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The Private Sector and Peace in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 July 2007

ANGELIKA RETTBERG
ANGELIKA RETTBERG
Affiliation:
Angelika Rettberg is Associate Professor, Political Science Department, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia.
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Abstract

The private sector plays a fundamental role in peace negotiations and in the implementation of agreements, as comparison between El Salvador, Guatemala and Colombia indicates. However, private sector involvement in peace negotiations varies: Conflict cost perceptions, degrees of unity of the pro-peace business faction, and varied access to the peace policymaking process account for important differences across the cases. Thus this article points to the need to fine-tune our understanding of private sector behaviour in the context of armed conflict and peace and underscores how private sector characteristics and business-state relations affect the emergence of peace negotiations and shape resultant outcomes.

Resumen: El sector privado juega un papel fundamental en las negociaciones de paz y en la implementación de sus acuerdos, como lo indica la comparación entre los casos de El Salvador, Guatemala y Colombia. Sin embargo, el involucramiento del sector privado en las negociaciones varía: diversas percepciones sobre el costo del conflicto, distintos grados de unidad entre la facción pro-paz de los empresarios, y variado acceso al proceso de diseño de políticas para la paz, muestran diferencias importantes al interior de cada caso. Por lo tanto, este artículo señala la necesidad de enfocar mejor nuestro entendimiento del comportamiento del sector privado en contextos de conflicto armado y de paz, subrayando cómo las características del sector privado y sus relaciones con el Estado influyen en el desarrollo de las negociaciones de paz y conforma sus resultados.

Palabras clave: sector privado, negociaciones de paz, construcción de paz, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador.

Resumo: A comparação entre El Salvador, Guatemala e Colômbia indica que o setor privado tem um papel fundamental em negociações de paz e na implementação de acordos. Todavia, o envolvimento do setor privado em negociações de paz é oscilante: percepções sobre o custo dos conflitos, diferentes graus de união entre as partes empresariais a favor da paz, e, ademais, acessos variados ao processo de criação de políticas explicam alterações importantes nos casos diferentes. Portanto, este artigo aponta a necessidade de apurar nosso entendimento sobre o comportamento do setor privado nos contextos de conflito armado e de paz, ressaltando como características do setor privado e relações entre o estado e esse setor afetam o surgimento de negociações de paz e formam os efeitos conseqüentes.

Palvras-chave: setor privado, negociações de paz, construção da paz, Colômbia, Guatemala, El Salvador

Keywords

private sectorpeace negotiationpeacebuildingColombiaGuatemalaEl Salvador
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 39 , Issue 3 , August 2007 , pp. 463 - 494
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

1  Interview with Jaime Hill, President of GMT Company, San Salvador, 29 June 2001.

2  Referred to as the structural power of capital, capital owners can expect states and other actors to provide them with a favourable investment climate. See Winters, Jeffry A., Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State (Ithaca, 1996)Google Scholar.

3  Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC), ‘Colombia’, ‘El Salvador’, ‘Guatemala’, in Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe (2001–2002) (2002), pp. 139–45, pp. 173–89.

4  Jenny Pearce, ‘Peace-building in the periphery: Lessons from Central America’, Third World Quarterly, 20 (Jan. 1999), p. 51.

5  See, for example, Collier, Paul et al. , Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, 2003)Google Scholar; Collier, Paul, ‘On the Economic Consequences of Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 51, pp. 168–83 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Anke Hoeffler and Marta Reynal-Querol, ‘Measuring the Costs of Conflict’, Centre for the Study of African Economies (Oxford, 2003); G. Lindgren, ‘The Economic Costs of Civil War’, Paper for the Ninth Annual International Conference on Economics and Security, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, 23th to 25th June, 2005; Nelson, Jane, The Business of Peace: The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict and Resolution (London, 2000)Google Scholar; Jeremy Weinstein and Kosuke Imai, ‘Measuring the Economic Impact of Civil War’, CID Working Paper No. 51, Center for International Development at Harvard University (Cambridge, 2000).

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8  Spoilers are ‘leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it’. See Stedman, Stephen John, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security, vol. 22, no. 2 (Autumn, 1997), p. 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9  See, for example, Mack, Andrew, The Private Sector and Conflict – Global Compact Policy Dialogue, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (Cambridge, 2002)Google Scholar; International Peace Academy (IPA), Private Sector Actors in Zones of Conflict and Policy Responses – IPA Workshop Report (New York, 2001)Google Scholar; Haufler, Virginia, A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy (Washington DC, 2001)Google Scholar; and Nelson, The Business of Peace.

10  See, for example, Banfield, Jessica, Gündüz, Canan and Killick, Nick (eds.), Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector (London, 2006)Google Scholar.

11  See Peter Evans, ‘State Structures, Government-Business Relations, and Economic Transformation’, in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider (eds.), Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca, 1997); Stephen Krasner, ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics’, Comparative Politics, vol. 16, no. 2 (Jan. 1984), pp. 223–46; Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990); and Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Fred Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York, 1992).

12  See, for example, Maxfield and Schneider (eds.), Business and the State in Developing Countries; Francisco Durand and Eduardo Silva (eds.), Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in Latin America (Miami, 1998); Peter Kingstone, Crafting Coalitions for Reform: Business Preferences, Political Institutions, and Neoliberal Reform in Brazil (University Park, 1999); and Ben Ross Schneider, Business Politics and the State in Twentieth Century Latin America.

13  For example, Tricia Juhn, Negotiating Peace in El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations and the Conspiracy to End the War (New York, 1998); and John Peeler, ‘Elites and Democracy in Central America’, in Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth (eds.), Elections and Democracy in Central America, revised (Chapel Hill, 1995), pp. 244–63.

14  Elizabeth Jean Wood, Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador (London, 2000).

15  See Susanne Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process (Boulder, 2000).

16  Unidad Empresarial, (Sept.–Oct. 1991), p. 36.

17  See Geske Dijkstra, ‘The Limits of Economic Policy in El Salvador’, in Wim Pelupessy and John Weeks (eds.), Economic Maladjustment in Central America (New York, 1993), pp. 53–66.

18  Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, former FMLN commander, now head of an NGO, San Salvador, 26 June 2001.

19  Interview with Camilo Bolaños, former president of ANEP, now president of Rent-a-Car, San Salvador, 28 June 2001.

20  Wood, Forging Democracy from Below, p. 55.

21  James K. Boyce, ‘Adjustment Toward Peace: An Introduction’, World Development, vol. 23, no. 12 (1995), p. 2072. ‘New’ business families include the Simán commercial group, which has expanded its retail operations throughout Central America.

22  FUSADES received approximately US$100 million from the US to promote economic modernisation. See Alexander Segovia, Modernización empresarial en Guatemala: ¿cambio real o nuevo discurso? (Guatemala, 2004). Before the creation of FUSADES, the Alliance for Progress, also a US-funded initiative, had supported the modernising elite in El Salvador.

23  See Ministerio de Planificación y Coordinación del Desarrollo Económico y Social (MIPLAN), Plan de Reconstrucción Nacional, Vol. I (San Salvador, March 1992), p. 4.

24  Interview with Juan Héctor Vidal, former executive director of ANEP, San Salvador, 25 June 2001.

25  CEPAL, Anuario estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe, “Cuentas nacionales de América Latina y el Caribe por país – El Salvador”, 2006.

26  Johnson, ‘Between Revolution and Democracy’.

27  Interview with Camilo Bolaños.

28  John Williamson. ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’, in Institute of International Economics, Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, 1990), pp. 7–20.

29  See, for instance, Wood, Forging Democracy from Below, pp. 72–3.

30  Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martínez.

31  Interview with Ricardo Montenegro, Executive director Unifersa, former vice-president ANEP, San Salvador, 28 June 2001.

32  Interview with Rubén Zamora, former FMLN leader and scholar, San Salvador, 25 June 2001.

33  Johnson, ‘Between Revolution and Democracy’, and Paige, Coffee and Power.

34  Interview with Juan Héctor Vidal.

35  Johnson, ‘Between Revolution and Democracy’.

36  For a discussion of incentives promoting strong business organisations see Schneider, Ben Ross, ‘Why is Mexican Business so Organized?’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 77–118Google Scholar.

37  Paige, Coffee and Power, p. 36.

38  Wood, Forging Democracy from Below, p. 71.

39  Paige, Coffee and Power, p. 37.

40  Interview with David Escobar Galindo, former member of government peace commission, 25 May 2001; interview with Jaime Hill; interview with Camilo Bolaños; interview with Ricardo Montenegro.

41  See Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path (Washington DC, 1998).

42  Since signing the accords, the FMLN has maintained its position as the second political force in the National Assembly and has won the elections for the mayoralty of the capital San Salvador.

43  Carlo Nasi argues that the FMLN's decision to forego socioeconomic issues also represented a strategic decision not to alienate the military and the private sector at once. Carlo Nasi, Peace Agreements in Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala: A Comparative Study, Ph.D. diss. (South Bend, 2002), pp. 361–2.

44  See Vilas, Carlos M., ‘Prospects for Democratisation in a Post-Revolutionary Setting: Central America’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 28, no. 22 (1996), pp. 461–503CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45  See Carlos Briones, ‘La reconstrucción de El Salvador: Dilemas y alternativas’, in Juan Héctor Vidal, Héctor Dada Hirezi and Carlos Briones, La reconstrucción de El Salvador: Dilemas y alternativas (San Salvador, 1992), pp. 61–75; Briones, Carlos, ‘El desafío de la pobreza y la concertación social’, Estudios Centroamericanos, no. 521 (1992), pp. 227–44Google Scholar; ‘Declaración de propósitos del Foro de Concertación Económico y Social’, unpubl. document (San Salvador, 9 Sept. 1992); ANEP, ‘Enfoque de ANEP sobre la realidad económica y social de El Salvador’, Unidad Empresarial, (Sept.–Oct. 1992), pp. 35–45.

46  Interview with Ricardo Montenegro.

47  See Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) – Universidad Centroamericana, La violencia en El Salvador en los años noventa. Magnitud, costos y factores posibilitadores (San Salvador, 1998).

48  Rodrigo Rivera Campos, La economía salvadoreña al final del siglo, desafíos para el futuro (El Salvador, 2000), p. xii.

49  Remittances of Salvadoreans abroad also played a significant role in explaining economic growth. Manuel Orozco, Worker Remittances in an International Scope. Inter-American Dialogue Research Series (March 2003), and Rivera, La economía salvadoreña al final del siglo.

50  See, for example, Luis Pásara, The Guatemalan Peace Process: The Accords and their Accomplishments, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper No. 21 (Notre Dame, Dec. 2001), p. 12. See also Jack Spence et. al., Promise and Reality: Implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Accords (Cambridge, 1998).

51  Interview with Eduardo González, Executive president of Bancafé, Guatemala City, 13 July 2001.

52  William Godnick, with Robert Muggah and Camilla Waszink. Stray Bullets: The Impact of Small Arms Misuse in Central America, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 5 (Geneva, 2002).

53  United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, Presentación del Informe ante la Reunión del Grupo Consultivo (14–15 May 2003); Interamerican Development Bank (IADB), ‘Consultative Group for Guatemala opens with call for consensus to support national transformation, peace accords’ (Press Release, 13 May 2003).

54  See, for example, Paris, Roland, ‘Peacebuilding in Central America: Reproducing the Sources of Conflict?’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 9, no. 4 (2002), pp. 39–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

55  Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH). Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio – Conclusiones y recomendaciones del Informe de la Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico (Guatemala City, 1999) p. 226.

56  The Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales (Centre for National Economic Research – CIEN), for example, questions the possibility of establishing any quantification of costs due to the lack of reliable data tracking destruction through decades of violent conflict. See Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales (CIEN), ‘La violencia en Guatemala: Un tema prioritario’, Carta Económica, No. 190, (1998).

57  Interview with Fernando Asturias, president of the Agricultural Chamber, Guatemala City, 9 July 2001.

58  According to Luis Pásara, former legal advisor to the United Nations Mission in Guatemala, in Guatemala ‘international aid institutions increasingly appeared to have the primary responsibility for the accords, [and] were tempted to substitute themselves for the Guatemalan actors in the process.’ See Pásara, The Guatemalan Peace Process, pp. 18–19.

59  Juhn argues that ‘El Salvador represented the longest sustained US military commitment since Vietnam’. See Juhn, Negotiating Peace in El Salvador, p. 6.

60  Pearce, ‘Peace-building in the periphery’, p. 171.

61  David Holiday, ‘Guatemala's Long Road to Peace’, Current History, vol. 96, no. 607 (1997), pp. 68–74.

62  Paul Dosal, Power in Transition: The Rise of Guatemala's Industrial Oligarchy (1871–1994) (Westport, 1995).

63  Rachel McCleary, Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End of Violent Revolution (Gainesville, 1999), p. 14.

64  Dinorah Azpuru argues that, in fact, the Guatemalan peace negotiations were an extension of the democratisation process of the 1980s. See Dinorah Azpuru, ‘Peace and Democratization in Guatemala: Two Parallel Processes’, in Cynthia Arnson, (ed.), Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America (Washington DC, 1999), pp. 97–125.

65  See, for example, Segovia, Modernización empresarial en Guatemala.

66  Interview with Carlos Vielman, former president of Chamber of Industry, former member of CEPAZ, Guatemala City, 9 July 2001.

67  Dosal, Power in Transition, p. 181.

68  Interview with Carlos Vielman.

69  Some have noted that the Instancia served to consolidate democracy in Guatemala. See, for example, Azpuru, ‘Peace and Democratization in Guatemala: Two Parallel Processes’.

70  Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves, p. 60.

71  Interview with Víctor Suárez, former president of CACIF, Guatemala City, 4 July 2001.

72  Interview with Peter Lamport, former president of CACIF, former Minister of Finance, former member of CEPAZ, Guatemala City, 6 July 2001.

73  Interview with Roberto Ardón, Executive director of CACIF, Guatemala City, 10 July 2001.

74  In the words of its leader, ‘[CONAGRO] refused to sit at the negotiating table because it meant accepting it was legal’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, his memoirs of the Guatemalan peace process are entitled ‘Wasted Time’. See Anzueto Vielman, Tiempo perdido, p. 45.

75  Interview with Carlos Vielman.

76  Interview with Raquel Zelaya, former member of government negotiating team, Director of ASIES think tank, Guatemala City, 12 July 2001.

77  Interview with Roberto Ardón.

78  Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves, p. 79.

79  Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF), Guatemala: Reflexiones del pasado, consideraciones del presente y recomendaciones para el futuro (Guatemala City, 1995), p. 21.

80  United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, El pacto fiscal un año después (Guatemala City, 2001), p. 32.

81  Ironically, the fact that the private sector had agreed to endorse the accord made it suspicious to the Civil Society Assembly and to the URNG. The former took two months before accepting the accord while the latter suffered internal tensions for having agreed to sign. See Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves, p. 80.

82  See Ibid. Jonas, pp. 171–2; Nuria Gamboa and Bárbara Trentavizi, La Guatemala posible: La senda del Pacto Fiscal (Guatemala City, 2001), p. 20; and J. Fernando Valdéz and Mayra Palencia, Los dominios del poder: La encrucijada tributaria (Guatemala City, 1998).

83  United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, Second Report: Verification of Compliance with the Commitments Made in the Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance, and Verification Timetable of the Accords (New York, 4 Feb. 1998).

84  Interamerican Development Bank (IADB), Economic synthesis of Guatemala (Washington, 2002).

85  See, for example, Gamboa and Trentavizi, La Guatemala posible, p. 20.

86  United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, Report of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala for the Consultative Group meeting for Guatemala (Guatemala City, 18 Jan. 2002), p. 4; Operaciones de Paz de las Naciones Unidas, Informe Annual 2004.

87  Pásara, The Guatemalan Peace Process, p. 16.

88  Interamerican Development Bank (IADB), Guatemala Country Paper (Washington, 2001).

89  Alexander Segovia, Evaluación de progreso del Pacto Fiscal en 2004, Informe Final (Guatemala City, 2005), p. 4.

90  A wealthy agricultural entrepreneur, Oscar Berger was backed by Guatemala's agricultural and banking elite, linking ‘traditional’ and modernising interests. In his campaign he promised to fight crime, corruption and poverty, and to implement the 1996 peace accord. Two of his most important cabinet appointees, Jorge Briz (Secretary of External Relations) and Carlos Vielman (Secretary of Domestic Affairs), belong to the modernising business faction that once promoted CEPAZ.

91  Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF), Propuesta del plan de desarrollo económico y social 2004–2007, versión completa (Guatemala City, Aug. 2003).

92  Segovia reaches a similar conclusion. See Segovia, Modernización empresarial en Guatemala, p. 113.

93  See J. Fernando Valdéz, Iván Monzón and William Godnick, ‘War and Peace: The Ongoing Business Revolution in Guatemala’, in Jessica Banfield, Canan Gündüz and Nick Killick (eds.), Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector (London, 2006), pp. 335–63.

94  United Nations Information Service, ‘Guatemala Mission Successful Example of UN Peace-Building, with Lessons for Other Operations, Says Secretary-General in Message to Closing Ceremony’, SG/SM/9595, CA/27 (Nov. 2004).

95  World Bank and Oxford University Press, World Development Report, 2005. A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (Washington, 2004), p. 246.

96  See, for example, ‘Habla Vicente Castaño’, in Revista Semana (6 June 2005), pp. 29–36. Vicente Castaño, one of the leaders of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a union of paramilitary organisations, said that ‘cattle ranchers and industrialists made direct [financial] contributions’.

97  Juan Carlos Echeverri, Las claves del futuro: Economía y conflicto en Colombia (Bogotá, 2002).

98  Pedro Gómez, Visiones frente al proceso de paz, Address at the Universidad Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario (Bogotá 2000), p. 6.

99  Martha Elena Badel and Edgar Trujillo, Informe especial: Los costos económicos de la criminalidad y la violencia en Colombia: 1991–1996, Colección Archivos de Macroeconomía – Departamento Nacional de Planeación Document 76 (Bogotá, 10 March 1998); Granada, C. and Rojas, L., ‘Los costos económicos del conflicto armado en Colombia: 1990–1994’, Revista de Planeación y Desarrollo, vol. 26, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1995)Google Scholar; Mauricio Rubio, ‘Los costos de la violencia en Colombia’, in Documentos CEDE (1997).

100  María Eugenia Pinto et.al., ‘¿Cuánto ha perdido Colombia por el conflicto?’, Cuartillas de Economía Departamento Nacional de Planeación (19 Aug. 2004).

101  See Global Terrorism Index 2003/4, World Markets Research Centre (London, August 2003).

102  Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), ‘Colombia, gastos y producto interno bruto a precios constantes de 1994’, http://dane.gov.co, accessed 20 July 2005.

103  Angelika Rettberg, ‘Los costos del conflicto armado colombiano para el sector privado: Resultados de una encuesta nacional’, Programa de Investigación sobre Construcción de Paz, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Universidad de los Andes and International Alert (Bogotá, 25 Aug. 2006).

104  Portafolio, ‘Terrorismo y corrupción impactan clima de negocios’ (23 Oct. 2006).

105  Dirección de Justicia y Seguridad, Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), ‘Costos de la paz y de la guerra’, Power Point presentation, 21 Feb. 2002 (http://www.dnp.gov.co/02_sec/justicia/justi.htm).

106  País Libre NGO, (http://www.paislibre.org.co/) accessed 26 Oct. 2002.

107  See Gloria A. Alonso M., Enrique Montes U. and Carlos Varela B., ‘Evolución de los flujos de capital y de la deuda externa del sector privado en Colombia, 1990–2003’, Borradores de Economía, Banco de la República de Colombia, No. 266 (November 2003); José Darío Uribe, ‘Capital controls and foreign exchange market intervention in Colombia’, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Papers, No. 23 (November 2003).

108  Mauricio Cárdenas and Carolina Mejía, ‘Migraciones internacionales en Colombia: ¿qué sabemos?’, Working Paper Series, Fedesarrollo, No. 30 (September 2006).

109  Interview with Alberto Espinosa, president of Meals de Colombia, president and founder of the President's Forum, Chamber of Commerce, Bogotá, 12 Feb. 2002.

110  Interview with Rodrigo Gutiérrez, member of the Fundación Ideas para la Paz executive committee, Bogotá, 13 Sep. 2001.

111  Fedesarrollo 3-monthly Business Survey; El Tiempo, ‘Dirigencia raja gestión de paz’ (20 March 2000); Forum of the Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF), 8 Feb. 2001.

112  Interview with Rodrigo Gutiérrez.

113  Interview with Sabas Pretelt de la Vega, former president of the commerce association (Fenalco), 5 Dec. 2002.

114  Salomón Kalmanovitz, ‘Los gremios industriales ante la crisis’, in Francisco Leal and León Zamosc (eds.), Al filo del caos: Crisis política en la Colombia de los años 80 (Bogotá, 1991).

115  Interview with Juan Sebastián Betancur, vice-president of Suramericana Insurance Company and former leader of ANDI, Bogotá, 7 Nov. 2002.

116  Interview with Alberto Espinosa.

117  The Samper government was accused of having received funds from the Cali drug cartel. The ensuing political and economic crisis was unprecedented in its magnitude and in the degree of international attention it attracted, especially from the USA. See Rettberg, Angelika, ‘Business versus Business? Economic Groups and Business Associations in Colombia’, Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 47, no. 1 (2005), pp. 31–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

118  Interview with Mario Gómez, Fundación Restrepo Barco, Bogotá, 12 Nov. 2002.

119  Mario Gómez, Los gremios empresariales y la construcción de paz: El caso colombiano, unpubl. manuscript, commissioned by International Alert (Bogotá, 2001).

120  Encuesta de Opinión Industrial Conjunta, ANDI, Center for Economic Studies Survey, June 2000, May 2002.

121  A part of the ‘National Crusade against Poverty’, the proposal ‘recognises the need to redistribute wealth’. See El Tiempo, ‘FEDEGAN ofrece tierra a cambio de paz’ (8 Nov. 1997). ‘[The thing about us donating land] was something made up by the press’ said FEDEGAN leader several years later (Interview with Jorge Visbal, president of the cattle ranchers' association, 30 Jan. 2002).

122  See Cecilia Rico Torres, ‘Recursos fiscales para el restablecimiento del orden público en Colombia’, Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN) de Colombia, Oficina de Estudios Económicos, Cuadernos de Trabajo, Web Document 013 (April 2006).

123  For a detailed description of local-level business-led peace-building in Colombia see Rettberg, ‘Business-Led Peace-building in Colombia’.

124  Interview with Jaime Alberto Cabal, president of Asociación Hotelera de Colombia (COTELCO) and former president of Asociación Colombiana de Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (ACOPI), Bogotá, 10 Dec. 2002.

125  Interview with Fabio Villegas, president of Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (ANIF), Bogotá, 12 Nov. 2002.

126  Interview with Camilo Almonacid, general manager Vending de Colombia, later director of Corporate Social Responsibility for Cemex Colombia, Bogotá, 7 Feb. 2002. A favourable disposition towards peace did not translate into the abandonment of the private sector's war-proven security strategies. ‘They [the private sector] won't stop paying for security nor be detracted from buying insurance against bombs and rebellions’. Interview with Beatriz White, director of Social Relations, Entretodos, Proantioquia, Medellín, 16 Oct. 2001.

127  See, for example, Durand and Silva (eds.), Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in Latin America.

128  Angelika Rettberg, ‘Entre el cielo y el suelo: Una mirada crítica a los gremios colombianos’ in Ann Mason y Luis Javier Orjuela (eds.), La crisis colombiana: Más que un conflicto armado y un proceso de paz (Bogotá, 2003), pp. 253–67.

129  At the time, national and international figures – including the president of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) – visited the FARC, in an effort promoted by the government and the international community to overcome ideological distances.

130  Interview with Ramón de la Torre, former advisor of the Pastrana administration and former president of the oil company Exxon – Colombia, member of Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) Executive Committee, Bogotá, 7 Nov. 2002.

131  Gloria Castrillón, ‘Empresarios y FARC rompen el hielo’, El Espectador (18 March 2000).

132  Portafolio, ‘Bloqueo por la “002”’ (26 June 2001).

133  El Tiempo, ‘Dirigencia raja gestión de paz’ (20 March 2000); The Economist, ‘Few friends left for Colombia's peace talks’ (14 Dec. 2000).

134  Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), República de Colombia, Dirección de Justicia y Seguridad, Cifras de violencia, primer semestre 2005, No. 9 (January–June 2005).

135  Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), República de Colombia, Dirección de Justicia y Seguridad, Cifras de violencia, extorsión (1998–2004), Special Edition (2005).

136  El Tiempo, ‘Empresas no quieren pagar más’ (21 Feb. 2002), and ‘Lobby por menos impuestos’ (27 Oct. 2002).

137  See Antonio Hernández Gamarra, Evaluación del recaudo y asignación presupuestal del impuesto para preservar la seguridad democrática, Contraloría General de la Nación, Tercer Informe (Bogotá, March 2004).

138  See Portafolio, ‘Problemas que se crecen: baja demanda, reformas económicas y la inseguridad’ (10 May 2005), p. 20.

139  Colombian industrial and financial activity dates back to the beginning of the 20th Century, while Guatemalan and Salvadorean industrial development began in earnest in the 1960s.

140  See Francisco Gutiérrez (ed.), Degradación o cambio: evolución del sistema político colombiano (Bogotá, 2002).