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Expectant Fathers, Abortion, and Embryos

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Dara E. Purvis
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Extract

Today, multiple legal theories of parenthood interact to encompass all sorts of families. Adults and children bound through adoption, step-parenting, and assisted reproductive technologies (ART) demand familial recognition through some combination of biology, functionality, technology, and intent.

In the context of children born through ART, many scholars have proposed a more robust use of intent as a rule for identifying legal parents. When used to identify parents, intent asks who planned to become the parent of a child, and is often helpful when multiple adults simultaneously agreed to bring a child into the world. For example, in the case of surrogacy, as many as five adults — two intended parents, a gestational surrogate, and both a sperm and egg donor — could all contribute to bringing a single child into the world. Not only does intent provide a practical answer to such modern parentage dilemmas, but it recognizes the often-minimized emotional investment of men who wish to be fathers.

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 43 , Issue 2 , Summer 2015 , pp. 330 - 340
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2015

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