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In with the New, Out with the Old? The Democratising Impact of Constitutional Reform in Chile

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2009

Mark Ensalaco
Mark Ensalaco
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Political Science and Associate of the Center for International Programs, The University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio.
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Extract

On 30 July 1989 Chileans cast ballots in an historic but unheralded plebiscite, and approved a massive revision of the Constitution that in 1980 the Pinochet regime had crafted to institutionalise its rule. Some observers had doubted that it would be possible to change Pinochet's prized ‘Constitution of Liberty’, while others have since questioned the significance of the reforms that were achieved. In fact, as a result of the July referendum, 54 modifications involving 12 of the document's 14 chapters were enacted before the Constitution even went fully into effect. Moreover, since the reestablishment of democracy in Chile, the coalition government of Patricio Aylwin has won passage of still other constitutional reforms involving administrative decentralisation, and has introduced draft legislation designed to bring about changes in the judicial and electoral systems. His successor, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, is also committed to reform.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , May 1994 , pp. 409 - 429
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

1 The Report of the International Commission of the Latin American Studies Association to Observe the Chilean Plebiscite (LASA) noted cautiously that while ‘(i)t is clear that the 1980 constitution remains a fundamental obstacle for the opposition…(i)t seems doubtful that the opposition will obtain fundamental concessions from the Pinochet government’. See, LASA, ‘The Chilean Plebiscite: A First Step Toward Redemocratization’, LASA Forum vol. 19, no. 4 (Winter 1989), p. 31Google Scholar. After reforms were enacted, Oppenheimer observed that ‘[a]lthough some modifications were made to the constitution, these were fashioned by both the opposition and the military before they were voted on in July 1989; the approved amendments contained only some of the changes desired by the Concertación’. See Oppenheim, L., ‘Military Rule and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile: Introduction’, Latin American Perspectives vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Maira, L., La Constitución de 1980 y La Ruptura Democrática (Santiago, 1988)Google Scholar.

3 Garretón, Manuel Antonio, El Plebiscito de 1988 y la Transitión a la Democratia (Santiago, 1988), p. 13Google Scholar.

4 All quotations are from General Pinochet's Chacarillas speech as reproduced in Farren, Gustavo Cuevas, ‘Bases Institucionales del Nuevo Régimen Político’, Política (01 1987), p. 13Google Scholar. All translations are my own. For an extensive discussion of the legal and institutional framework of the regime prior to the promulgation of the constitution, see El Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliatión, vol. 1 (Santiago, 1991), pp. 55–78.

5 Three members of the Study Commission resigned and joined the ‘Group of 24’ legal experts who attempted unsuccessfully to campaign against ratification of the new constitution when it became apparent that Pinochet's views would automatically prevail over those of learned jurists. See L. Maira, La Constitutión de 1980, p. 20. Alessandri cited personal reasons for his resignation from the Council of State, but later acknowledged that the real motive for doing so had to do with modifications made by Pinochet to the transitory articles of the Constitution dealing with the timing of the transition back to civilian rule, and, more importantly, to those articles relating to the composition and functions of the National Security Council. See Baltierra, Luis Alvarez, ‘Alessandri y la Constitución de '80’, Alternativa (16 04 1986), pp. 5–6Google Scholar. The controversy surrounding the National Security Council is discussed below.

6 Maira, La Constitution de 1980, p. 22; LASA, ‘The Chilean Plebiscite’, p. 18.

7 On the status of the organic laws, see Solar, Julio Silva, ‘Las Leyes Políticas del Régimen Militar’, in CESOC, Elecciones Libres Y Plebiscito: El Desafío Democrático (Santiago, 1987), p. 67Google Scholar. Varas interprets the sheer number of matters left to be determined by organic laws as a reflection of its inherent weaknesses. See Varas, A., Los Militares en el Poder: Régimen y Gobierno Militar en Chile, 1973–1986 (Santiago, 1987), pp. 77–8Google Scholar. Here only those organic laws governing the electoral system will be discussed.

8 The texts of the various proposals are reproduced in Geywitz, C. Andrade, Reforma Constitucional de la Constitutión Política de Chile de 1980 (Santiago, 1991), pp. 233–331Google Scholar.

9 Dahl, R., Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, 1989), p. 221Google Scholar.

10 The Movimiento Democrático Popular comprised the Communist party, the faction of the Socialist Party aligned with former Allende Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda, and the Revolutionary Movement of the Left; it was declared unconstitutional in January 1985;. See Maira, La Constitutión de 1980, pp. 91–5.

11 Cuevas Farren, ‘Bases Institucionales del Nuevo Régimen Político’, p. 28.

12 Julio Silva Solar, ‘Constitución de 1980: Obstáculo para la Transición a la Democracia’, in Solar (ed.), Elecciones Libres y Plebiscito, p. 15.

13 Keith Rosen, ‘Soberanía y Participatión Política en la Nueva Constitución Politíca de 1980’, in CESOC, Elecciones Libres y Plebiscito, p. 27.

14 Maira, La Constitución de 1980, p. 76.

15 In a speech on 11 March 1989, Pinochet conceded the advisability of some constitutional amendments but only those intended to ‘perfect’ and not ‘dismantle’ the constitution. By that time, four major proposals, three of which contained specific alternative language, had already been tabled. See El Mercurio, 12 March 1989.

16 Bertelsen, Raul, ‘Participación y Representatión en la Nueva Institucionalidad’, Política, no. 3 (1983), p. 172Google Scholar.

17 Oxhorn, Philip, ‘The Popular Sector Response to an Authoritarian Regime: Shantytown Organizations since the Military Coup’, Latin American Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Francisco Rubio Llorente has denoted this the ‘quasi-constitutionalization of the international pacts on human rights’. See ‘Writing the Constitution of Spain’, in Goldwin, R. and Kaufman, A. (eds.), Constitution Makers on Constitution Making: the Experience of Eight Nations (Washington, 1988), p. 257Google Scholar.

19 The text of the 1978 plebiscite read: ‘In the face of international aggression unleashed against the government of the Fatherland, I support President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile, and I reaffirm the legitimate right of the republic to conduct the process of institutionalization in a manner befitting its sovereignty.’ Reproduced in LASA, ‘The Chilean Plebiscite’, p. 18.

20 Lijphart, A., Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, 1984), p. 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 Pinochet said in a speech delivered in April 1979, ‘[u]niversal suffrage, in and of itself is not the only valid medium of the expression of the will of the nation, nor is it a formula which necessarily and mechanically grants authority’. Quoted in Rosen, ‘Soberanía y Participatión’, p. 30. Similarly, the ideologue of the dictatorship, Jaime Guzmán, linked the ills of Chilean politics to universal suffrage: ‘If one analyses when Chilean democracy functioned best, it will be seen that this occurred whenever a better educated minority which felt a real commitment to the system voted and manipulated the suffrage. But, when the great masses were incorporated into the electoral body … democratic instability was the logical consequence.’ Quoted in Maira, La Constitución de 1980, p. 58.

22 The four organic constitutional laws which relate in one way or another to the electoral system were promulgated in November 1985, October 1986, March 1987 and May 1988. Here the discussion is limited to the distortions introduced by the binomial majoritarian system, but there are other concerns, e.g. gerrymandering. See: Cereceda, Francisco Cumplido, ‘Opciones para la Electión del Congreso Nacional’, Revista de Ciencia Politíca (09 1988), pp. 42–51Google Scholar.

23 Ossadón, Magdalena, ‘Sistema Electoral: a la Pesca de Escaños,’ El Mercurio, 13 10 1991, p. D–5Google Scholar; See also ‘Oposición Rechaza, en Principio, Modificatión a Sistema Electoral’, El Mercurio, 6 September 1991, p. C–2; Maira, L., ‘Notas sobre la Transición Chilena’ (Santiago, 1991), p. 18Google Scholar.

24 Ossadón, ‘Sistema Electoral’, p. D–5.

25 Zaldivar's comments were made in an interview. See Scantlebury, Marcia, ‘No Manejo a Irureta’, Caras, vol. 9, no. 90 (16 09 1991), p. 100Google Scholar.

26 ‘Exponen Debilidades del Sistema Binomial’, El Mercurio, 27 October 1991, p. C–2.

27 Incidentally, the National Security Council is entitled under article 81 to elect two lawyers to the all-powerful Constitutional Tribunal. Thus, under article 96, the National Security Council could appeal to a body, possessing tremendous powers, on which it is assured of having two sympathetic members.

28 LASA, ‘The Chilean Plebiscite’, p. 34.

29 Andrade, La Reform de la Constitución, p. 233.

30 The change of phraseology, from representar to hacer presente, is quite important in Chilean legal parlance. Andrade notes that ‘representar has a precise connotation in [Chilean] legislation’, and therefore ‘such representations, coming from those who possess a monopoly of arms, would tend to have a very special and rigorous connotation, one that would be difficult to resist’. By contrast, the expression hacer presente ‘has a lesser degree of obligation’. Reforma de la Constitución, p. 234.

31 O'Donnell, G., Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, 1973), p. 95Google Scholar.

32 Secretaría de Comunicación y Cultura, ‘El Mensaje Presidencial, 11 de Marzo de 1990 – 21 de Mayo, 1991’ (Santiago, 1991), p. IVGoogle Scholar.

33 Pinochet himself stressed the distinction between proposals intended ‘to perfect’ the constitution and those intended to ‘dismantle the new institutionality’. See El Mercurio, 12 March 1989.

34 On 10 December 1993, as this article was being prepared for publication, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei won the presidency. As a candidate, Frei had promised to move forward with constitutional reforms.