Nicander was one of Polybius' informants while both were detained in Italy: Walbank I 34 and n. 6. Yet see the justified criticism of Pédech, Paul, La Méthode historique de Polybe 361, n. 35Google Scholar.

15 The sea metaphor is elsewhere recorded by Polybius (xi 29.9–10), but it is probable that neither speech is his own creation: Walbank, F. W., ‘Speeches in Greek HistoriansThe Third J. L. Myres Memorial Lecture (Oxford, 1965) 14Google Scholar.

16 Cf. p. iii 7.2 on the origins of the Syrian War: But Polybius does not qualify it with . And cf. P. xxx 11 on second-century vitriolics.

17 Nissen 167 and 172–3.

18 Lehmann, 86, points to the speech as indicating that Polybius is not one-sidedly malicious towards the Aetolians.

19 Nissen, chapter 4, and Briscoe, John, A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI–XXXIII, 112Google Scholar and 22, n. 4 (hereafter, Briscoe).

20 Cf. especially P. xx 9–10 = L. xxxvi 27–8; see p. 97 of this paper. Nissen himself used this case, p. 30. Also P. xviii 3.1 = L. xxxii 33.9–11: the addition of vir ut inter Aetolos facundus (cf. Briscoe 233) and Alexander's negative attitude concerning the conference; and P. xxi 5.7 = L. xxxvii 7.4: Livy adds the self-pity.

21 E.g., L. xxxvi 29.1–2 = P. xx 10.15–6 (with insignificant differences); L. xxxvii 7.1–2 = P. xxi 5.2–4; L. xxxviii 3.3–8 (but not .9) = P. xxi 25.3–11; and L. xxxviii 5.8–9 = P. xxi 27.7–9 (with lacuna).

22 Livy occasionally consulted the annalists for Eastern policy: he cites them at xxxii 6.5–8; xxxiii 10.8–10, and 30.8–11; cf. Nissen 34–5 and Briscoe 11.

23 Nissen 150–1. Briscoe, 11, points out that the adjoining passage, 44.8, though annalistic may contain Polybian language.

24 L. xxxiv 24.1, 49.7; xxxv 34.4; xxxvi 17.8 (though it is probably not even Polybian: Ullmann, Ragnar, La Technique des discours dans Salluste, Tite Live et Tacite [Oslo, 1927] 147–8)Google Scholar; and xxxv 33.9–11;. The last concerns Damocritus and his famous insult to Flamininus that the former would personally hand the declaration of war to the Roman commander when the Aetolians and Syrians camped along the Tiber. Damocritus' subsequent captivity was avidly recorded by the annalists (xxxvii 3.8, 46.5—Nissen 189 and 197). Polybius also appears to have mentioned him further, as reflected in L. xxxvi 24.12 and Appian Syr. 21 (cf. Nissen 184). But note what Livy has, which Appian does not: Ob eam ferociam maius victoribus gaudium traditus fuit. A Livian addition?

25 The Aetolian assassination of Nabis and the momentary seizure of Sparta (L. xxxv 35 f.) closely parallel the episode. There is direct criticism of Aetolia here also, but again Polybius' anger is directed at Aetolian intervention within the Peloponnesus, rather than at a possible cause for the Syrian War. Relevant here is Polybius' criticism of the supposed πρόφασις of that war, Aetolia's desire to ‘liberate’ Greece (p. 93). It too reflects third-century politics, as the Aetolians appear to have offered the same false πρόφασις for the First Macedonian War (xi 5.1).

26 Nissen 197–8.

27 And here, as in the previous events regarding Sparta, there is a parallel episode in the first Aetolian embassy to Rome: L. xxxvii 1 = P. xxi 2. Nissen (188) has shown that Livy draws on Polybius here, despite the fact that the episode in Livy is surrounded by annalistic material. But as in the embassy discussed above, Livy may have added his own opinion, or consulted, and thus have been influenced by, annalists. The description of the Aetolian people as being indomita et insociabilis gens (1.4) is similar to a proven Livian sententia and also to a possible annalistic statement (xxxiii 44.7): cum ingenio inquietam.

28 For a discussion and current bibliography of the problem of Aetolian participation in the battle, cf. Briscoe 251 and 253–4: most modern scholars believe it to have been substantial. Compare this description of Aetolian behaviour with that in an earlier action of the same war: L. xxxi 41–2—from Polybius, Nissen 129.

29 As printed in the Büttner-Wobst text and followed by the Loeb edition.

30 The corresponding passages in Livy appear to contain little more (though rearranged) than is still extant in Polybius. Holleaux (98), following Reiske, suggested in completing the sentence, δυσηρεστεῑτο, inspired by et suscensebat… Aetolis ob insatiabilem aviditatem praedae (L. xxxiii 11.8): Maurice Holleaux, ‘Le caduceator envoyé par Philippe V à T. Quinctius Flamininus en 197 (Tite Live, 33,11,3–4)’, in Études d' épigraphie et d'histoire grecques V 86–103. All subsequent references to Holleaux concern his various works collected in this volume.

31 Holleaux, ‘Le caduceator …’ supra, n. 30.

32 Holleaux 95.

33 The question of whether the mission of the herald initiated or increased Aetolian anger arises out of Livy's lack of clarity; but whatever the answer, Livy's obfuscation appears unintentional: Briscoe 267.

34 Holleaux 98–100.

35 On the latter point, Holleaux 100–3. Yet L. 11.5, even if Livy rearranged its position within the text (Holleaux 97, n. 2), indicates that Livy did not omit all such sentiments.

36 Holleaux has questioned parts of this section, seeing references to sentiments expressed elsewhere in Polybius. He argues that Livy has conflated in this section the Aetolian ill-feelings for the entire chapter. Livy 11.5, ante pugnam omnia magna parvaque communicare cum sociis solitum; nunc omnium expertes consiliorum esse, suo ipsum arbitrio cuncta agere, is equated with P.34.3, διὸ καὶ κατά τε τὰς ἐντεύξεις ἀγερωχόερ∨ν αὐτοῑς ἀπήντα (a phrase not in Livy) καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἀπεσιώπα, τὰ δὲ προκείμενα συνετέλει καὶ δι᾿ αὑτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἰδίων φίλων (p. 97, n. 2). And 11.7, donis regis imminere credebant invicti ab ea cupiditate animi virum, was inspired not by the initial suspicion of bribery (which is, however, implied in 11.6: cum Philippo iam gratiae privatae locum quaerere [Romanum]), but by the ‘doubled’ suspicion resulting from the reception of the Macedonian embassy (p. 101, n. 4). Despite the similarities of these passages, Holleaux's points are inconclusive. As Livy's account appears to be sound where Polybius is extant, Holleaux must prove a negative: that where Polybius is no longer extant, Livy's account is not sound.

Holleaux also claims there are passages in the Aetolian complaint which ‘[ont] tout l'air de n'être que du verbiage, imputable au seul Tite Live’ (p. 97, n. 3). Among them 11.6: ut dura atque aspera belli Aetoli exhauserint, pacis gratiam et fructum Romanus in se vertat (p. 97, n. 3); 11.7: et haud dubie decesserat iis aliquantum honoris; and 11.10: ob eas causas multa sedulo, ut viliores levioresque apud omnes essent et viderentur, faciebat (p. 101, n. 4). But the same methodological objections can be raised here as above—though in all the cases, Holleaux's subjective appreciation of the styles of the two authors must be given its due consideration.

37 E.g., L. xxxii 36.10–37 = P. xviii 10–12 and L. xxxiii 28.1 = P. xviii 43.7–12. Complete citations and bibliography in Briscoe 22, n. 4.

38 Weissenborn, W. and Müller, H. J., Titi Livi ab urbe condita libri (4th edn.), on L. xxxiii 11.10Google Scholar, point out that viliores levioresque is somewhat of a Livian sententia: cf. L. xxvi 22.15. The latter passage comes within an annalistic chapter (Klotz, Alfred, Livius und seine Vörganger II 176)Google Scholar, but is unquestionably Livy's own creation: he compares the moral qualities of Roman youths of antiquity with those of his own day. This only means that Livy may have employed in xxxiii 11.10 a favourite expression in translating from the Greek, and not that he actually created the sentiment stated there.

39 Holleaux 34, n. 1.

40 Adopted from Walbank II 592–3.

41 For this passage and the next one, Paton's translation in the Loeb edition is used: it is here more accurate and in the second passage more complete.

42 Holleaux 34, n. 2.

43 Walbank, ‘Speeches in Greek Historians’ (supra, n. 15), has already suggested some loose connections between the two Greek historians in their approach to speech writing.

44 Cf. Holleaux 100, n. 6.

45 Cf. Aymard, André, Les premiers rapports de Rome et la confédération achaienne 169 and Briscoe271Google Scholar.

46 Holleaux (100, n. 6) recognised at least the general import of Flamininus' statements, sensing that they were addressed to the Aetolians, yet intended for all the Greeks. Aymard, (supra, n. 45) 170, saw also what Flamininus was trying to accomplish with his insults against the Aetolians: ‘Elle (une semonce … du proconsul) ne saurait laisser les alliés indifférents’. Yet Polybius must have included the insult with a bit of irony: ‘Cease this trifling Phaeneas! For I will so settle the terms of the peace that Philip will be unable, even if he wished it, to molest the Greeks’ (xviii 37.12). In fact, Flamininus, as it turned out, could not keep Philip from harming the Greeks (P. xxiii 1); and Polybius, at least, holds Philip responsible for the next Macedonian War fought by his son, Perseus (xxiii 18.10 f.). So Phaeneas' prediction (xviii 37.11) proved true.

47 Though their main demand was no longer the abdication of Philip, for even the Aetolians tacitly accepted Philip in demanding only the four towns (38.3 f.). Later, however, the Aetolians and perhaps other Greek states—Polybius is vague—work against the peace (39.7).

48 Recently: Badian, E., ‘Titus Quinctius Flamininus: Philhellenism and Realpolitik’, Louise Taft Semple Memorial Lectures (Cincinnati, 1970), 4853Google Scholar; and Review of Lehmann (supra, n. 1) 642.

49 The original publisher of the inscription, Günther Klaffenbach (supra, n. 1) 17 f., hesitantly suggested that Polybius both changed the Aetolian arguments to the worse and failed to criticise Flamininus' dissembling in order to fool the reader into believing the Roman commander.

Subsequent attempts to avoid such a construct have necessitated trying to make the inscription and Flamininus' statement accord; most recently, G. A. Lehmann (supra, n. 1) 51–131, but he has been effectively countered by Badian (Review of Lehmann [supra, n. 1] 639–41, Deininger (Review of Lehmann [supra, n. 1] 66–7) and Walbank, (Review of Lehmann, JRS lviii [1968] 253–4)Google Scholar. For a complete bibliography of the problem, cf. Die Staatsverträge des Altertums III no. 536 (ed. by Hatto H. Schmitt) and Briscoe 273.

50 Polybius remarks that while the Aetolians were unhappy the rest of the Greeks rejoiced at what Titus said (P. xviii 39.1). It is likely that in his denial that cities which surrendered to Roman fides were ever to be included within the Aetolian League by the terms of the treaty, Flamininus was serving notice of his policy of freedom for the Greeks (cf. Badian, E., Foreign Clientelae 72)Google Scholar. This, and not the reduced position of the Aetolians, would be the cause of Greek joy. The Greeks will be little concerned with whether Flamininus is historically accurate: they are sufficiently delighted that if the Romans were ever in fact turning over to the Aetolians autonomous towns which had voluntarily surrendered, this is no longer their intention.

51 From Polybius: Nissen 152–3 and Briscoe 335.

52 Cius was under Aetolian control until just prior to the outbreak of war: P. xv 23.6–10; xviii 3.12, and 4.7; cf. P. xvi 34.4 and L. xxxi 31.4.

53 In JRS liii (1963) and Polybius 160–66.

54 Suggestions and encouragement by the Editor of the Journal and by my dear friends, Barbara Forbes, Judith Ginsburg, and David Thomas, are here gratefully acknowledged. I am especially indebted to Professor Erich S. Gruen who suggested the topic and in whose seminar an earlier version of this paper was delivered. Though he may not agree with some of its conclusions, much of whatever value lies within is due to his penetrating criticisms and his unfailing kind attention.