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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 April 2015
This comment on Chaim Saiman's illuminating comparison between rabbinic and Christian approaches to religious texts that are in some sense authoritative focuses on what we can fairly infer from the sharp difference he describes. I believe there is much more to be said on this fascinating topic, and I now write with large gaps in my understanding of relevant subjects. I concentrate here on the question whether the Christian view that Professor Saiman describes actually has strong logical implications for what one should regard as desirable interpretive and legislative strategies for the (secular) law of large diverse societies. On that crucial point, I am more skeptical than Saiman appears to be.
I begin with a few preliminary observations, and then pose some other questions about connections between religious perspectives and views about ordinary legal interpretation before tackling my main topic.
1. Saiman, Chaim, Jesus' Legal Theory—A Rabbinic Reading, 23 J.L. & Religion 97 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2. I leave open whether it might be enough for either theorist to think an approach is sound as a matter of Jewish or Christian tradition, although not reflective of any transcendental relation between God and human beings.
3. Rom 7:6 (all Biblical citations are taken from the Jerusalem Bible).
4. Gal 5:14.
5. The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics and Human Nature vol. 1 (Witte, John Jr. & Alexander, Frank S. eds., Colum. U. Press 2006) (two volume work)Google Scholar [hereinafter Teachings of Modern Christianity vol. 1].
6. Although in my summary essay I noted that the theorists paid little attention to the subject of judicial decision, I failed to suggest that the manner of understanding and interpreting ordinary law might be affected by the antilegalism of many Christian views, which is something I probably would have done had I previously read Professor Saiman's essay. See Greenawalt, Kent, Reflections on Christian Jurisprudence, in Teachings of Modern Christianity vol. 1 Google Scholar, supra n. 5, at 715, 749-750.
7. See Saiman, supra n. 1, at 105-114.
8. Id. at 114-119.
9. Many scholars assume that the Gospels were composed in light of such assumptions about converts among early Christians, although I have not done the research necessary to support the view that this helps to explain the account of the disagreement with the Pharisees about the Sabbath. For those who think the Gospels, or this particular story, preceded any decision about admission of Gentiles, the story itself can be taken as one piece of evidence that conversions to Judaism were rightly not demanded.
10. Matt 5:38-40.
11. Matt5:31-32;19:7-9.
12. It is relevant here that Jews traditionally have not tried to convert others to Judaism, a stark variation from the typical Christian understanding about spreading Christianity.
13. For a fuller discussion of the limited place of purpose, see Levine, Samuel J., Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theo?: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 Hastings Const. L.Q. 441, 458–468 (1997)Google Scholar.
14. Waldron, Jeremy, “Dead to the Law:” Paul's Antinomianism, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 301 (2006)Google Scholar.
15. Id. at 304.
16. The law may even tell what it is to have a forbidden attitude. Paul uses “covet” as an example. Rom 7:7-8. I myself do not find this example persuasive. Perhaps I lack a sense of some of the nuances of “coveting,” but I think small children often covet each other's toys without any appreciation that that is wrong. Waldron gives us the more obvious example of learning about the prohibition on adultery. Waldron, supra n. 14, at 313.
17. Given that Waldron draws out his analysis from very brief remarks in Paul's letters, I wonder whether they would seem a useful vehicle to make his points, were it not for the familiarity for Christians of what Paul wrote.
18. See Waldron, supra n. 14, at 323-325 (referring to minute regulations governing police behavior, despite wide recognition that police do, and need to, exercise wide discretion “on the street”).
19. I do not know the extent to which Jewish communities within the Roman Empire at the time of Jesus could enforce their own law by coercion, and, more particularly, whether a failure to observe Sabbath requirements might have led to coercive sanctions.
20. One kind of causal relation could be that a person who rejects his or her religious upbringing would be inclined to adopt an interpretive strategy at variance with one the rejected religion would suggest.
