¹ For definitions and trends of geopolitics see Ladis, K. D. Kristof, ‘The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 4, no. 1 (03 1960), pp. 15–51;Google ScholarDerwent, Whittlesey, ‘Haushofer: The Geopoliticians,’ in Edward Mead, Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 388–411;Google ScholarJames, E. Dougherty and Robert, L. Pfalzgraff Jr, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York, Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 54–83;Google Scholar and Keiichi, Takeuchi, ‘Geopolitics and Geography in Japan Reexamined’, Hitot Subashi (Journal of Social Studies), vol. 1, no. 1 (11 1980), pp. 14–24.Google Scholar

² Among examples of the recent upsurge of interest, these stand out as new perspectives on the topic: Cohn, A. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (New York, Crane, Russak, 1977);Google ScholarDaniel, Deudney, Whole Earth Security: A Geopolitics of Peace (Washington, D.C., World Watch Institute, 1983);Google ScholarBenjamin, A. Most and Harvey, Starr, ‘Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War’, American Political Science Review, vol. 74, no. 4 (12 1980), pp. 932–46;Google Scholar and John, Child, ‘Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 14, no. 2 (1979), 89–111.Google Scholar

³ Lewis, A.Tambs traces Brazilian geopolitical consciousness to colonial times. See his ‘Brazil's Expanding Frontiers’, The Americas, vol. 23, no. 2 (10 1966), pp. 165–9,Google Scholar and ‘Rubber, Rebels, and Rio Branco: The Contest for the Acre’, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 46 (08 1966), p. 254–73.Google Scholar See also Carlos de Meira, Mattos, Uma Geopolitica Pan-Amazônica (Rio de Janeiro, Livraria José Olympio Edirora, 1980). pp. 19–62,Google Scholar and Howard, Pittman, ‘Geopolitics in the ABC Countries: A Comparison’, paper prepared for the Western Political Science Association meeting, Seattle, Washington, 03 1983, pp. 12–31, 31–58.Google Scholar

⁴ For a summary of twentieth-century Brazilian strategic planning, see Frank, D. McCann, ‘The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil's Military Situation, 1900–1945’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol.25, no. 3 (08 1983), pp. 299–324. The works of Child and Pittman describe these factors also.Google Scholar

⁵ Robert N. Burr discovered a Brazil–Chile–Colombia alliance formed at various times during the nineteenth century in opposition to an Argentina–Peru axis. See his ‘The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay’, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 35 no. 1 (02 1975), pp. 37–60.Google Scholar

⁶ Curso Geopolítica Geral e do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Biblioteca do Exército, 1952).

⁷ Projeçāo Continental do Brasil (2nd edn, Sāo Paulo, Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935 ), Meira Mattos ascribes a particular scholarly debt and inspiration to Travassos, whose work represents to him ‘a unique labor of intellectual pioneerism’.Google ScholarProjeçāo Mundial do Brasil (Sāo Paulo, Gráfica Leal, 1960), p. 3. See also his praise of Travassos in Brasil: Geopolitica e Destino (Rio de Janeiro, Livraria José Olympio Editora,1975) pp. 52–3 (henceforth BGD).Google Scholar

⁸ Aspectos Geopolíticos do Brasil (Rio de Janeiros, Biblioteca do Exército, 1957)Google Scholar and Geopolítica do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, José Olympio Editora, 1967).Google Scholar

⁹ Howard Pittman considers Golbery the dominant geopolitical writer in Brazil during the 1950s and one whose ideas continued to influence national policies to the present. Yet he describes Meira Mattos as a ‘new phase’ in national strategic thought, where new themes arise beyond former preoccupations of frontier defense and internal development. ‘Geopolitics in the ABC Countries’, pp. 39–43, 47–52. Three additional Brazilian geopolitical writers, Meira Mattos' contemporaries, could be cited as contributing to various aspects of the General's publications: Lysias, A. Rodrigues, Geopolitica do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Biblioteca Militar, 1947);Google ScholarJayme, Ribeiro da Graça, A Geografia na Poitica Externa; Introduçāo à Geopolitica (Rio de Janeiro), Biblioteca do Exército, and Therezinha de Castro, Rumo à Antartica (Rio de Janeiro, Freitas Bastos, 1976), and O Brasil no Mundo Atual: Posicionamento e Diretrizes (Rio de Janeiro, Colégio Pedro II, 1982).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Pittman finds ‘both continuity and homogeneity [in Brazilian geopolitics] with one theorist building on the works of another in a type of logical progression. The reason for this seems to be widespread acceptance of certain national goals and aspirations accompanied by a continuing national will and desire to achieve them. Brazilian geopolitical thought has both civil and military authors; it is not exclusively a military affair.' See his ‘Geopolitics of the ABC Countries’, p. 57.

¹¹ For descriptions of the ESG and its impact see Roger Fontaine, W., Brazil and the United Slates: Towarda Maturing Relationship (Washington, D.C.), American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, pp. 80–92;Google Scholar and Alfred, Stepan, The Mililarj in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 245–7.Google Scholar

¹² Stepan, op. cit., pp. 236–45.

¹³ Clifford, A. Kiracofe Jr, ‘Brazil: An Emerging Strategic Factor in the Southern Atlantic’, Journal of Social and Political Studies, vol. 5, no. 3 (Fall 1980), p. 200.Google Scholar See also Pittman, op. cit. pp. 122–31 and Fontaine, op. cit. p. 82.

¹⁴ ‘Geopolitics and the ABC Countries’, p. 106.

¹⁵ See for example, Jordan, M. Young, ‘Brazil: World Power 2000?’ Intellect, vol. 105, no. 2384 (05 1977), p. 407.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Kiracofe, op. cit.. pp 211–12.

¹⁷ For an excellent review of current trends in Brazilian foreign policy see Riordan, Roett, ‘Brazil's International Relations in Perspective‘, Orbis, vol: 26, no. 1 (Spring 1982), pp. 257–67.Google Scholar

¹⁸ This inference is suggested by the author. The General, clearly pre-occupied with his country's several problems and opportunities, devotes very little space to East–West questions. No references are made to Cuba, Vietnam, East Europe, Central America, or other Cold War trouble areas. Only within the realist context of international politics (as noted below) does Meira Mattos express his preference for western ideology, and he does this quite sparingly.

¹⁹ Carlos, de Meira Mattos, Geopoiltica e Tropicos (Rio de Janeiro, Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1984), pp. 155–7.Google Scholar In addition to military and academic achievement, Meira Mattos likewise possesses political acumen, for Ronald Schneider describes the General as a close friend and ‘key military aide’ to President Castello Branco (1964–8) and as an 'officer who would be entrusted with at least one very sensitive [political] task during each of the ensuing four years' of the president's term. The Political. System of Brazil: Emergence of a ‘Modernizing’ Authoritarian Regime. 1964–1970 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 247.Google Scholar

²⁰ In his analysis of realism and power, Meira Mattos is particularly influenced by Hans Morganthau. Morganthau's famous six principles of realism are carefully examined in A Geopolitica e as Projecões do Poder (Rio de Janeiro, Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1977), pp. 60–3 (henceforth GPP), in addition to elements of national power, spheres of influence, and balance-of-power doctrines. None the less, Meira Mattos only enlists Morganthau, and to a lesser extent Nicholas Spykman and other realists, in formulating a general framework of politics. Once formed, Meira Mattos assuredly is on his own turf in the geopolitical formulas he prescribes for Brazil.Google Scholar

²¹ For example, the General labels Brazil the ‘bastion of the free world' and a ‘citadel of democracy’ because the country's strategic northeast salient will continue to be used by American forces in military crossings to North Africa when dangers arise from the Eurasian landmass (BGD, p. 74).Google Scholar In another instance, Meira Mattos calls for U.S. military assistance for securing the South Atlantic, suggesting that Soviet blockade of oil supply lines ‘would paralyze NATO, the principal instrument against the Soviet Union’. ‘Estratégia Militar Brasileira’, A Defesa Nacional, No. 673, 3° Trimestre (1973) p. 8. Other passages which reflect his preference for western democracy in contrast to Marxism are found in his GPP, pp. 9–60,Google Scholar and BGD, p. 73.Google Scholar

²² Adopted from, and with additions to, a similar approach by Ray, Cline, World Power Assessment – A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Washington D.C., Georgetown University, 1975).Google Scholar The several aspects of the General's formula are not operationalized and consequently the results are rough estimates, not precise comparisons. Meira Mattos accepts the ESG national power definition which stipulates power as ‘the integrated expression of all capacities which a nation possesses at a considered moment for promoting internally and externally the achievement of national objectives, in spite of whatever challenges to it’. A Geopolitica e as Projeçñes do Poder, p. 129.Google Scholar

²³ Geopoliticae Trópicos, pp. 101–18. This theme is frequently stated throughout the writings of Meira Mattos.Google Scholar

²⁴ GPP, p. 38. Realists commonly separately define morality of individuals and morality of states, contending that joining the two levels of analysis under one system of ethics is not possible. Rather, the ultimate morality of the state, to Meira Mattos, ‘is, above all, to defend the interests of the nation’ (p. 59).Google Scholar

²⁵ GPP, pp. 31, 16–17, 54–5.

²⁶ GPP, p. 50.

²⁷ BGD, pp. 88, 205–7, and GPP, p. 30. In these instances the General acknowledges his debt to the writings of the British historian Arnold Toynbee.

²⁸ BGD, pp. 101–2.

²⁹ GPP, 54–5, 102–3.

³⁰ BGD, pp. 4–6. For realism as a model for geopolitics, see Sigmund Neumann, ‘Comparative Politics: A Half-Century Appraisal’, in Louis, J. Canton, Comparative Political Systems (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1974), pp. 14–19.Google Scholar

³¹ BGD, p. 4, and GPP, p. 15.

³² GPP, pp. 105–6. Meira Mattos can be labeled a geopolitical ‘strategist’ in this regard. According to Ladis Kristof, strategists ‘plead for specific policies and strategies which they consider imperative given the geographical factors and certain developments in international politics and military technology’. They are involved with considerations of space, national power potentials, distributions of raw materials and population, strategic routes, and the like. See his ‘Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics’, pp. 37–8.

³³ BGD, pp. 7, 9–12, 40.

³⁴ BGD, pp. 13–18, 71.

³⁵ Ibid. pp. 21–1.

³⁶ BGD, 39–40.

³⁷ Ibid. pp. 8–9, 19–20.

³⁸ The General believes that vast space gives its inhabitants a ‘highly optimistic spirit, and a vocation for great political, economic, and social enterprises.… providing a formidable state potential. We Brazilians feel this well.’ ‘Aspectos Geopolfticos do Nosso Território’, Boletim Geográfico (02 1952), pp. 48–9.Google Scholar

³⁹ See, for example, Geopolitica e Trópicos, especially pp. 3–6, 129–137.

⁴⁰ GPP, p. 102. The reference to saci-pererê in this passage is to a small one-legged negro in Brazilian folklore who pesters wayfarers at night or sets traps for them.

⁴¹ GPP, p. 94.

⁴² BGD, pp. 71–3.

⁴³ GPP, p. 143. Elsewhere, the General writes: ‘This Brazilian extension of power into the international scope represents a geographical extension of national interests which ought to correspond to an amplification of strategic responsibilities.’ ‘Estratégia Militar Brasileira – Reflexões’. A Defesa Nacional, no. 673 (3 Trimestre 1977), p. 7. See also his Doutrina Política de Potência.

⁴⁴ BGD, p. 75. In this respect, he adds: ‘Brazil's destiny is conditioned by both continental and maritime influences.’ GPP, p. 105.

⁴⁵ GPP, p. 142.

⁴⁶ ‘Estratégia Militar Brasileira – Reflexões’, pp. 8–9.

⁴⁷ GPP, pp. 119–23.

⁴⁸ GPP, p. 122, and ‘Estratégia Militar Brasileira – Reflexões’, p. 8.

⁴⁹ BGD, p. 76, GPP, p. 122, and ‘Estratégia Militar Brasileira – Reflexões’, p. 8.

⁵⁰ BGD, pp. 75–76. Meira Mattos writes that ‘rockets’ aimed toward Brazil from Africa could be set up, posing a serious defense liability.

⁵¹ ‘O Brasil e o Despertar Aro-Asiático’, A Defesa Nacional (06 1960), pp. 114–18, in Fontaine, pp. 84–5.Google Scholar

⁵² ‘Portugal na Africa’, A Defesa Nacional (01–02 1962), pp. 63–5,Google Scholar and an editorial article in Boletim de Informações (07 1961), pp. 19–21, both from Fontaine, op. cit. pp. 85–6.Google Scholar

⁵³ Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazõnica, pp. 93, 136, 145–6. See also his ‘La Revolución y Ia Geopolírica de lntegración Nacional’, Eslrategia, no. 1 (03–04 1973), pp. 65–6,Google Scholar and ‘Aspecros Geopoliticos do Nosso TerritOrio’, pp. 48–9. In the latter source, Meira Mattos quotes statistics which maintain the Brazilian frontier could hold over a billion inhabitants.

⁵⁴ ‘O Poder Militar e a Politica Internacional’, Revista Brasileira de Politica Inlernacional, nos. 63–4, 2° semestre no. 73, pp. 63–80. See also ‘Aspectos GeopolIticos do Nosso Território’, p. 49, Fontain, op. cit. p. 82. and Schneider, op. cit. p. 252.

⁵⁵ Uma Geopoihica Pan-Amazõnica, pp. 148, 166. The General refers in this respect to Backheuser's ‘continentality quotient’, which measures territorial borders with maritime frontiers and reveals that an ‘interior impulse’ is capable of cutting the ‘umbilical cord’ of coastal dependence (p. 161).

⁵⁶ ‘La Revolución y la Geopolítica de Integración Nacional’, p. 67 GPP, p. 15. Because Brazil possesses insuflcient quantities of oil, Meira Mattos states the necessity for energy sources from nuclear power, utilized for peaceful purposes. BGD, pp. 89–99, and Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica, p. 141. He is quite critical of the Carter administration's attempt to restrict nuclear fuel and technology from Brazil, which would have kept his country in an ‘inferior position’ to developed northern states had it succeeded.

⁵⁷ Uma Geopolílica Pan-Amazônica, pp. 126, 131–4, 169 and GPP, p. 92.

⁵⁸ Uma Geopolílica Pan-A mazônica, p. 139, Brazil's traditional foreign policy has been to seek peaceful ties with neighbors, and although the nation's frontiers expanded westward and northward in past centuries, Brazil currently suffers no major border controversy. Meira Matros is hinting in this passage of alleged attempts in the early 1970s to isolate Brazil from the Spanish American world. Adroit Brazilian dipomacy and United States reverses in Middle American reversed this trend and brought Amazon nations including Peru and Venezuela into the Amazon Pact, which is designed for the basin's joint development. See Robert, D. Bond, ‘Venezuela, Brazil, and the Amazon Basin’, Orbis, vol. 22, no. 3 (Fall 1978), 635–50.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Uma Geopolítica Pan-A mazônica, pp. 22, 136–7, and GPP, Pp. 143–4.

⁶⁰ Uma Geopolítica Pan-A mazônica, especially pp. 141–58. See also Smith, N. J. H., Rainforest Corridors. The Transamazon Coloniztion Scheme (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982), pp. 12–13, for the close similarities between the General's suggestions and the actual direction taken by the government for establishing transportation, communications, and colonization networks.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Initiated by Brazil, the Treaty provides for the free navigation of rivers in the Amazon basin, coordination of communication and transportation systems, protection of flora and fauna, promotion of scientific and technological research, rational use of water resources, and advancement of improved health conditions and of tourism. The Pact is not an integration venture and does not provide for either a supranational organization or transnational development projects.

⁶² Uma Geopolítica Pan-A mazônica, pp. 161–7; also pp. 146 and 175. These points likewise are firmly stressed in the General's latest book, Geopolítica e Trópicos (1984).

⁶³ For a survey of debates concerning Amazonian development, see Gross, A. R.' reviewarticle, ‘Getting to the Frontier: Recent Books on the Development of the Brazilian Amazon’, The Journal of Development Studies, vol. 16 (10 1979), pp. 99–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁴ Toynbee, in fact, provides a negative challenge–response appraisal of the Brazilian jungle when he writes: ‘The equatorial sector [of Brazil including the Amazonian watershed] is not stimulating but positively relaxing, and the optimum climatic area – in the sense of the area in which the challenge of physical environment evokes the most effective human response [for the Atlantic side of South America] begins south of the zoth parallel and is nearer to its best in the neighborhood of the Rio de Ia Plata than in the neighbourhood of the Tropic of Capricorn.’ A Study of History, vol. 11 (London), Oxford University Press, pp. 296–7.Google Scholar