In contrast to other countries in Latin America, Chile emerged from the chaotic postindependence period with a strong state apparatus. Fashioned by the leadership of Diego Portales and institutionalized in the Constitution of 1833, the Chilean state became (and remains) the central focus for national development. Portales was able to marry the existing social and economic order, which was sharply hierarchical, to the institutional structures of a corporate state. In doing so, he shaped political conflict throughout Chilean history into a series of struggles for inclusion in the coalition in control of the state apparatus at any given time. Problems of violence and instability can be seen as the the natural by-products of these multiple attempts to define and redefine both the legitimate scope and orientation of the state and the composition of the dominant groups exercising power.

On 1 January 1976, President Carlos Andrés Pérez formally proclaimed the nationalization of Venezuela's massive petroleum industry. Standing upon the site of Zumaque Number 1, in 1914 the first commercially drilled well in the nation, he thus observed a historic benchmark in the evolution of the relationship between the foreign corporations and the Venezuelan state (Pérez, 1976a). After six decades' concessional exploration and exploitation, an era had ended. From the outset it was apparent that the 1976 nationalization was moderate and nonradical. As will be seen, both compensation and association agreements with international oil interests were central elements in the action. The latter in particular had been the focus during months of acrimonious national debate, as symbolized by article 5 and the Ley de Nacionalización de la Industria Petrolera. Moreover, it was largely upon discussion of its implications that a determined effort to achieve nonpartisan agreement ultimately foundered and sank.

Negotiating a treaty between two sovereign nations is no simple matter. Even when there is consensus that a new accord is long overdue, a solution acceptable to both governments and their most vocal constituencies is most elusive and often difficult to conclude within a reasonable period of time. This is especially true when there is strong popular opinion aroused on both sides. Discussions usually drag on, and while diplomats publicly agree that “progress is being made,” there are significant political and economic benefits unrealized by either or both countries involved in the negotiation proceedings (Lopez Guevara, 1976).

The present treaty negotiations between the Republic of Panama and the United States of America is a case in point. That Panamanian public opinion is aroused on the Canal issue is indicated by the 1964 Canal Zone border incidents in which twenty-one Panamanians and three Americans died and by subsequent demonstrations.

The six-year presidency or sexenio of Luís Echeverría Alvarez was initiated in December of 1970. Six years later, significant changes had taken place in the public policies espoused by the Mexican regime. Most importantly, perhaps, the federal government shifted its public investment priorities away from an overriding preoccupation with industrial development toward greater concern for agricultural development. From 1971 to 1976, Echeverria's administration allocated more money to the agricultural sector than any sexenio since that of Miguel Alemán (1946 to 1952). The change occurred gradually, federal public investment in agriculture growing from 14.5% of the total in 1971 to 20% budgeted for 1975 and 1976. Increased attention to agriculture was achieved primarily through proportional reductions in investments for industrial and infrastructure development. Along with a revision in sectoral allocations went a change in policy concerning both the anticipated outcome and the target population for agricultural investment.

A great many of the political initiatives of Mexico's President Echeverría were responses to stimuli generated directly by the university community's behavior during the 1968 student government crisis. Prior to this 1968 confrontation, student activism had a marginal “nuisance effect”; since then, however, it has risen to political prominence in Mexico.

The following discussion focuses on establishing a casual relationship between student protest and Echeverría's reformism. It will begin with a possible framework for the student protest movement within the national political context in terms of structural-functional concepts. To that part pertains also the section dealing with protagonists' tactics in the confrontation—i.e., principal student measures to organize, communicate demands and mobilize support, and the government countermeasures aimed at discrediting the students' protest and reducing the effectiveness of their dissent. Issues concerning the link between the 1968 events and the reform policies of the Echeverría administration will be noted.