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Salvador Allende and Argentine Military Rule: Domestic Politics, Geopolitical Factors and Transnational Dimensions, 1970–3

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2023

María José Henríquez  and
Beatriz Figallo
María José Henríquez*
Affiliation:
Universidad de Chile – Instituto de Estudios Internacionales
Beatriz Figallo
Affiliation:
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Argentina
*
*Corresponding author. Email: mjhenriq@uchile.cl
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Abstract

The 1970 election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile gained international attention, as a declared Marxist came to power through elections, offering an alternative to Castro's Cuba. In Argentina, governed by a right-wing dictatorship, the initial fear was transformed into a policy of rapprochement. In the midst of the Cold War, the historical Argentine–Brazilian rivalry was stronger than both military regimes' anti-communism. General Alejandro Lanusse decided to support Allende's Chile to balance Brazil's influence, but also as a way to control the domestic repercussions of Allende's victory, especially the rise of revolutionary slogans and the circulation of guerrillas. This article traces the network of national, international and transnational factors that influenced a surprising bilateral relationship.

Salvador allende y el régimen militar argentino: política interna, factores geopolíticos y dimensiones transnacionales, 1970–3

Salvador Allende y el régimen militar argentino: Política interna, factores geopolíticos y dimensiones transnacionales, 1970–3

La elección de Salvador Allende como presidente de Chile en 1970 ganó atención internacional, ya que un declarado marxista llegó al poder por vía electoral, ofreciendo una alternativa a la Cuba de Castro. En Argentina, gobernada por una dictadura de derecha, el temor inicial se transformó en una política de aproximación. En plena Guerra Fría, la histórica rivalidad argentino-brasileña fue más fuerte que el anticomunismo de ambos regímenes militares. El general Alejandro Lanusse decidió apoyar al Chile de Allende para equilibrar la influencia de Brasil, pero también como una manera de controlar las repercusiones internas de la victoria de Allende, especialmente el aumento de consignas revolucionarias y circulación de guerrilleros. Este artículo rastrea el entramado de factores nacionales, internacionales y transnacionales que influyeron una sorprendente relación bilateral.

Salvador allende e o regime militar argentino: política interna, fatores geopolíticos e dimensões transnacionais, 1970–3

Salvador Allende e o regime militar argentino: Política interna, fatores geopolíticos e dimensões transnacionais, 1970–3

A eleição de Salvador Allende como presidente do Chile em 1970 ganhou atenção internacional, quando um marxista declarado chegou ao poder por meio de eleições, oferecendo uma alternativa à Cuba de Castro. Na Argentina, governada por uma ditadura de direita, o medo inicial se transformou em política de aproximação. Em plena Guerra Fria, a histórica rivalidade argentino–brasileira era mais forte do que o anticomunismo de ambos os regimes militares. O general Alejandro Lanusse decidiu apoiar o Chile de Allende para equilibrar a influência do Brasil, mas também como forma de controlar as repercussões internas da vitória de Allende, especialmente a ascensão de slogans revolucionários e circulação de guerrilheiros. Este artigo traça a rede de fatores nacionais, internacionais e transnacionais que influenciaram uma surpreendente relação bilateral.

Keywords

military dictatorshipUnidad Popular (Chile)Salvador AllendeAlejandro Lanusseguerrilla movementsLatin American Cold Wardictadura militarUnidad Popular (Chile)Salvador AllendeAlejandro Lanussemovimientos guerrillerosGuerra Fría Latinoamericanaditadura militarUnidad Popular (Chile)Salvador AllendeAlejandro Lanussemovimentos de guerrilhaGuerra Fria Latinoamericana
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 55 , Issue 2 , May 2023 , pp. 241 - 265
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

1 The UP was an alliance formed by the Partido Comunista, Partido Radical and Partido Socialista (Communist, Radical and Socialist parties) and three lesser groupings, the Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (Movement of Unified Popular Action, MAPU), a left-wing party that broke away from the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party) in 1969, the Partido Social Demócrata (Social Democratic Party) and Acción Popular Independiente (Independent Popular Action). The shared programme had to satisfy moderate sectors as well as the most radical currents of socialism.

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13 Harmer, Allende's Chile, p. 31.

14 Pierre-Yves Saunier, Transnational History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 130–1.

15 Juan Bautista Yofré, Misión argentina en Chile: 1970–1973 (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2000), pp. 74–5.

16 James Brennan and Mónica Gordillo, ‘Working Class Protest, Popular Revolt, and Urban Insurrection in Argentina: The 1969 Cordobazo’, Journal of Social History, 27: 3 (1994), pp. 477–98.

17 Liliana de Riz, Historia Argentina: La política en suspenso, 1966–1976 (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2007), p. 86.

18 Robert A. Potash, El Ejército y la política en la Argentina, 1962–1973: De la caída de Frondizi a la restauración peronista, vol. 2: 1966–1973 (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1994), pp. 170–4.

19 Confidential communication, Ambassador to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (hereafter MRE), 27 Oct. 1970, Archivo Histórico Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile (hereafter AHMRECH), Vol. 1744, N° 1557/131.

20 Driven by the Partido Comunista (Communist Party), that electoral alliance brought together disparate sectors of socialistas (socialists), peronistas (peronists), radicales (radicals), popular organisations, movements for the defence of public liberties, and independent personalities. Gonzalo de Amézola, ‘La izquierdización de los moderados: Partidos políticos tradicionales entre 1970 y comienzos de 1971 en Argentina’, Signos Históricos, 7: 14 (2005), pp. 74–107.

21 Confidential communication, Business Attaché to MRE, 9 Feb. 1971, AHMRECH, Vol. 1778, N° 220/18.

22 Fermín Chávez and Armando Puente, Visitantes de Juan Perón: Década 1963–1973 (Buenos Aires: Instituto Nacional Juan Domingo Perón, 2010), p. 361. It would not have been Allende's first visit to see Perón: the Spanish ambassador in Buenos Aires mentions a previous one. Confidential communication to the Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (hereafter MAE), N° 500, 22 May 1964, Archivo Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de España (hereafter AMAE), R. 7537/47.

23 Tim Weiner, Legado de cenizas: La historia de la CIA (Madrid: Debate, 2007).

24 Sebastián Hurtado, ‘El golpe que no fue: Eduardo Frei, la Democracia Cristiana y la elección presidencial de 1970’, Estudios Públicos, 129 (Summer 2013), pp. 105–40.

25 ‘Revelaciones de una historia sobre la Central de Espionaje de Estados Unidos: Cuando Lanusse se negó a colaborar en la caída de Salvador Allende’, Clarín, 8 Feb. 2009.

26 Harmer, Allende's Chile, p. 143.

27 ‘El general Lanusse consulta con Washington y Lima’, Madrid, 14 Sept. 1970.

28 Harmer, Allende's Chile, p. 143.

29 Yofré, Misión argentina en Chile, p. 78.

30 Fermandois, Chile y el mundo, 1970–1973, p. 123.

31 Encrypted cable, Embassy to MRE, 23 Dec. 1970, Archivo Histórico de Cancillería de la República Argentina (hereafter AHCRA), Fondo E, N° 965.

32 Strictly confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 24 Feb. 1971, AHMRECH, Vol. 1778, N° 279/27.

33 Madrid, 14 Sept. 1970, p. 7.

34 The ELN–B was created by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara in the Bolivian highlands on 25 March 1967, with the aim of developing a guerrilla foco that would spread the revolution throughout South America. See Aldo Marchesi, ‘“El llanto en tu nombre es una gran traición”: Lecturas políticas y emocionales de la muerte de Ernesto Guevara en el Cono Sur (1967–1968)’, Políticas de la Memoria, 18 (Dec. 2018), p. 130. On the Elenos, see Pedro Valdés Navarro, El compromiso internacionalista: El Ejército de Liberación Nacional. Los elenos chilenos 1966–1971. Formación e identidad (Santiago: LOM, 2018), p. 15. The Elenos (the ELN's Chilean section) were, in the majority, members of the Socialist Party. They formed the core of Allende's first security group, during the 1970 presidential campaign. Among them was Salvador Allende's daughter, Beatriz. See Tanya Harmer, Beatriz Allende: A Revolutionary Life in Cold War Latin America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2020). The ideas of a rural guerrilla under the responsibility of military cadres, a popular army and the creation of the conditions for a successful uprising were laid out in various texts by Guevara and popularised by Régis Debray in his book ¿Revolución en la revolución? (1966).

35 Eduardo Labarca, Salvador Allende, biografía sentimental (Santiago: Catalonia, 2007), p. 226.

36 Secret cable, Embassy to MRE, 24 Dec. 1970, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0033, N° 972.

37 Secret cable, Embassy to MRE, 28 Dec. 1970, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0033, N° 977.

38 Secret cable, Embassy to MRE, 28 Dec. 1970, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0033, N° 978/979/980.

39 Encrypted cable, Embassy to MRE, 28 Dec. 1970, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0033, N° 983.

40 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 28 Jan. 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 27.

41 A minister counsellor is a diplomatic corps official belonging to the Argentine Foreign Service, who may replace the ambassador when absent.

42 Secret memorandum, 26 Feb. 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027.

43 Ibid. The MIR, founded in 1965, was a Chilean revolutionary group of political and social action, opposed to the traditional Left. The young members, more radicalised, prevailed at the end of 1967, putting an end to the heterogeneity of the group and becoming a reference point for the radical, extra-parliamentary and revolutionary Chilean Left. The VOP was a Chilean armed group of the extreme Left that represented the insurrectionary path towards socialism. It was created in 1968 when it separated from the MIR because it was considered bourgeois.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Carlos Sandoval Ambiado, MIR (una historia) (Santiago: Sociedad Editorial Trabajadores, 1990), p. 35.

49 Secret memorandum, Ambassador to MRE, 11 Feb. 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 50.

50 Ibid.

51 Labarca, Salvador Allende, biografía sentimental, pp. 208–9.

52 Communication, Ambassador to MRE, 3 June 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 217.

53 Cristián Pérez, Vidas revolucionarias (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria – Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP), 2013), pp. 113–14.

54 Cristián Pérez, ‘Salvador Allende, apuntes sobre su dispositivo de seguridad: El Grupo de Amigos del Presidente (GAP)’, Estudios Públicos, 79 (Winter 2000), p. 55.

55 Aldo Marchesi, Hacer la revolución: Guerrillas latinoamericanas, de los años sesenta a la caída del muro (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2019), pp. 132–3.

56 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 17 March 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 110.

57 Robinson Rojas, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas’, Causa ML, N° 21, July–Aug. 1971.

58 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 17 March 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 110.

59 Ibid.

60 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 17 May 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 185.

61 Bayron Velásquez, ‘La Organa y la escuela de guerrilla de Chaihuín (1968–1970): Leninización y guevarización del socialismo chileno’, Izquierdas, 49 (April 2020), p. 426.

62 Ibid, pp. 428–9.

63 Secret memorandum, 26 Feb. 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027.

64 Ibid. ‘Momio’ is a pejorative term used in Chile to refer to right-wing persons.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 17 March 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 110.

68 Joaquín Fermandois, La revolución inconclusa: La izquierda chilena y el gobierno de la Unidad Popular (Santiago de Chile: CEP, 2013), p. 111.

69 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 17 March 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 110.

70 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 18 March 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 116.

71 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 24 March 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 120.

72 Confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 14 May 1973, AHMRECH; quoted in Fermandois and León, ‘¿Antinomia entre democracia y gobierno militar’, pp. 135–6.

73 Alejandro A. Lanusse, Mi testimonio (Buenos Aires: Lasserre, 1977), p. 240.

74 Mario Rapoport and Graciela Sánchez Cimetti, ‘Luis María de Pablo Pardo: Un ideal geopolítico y la ruptura de las fronteras ideológicas, 1970–1972’, in Mario Rapoport (et al.), Historia oral de la política exterior argentina (1966–2016) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Octubre, 2016), pp. 357–89.

75 ‘Las ideas, la guerra y el estilo’, Panorama, 225, 17 Aug. 1971.

76 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 30 March 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 125. We have not yet found further sources that corroborate this communication. Nevertheless, it is plausible given the movement to Argentina of Chileans opposed to Allende.

77 Ibid.

78 Confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 20 May 1971, AHMRECH, Vol. 1779, N° 773/117.

79 Bruno Fornillo, ‘Centralidad y permanencia del pensamiento geopolítico en la historia reciente de Sudamérica (1944–2015)’, Estudios Sociales del Estado, 1: 2 (2015), pp. 124–5.

80 Panorama, 106, 6–12 May 1969.

81 Republic of Argentina, Law N° 18.814, 14 Oct. 1970.

82 La Nación, 13 July 1971.

83 Communication, Ambassador to MRE, 2 June 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 214.

84 The Paris Club, created gradually from 1956, is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries.

85 Report on Chile, 23 Oct. 1972, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0028.

86 The Integration Commission was created by the Joint Declaration of Presidents Onganía and Frei on 10 Jan. 1970. Its mission was to coordinate and promote physical integration projects, especially the improvement of roads and border crossings. Samuel Fernández, ‘La integración de Chile y Argentina, un largo proceso en marcha’, Revista Chilena de Derecho, 17: 2 (1990), p. 376.

87 Confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 6 Aug. 1971, AHMRECH, Vol. 1779, N° 1175/174.

88 ‘Use of river and lake waters shall always be done in an equitable and reasonable way’, in Fermandois, Chile y el mundo, 1970–1973, p. 126.

89 Primera Plana, 440, 6 July 1971.

90 Ibid.

91 Confidential communication, Business Attaché to MRE, 19 Oct. 1971, AHMRECH, Vol. 1780, N° 1579/226.

92 Fermandois, Chile y el mundo, 1970–1973, p. 126.

93 Análisis, 541, 27 July–2 Aug. 1971. The ALALC came into existence in 1960, with the purpose of creating a free-trade zone, with complementarity agreements in some industrial fields and the harmonisation of economic policies.

94 Rafael Pedemonte, ‘Desafiando la bipolaridad: La independencia diplomática del gobierno democratacristiano en Chile y su acercamiento con el “mundo socialista” (1964–1970)’, Estudos Ibero-americanos, 44: 1 (2018), pp. 186–99.

95 Confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 6 Aug. 1971, AHMRECH, Vol. 1779, N° 1175/174.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Ramiro Sánchez, Brasil en Bolivia: Lecciones de un golpe militar (Santiago: Librería y Ediciones Letras, 1972), pp. 34–5.

99 Confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 25 Aug. 1971, AHMRECH, Vol. 1780, N° 1269/184.

100 Secret memorandum, Latin American Department to General Directorate of Politics, 9 Sept. 1971, N° 323, AHCRA, 863.

101 Strictly secret communication, Secretary for State Information to MRE, 23 Dec. 1971, AHCRA, 863.

102 See Clara Aldrighi and Guillermo Waksman, Tupamaros exiliados en el Chile de Allende: 1970–1973 (Montevideo: Mastergraf, 2015).

103 See Luis Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Fórmula para el caos: La caída de Salvador Allende (1970–1973) (Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 2011).

104 Memorandum, Argentine Embassy, 19 July 1972, AHCRA, Fondo América del Sur, N° 19.

105 Letter, Under-Secretary of Foreign Trade to Under-Secretary for International Economic Relations, 28 Sept. 1972, AHCRA, Fondo América del Sur, AH/0019, N° 45/72.

106 Confidential communication, Business Attaché to MRE, 19 Oct. 1971, AHMRECH, Vol. 1780, N° 1579/226. The ‘Brazilian miracle’ logged a growth rate of 14 per cent of GDP in 1973. Benefitting from the size of the internal market and regional expansion, the strategy was to increase the supply of goods and services with aggressive industrialisation policies and investment in infrastructure financed from external debt. One of the model conditions was that the strong state intervention held wages down and prohibited strikes. See Jeffry A. Frieden, ‘The Brazilian Borrowing Experience: From Miracle to Debacle and Back’, Latin American Research Review, 22: 1 (1987), pp. 95–131.

107 Panorama, 225, 17 Aug. 1971.

108 In 1971 President Allende's government nationalised the partly US-owned copper companies that made up the large copper mining sector. This move gave rise to a sharp conflict between Chile and US companies. See Carlos Fortin, ‘Compensating the Multinationals: Chile and the United States Copper Companies’, Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, 7: 1 (1975), pp. 23–9.

109 Confidential communication, Business Attaché to MRE, 19 Oct. 1971, AHMRECH, Vol. 1780, N° 1579/226.

110 Fermandois, Chile y el mundo, 1970–1973, pp. 128–30.

111 Marcelo Sánchez Abarca, ‘La visita de Fidel y sus efectos políticos: ¿Polarización, disputa o solidaridad en el Socialismo Latinoamericano?’, Pacarina del Sur, 12: 45 (Oct.–Dec. 2020).

112 Confidential communication, Business Attaché to MRE, 19 Oct. 1971, AHMRECH, Vol. 1780, N° 1579/226.

113 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 17 May 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 185.

114 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 22 July 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 295.

115 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 7 Sept. 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 179.

116 Secret communication, Business Attaché to MRE, 26 Aug. 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 357.

117 Restricted communication, Ambassador to MRE, 15 Sept. 1971, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0027, N° 400.

118 Secret memorandum N° 354, 21 Sept. 1971, AHCRA, General Directorate of Politics, Fondo E, AH/0018.

119 Communication, Foreign Ministry to President of the Republic, 10 Feb. 1972, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0050. The government committee consisted of the under-secretary of foreign relations, José María Ruda; the director general of politics, Ambassador Guillermo de la Plaza; the secretary of the embassy, Ernesto Malpede; and the head of the SIE, Capt. (Rt.) Carlos Viganó.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid. Appendix 2.

122 Ibid. Appendix 3.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Félix Peña, ‘El Grupo Andino: Un nuevo enfoque de la participación internacional de los países en desarrollo’, Estudios Internacionales, 6: 22 (1973), pp. 44–81.

126 Hal Brands, Latin America's Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 134.

127 María Cecilia Míguez, ‘Argentina y el Pacto Andino en la década de 1970: Política interna y relaciones internacionales’, Ciclos en la historia, la economía y la sociedad, 52: 1 (2019), pp. 33–62.

128 CORFO is a state body created in 1939, responsible for promoting industrial activity.

129 Memorandum, FIAT Concord to MRE, 9 Aug. 1972, AHCRA, Fondo América del Sur, AH/0019.

130 Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, ‘Pacto Andino y libre comercio’, Estudios Internacionales, 10: 38 (1977), p. 8.

131 Ernesto Tironi, ‘La Decisión 24 sobre capitales extranjeros en el Grupo Andino’, Estudios Internacionales, 10: 38 (1977), p. 20.

132 Other companies interested in the CORFO approach included Nissan, Scania-Bavis, Berliet, Mercedes Benz, BLM, Mercedes Argentina, Chrysler Argentina and Pegaso.

133 Memorandum N° 19, Report on Meeting of the Special Commission on Argentine–Chilean Coordination, July 1972, AHCRA, Fondo América del Sur, AH/0019.

134 FIAT Concord memorandum, 9 Aug. 1972, AHCRA, Fondo América del Sur, AH/0019.

135 Henríquez, ¡Viva la verdadera amistad!, pp. 130–6.

136 Confidential communication, Business Attaché to MRE, 8 Feb. 1972, AHMRECH, Vol. 1806, N° 162/27.

137 Communication, Latin American Department to General Directorate of Politics, 16 Aug. 1972, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0028.

138 Fermandois, Chile y el mundo, 1970–1973, p. 129.

139 Martín Gaudencio, Interceptado en Trelew (Buenos Aires: Imago Mundi, 2011), p. 203.

140 ¿Qué Pasa?, 72, 31 Aug. 1972, p. 7.

141 See María Cecilia Míguez and Jorge Núñez, ‘La fuga del Penal de Rawson, la Masacre de Trelew y las relaciones bilaterales entre Argentina y Chile: Tensiones y acercamientos durante la dictadura de Lanusse (agosto 1972)’, Prohistoria: Historias, políticas de la historia, 33 (June 2020), pp. 203–31.

142 ¿Qué Pasa?, 72, p. 9.

143 Sepúlveda, Alfredo, La Unidad Popular: Los mil días de Salvador Allende y la vía chilena al Socialismo (Santiago: Penguin Random House, 2020), pp. 121–32Google Scholar.

144 Secret communication, Business Attaché to MRE, 28 Aug. 1972, AHCRA, Fondo E, AH/0040, N° 424.

145 Ibid.

146 ‘La masacre condenó a la extradición’, Chile Hoy, 11, 25–31 Aug. 1972.

147 Lanusse, Mi testimonio, pp. 303–26.

148 Strictly confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 5 Sept. 1972, AHMRECH, Vol. 1807, N° 1157/234.

149 Confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 8 Sept. 1972, AHMRECH, Vol. 1807, N° 1177/236.

150 ¿Qué Pasa?, 76, 28 Sept. 1972, p. 8.

151 Marco Antonio Sandoval Mercado, La Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR): El internacionalismo proletario del Cono Sur, 1972–1977, Master's thesis, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico City, 2016, p. 46.

152 Marchesi, Hacer la revolución, p. 144.

153 Very urgent secret telegram, Ambassador to MAE, N° 281, 7 Sept. 1972, AMAE, R. 10.432/1.

154 Strictly confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 12 March 1974, AHMRECH, N° 371/33.

155 Letter, Director General of International Foreign Relations to Ambassador, 23 Sept. 1972, AMAE, R. 10.432/1.

156 Secret telegram, Ambassador to MAE, N° 277, 5 Sept. 1972, AMAE, R. 10.432/1.

157 Míguez, ‘Argentina y el Pacto Andino’, p. 41.

158 Letter, Embassy to Under-Secretary for Foreign Trade, 21 Aug. 1973, AHCRA, Fondo América del Sur, AH/0019, N° 297.

159 Economic and Trade Relations, MRE, 4 June 1973, AHCRA, Fondo América del Sur, AH/0092.

160 Letter, Under-Secretary for Foreign Trade to Under-Secretary for International Economic Relations, 28 Sept. 1972, AHCRA, Fondo América del Sur, AH/0019.

161 Secret cable, Ambassador to MRE, 14 Oct. 1972, AHCRA, Fondo América del Sur, AH/0019, N° 992/993/994.

162 The list included 3,500 pick-up trucks, 1,000 trucks, as well as cars and vans, patrol cars, jeeps, buses, semi-trailers, ambulances, tractors, an electric train for the El Teniente mine, diesel engines and agricultural machinery. Economic and Trade Relations, MRE, 4 June 1973, AHCRA, Fondo América del Sur, AH/0092.

163 Confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 14 May 1973, AHMRECH, Vol. 1832, N° 627/91.

164 De Riz, Historia Argentina, p. 122.

165 Confidential communication, Ambassador to MRE, 15 March 1973, AHMRECH, Vol. 1832, N° 334/ 57.

166 Confidential communication, Business Attaché to MRE, 9 Oct. 1973, AHMRECH, Vol. 1833, N° 1814–191.

167 Joseph, ‘Border crossings’, p. 155.