The subject of this article is the Peronist union leadership in the period from the fall of Perón in 1955 until the elections of March 1973, which heralded the return of Peronism to power. The first section examines this leadership mainly in terms of its internal power base, especially vis-á-vis its membership. This involves primarily an examination of internal union government, union elections, and potential limitations of leadership power by the rank and file. The second part looks at the union leadership in terms of its power as a political force bargaining on behalf of the Peronist movement. This will also involve a brief look at the union leadership's relationship with Perón himself. Finally, the third section attempts to suggest an explanatory framework within which to situate the development of this union leadership's power.

December 12, 1974, the Twenty-ninth General Assembly of the United Nations (1974) passed the long-awaited Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States by a vote of 120-6-10. This chapter, conceived by Mexican President Echeverría (UNCTAD, 1972) was drafted upon the supposition that definitive legal guidelines on international economic rights would suppress considerably world political-economic tension and protect the rights of all states, especially developing ones (Vanzant, 1974). Although a substantial proportion of the charter was adopted with relatively little controversy during the two years of negotiations, conflicts over key sections were insurmountable and the negotiating committee failed to attain unanimity on its final text. The inability of the working group to reach a consensus did not come as a complete surprise, since during the past decade important concepts embodied in the document had provoked considerable controversy (Haight, 1975).

The central purpose of this paper is to show that the character of Peruvian national politics changed substantially during the century after independence from Spain and that a focus on the shifting relations between the central government and social and economic power in the private sector is crucial for appreciating the significance of these political developments and for comprehending their sources. Clearly a wide variety of forces conditioned the organization and exercise of political power in nineteenth-century Peru, but historical interpretations that stress the roles of economic elites (e.g., Bourricaud, 1970), foreign interests (Yepes del Castillo, 1972) or leaders’ personalities (Pike, 1967) obscure the magnitude of these political changes and do not adequately explain them.