Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-g7rbq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-25T18:38:00.272Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Commentary: Double Effect—Intention is the Solution, Not the Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Daniel P. Sulmasy
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , Spring 2000 , pp. 26 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2000

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Nuccetelli, S. Seay, G., “Relieving Pain and Foreseeing Death: A Paradox About Accountability and Blame,” Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 28 (2000): 19–25.Google Scholar
Foot, P., “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978): At 24–25.Google Scholar
Cavanaugh, T., “The Ethics of Death-Hastening or Death-Causing Palliative Analgesic Administration to the Terminally Ill,” Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, 12 (1996): 248–54, at 248–50.Google Scholar
Kaczor, C., “Double-Effect Reasoning From Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer,” Theological Studies 59 (1998): 297–316.Google Scholar
Grisez, G.G., “Toward A Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 15 (1970): 64–96, at 78.Google Scholar
Bratman, M., Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987): At 154ff.Google Scholar
Sulmasy, D.P., Killing and Allowing to Die (1995) Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University (on file with UMI Dissertation Services, No. 9608827), at 397–399.Google Scholar
Boyle, J., “Who Is Entitled to Double Effect?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (1991): 475–94, at 478.Google Scholar
Anscombe, G.E.M., “Action, Intention, and Double Effect,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56 (1982): 12–25, at 18.Google Scholar
See Donagan, A., Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989): At 40–41, 51; Brand, M., Intending and Acting (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984): At 94–97, 122–26; Bratman, , id., at 1–22, 37, 60, 141; Searle, J., Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983): At 7–10, 35–36, 103–105; Gustafsen, D., Intention and Agency (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1986): At 44, 68.Google Scholar
Sulmasy, D.P., “The Use and Abuse of the Principle of Double Effect,” Clinical Pulmonary Medicine 3 (1996): 86–90.Google Scholar
Sulmasy, D.P. Pellegrino, E.D., “The Rule of Double-Effect: Clearing Up the Double Talk,” Archives of Internal Medicine 159 (1999): 545–550.Google Scholar