^{Page 1 note 1} In January 1964 the Government of Kenya announced that it hoped to hold the elections for the seventh, the North-Eastern Regional Assembly, early in 1964. This Region contains many Somalis who boycotted the May 1963 election as part of their campaign to secede and join Somalia.

^{Page 2 note 1} There were 65 elective seats in all, 20 of them reserved to Asian, Arab, and European candidates in the ratio of 8: 2: 10, and 12 national members (in three groups: African, European, and Asian-Arab), co-opted by the 53 elected members. The numbers of official and nominated members fluctuated, and members ‘crossed the floor’ numerous times between 1961 and 1963, so that it is impossible to give a full party count which is valid for the whole period. K.A.N.U., however, was always the largest single group, and with three European and up to seven Asian allies its voting strength rose to more than 30 in early 1962.

^{Page 3 note 1} For a fuller summary of the formation of political parties, and in particular a study of the 1961 election, see The Kenyatla Election, by George Bennett and Carl Rosberg (Oxford, 1961).Google Scholar This covers the period up to May 1961 so well that it would be superfluous for us to dwell on it at greater length.

^{Page 6 note 1} He changed back to K.A.N.U. when A.P.P. would not nominate him as their official party candidate, and in the general election the figures were: Mathew Mutiso, A.P.P. 17,301 William Malu, Ind. 10,983 Esther Kimwele, K.A.N.U. 683

^{Page 6 note 2} Literally ‘the little person who belongs’, Kamwene is a term used to express Kikuyu tribal solidarity.

^{Page 7 note 1} The Land Freedom Army, which had first been heard of as a forest organisation in the early days of the Emergency, was also to be found on a small scale in the Central Region in 1962, but made little headway against the strong legitimate K.A.N.U. organisation there. Conditions in the Rift Valley, where many feared expulsion from the European-owned farms by the K.A.D.U.-controlled Regional Assembly, in the same way as they had been removed during the Emergency, were more fertile for L.F.A. growth. Its relationship with the Mau Mau freedom fighters who remained in the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests is not clear.

^{Page 10 note 1} Perham, Margery and Huxley, Elspeth, Race and Politics in Kenya (London, 1956), p. 350.Google Scholar

^{Page 12 note 1} Daily Nation (Nairobi), 24 09 1961.Google Scholar

^{Page 13 note 1} Report of the 1962 Kenya Constitutional Conference (London, 1962),Google Scholar Cmnd. 1700.

^{Page 16 note 1} The Fiscal Commission, in a table on page 14 of its report, had taken the 1962–3 estimates of expenditure and redistributed them as though the new apportionment it was recommending was already in operation. The table showed £19.7 million being spent by central government; £4 million by Nairobi area; £10 million by regional authorities; and £8.2 million by local authorities. These figures compare with the £32.6 million spent by central government and £9.4 million by local authorities under the system which in fact still prevailed. Report of the Fiscal Commission (Nairobi, 1963).Google Scholar

^{Page 16 note 2} Daily Nation, 6 May 1963.

^{Page 16 note 3} The only exception was in Nairobi Central, where Mboya was opposed by an A.P.P. Asian, Kanti Mandalia, who had a fair proportion of Asian votes amongst his 8,049.

^{Page 17 note 1} Mombasa Times, 14 May 1963.

^{Page 17 note 2} Ibid. 29 April 1963.

^{Page 20 note 1} Kenya Independence Conference (London, 1963), Cmnd. 2156, paras. 26—7.Google Scholar

^{Page 23 note 1} Nyangori location had a population two-thirds Nilo-Hamitic Terik and one-third Bantu Abaaluhya. In these two sections, however, each ethnic group had 50 per cent representation, although the Terik had first occupied the land. There has been sporadic violence in the area for the last three years, and neither side was satisfied with the Regional Boundaries decision to partition the location.

^{Page 24 note 1} It is just conceivable that, if the British had chosen instead to complete the wartime base at Mackinnon Road, near Mombasa, and to negotiate for a coastal enclave including harbour facilities—a mixture of the Simonstown naval agreement with South Africa and the military agreement with Cyprus—an independent Kenya might have agreed to this. But Kahawa was too conspicuously central.

^{Page 24 note 2} Kenya Weekly News, 21 July 1961.

^{Page 33 note 1} Sunday Post (Nairobi), 10 03 1963.Google Scholar

^{Page 39 note 1} Thirty-five per Cent go to the regions, and six per Cent to the Raisman ‘distributable pool’, by which Uganda and Tanganyika receive fiscal compensation for Kenya's disproportionate benefits gained from the East African common market.

^{Page 40 note 1} The figure of £4 million is the estimate of a senior Treasury official, who rejected K.A.D.U. politicians's estimates £10 million. The loss of this revenue is a more serious blow to Kenya's economy than the departure of 1,000 or more white farmers, many of whom made only small profits from their farms, or the retirement of British officials, who did not spend lavishly in Kenya but preferred to save money for overseas expenditure.